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Abstract.
Court advocacy in England and Wales, and the United States, has, over the last three 
centuries, been very fluid and remains so. It certainly did not develop according to an over­
riding logical plan, but has grown piecemeal and at an uneven pace, the result of a complex 
interplay of many influences. An attempt is made to identify as many of these, 
chronologically, as possible. A non exhaustive list of principal factors , the relative 
importance of each has varied over time, includes: the effect on juniors of successful 
styles and approaches used by senior advocates; judicial tastes for the advocacy of lawyers, 
especially in the absence of jurors, when it is usually for the practical and the unadorned; 
changes in court procedure made by judges; reforms in the law of evidence concerning who 
and what may be put before courts and informing the content of submissions made; 
alterations in civil and criminal procedure and in the substantive law; the amount of media 
reporting of court cases; public and press opinion about the acceptable limits of advocates’ 
tactics and oratory; the forming, by advocates, of professional rules of conduct and how much 
they are followed; levels of respect and civility between the bench and the bar; the standing of 
the judiciary and its power to control proceedings in court; the extent to which juries are used 
in trials and the social origins of those serving on them; greater education of jurors and less 
susceptibility by them to melodramatic appeals to emotion; awareness by advocates that in 
addressing juries they have to take into account contemporary use of language and , when 
making allusions, draw on popular culture, itself far fi-om still, formed by newspapers, novels, 
radio, films, television and increasingly the computer internet; the school educational 
curriculum, which has substantially evolved, usually received by lawyers and judges; general 
styles of public speaking and discourse in society; the formal teaching of advocacy, only 
introduced comparatively recently; and a relationship, although not a simplistic one, between 
quality of advocacy and the amount parties and the state are prepared to pay for it. New 
technology will, very probably, exert a strong influence on future forensic oratory. Recent 
widening of the pool of advocates may also be important.
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Introduction and structure.
Few comprehensive histories exist on how courtroom advocacy has evolved in this 
country and about the important factors that have shaped it. This may be partly because 
advocacy in court is usually regarded by its practitioners as an intensely practical 
activity, firmly anchored in immediate concerns. Nonetheless, an attempt can be made to 
trace how advocacy has changed, to examine some of the influences on its development and 
to consider what may well affect it in the future. In this thesis “advocacy”, truly the art of 
make believe, is meant to encompass: what advocates may say, much governed by laws, 
procedure, professional rules and etiquette; the manner in which they say it, comprising many 
factors, but based ultimately on a desire to persuade, and who says it, predominantly in the 
past barristers and now increasingly also solicitors, legal executives and others. Central to this 
thesis is an attempt to answer the question why has advocacy in court changed over the period 
studied?
After setting out the methodology employed in this thesis, a historical examination of 
advocacy commences (Chapter One) with the roughness and uncouthness of much Tudor and
Stuart advocacy, and the timid reserve which to some extent replaced it in the late 17* 
Century. These aspects began to be displaced by the greater eloquence of distinguished 18* 
Century judges and barristers - very likely themselves responding to greater refinements in 
the English language and awareness amongst the educated of its possibilities to persuade. 
Growing knowledge amongst the higher echelons of society about the classical literature and 
of Greek and Roman rhetorical style affected advocacy, especially before the House of Lords, 
when it acted as a court, for example in the long running impeachment trial of Warren 
Hastings, and special juries. Because of the influence of the classics and ancient rhetoric on 
advocates, which was still present, though weakening, well into the 20* Century, there is an 
excursus (Appendix 1) on classical rhetoric, concentrating on Cicero and Quintillian who 
were much studied in Britain and North America. The ancient world also shows that styles 
of advocacy were not fixed and evolved due to a variety of influences.
The effect of contemporary poetry, used to awaken generous sympathies in jurors, and 
of literature, including that of Sir William Blackstone which may be regarded as such, in 
enriching vocabulary and providing advocates in the later 18* Century with more allusions on 
which to draw is considered, as is the florid and emotional style, taken to new heights by 
barristers from Ireland. Contributions by prominent barristers to advocacy, conspicuously 
Thomas Erskine, who also did much to establish the moral basis for its practise, are 
described. Mention is made of previous cases becoming binding authority, the doctrine of 
stare decisis , before courts in the 18* Century and the effects of this on advocates, who had 
to adapt their submissions to take account of that key change.
In the 18* Century (Chapter Two) lawyers started to appear for prosecutors in felony 
cases. To redress the balance, and amounting to a major inroad into the centuries old rule 
forbidding representation by counsel, in such cases, judges began to allow prisoners to 
instruct counsel to conduct examination in chief, cross-examination and argue points of law. 
The effects of this on advocacy, particularly the development of cross -  examination and a 
more determined and aggressive approach by barristers on behalf of their clients, is examined. 
Advocacy in criminal trials , which became essentially adversarial in nature but remained 
short in length, became increasingly affected by rules of evidence.
Next considered (Chapter Three) for its effect on advocacy is the Prisoners’ Counsel 
Act 1837, which gave prisoners the right to a full defence by counsel in felony cases.
importantly including addressing the jury. This led to a forceful advocacy for prisoners, often 
matched by counsel for the Crown. It was usually delivered, as was advocacy in civil cases, 
with much melodrama and floridity of language before common jurors who, because of their 
often limited education, were especially susceptible to theatricality, strong appeals to emotion 
and allusions to religion, then very potent.
How public opinion, developing rules of professional etiquette and the judiciary came to limit 
the bounds of the forensic licence granted in 1837 is examined.
Scenes of discourtesy, and worse, between counsel and towards judges in court in the 1830’s, 
40’s and 50’s are recounted, as is press and public reaction to them. Some reasons for this 
behaviour, and poor quality of advocacy associated with it, are offered, including the inability 
of some judges to control proceedings in court, drink and tiredness. In the second half of the 
19* Century, with memories of earlier public disquiet refreshed, evolving etiquette at the bar 
and a greater determination to enforce standards by its members, matters improved, although 
not without some setbacks - the second Tichbome case in 1871 -  72 being a very vivid 
example.
Key changes in 1851 to rules concerning criminal indictments, which limited arguments in 
court about their validity, are outlined. This is followed by tentative conclusions that the 
reduction, in the first half of the Nineteenth Century, of the number of offences punishable 
by death had on advocacy.
The dominant style of advocacy before juries in the second half of the 19* Century, 
up until roughly the 1880’s, was declamatory, melodramatic and lachrymose. It was 
frequently marked by aggressive, intimidating and wide ranging - “blunderbuss”- cross- 
examination and also by long and repetitious closing speeches in the course of which strong 
appeals to emotion were made, often invoking the Deity and the Bible or the spirit of justice. 
(Special jurors, because they were usually more educated, would often be treated to more 
allusions to the classics references to history, and quotations from literature and poetry than 
common jurors.) A number of examples of this style are presented ( Chapter Four ).
Even though histrionics continued to thrive, some leaders of the bar, including Hardinge 
Giffard (later Lord Halsbury ) , John Holker, ( a future Attorney General ), Charles Russell ( 
who became Lord Chief Justice ) and Edward Clarke, began to significantly change the style 
of advocacy. Their approach was quieter, more learned and less inclined to violent appeals to
emotion, florid speech and to widely quoting from literature and verse. In the bar’s tradition 
of copying what appeared to succeed, they began to be emulated by junior members.
Opportunities for passionate appeals to emotion, flowery passages and histrionic 
gestures considerably reduced as trial by jury in civil actions diminished with the 
establishment of County Courts, where the overwhelming majority of cases were heard by 
judges alone, and the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 which, provided both parties 
consented, permitted issues of fact in the higher courts to be tried by judges without juries. 
Judges had little taste for sensational appeals, floridity, and theatricality but did have a high 
regard for fact, law and logically structured argument. Accordingly advocacy before them 
adjusted and shortened in length. Some barristers mourned what they saw as the decay of 
forensic oratory, due to the reduction of trials by jury; others accepted the altered style 
required as a necessary adaptation to changed circumstances (Chapter Five).
Specialist statutory tribunals, conceived to implement new regulatory legislation and to 
resolve disputes between the state and the subject, or between subjects, did not employ juries. 
Indeed the majority of them had little or no need for advocates.
The Judicature Acts 1873 -75 much lessened prospects for winning civil cases by advocates 
taking points at the beginning of trials, based on principles of law developed over centuries, 
about inadequacies and defects in opponents’ pleadings, but gave them more flexibility to 
bring new evidence and advance freshly thought legal argument.
Returning to criminal matters (Chapter Six); chances to address juries fell with the 
growth of summary trial before magistrates in the second half of the 19*^  Century. After a 
long campaign, prisoners were given the right to give evidence on oath by the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1898. Advocates were placed in the position of having to advise clients whether 
they should step into the witness box. If they did, counsel’s closing speech had to take into 
account the evidence they had given. No longer was an advocate free to suggest to the jury 
any story his ingenuity could devise as a possible explanation of the proved facts: In short it 
revolutionized the style of defence advocacy in many criminal cases. Skills in re-examination, 
to minimise damage inflicted in cross-examination, became vital.
In both civil and criminal cases, advocacy at the turn of the 20* Century was affected 
by rules concerning the content of opening speeches. It was also influenced by having to
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accommodate increasing numbers of expert witnesses. Examination of witnesses, especially 
cross-examination, had become a much more precise and subtle endeavour, far removed from 
types of indiscriminate and instinctual performances seen earlier.
At the end of the 19* Century and during the first quarter of the 20* Century the 
advocacy of Rufus Isaacs, Edward Carson, F. E. Smith and Edward Marshall Hall, who 
frequently opposed each other in court in greatly publicized cases, was an important influence 
on other barristers of the period and beyond (Chapter Seven). In very broad terms, and aware 
of the limitations of this approach, it might be said that the first three were the descendants in 
advocacy of Hardinge Giffard, John Holker, Charles Russell and Edward Clarke, but who 
took the art further - especially in employing conversational language and in carefully 
planning precise cross-examination rather than making long and emotive closing speeches; 
the small quiet sniper’s rifle with accurate sights was replacing the loud blunderbuss, often 
unpredictable in results and dangerous to its user. Marshall Hall’s advocacy, on the other 
hand, with its blatant appeal to emotion, sometimes sprinkled in tears, fell within the tradition 
of 19*^  Century histrionic advocacy.
In the 19*^  Century considerable alterations in advocacy took place throughout the 
common law world; not just England and Wales. For purposes of comparison some attention 
is paid to the United States (Chapter Eight). The place of the Greek and Roman classics and 
rhetoric in advocacy in late 18* Century America and in the first half of the Nineteenth 
Century is explored. Use by many attorneys of an apologetic, dispassionate and formulaic 
type of criminal advocacy bearing much of the influence of Cicero, provides a strong contrast 
to the extravagant, melodramatic and flowery styles of address in the English courts at the 
time. However, changes in procedure, laws of evidence and the prevailing general style of 
public oratory led, in the third quarter of the 19* Century to attorneys assuming the mix of 
flamboyance, appeal to emotion and aggression which has been their hallmark before juries 
since.
As in England and Wales, there was discussion about whether advocates should be 
allowed to express belief in the causes of their clients and later the adoption of professional 
rules forbidding the practice. Further, like in England, attorneys in the United States found it 
both necessary to adjust to laws granting accused persons the right to give evidence on oath 
and also to the presence of expert witnesses in court. Attorneys in criminal cases, had to be
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able to conduct plea bargaining, a procedure which arose independently in a number of 
jurisdictions in the early mid 19* Century, and pleas in mitigation.
The late 19* Century saw the beginnings of bench trials. These became more frequent 
in the century which followed. Taking the jury out of the court had a huge impact on 
advocacy. Unlike jurors, judges had no time for stirring speeches, sensationalism and 
histrionics. Strict attention to evidence and law by attorneys was required.
Back across the Atlantic, to England and Wales (Chapter Nine), George Keeton wrote, 
in 1943, about silent revolution in methods o f  advocacy as practiced by the English 
Bar over the last fifty  years'' \  Changed standards of etiquette, professional rules and 
greater control exerted by judges over these years had led to a vast increase in courtesy in 
interactions with judges and between counsel. The conduct of prosecutions had also 
improved. They were generally no longer carried out in a sneering hectoring manner with 
witnesses mercilessly browbeaten or bullied. Dramatic types of 19* Century advocacy, in 
which counsel was prepared to use mannerisms , tricks of speech and gestures to heighten the 
effects of their pleas to juries, was replaced by a conversational and matter of fact tone. The 
idea that to cross-examine meant to examine crossly had almost vanished. Appeals to juries 
were now to reason combined with a controlled, subtle and focused appeal to emotion. Jury 
trials in civil cases had continued to decline. Advocacy before judges was concerned with 
facts and the law, not oratorical flourishes. Fewer criminal trials before juries took place as 
the jurisdiction of the magistrates had widened further. The more restrained and 
conversational style of advocacy before criminal juries may have been to some extent 
influenced by that of the civil courts, where the leaders of the bar appeared more often and 
increasingly without juries. Two dominant members of the bar during the first half of the 20* 
Century were Patrick Hastings and Norman Birkett. Their styles, because of triumphs linked 
with them, were influential on those of other barristers. Hastings was a master of direct 
forcible speech without any embellishments or ornamentation and prized brevity. Unlike 
Hastings, Norman Birkett believed that the advocate ought to use the full range of English 
speech.
Other factors lay behind the mainly conversational and matter of fact advocacy that had 
become established. These include a widely held suspicion of rhetoric and, very importantly.
 ^G. W. Keaton, H a rris’s Hints on Advocacy, Stevens and Sons, 1943, page 10.
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better informed and greater educated juries. Jurors were less susceptible than their 
predecessors to theatrical gestures and melodrama, which had largely been replaced in • 
literature and on the stage by introspection and realism, references to God and the Bible, 
elegant and flowery, but empty, speech and appeals to strong emotion and prejudice. In a 
more scientific age , jurors expected more of an appeal to reason. The success of barristers 
such as Hardinge Giffard, John Holker, Charles Russell and Edward Clarke may have been 
because they appreciated early on the changes that were occurring to juries.
Attempting to catch the eye of the press to help create a reputation, useful to generate work, 
was an important factor behind the emotive, vividly worded and aggressive advocacy of the 
early Victorian period and afterwards. The decline of court reporting in the newspapers, 
removing much of the gallery from the stage, may well have contributed to the more subdued 
form of speech.
The thesis continues by considering alterations in advocacy before juries in the second 
half of the 20* Century and what has accounted for them (Chapter Ten). Changes scrutinized 
include: the falling away in the use of Aristotle’s ancient order of closing speeches, which 
usually ended with an emotive peroration ; the enormous expansion of eligibility to serve on 
juries, a démocratisation , brought about by the Juries Act 1974, leading to great 
adjustments in the way jurors were addressed and to different allusions and references made 
by advocates; the reduction, and eventual abolition, by the Criminal Justice Act, 1988, of 
peremptory challenge of jurors; the removal of certain offences from Crown Court jury trial; 
prosecutions conducted in more measured tones and more methodical and less aggressive 
defences, although the latter was not always being seen in sexual offences cases; decline in 
weight attached by juries to police evidence; less heavy drinking by some barristers and the 
positive effects of this on their performance in court; the rise of plea bargaining and the need 
to mitigate effectively after guilty pleas; the introduction of Social Enquiry Reports and their 
effect on pleas in mitigation; the need to make, and respond to, submissions arising out of key 
changes in evidence and procedure concerning exclusion of confessions, when adverse 
inferences can be drawn from silence to questions put to the accused and from admission of a 
defendant’s bad character; increased employment of expert witnesses in trials; the use of 
special measures for vulnerable and intimidated witnesses and of witness protection orders in 
trials of serious and violent offences; submission of written skeleton arguments on complex 
questions of law; and victim impact statements. The prospect of trials without juries in 
complex frauds and where there is a danger of jury tampering is also looked at.
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It is in civil cases, however, that the greatest changes to advocacy have occurred in the 
last fifty or so years. A number of developments and their consequences are examined 
Chapter Eleven ). These include; the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 ,which made advocacy 
available to more people ; relaxation of the rules against hearsay evidence; less impatience 
and aggression by judges to advocates; changes in civil and court procedure from the 1990’s; 
the growth of informed judicial intervention in trials at first instance; the Woolf reforms 
leading to substantial modifications of the stages in civil trials, the introduction of advocacy 
on paper, precipitating a debate about whether the oral tradition of English advocacy was 
threatened; joint witness reports; the decline of allusions to the classics, literature , poetry and 
history and use of Latin in advocacy; changes in advocacy in the County Court; clients’ 
perceptions of the “new” advocacy ; conditional fees and behaviour in court and the presence 
in court of litigants in person.
Some matters bearing on the examination of witnesses are dealt with next ( Chapter 
Twelve). Programmes which have come into being to familiarize expert witnesses with courts 
and trial procedures are described. The latest rules concerning contact with lay witnesses and 
prohibiting pre-trial rehearsal of evidence are set out and a recent decision by the Crown 
Prosecution Service to interview prosecution witnesses before tria l, breaking with a rule 
established in the 18* Century , is discussed.
A most important infiuence on advocacy, particularly that of junior practitioners, has 
been the introduction of systematic instruction on the subject. Not many decades ago the 
prevalent view had been that attempts to teach advocacy would be of little value - facility in 
the art being mainly regarded then as innate . The origins of advocacy teaching in England 
and Wales is traced and the content of the current courses outlined (Chapter Thirteen ).
Again to add the dimension of another common law country, advocacy in the United 
States and the influences upon it over the last half century , or so, is considered ( Chapter 
Fourteen). Methods of witness preparation and trial consultancy, neither of which have 
English equivalents, are investigated. Reasons for the reduction in trials and the consequences 
for advocates and advocacy are discussed.
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Finally a number of diverse topics which are likely to affect advocacy in future are 
presented ( Chapter Fifteen).
The first to be dealt is the expected rise in mediation as an alternative to using courts.
Secondly time is spent on: consequences arising from the extension of rights of audience 
in the higher courts to solicitors, representing a important departure from the past when they 
were limited to barristers; issues arising from large firms of solicitors conducting “in-house” 
advocacy ; increased employment in thè Crown Court of its own lawyers with higher rights of 
audience by the Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”), rather than instructing independent 
advocates; CPS use of employees. Associate Prosecutors, who are not qualified lawyers to 
conduct more prosecutions in the Magistrates’ Courts; granting rights of audience before the 
lower courts to Fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives; and, in a period when more 
persons can act as advocates, the creation of new formal quality control bodies, external and 
additional to lawyers own professional bodies.
Attention is then given to the subject of whether broadcasting of court proceedings in this 
country should be allowed and, if permitted, what the effects might be on advocacy and 
advocates.
The long running debate about traditional dress in court and its effects on advocacy will be 
considered and newly announced rules, which may settle things for at least some time, is 
outlined. Still within the topic of dress, the consequences for advocacy of wearing the 
Moslem niqab and burqa by advocates, judges and witnesses in court is pondered.
Lastly, new technology in the courtroom, and the very significant ways advocacy may be 
influenced by it, is examined.
The conclusion reached, or broad hypothesis, is that advocacy in England and Wales, 
and the United States, has been far from static over the last three centuries. Advocacy has 
been, and remains, very fluid. It certainly did not develop according to an over-riding logical 
plan, but has grown piecemeal and at an uneven pace, the result of a complex interplay of 
many influences. Research for this thesis has attempted to identify as many of these as 
possible. A non exhaustive list of principal factors , the relative importance of each has
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varied over time, includes: the effect on juniors of successful styles and approaches used by 
senior advocates; judicial tastes for the advocacy of lawyers, especially in the absence of 
jurors, when it is usually for the practical and the unadorned; changes in court procedure 
made by judges; reforms in the law of evidence concerning who and what may be put before 
courts and informing the content of submissions made; alterations in civil and criminal 
procedure and in the substantive law; the amount of media reporting of cases in court; public 
and press opinion about the acceptable limits of advocates’ tactics and oratory; the forming, 
by advocates, of professional rules of conduct and how much they are followed; levels of 
respect and civility between the bench and the bar; the standing of the judiciary and its power 
to control proceedings in court; the extent to which juries are used in trials and the social 
origins of those serving on them; greater education of jurors and less susceptibility to 
melodramatic appeals to emotion; awareness by advocates that in addressing juries they have 
to take into account contemporary use of language and , when making allusions, draw on 
popular culture, itself far from still, formed by newspapers, novels, radio, films, television 
and increasingly the computer internet; the school educational curriculum, which has 
substantially evolved, usually received by la^vyers and judges; general styles of public 
speaking and discourse in society; the formal teaching of advocacy, only introduced 
comparatively recently; and a relationship, although not a simplistic one , between quality of 
advocacy and the amount parties and the state are prepared to pay for it. Probably new 
technology is chief amongst elements that will exert an influence on future forensic oratory. 
Another important factor may be the effects of widening the pool of advocates.
1 A
Methodology.
Although covering the present and looking to the future, the bulk of this thesis, 
which aims to answer the question why courtroom advocacy has changed over the 
period examined, rests upon historical methodology - research from paper sources and 
interviews. Advocacy has grown at an uneven pace and in a piecemeal way, the result 
of many interacting influences. It has not followed an over-riding logical plan, just the 
opposite. It is a product of history. In this thesis, key developments in advocacy are 
identified chronologically, analysed and explained; time provided the story which 
called for interpretation. Because of this, the social science model (the hypothetico- 
deductive method), derived from scientific enquiry, of formulating a hypothesis and
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testing i t , in an operationalised form, against quantitative and qualitative data^ was 
not consciously used. This is arguably not easily applied where a great number of 
factors are involved and the principal actors no longer living , carrying risks of over­
determinism and is seldom employed in historical research. The social science method 
of semi structured interviews was, however, adopted and proved very usefuP. The main 
concern of the thesis is England and Wales, but, where suitable, comparisons are made with 
the United States. Some references are also made to advocacy in other countries Social 
science contributed the understanding that selection in a study of what is relevant, and 
the way it is examined, is inevitably influenced by the background of the writer^. In 
outline, the writer received a liberal university education in, English, drama, social 
sciences, including research techniques, humanities, legal history and law. He 
practiced in the capacity of a solicitor and as a barrister from 1984 to the mid 1990’s. 
During this time he acted as an advocate and appeared at all levels of courts from the 
Magistrates and County Courts to the House of Lords. Subsequently, he taught 
advocacy, as a lecturer , on the Bar Vocational Course at the Inns of Court School of 
Law, from 1989 to 2001, and at the College of Law, 2003- 2005. From 2005 the writer 
taught advocacy on the Legal Professional Course for solicitors at the College of Law. 
He was a visiting lecturer on Advocacy Training Workshops at Harvard Law School 
from 1998 -  2003 and received supervision at Harvard Law School for research on 
aspects of American legal history and law. He has taught English Legal History at a 
number of Universities in Britain and the United States. The writer was an Assistant
 ^ See Gibert N, ed, From postgradu ate  to socia l scientist: a guide to key skills, SAGE, London,2006, 
Bryman A, Social Research M ethod, 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008 and Janet 
Ruane, E ssentials o f  Research M ethods: A Guide to Social Science Research, W iley -  B lackwell, 
2004..
 ^Mike M cConville and W ing Hong Chui, Research M ethods fo r  Law, Edinburgh University Press, 
2007, page 3, state; In order to advance legal scholarship, students, lawyers and academ ics are 
recom m ended to be open-m inded and flex ib le  in terms o f  choosing the best method o f  understanding  
and investigating a m atter o f  concern. It is hoped that the best combination o f  methods was employed  
to reveal the numerous influences on the style and practice o f  advocacy, although the writer 
recognizes other approaches may be greatly useful.
 ^Wholehearted agreement exists with Geoffrey Wilson, Comparative Legal Scholarship, in Mike McConville 
and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods fo r  Law, Edinburgh University Press, 2007, Chapter 4, page 87, that by 
looking at other jurisdictions opportunity is created to stand back and consider aspects o f one’s own legal system 
more critically ; also that comparisons may suggest future developments and give possible warning of 
difficulties.
 ^Much modern historiography also takes a similar view . It is widely, though not universally, accepted 
that the historian’s work is more than merely an empirical accretion o f  facts. For example, E.H. Carr, 
What is H istory?  Penguin Books, 1987, page 18, wrote: Study the historian before you  begin to study
the f a c ts  H istory means interpretation. Indeed, if, standing Sir George Clark on his head, I  were
to call h istory “ a hard core o f  interpretation surrounded by a pu lp  o f  disputable fa c ts  ”, my statem ent
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Professor at Niigata University in Japan between 1993 and 1995 during which time he 
researched lay participation in Japanese trials, the prospects of increasing it, and - 
consequences for courtroom advocacy. This resulted in a thesis on the subject, written 
at Cambridge University and later published ^ . He taught Japanese Law at the School 
of Oriental Studies in 2001 and was appointed a London University external examiner 
in that subject.
Whilst hypotheses were not formulated, operationalised and tested, research was 
informed by belief in the importance of certain factors. The writer’s experience of 
modern advocacy, as a barrister and one who taught it in London^, led him to surmise 
that styles of leading advocates, tastes of judges, laws of evidence and procedure -  he 
was particularly conscious of them in the wake of the 1990’s reforms of civil 
procedure inspired by the Woolf Report -  would also be important influences on 
advocacy in the past. Some, albeit limited, knowledge of relatively well known 
advocates in history also existed in his mind, as did a hazy awareness that criminal 
trials had changed, over the centuries, from rambling altercations - in which advocates 
and advocacy played little or no role- to the modern adversarial system. With this very 
rudimentary framework of understanding, the writer embarked in 2001 upon a series of 
articles purporting to explain how and why advocacy had changed over the centuries^ 
The articles principally concentrated on styles of leading advocates, judicial tastes, 
and laws of procedure and evidence. Reflection led to a realization that these were 
very complex matters that had only been examined in an inadequate, or at best much 
too superficial, manner in the articles. Further thought, and discussion with those who 
read the articles, also led to an appreciation that many more factors had influenced the 
style and practice of advocacy. A much deeper analysis of the broad factors that had 
been identified was called for, as was a thorough search for others and an explanation
w ould no doubt, be one-sided and misleading, but no more so, I  venture to think, than the original 
dictum.
 ^Andrew Watson, Popular Involvem ent in Criminal Justice: Should the Jury Return to Japan? A nd the 
Question o f  M ixed Courts in Laienrichter in Japan, und Europe, pp. 101-187. Edited by Hans-Peter 
Marutschke, Berliner W issenschafts-Verlag 2005.
Knowledge and insights, gained over periods o f  years in these roles might be seen as flow ing from 
participant observation ie those forms o f  this methodology identified by Raymond Gold as the ‘ 
participant-as - observer’ and ‘the complete participant’. R. Gold, Roles in socio logica l f ie ld  
observation, in G..McCall and J.Simmons (edsj Issues in P articipant O bservation, Addison W esley  
1969.
* Andrew Watson, Changing A dvocacy, Justice o f  the Peace, Volume 165,2001: 743-749; 804-810 and 
862-868.
19
of them. In order to do this two principal research techniques were employed: A literature 
survey and interviews.
The former involved finding and reading modem literature dealing with the history of 
advocacy and its contemporary practice, and books, journals and articles that provided more 
general explanation and background; discovering and exploring works about courtroom 
advocacy, mainly written for practitioners, from earlier centuries; considering law reports; 
studying press and journal accounts of trials and how advocates conducted themselves in 
them; reading biographies and autobiographies of judges and renown advocates  ^; listening, 
or reading transcripts, of radio programmes which concern advocates, judges and trials, and 
watching television programmes and plays on these subjects.
Each of the Books, Pamphlets, Papers and Journals listed in the Bibliography is cited by 
footnote in the narrative.
Libraries resorted to most were: Lincoln’s Inn; Gray’s Inn; Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies, University of London; Senate House, University of London; Squire Law Library, 
University of Cambridge; University Library, Cambridge University; Harvard Law School 
Library; Harvard University Library; Roger Williams University, Rhode Island; and the Law 
Library, College of Law, Bloomsbury Branch, London. Gratitude for their assistance is 
expressed to the librarians of all these libraries. Particular thanks are due to Mr Guy Holbom 
of Lincoln’s Inn Library and Ms Theresa Thom of Gray’s Inn Library.
Interviews in England and Wales took place with: judges in the House of Lords (3), the 
Court of Appeal (3) , the High Court (2 ) ,  the County Court (2 and the Crown Court ( 2); 
practicing barristers (12, including 6 Queen’s Counsels ) ; solicitors (8) ; retired judges ( 
including 2 from the House of Lords and 3 from the County Court ) ,  barristers ( 6, including 
1 Queen’s Counsel ) and solicitors (3); and teachers of legal vocational courses (5). 
Additionally, interviews were conducted with lawyers and judges from the United States and 
with British and American academics
Judges and lawyers were chosen because of their present or past prominence, expression of 
views on advocacy in journals or in lectures, or because they were thought to be able to speak 
of their time and section of the legal profession.
 ^On the value of biography to scholarship, both general and legal, and the caution sometimes necessary in its 
use, see R Gwynedd Parry, Is legal biography really legal scholarship?. Legal Studies, Vol.30 No. 2, June 2010, 
pp. 208-229. Dr Gwynedd Parry was interviewed about this subject on the 19* October, 2010 at the Institute for 
Advanced Legal Studies, London.
No claim is made that the interviews constitute a scientific sample.
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First contact was usually by letter. Almost all responded. Very few declined to be 
interviewed. Of those that did so, most said they were prevented by pressures of time. 
Although not able to meet me, one judge arranged an interview with another judge of 
comparable seniority.
Some judges and lawyers were approached “opportunistically” at functions they attended 
or lectures delivered. After being introduced, a request for an interview would be made. If it 
was not possible to ask, a letter would be written shortly after the occasion.
The interviews with judges and lawyers were semi-structured. Questions asked were broad 
in scope . This was to allow interviewees to say what they thought was relevant and to enable 
as much ground to be covered in often limited time. It was sought to avoid confining 
interviews to what the interviewer, whose knowledge was much more limited, thought 
germaine As interviews continued, it became possible to put matters, identified as 
important earlier in the series, to later interviewees for their consideration and views.
Interviews with judges and lawyers ranged in length; the shortest was ten minutes and the 
longest two and a half hours. The average duration of interviews was about one hour. Some 
interviewees kindly gave permission for further contact by letter, telephone or e-mail to 
clarify what had been said or deal with questions not raised in interviews. Some interviewees 
suggested contacting persons who they thought it would be useful to interview.
Academics were approached initially by letter, but, as with a number of judges and 
lawyers, some were done so opportunistically” after they had delivered papers or attended 
events. A number of short interviews were conducted there and then. Teachers of vocational 
legal courses were contacted by letter or e-mail. Interviews with both groups were more 
structured and tailored closely to the areas on which they had written or lectured or taught.
" A small number o f interviewees asked for questions to be sent in advance o f the interview. They said this was 
to allow them to think about answers beforehand and be efficient in the limited time allocated. An example o f a 
question list is included as Appendix 2.
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All those who were interviewed gave permission for them to be quoted in this thesis'^. A 
small number asked to be shown what was going to be said before it was to be submitted; 
their wishes were complied with. In the absence of a substantial body of existing academic 
work, it was considered appropriate to use direct quotes from interviewees where possible, 
with relatively little deconstruction. The makers of quotations, or specific observations, are 
cited by name in the text*^
On influences on the style and practice of advocacy in the United States, interviews with 
judges and lawyers and academics from that country, present in Britain for varying periods of 
time, were held. Earlier, whilst assisting, during 2000 and 2003, at the Harvard Law School 
Trial Winter Advocacy Workshop, held annually over three weeks in January, views were 
obtained from contributing judges, attorneys and law school teachers from numerous states. 
Although very helpful and informative, they were not sought in the context of formal 
interviews, in which authority to attribute them would have been raised. Accordingly, no 
names are included.
A list of interviews undertaken is presented below. Those named gave authority to be 
cited in a university thesis. Any wider publication would, as a matter of ethics, require their 
express permission.
Arlidge, Anthony, QC, 30* October, 2007.
Ashton, Professor Rosemary, University College London, Department of English Language
I am aware o f the Surrey University Ethics Committee, Ethical Guidelines fo r  Teaching and Research, 2009. 
Paragraph 3.5 deals with The use o f  questionnaires and testing within and without the University. Questionnaire 
is defined broadly to include any systematic technique fo r  eliciting information by and /or from any individual 
student, ,member o f  staff, other member o f  the university or member o f  the general public. Paragraph 3.5e) 
states: The information from any individual questionnaire shall remain confidential, and the anonymity o f  the 
respondents shall be preserved. It is perhaps unclear whether semi-structured interviews employed in this 
research fall within questionnaire, so defined, or are a qualitatively different method o f research. They are, it is 
submitted, unambiguously removed from the ambit o f the paragraph, with its correct concern to prevent 
breaches o f confidence, by the obtaining o f oral permission from interviewees to express their views.
Because matters raised were not deemed confidential, or sufficiently sensitive, interviews were not referred to 
by a relevant transcript, or file, number instead o f by name, unlike the methodology taken by Ruth MacKenzie, 
Kate Mallinson, Penny Martin and Philippe Sands in Selecting International Judges:Principle, Process, and
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and Literature, 13* November, 2007.
Bailey, Judge Edward, Central London County Court, L* November, 2007.
Basra, Baljeet, Professional Development and Regulation Department, Institute of Legal 
Executives, 17* July, 2007.
Beloff, Michael QC, 30* July, 2009.
Bergman, Paul, Emeritus Professor, University of California Los Angeles, ISthMay, 2011. 
Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Thomas, Senior Law Lord, 10* and 23* October, 2007. 
Cape, Professor Edward, Bristol Law School, University of the West of England, 7* May,
2008.
Bull, Judge John, Retired Circuit Judge, 12* July, 2010.
Carter, Peter QC, 18* May, 2007.
Case, Janet, Circuit Judge and Treasurer of the United Kingdom Women Judges’ Association, 
15* May, 2009.
Cowan, Steven, Research Officer, Institute of Education, University of London, 8* June, 
2010 .
Cratesly, John, Judge of Massachusetts Superior Court, 20th November, 2007. 
Critchley, Anne Marie, Barrister, 7* September, 2007 and 14* June, 2011.
Delbourgo, Angela, barrister and lecturer at the College of Law in London, 31®* 
October, 2007.
Downing, John, Barrister, 1®* August, 2007.
Dutton, Timothy, QC, President of the Bar Council of England and Wales 2008/9, 8* May, 
2008 and 4* February, 2010.
Fortson, Rudi, QC, Visiting Professor, Queen Mary College, London, School of Law, 8*
July, 2011.
Galanter, Professor Marc, Emeritus Professor of Law, University o f Wisconsin- 
Madison and Centennial Professor, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 27* June, 2006.
Gerrard,Graeme, Association of Chief Police Officers, 10* May, 2010.
Gillman, Michael, Solicitor Advocate, Partner Bishop and Sewell, President of the City and 
Westminster and Holbom Law Society, 16* October, 2007.
Goldring, Lord Justice, John, 30* April, 2009.
Greenfield, Helen, Family Law solicitor, 24* April, 2008.
Politics, Oxford University Press, 2010, see Appendix 1. Their study involved a very considerable number o f  
interviews with judges and those involved in their appointment.
Gwynedd Parry, Dr R, School of Law, Swansea University, 19* October, 2010.
Hadden, Sally, Professor of History and Law, Florida State University, 11* May, 2010. 
Handler, Dr Philip, Keele Law School, 6* February, 2008.
Hewitt, Alexander, Barrister, 14* September, 2007.
Hoffmann of Chedworth, Lord Leonard, 27* July, 2009.
Hynes, Steven, President of the Legal Action Group, 15* May, 2008.
Jackson, John, Consultant, Mischon de Raya, Solicitors, 26* November, 2008.
Kleefeld, John, Lecturer, University of British Columbia Faculty of Law, 26* June, 2009. 
Kodagoda, Fritz, Advocate of Sri Lanka and English Barrister ,5* July, 2007.
Kritzer, Herbert M., Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin- 
Madison, 21®* January, 2009.
Lerego, Michael, QC, 4**^ February, 2010.
Ley, Nigel, Barrister, 21®* March, 2007 and 29*^  July, 2007.
Lightman, Mr. Justice, Gavin, 8**^ March, 2007.
Lipton, Judge, Julian, 25**^  July, 2007.
Loveland, Kate, Lecturer, School of English, Leicester University, 29*  ^April, 2010. 
Lynch, Moira, Solicitor Advocate , 12**^  March, 2006.
MacDonald, Kenneth QC, then Director of Public Prosecutions, 23* May, 2006 and 4**^ 
March, 2010.
Mackay of Clashfem, Lord James, 10**^ December, 2008.
March Hunnings, Neville, former editor of Common Market Law Reports, 7**^ June, 2010. 
Millard, Amy, Attorney, daym an and Rosenberg, New York, 30**^  January, 2008.
Mitchell, Dr Paul, School of Law, Kings College, London, 12**^  March, 2008.
Morton, James, Solicitor and Author, 16**^  July,2007.
Murray, Professor Peter L, Robert Braucher Professor of Law from Practice at Harvard 
Law School, 29*  ^March, 2007.
Nathan, Barrie, Barrister and Lecturer, College of Law, 22"^ July,
2009.
Pearson, Katherine, Trial lawyer and Professor of Law, Dickinson Law School, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1®* August, 2007.
Phillips of Worth Matravers, Lord Nicholas, President of the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom, 28*^  April, 2009.
Pickering, Murray, QC, 20th May, 2007.
Rabie, Gerald, Barrister and Lecturer, College of Law, 30th July, 2009.
Richards, Lord Justice, Stephen, 18^  ^July, 2007.
Robertson, Geoffrey, QC, 18^ *^  April, 2000 .
Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Alan, 11^  ^May, 2009.
Rose, Jonathan, Professor, Department of History, Drew University, 2"^ July, 2010. 
Ross, Nicholas, Solicitor and Senior Lecturer, Bar Vocational Course, College of Law, 
London, 16^  ^August, 2007.
Sedley, Lord Justice, Stephen, ll/^ July, 2007.
Sharpley, Deborah, Solicitor Advocate and Member of the Bar of South Africa, 20th 
June, 2007 and 7^  ^May, 2009.
Smith, Dr Charlotte, Reading University School of Law, 28^ February, 2008.
Starr, Terri, Barrister, 4^  ^February, 2010.
Stray, Dr Christopher, Research Fellow, School of Classics, Swansea University, 2"  ^
July, 2010.
Susskind, Richard, former IT Adviser to the Lord Chief Justice and Gresham 
College Professor, February, 2001.
Taylor, Daniel, Senior Partner at Taylor Hampton Solicitors, 3"^  ^November, 2008. 
Thomas, Cheryl, Professor of Law, University College London, 11th May, 2010.
Van Issum, John, Barrister and Senior Lecturer, Bar Vocational Course, College of 
Law, London , 4^  ^ July, 2007.
Waddington, Nigel, Barrister and Senior Lecturer, Bar Professional Training Course, 
College of Law, 5^  ^July, 2010.
Warren, Mr. Justice Nicholas, 22"^ September, 2009.
Williams, Bradley, Family Law Solicitor, 24^ April, 2008.
Williams, Dr Ian, Lecturer in Legal History, University College London, 5^  ^May, 2010. 
Wood, Jonathan, Solicitor and Senior Crown Prosecutor, 4* May, 2009 and 12* July, 2011. 
Woolf of Barnes, Lord Harry, 27th June, 2007.
Some of those who were interviewed kindly read drafts of this work and made helpful 
comments to improve it.
Contribution.
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The thesis;
Synthesises material over the centuries, from many sources, to enable 
a chronological and overall presentation of developments in advocacy, investigates as 
many factors as possible that led to them and draws comparisons with the United 
States. Little by way of a narrative and analysis exists elsewhere on the late 18th 
Century, the late 19th and 20th Century*'*. Particular attention is paid to the exuberant, 
emotive and combative form of advocacy which culminated in the mid 19th Century 
and thereafter, for reasons described, became increasingly restrained. An opposite 
trend in the United States in the 19th Century is identified and explained. The great 
changes in advocacy, and why they came about, especially in civil advocacy in the 
second half of the 20th Century are also scrutinised.
Seeks to emphasise how advocacy has developed piecemeal, rather than resulting 
from overall planning and logic.
Incorporates interviews with advocates, judges, trainers and academics to ascertain 
views on the past and changes in advocacy over recent decades- in these two respects 
it might be seen as an attempt to record oral history - and their predictions for the 
future.
In the Preface to his book, A dvocacy and the Making o f  the A dversarial Criminal Trial 1800-1865, 
Clarendon Press, 1998, David Cairns described the history o f  advocacy as neglected; no more 
soph istica ted  or significant expression o f  the art o f  the lawyer has been studied less. Inattention to the 
subject, in his view , exem plified the continuing gu lf between the worlds o f  legal scholarship and legal 
practice. He expressed the wish that his book would stimulate further research and writing on 
advocacy. The subsequent ten or so years has produced some impressive scholarly works on aspects o f  
the subject. These include: Jan -M elissa  Schramm’s Testimony in Victorian Law, Literature, and  
Theology, Cambridge University Press, 2000, spanning the first half o f  the 19*** Century, John 
Langbein’s The Origins o f  the Crim inal Trial, Oxford University Press, 2003, covering the 1690’s to 
the 1780’s, A llyson M ay’s The O ld B ailey and the Bar 1785 -  1834, University o f  North Carolina, 
2003 and Sadakat Kadri’s The Trial: A H istory from  Socrates to O.J. Simpson, Harper Collins, 2005. 
Notwithstanding these and other books, advocacy, especially in the form o f  any comprehensive 
scholarly treatment over the centuries and about how it may develop in future, remains understudied. 
Indeed, Geoffrey Robertson QC, in his Preface to Sir William Garrow, His Life Times and Fight fo r  
Justice, by John Hostettler and Richard Braby, Waterside Press, 2009, criticises legal history’s disdain 
o f  advocacy in favou r o f  teaching the tedious history o f  contract and land law, p a rtly  because o f  the 
inability o f  historians to com prehend the dynamics o fforen sic  p ra c tice  and how this im pacts on the 
rules o f  the tria l process. It is hoped that this thesis, albeit in a small way, may help to remedy this 
and lead to more investigation.
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Conceives advocacy as very fluid - certainly not static as might be thought by those 
who regard courts and the law as very conservative- subject to a complex interplay of 
factors, the principal ones, which have varied in weight over time, are identified.
Hopefully, by its use of diverse sources, contributes to the growing body of 
external legal history, which examines law and legal phenomenon within wider 
historical, social , economic and political contexts and may also be of interest to 
those other than lawyers.
May, although cross cultural relationships are not simple, assist comprehension of 
future developments in countries where court oral advocacy has recently been given 
greater importance by providing knowledge about how and why advocacy has changed 
over time in Britain , and, to a lesser extent, also the United States.
Gilbert Garraghan, A Guide to H istorical M ethod, Fordham University Press, N ew  York, 1946.
External legal history  be contrasted to internal lega l history, a phrase used to describe the 
activity o f  tracing the history o f  legal rules and legal principles which largely confines itse lf to 
internal sources such as statutes and case law and secondary sources concerned with articulating the 
meaning o f  the law within traditional doctrinal or theoretical legal analysis. See D. Ibbetson, What is 
legal history a history of?, in Andrew Lewis and Michael Lobban (eds) Law and H istory  (2003) 6 
Current Legal Issues pp. 863-879.
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One such country being Japan where in May, 2009 , a new m ixed court system  {Saiban-in  Seido  
), in which six  randomly chosen citizens sit as lay judges with three professional judges to try 
serious criminal cases, previously tried by judges alone, was introduced after five years o f  
planning. Hitherto, language used by judges and advocates in court was highly technical. L ittle  
exam ination o f  w itnesses occurred and there was much reference to written evidence and 
subm issions. Docum ents would be read to judges, usually in a dry way and with hardly any eye 
contact, in the know ledge they would be review ed by them later. A ll this took place in a context 
o f  a shared unspoken understanding between judges prosecutors and defence lawyers and in which  
subtle signals to each other, including rhythmic breathing, were em ployed. Considerable 
preparation was undertaken to ensure that the style and content o f  law yers’ addresses to the lay  
members o f  the court would be com prehensible to them. This included holding mock trials and 
training prosecutors, defence lawyers and judges, often drawing on foreign expertise about oral 
advocacy to lay persons. See Colin Jones, An A m erican L a w y e r ’s View o f  the Law Judge System , 
H eibonshinsho, Tokyo, 2009 and A Watson in Hans —Peter Marutschke ed. L aien rich ter in Japan, 
D eutsch land und Europa, BW V, Berlin, 2006, P opu lar Involvem ent in C rim inal Justice; Sh ou ld  ' 
the Jury Return to Japan? -  A nd the question  o f  m ixed court, .p p . 1 0 1 - 1 8 6 .  Jury trial has been  
restored in Russia and Spain. Reforms to c iv il procedure in 1993 and 2003 in Finland, partly to 
reduce delay caused by repeated adjournments and to establish a more concentrated form o f  
hearing, have resulted in greater orality during court proceedings and have lessened reliance on 
written evidence and legal subm issions. See Laura Ervo, Scandinavian Trends in C iv il P re - tr ia l  
P roceedings, C ivil Justice Quarterly., Volum e 26, October, 2007 , pp. 466- 483.
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Might, at a time when there is particular interest in the effect of one influence - 
the computer and the internet on advocacy before jurors, be a reminder that advocacy 
is shaped by many factors.
oc
Chapter One : Distinguished advocates, judges, 
ciassicai iearning and other infiuences on advocacy 
in the 18th and eariy 19th Centuries.
There are few records o f the advocacy o f early lawyers; their words having 
long since evaporated. Those that do exist, chronicled in the lives o f jurists such as 
Edward Coke and Francis Bacon and in the State Trial Reports show that 
lawyers in Tudor and Stuart times were not accustomed to principles o f restraint 
and moderation. Advocacy in these periods was marked, as a rule, by what Bernard 
Kelly, author o f Famous Advocates and their Speeches described, in the 
introduction to his work, as a fierce  bitterness, or rather savagery, hardly to be 
realized at the present day. For instance, in the treason trial o f Sir W alter Raleigh, 
in 1603, the Attorney General, Sir Edward Coke, addressed the defendant, who was 
about to speak in his own defence:
'‘Thou art a scurvy fellow ; thy name is hateful to all the realm o f  England fo r  
thy pride. I  will now make it appear to the world that there never existed on the 
fa ce  o f  the earth a viler viper than thou art•- »  20
In the m idst o f other opprobrious epithets aimed at Raleigh, Coke said:
"Thou art a monster , thou hast an English face , and a Spanish heart. Thou 
viper! For I  thou thee, thou v iper”
These reports, made betw een 1163 — 1858, ch iefly  cover cases o f  high treason but also include  
bigam y, sed ition , seditious libel, murder involving high ranking offic ia ls or peers, riot, piracy, 
w itch craft, bribery and corruption. The quality o f  reporting, especially  in early cases, is variable, 
but increased in the late 17**' Century, when good shorthand writers were em ployed. It is d ifficu lt 
to say h ow  representative the cases reported in the State Trials are o f  criminal trials more 
generally , o f  which there are few  records. See Sir James FitzJames Stephen, A H istory  o f  the  
C rim ina l Law o f  England,  London, M acM illan and Co, 1883, V ol. 1, Chapter XI, page 345 .
S w eet and M axw ell, London, 1921
The Trial o f  Sir W alter R aleigh, 1 State Trials (1730) page 205.
"It becometh not a man o f  virtue and quality to call me s o ” was Raleigh’s 
dignified rebuke adding, but I  take comfort in it, it is all you can do ”.
Coke then asked Raleigh ''Have I  angered you? ” Raleigh replied, "I am in no 
case to be angry” . In other instances, during the trial, similar language was used 
by Coke towards the prisoner, until he was told by the bench not to be impatient 
and to allow Raleigh to speak. Admonished, Coke sat down in anger and was only 
with much difficulty persuaded to proceed. When at length he did , it was with a 
fresh torrent of invective in which Raleigh was accused o f the darkest treasons and 
called a "damnable a th e ist”. As well as displaying intemperate language. Coke 
adduced evidence against the prisoner which, even by the then lax practice o f trials 
for treason, was obviously illegal. It was principally upon this proof that Sir Walter 
Raleigh was convicted
Coke, as Attorney General, is also remembered for splenetic performances in 
other trials, including that of the Earl of Essex (1600)^^. Many historians have been 
so appalled by his offending speeches that they have felt unable to give Coke 
anything like his fair share o f credit in defending the common law against the royal 
prerogative and for his influential written works on the law^\ Nevertheless, though 
not readily defensible according to modern ethical notions. Coke’s conduct seems 
to have complied broadly with the rhetorical standards expected o f crown counsel 
in treason trials at the period
In the opinion o f  Sidney W. Clarke, w riting in 1896,( W illiam  Andrews ed .The L aw yer  in 
History, L itera ture  and Humour, W illiam  Andrews and Co, London, 1896 page 56) the phrase “i f  
thou thou’St him som e thrice”, said by Sir Toby B elch in the course o f  directing Sir Andrew  
A gue-C heek, in A ct iii. Scene 2 o f  Tw elfth N ight, probably first performed in M iddle Tem ple 
Hall on 2"'* February 1602, to convey a challenge to the d isguised V iola was an obvious allusion  
by Shakespeare to the vio lent invective thrown by Coke at Sir Walter R aleigh in court.
C onversely, appreciation o f  Shakespeare in succeeding centuries was to ensure that his words 
were much alluded to in trials by generations o f  advocates in numerous lands.
F R W rottesley, The Examination o f  Witnesses in Court, Sweet and M axw ell, London 1910. 
Chapter 3. Pages 89-90
^ State Trials 43 ELIZ 1600,1333- 59. At his trial, the Earl o f  E ssex told the jury that Coke w as” 
p la y in g  the ora tor  and displaying the trade  and talent o f  those who value them selves  upon their  
skill  in p le a d in g  innocent men out o f  their l i v e s ”. David Jardine, Criminal Trials ,  Charles K night, 
London, 1832, Volum e 1, Page 321.
See John H ostettler, Champions o f  the Rule o f  Law, W aterstone Press, 20 1 1 , Chapter 2, 
esp ecia lly  page 46.
^  Bernard Kelly, Famous Advocates and their Speeches: British Forensic Eloquence from Lord Erskine to Lord  
Russell o f  Killowen, London,Sweet and Maxwell, 1921, page 2. Sir James FitzJames Stephens, how ever.
Edward Coke was a skillful rhetorician - rhetorical technique, largely derived from 
the Latin classics, formed an important component of Elizabethan education in 
Grammar schools^^ - with a forceful ability to persuade.
Away from State Trials, Coke’s great rival and foe Francis Bacon, recalled 
both as Lord Chancellor and founder of modern science, had a reputation for 
eloquence both in the courts and parliament^’. Regarding Bacon’s oratory Ben 
Jonson wrote
concluded, after surveying the State Trial Reports that, in the rancorous ferocity o f  his advocacy. 
Coke was unrivalled in any English court o f  justice , except perhaps those in which Judge Jeffries 
presided, fo llow ing the Restoration. Sir James FitzJames Stephens, A H istory  o f  The Criminal  
Law o f  England. V ol. I, Chapter XI, page 333.
Coke had attended Norwich Grammar S ch oo l.( For further details o f  his background and career, 
see Cuthbert W. Johnson. The Life o f  Sir E dw ard  Coke, 2 V olum es, Henry Colborn, London,
1837. ) Many lawyers, members o f  the gentry and o f  com m ercial fam ilies, who served as jurors, 
were educated at grammar schools. On the Elizabethan grammar school curriculum and the prime 
place within it o f  Latin and reading Cicero, Ovid, V irgil and Horace, see A lison  Plowden, 
Elizabethan England, RDA Lim ited, 1982, Chapter 3. Boys at Grammar school were also taught 
adoxography, the art o f  eruditely praising worthless things. It has been said Coke mastered a 
reverse skill and with his words sent scores o f  men to their deaths. Sadakat Kadri, The Trial. A 
H istory  from  Socrates to O.J. Simpson, Harper, London, 2006 , page 82. Probably the first E nglish  
treatise on adoxography. The Defence o f  Contraries, written by Anthony Munday, was published  
in 1593 . The work contains essays celebrating deform ity, ugliness, poverty, blindness, sterility  
and stupidity. In its preface is a claim  that it would be particularly useful to law yers. Francis 
Bacon, typical o f  those from particularly wealthy backgrounds, did not attend grammar school but 
was educated privately by tutors.
Late 16*'' and early 17*'' Century judges, members o f  what Dr Ian W illiam s ( Interview ed on the 
5 May, 2010 ) described as the c lassica lly  educated  humanist e li te ’’, occasionally  referred to 
the classics in their judgem ents ( no records o f  their use by advocates before them appear to exist, 
although, in Dr W illiam ’s view , it is highly likely that they were em ployed to persuade Privy  
Counsellors, not usually legally  trained but educated in the classics, who sat in Star Chamber 
Cases, with com m on-law judges, and in treason cases.). Exam ples kindly supplied by Dr 
W illiam s, from his research, included: B erkeley J’s reference to A esop ’s Fables,  Plato and 
D iogenes in H astings v D ouglas  (1634) CUL. G g .ii.l9 ,f .5 0 6 ; A risto tle’s P oli t ics  and 
D em osthenes in Zangis V Whiskard { \ 5 9 5) BL. MS. Add. 25211 , f. 126, per Harris sjt; R eference  
to the Philosopher  ( presumably A ristotle) in L ord  C ro m w ell’s Case  (1601) 2 Co.R ep., ff.72-73: 
R eference to V irgil by Francis Bacon in The Case o f  Impeachment o f  Waste (undated) in 
Arguments o f  Law o f  Sir Francis Bacon, Knight, In Certain Great and Difficult Cases. In The 
Works o f  Francis Bacon. Ed. Spedding J., E llis R. L. and Heath D .D ., vol. 7, p. 532 and B acon ’s 
reference to Julius Caesar’s works and his departure from Engand in L o w e ’s Case  (undated) in 
Arguments o f  Law o f  Sir Francis Bacon, Knight, in Certain Great and Difficult Cases. In The 
Works o f  Francis B a co n .E d .  Spedding J., E llis R. L. and Heath D .D .. vol. 7, p. 548. Dr W illiam s 
was in no doubt that, although no explicit reference was made to it, the judges and jurors in the 
Trial o f  Walter Raleigh would have im plicitly  understood C oke’s portrayal o f  R aleigh to be 
C icero’s Cataline, the arch traitor.
’’ S ee  Thomas H. M acauley’s biographical essay. L o rd  Bacon  in C ritica l and H istoric  Essays,  
London: Longman, Green and Longman, 1877, pp 356 -  414. A lso  see F.E. Smith, First Lord 
Birkenhead, Famous Trials, Hutchinson and Co, Ltd, Francis Bacon  p p ,.395-399 , who describes 
B acon’s career and his trial, conviction  and ruin in 1621 for taking bribes from parties in a case  
which he sat as a judge. Although seldom  discussed, it is broadly accepted that in England, right 
until the impeachment o f  Lord M acclesfield , in 1725, there was a steady tradition o f  jud icia l
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"There happened in my time one noble speaker, who was fu l l  o f  gravity in his 
speaking. His language, where he could spare or pass by a jest, was nobly 
censorious. No man ever spoke more neatly, more pressly, more weightily, or 
suffered less emptiness, less idleness, in what he uttered. No member o f  his speech 
but consisted o f  his own graces. His hearers could not cough or look aside from  
him without loss. He commanded where he spoke and had his judges angry and 
pleased  at his devotion. No man had their affections more in his power. The fea r  o f  
every man that heard him was lest he should make an en d ”.
However it has been said that Bacon did not always exert him self fully if  he saw 
little chance o f success or personal advantage:
"When engaged in some cause celebre -  the Queen and the Court coming to hear 
the arguments or taking a lively interest in the result -  Bacon no doubt exerted  
him self to the utmost and excited applause by the display o f  learning and 
eloquence; but on ordinary occasions, when he fo u n d  h im self in an empty court, 
and before an irritable judge, he must have been unable to conceal his disgust -  
and eager to get home that he might fin ish  an essay or expose some fa llacy  by 
which past ages had been misled -  i f  he stood up fo r  his client as long as he fe l t  
there was a fa ir  chance o f  success, we may believe that he showed little energy in a 
hopeless defence, and that he was careless about softening defeat by any display o f  
zeal or sympathy ”
Coke, then Attorney General, and Bacon, the first Queen’s Counsel, bitterly 
clashed in the Court o f Exchequer when Bacon made an application in a case in 
which he had neither a b rief nor a fee:
Coke: "Mr Bacon i f  you have any tooth against me , p luck it out, fo r  it will do you  
more hurt than all the teeth in your head will do you any g o o d ”.
corruption, a hidden and silent influence on the success o f  advocacy in trials. Bribes were resisted  
by som e judges but, it w ould seem , taken by many. Andrew Dewar Gibb, Judic ia l Corruption in 
the United  Kingdom,  W .Green and Son, Edinburgh, 1957.
On L o rd  Francis Bacon,  published in 1625, Harvard C lassics, 1910, V ol 27, page 60.
John, Lord Campbell, Lives o f  the Chancellors,  London: John Murray, 1856, Volum e HI, page 12.
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Bacon: "Mr Attorney, I  respect you; I  fea r  you not, and the less you speak o f  your 
own greatness, the more I  w ill think o f  i t ”. .
Coke: "1 think scorn to stand upon terms o f  greatness towards you, who are less 
than little, -less than the lea st”. [Here he added some similar expressions with an 
insolence which cannot be expressed].
Bacon: "Mr Attorney, do not depress me so fa r  ; fo r  I  have been your better, and 
may again when it please the Q ueen”
The arrival of eloquence.
W illiam Forsyth (1812-1899), in his highly influential book, Hortensius; or 
the Advocate, first published in 1849, on the conduct and duties o f an advocate, 
then highly topical, but which also presented a history o f advocacy from ancient 
Greece onwards, saw eloquence only becoming important at the English Bar in the 
late eighteenth century :
"Forensic eloquence in this country seems to have been almost unknown until the
latter part o f  the eighteenth century   and we search in vain that voluminous and
interesting repository o f  cases, the State Trials, where the higher efforts o f  jud icia l 
oratory ought, i f  anywhere, to be found, fo r  ‘ thoughts that breathe, and words that 
burn ’ in the efforts made by our advocates in form er days fo r  their clients. We fin d  
, indeed, immense learning and research; a wonderful fam iliarity  with precedents, 
the pole-star o f  the English lawyer; and sound and logical argument, interrupted  
however too often by puerilities and laboured truisms, and conveyed in the s t i f f  and 
form al periods in which our ancestors used to enunciate their thoughts” .
30 John Lord Campbell, ibid, page 28.
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Bernard Kelly traced the beginnings o f what he terms British Forensic 
Eloquence to the early, rather than late. Eighteenth Century. In his account” , the 
roughness and uncouthness of early advocacy, and the tim id reserve and uninspired 
dullness which had to some extent replaced it in the late 17th century” , was 
supplanted through the efforts of a number of influential men. One such was Lord 
Cowper ( 1664 - 1723) who was appointed the first Lord Chancellor of Great 
Britain in 1707. Praised by Kelly for his melodious voice and perfect elocution , he 
was gifted with eloquence , which assisted his rise in the Whig Party, and appeared 
in many important cases , including that of Ashley V White ”  in 1703, establishing 
the constitutional principle that a qualified voter in an election has a right akin to a 
property interest and in the absence of a valid statute denying that right he would 
have an action for damages against those preventing its exercise. As Lord 
Chancellor he made important contributions to the development o f the law of 
equity. Also remembered for helping to shape equity, especially as Lord Chancellor 
from 1733 to 1737, and eloquence in court is Charles Talbot, 1685 - 1737, made 1®^ 
Baron Talbot in 1733 when he was appointed to the Woolsack. Called to the bar in 
1711, he rapidly acquired a reputation for persuasiveness appealing to both the 
hearts and heads o f juries . Indeed on his death the following anonymous memorial 
verse was published ”  :
“Flow the heart listened while he pleadings spoke.
While on the enlightened mind with willing art
William Forsyth, Hortensius or the Advocate, London: J. Murray, 1849, page 20.
”  Bernard K elly, Famous A dvoca tes  and their Speeches, Sw eet and M axw ell, London, 1921, page 
2 .
”  H eneage Finch ( 1621 -  1682), 1st Lord Nottingham , called to the Bar (Inner Tem ple) in 1645, 
appointed as Solicitor General in 1660, Attorney General in 1670 and five years later Lord 
C hancellor, spoken o f  as the fa th er  o f  equity  and known as the English C icero,  the English  
Roscius  and s i lver  tongued, appears as a 17*'' Century eloquent exception to this. H owever, 
according to Forsyth ( H ortensius, 1879 Edition, page 312 .) none o f  his speeches remain that 
w ould ju stify  these descriptions. There is evidence that judges who sat in the reign o f  Charles II 
disapproved o f  long or elabourate speeches by counsel. Lord Guilford, for exam ple, had little  
toleration for speeches at all. A ccording to contemporary reports, he would strongly discourage 
counsel from making them after the conclusion o f  evidence. Mr. C om m issioner Kerr at the Old 
B ailey  had the ledges in front o f  cou n sel’s seats cut away, so that they had nowhere to rest their 
papers, thus reducing the length o f  their speeches. Another Stuart judge much annoyed by the 
length o f  som e written p leadings, which would subsequently have to be read aloud in court, 
ordered the draftsman to parade through the courts with his head through them. ( Richard Du 
Cann, The A rt  o f  the A dvoca te ,  1993, Penguin B ooks, page 21 .)
”  1703 92 ER 126.
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his gentle reason so persuasive stole that the charmed 
hearer thought it was his own
Another contribution was made by Phillip Yorke, Lord Hardwick (1690- 
1764), who became Lord Chancellor in 1738. Generally seen as the creator o f the 
modern systematised English law o f equity, in the words o f W illiam Forsyth, he 
was “ the oracle o f equity”” . W hilst at the bar. Lord Chesterfield praised his 
restrained manner in crown prosecutions. Contrasting Yorke to the former 
“bloodhounds” of the Crown, Chesterfield described him as naturally humane 
moderate and decent” . Early in his career Phillip Yorke conducted the prosecution 
of Christopher Layer for treason as a Jacobite in 1720.This case further elevated 
his reputation as a forensic orator which was already considerable in cases 
involving equity. In 1723 he rose to Attorney General .In that post Bernard Kelly” , 
described how he brought a variety o f learning and richness o f illustration to his 
speeches making them "among the fin es t specimens o f  their k in d ”. Lord Campbell 
in Lives o f  the Lord Chancellors ”  considered that Lord Hardwicke’s judgem ents 
combined a luminous method o f arrangement with elegance and lucidity of 
language.
W illiam Murray, Lord M ansfield, (1704-1793)'*° also had an effect on 
advocacy. As a judge he is recognized as the founder of English m ercantile law 
which, having found it in chaos, left in a form almost equivalent to a code. Highly 
educated, an outstanding Classics scholar'** when at Oxford, he mixed with the best 
o f literary society and was an intimate friend of Alexander Pope. Indeed it was said
”  Quoted by Brian Gibbens QC, Former Recorder o f  Oxford, Elements o f  M odern A dvocacy,  N ew  
Law C assettes, Butterworths, London, 1979.
”  William F o r s y t h , or the A dvocate ,  London, John Murray, 1849, page 13.
”  C haracteristics o f  L o rd  Hardwicke, by L o rd  Chesterfield ,  European m agazine and London 
review . Volum e 41 , 1802, page 250.
”  Bernard Kelly, Famous Advocates and their Speeches, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1921, page 3.
”  Lord CdiXnphQW, Lives o f  the Chancellors,'LondiOn, John Murray, Volum e V.
Lord Mansfield, C. H. S. Fifoot, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936.
'** Later in life , in 1775, W illiam  Murray, then Lord M ansfield, com m issioned a portrait. L o rd  
M ansfield  C h ie f  Justice o f  England,  attributed to David Martin, depicting him seated, in front o f  a 
bust o f  Solom an, reading Cicero. The picture was purchased for display in his very substantial 
London home, K enwood H ouse, beside Hamstead Heath. This property was acquired, and much 
altered, m ainly with the proceeds o f  his h ighly su ccessfu l career in law.
35
that the "graceful and f lu e n t” ”  periods in his much admired court oratory and 
judgm ents were strongly influenced by Pope, whose witty and eloquent work was 
much concerned with uniting elegant form and m atter” .
M urray’s early work at the bar centred on im portant Scottish appeal cases” . His 
English practice was small until 1738 when a single speech in a much reported 
cause célèbre ”  before a jury  placed him at the head of the bar. From that time he 
had all the work he could attend to. Separating him from the greater number o f his 
contemporaries at the bar W illiam Murray was noted for his self control and “being 
prudent to the point of tim idity”” . He was received criticism  for being moderate 
and dispassionate and unfavourably compared with Edward Coke. When asked 
about this, he replied, “1 would not have made Sir Edward Coke ’d speech to gain 
all Sir Edward C oke’s estates and all his reputation ” As solicitor general 
(1742-54) Murray prosecuted the Scottish Jacobite lords, Balmerino, Kilmarnock 
and Lovat. In 1756 Murray was raised to the peerage, as Lord M ansfield, and made 
Lord C hief Justice, a post he held until 1788. During this time he instituted a 
number o f procedural reforms in the Court o f K ing’s Bench bearing on the practise 
o f advocacy. One o f these was to allow barristers to submit only a single motion 
each day and, if  necessary, to continue with it the following day. Hitherto the 
number o f motions they were perm itted to make was unrestricted and barristers 
were heard in order o f seniority. That had meant almost all work went to senior
”  Bernard K elly, Famous A dvoca tes  and their Speeches, London, Sw eet and M axw ell, 1921, page 
3.
”  There is an anecdote that Pope undertook to teach Murray oratorical delivery shortly after his 
call to the Bar, and that one day a neighbour entering his Chambers, 5 K ing’s Bench W alk, found 
him gesturing before a mirror with Pope giving instructions. See Lord Cam bell, The Lives o f  the 
C h ie f  Justices,  Volum e II, London: John Murray. 1858, page 33.
”  Prominent am ongst these was, in 1737, as counsel in the H ouses o f  Parliament for Edinburgh to 
oppose the im position o f  penalties on that city fo llow in g  the Porteous R iots. His great eloquence  
in this cause was greatly noted. See Edmund Heward, Lord M ansfield: A B iography o f  William 
M urray F ‘ E a r lo f  M ansfie ld  1705-1793.  Chicester: Barry R ose, pp. 18-21. The story o f  the 
Porteous R iots is graphically told by Sir W alter Scott in The H eart o f  M idlothian.
”  The case o f  W illiam  Sloper, a wealthy young man, who had the m isfortune to be found in bed 
with an actress Maria Cibber. Proceedings, with the object o f  obtaining as much m oney as 
p ossib le  from him, were begun by her husband. W illiam  Murray acted as junior counsel for 
W illiam  Sloper. See Edmund Heward, ibid, pp.21-23 .
”  L o rd  M ansfield,  C.H. S F ifoot, ibid, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936, page 37.
”  C.H .S. F ifoot, ibid,  page 37. The speech to w hich Murray referred was that made by Coke in 
the prosecution o f  Sir W alter R aleigh, see Chapter One.
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barristers, who were often so overworked they frequently had insufficient time to 
read their briefs, to the detriment of those who instructed them” .
English, spoken by the educated in the Eighteenth Century became more 
refined, in no small measure due to the influence of Swift, Steele, Addison , 
Johnson, Lord Chesterfield and other writers and arbiters o f taste. Poetry and verse 
flourished as well” . Public speakers had more words to decorate their speeches as 
many Latinisms were substituted for common words of Anglo-Saxon derivation 
which were seen as low, slangy or imprecise. The Century also saw a greater 
awareness of the possibilities of language to persuade, thus Lord Chesterfield 
advised his son to master oratory, "the art o f  speaking w e ll”, not because o f what 
people would think o f him if  he did n o t , but because it was foolish to neglect an 
accomplishment which would serve him well in later public life, whether it be in 
parliament, the pulpit, or at the bar. According to Chesterfield." “It is not enough to 
speak” the hearers language in "its utmost purity, and according to the rules o f  
grammar , but he must speak it elegantly , that is he must use the best and most 
expressive words and pu t them in the best order. He should likewise adorn what he 
says by proper metaphors, similes, and other figures o f  rhetoric; and he should  
enliven i t , i f  he can , by quick and sprightly turns o f  w it” On the forensic skill 
o f Lord Mansfield, Lord Campbell wrote his observations "seemed to suggest 
trains o f  thinking rather than to draw to conclusions; and so skillfully did he 
conceal his art that the hearers thought they form ed  their opinion in consequence 
o f  the working o f  their own minds, when in truth it was the effect o f  the most
”  Edmund Heward, L ord  M ansfield  : A B iography o f  William M urray 1st E arl o f  M ansfie ld  1705  
-  1793.  Chicester: Barry Rose, pp.46-47. Other changes brought about by Lord M ansfield  
included reducing the number o f  reserved judgem ents after hearings had finished and restricting  
rehearing o f  cases to when only real doubt existed  about the first.
” The period also experienced works written in verse on a vast range o f  subjects including law.
An example is C o k e ’s Reports  in Verse published by the legal bookseller John Worrall in 1742 
and reissued in the early 1800’s. Each case is summarized in a rhyming couplet appearing in the 
same order as the full cases in C oke’s Reports, with the case name at the head o f  the couplet. 
According to research undertaken by John K leefeld , author o f  From Brehons to Brouhahas: P oe tic  
Impulse in the Law, a paper delivered at the Institute o f  Advanced Legal Studies on the 17“' June, 
2009, this slim  volum e sold w idely but particularly amongst law students. Mr K leefeld  was 
interviewed on the 26**' June, 2009.
Lord C hesterfield’s letter to his son Novem ber T* 1739. C h esterf ie ld ’s Letters.  J M Dent and 
Sons, last reprinted 1975, pp. 3-4. Alexander Pope saw poetry as a means o f  aiding public 
speaking. In The F irst Epistle  o f  the Second Book o f  H orace ,m  John Butt (ed). The Poem s o f  
Alexander Pope, vol. IV 1737, reprinted by M ethuen, London 1939, page 189, Pope wrote: What 
w ill  a Child  learn sooner than a song? / What better  teach a Foreigner the tongue?/ W hat’s long  
or short, each accent where to p la c e ? /  A nd speak  in p u b lic  with some so r t  o f  grace?
refined d ia lectic” In taking this approach he appeared to follow Pope’s advice in 
his versified Essay on Criticism  :
“Men must be taught as i f  you taught them not
And things unknown proposed as things fo rg o t”
An indication of M ansfield’s eloquence may be seen in extracts from his 
famous verdict in 1772 in the famous case o f James Somerset” which, although 
M ansfield carefully avoided a general pronouncement of principle” , effectively 
ended slavery in Britain in 1772:
“On the part o f  Somerset, the case which we gave notice should be decided this 
day, the Court now proceeds to give its opinion. The state o f  slavery is o f  such a 
nature, that it is incapable o f  being introduced on any reasons, moral or political; 
but only positive law, which preserves its force long after the reasons , occasions, 
and time itse lf from  hence it was created, is erased from  memory: i t ’s so odious, 
that nothing can be suffered to support it but positive law. Whatever 
inconveniences, therefore, may fo llow  from  a decision, I  cannot say this case is 
allowed or approved by the law o f  England; and therefore the black must be 
discharged”.
It is believed, although not recorded in his judgm ent, that Lord M ansfield said 
further:
“The air o f  England is too pure fo r  a slave to breathe, and so everyone who 
breathes it becomes free. Everyone who comes to this island is entitled to the 
protection o f  English law, whatever oppression he may have suffered and whatever 
be the colour o f  his skin ”
Quoted by A. W. Cockburn QC, In Limine An Address  on A dvocacy  to the Christ Church Law  
Club, May IS**', 1952, published and gestetnered by the Faculty o f  Law, U niversity o f  
Southampton.
”  Works o f  A lexander Pope,  B ook X X , Wordsworth, 1995.
”  i? V Knowles, ex p a r te  Somerset,  1772, 20 State Trials 1; 98 Eng Rep 499; 1 Lofft 1 (KB 1772). 
”  See W ilfred Prest, William Blackstone and the Historians,  H istory Today, July 2006, page 49.
”  See Lord John Campbell, Lives o f  the C h ie f  Justices, Volum e 11, page 418. A lso  Lord 
D enning, then Sir A lfred D enning ,attributed sim ilar words to Lord M ansfield in Freedom Under  
the Law, The Hamlyn Lectures,  London; Stevens and Sons, 1949, page 7.
Classics and rhetoric.
In the 18th century, forensic oratory was shaped by the fact it was sometimes, 
particularly in important cases, addressed to special ju rors”  and peers in the House 
o f Lords, when that body was acting as a court. Members of these groups usually 
shared a background o f education in the classics, as did judges and many lawyers. 
At public schools such as Eton, Harrow, Rugby, Charterhouse, W estminster and
”  Most trials, both criminal and civ il were before common juries, selected from the general pool o f  
those eligib le to serve as jurors. However four non-standard common law types o f  juries existed in 
England. These were;
The Gentleman Jury -  men o f  high social and econom ic status;
The Struck Jury -  principal landowners selected from a list o f  forty-eight names;
The Professional Jury -  members o f  special knowledge or expertise, and
The Party Jury ( known by the Latin phrase “ jury de medietate linguae”) -  a jury for defendants 
at special risk o f  suffering prejudice. It was composed either w holly or in half o f  persons o f  the 
same race, sex, religion or origin.
The first three types were first recognized by a statute in 1730 ( 3 G eo.11 .c.25) under the general 
term “special jury”. The background o f  special jurors meant that they could usually be relied upon 
to find for the Crown in political cases and tried many in the late Eighteenth Century. This feature 
continued w ell into the first third o f  the Nineteenth Century when out o f  the small number o f  
criminal cases tried each year by a special jury, a significant number were political prosecutions 
(som e 183 between 1816 and 1834 -  Woodward, L. The Age o f  Reform  2nd edition, Oxford, 1962, p. 
31)The special jury was em ployed extensively in civil cases from 1770 to 1790, roughly 
corresponding to Lord M ansfield’s period as Lord C hief Justice o f  the Court o f  Kings Bench, when 
he used juries o f  merchants ( The Professional Jury) in the shaping o f  a coherent body o f  
commercial law. After Lord M ansfield, special juries o f  merchants, continued to be influential, 
especially during the first h a lf o f  the nineteenth century under Lords Ellenborough and Campbell. 
The Parliamentary Select Committee on Special and Common Juries o f  1867 found a burgeoning use 
o f  special juries in the Court o f  Common Pleas, Chancery, in the Divorce Court and in a great many 
Sheriffs Courts dealing with compensation cases. They attracted some criticism as an adjunct to the 
class system  ( Oldham, James, The Seventh Amendment and the Anglo-American Special Juries,
NY U  Press, 2006, chapter 8) . The Juries Act 1870 defined the class o f  persons entitled and liable to 
serve on special juries. As before, they were every man whose name was on the jurors’ book for any 
county and who was legally  entitled to be called an esquire, or was a person o f  higher degree, or a 
banker or merchant. An additional qualification o f  occupying a house o f  a certain high rateable 
value was added. A special juryman received a fee o f  one guinea for each cause, unlike common  
jurors who were unpaid. Either party to a case could obtain an order for a special jury but had to pay 
the additional expenses incurred unless the judge certified that it was a proper case to be tried by a 
special jury. Under the 1870 Act a special jury could not be ordered in cases o f  treason or felony  
and could only be ordered in misdemeanours when the trial was before the K ing’s Bench D iv ision  o f  
the High Court, or the civil side at assizes. The Party Jury was abolished in the Naturalisation Act 
o f  1870, which also gave foreigners the right to serve on juries. Special Juries remained on the 
statute book until 1949 (1971 for London) and the last case using a special jury was in London in 
1950. ( N eil Vidmar, World Jury Systems  Oxford University Press, 2000). Perhaps the m ost famous 
post war action heard by a special jury was the much publicized libel case o f  Laski  v The N ewark  
A dvertiser Co. L td  and P a r i ty ,  tried by Lord Goddard, then Lord C hief Justice o f  England, in 1947, 
and in which Sir Patrick Hastings, see later  Chapter 9, appeared for both the defendants.
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W inchester and at grammar schools the school curriculum was dominated by Greek 
and Latin. Teaching methods tended to be very traditional ^.Nonconformists were 
excluded from most public schools. They formed what became known as Dissenting 
Academies such as those at Daventry, W arrington and Hackney, the centre of 
dissenting education in London. The education received at these schools was more 
closely linked to the world of business and additionally comprised science and 
accountancy ”  . The grip o f Latin and Greek at public schools remained strong and 
it was only during the following century that attempts were made to extend what 
was taught with, for example, Samuel Butler’s introduction of mathematics and 
history at Shrewsbury School and Thomas A rnold’s provision of lessons in 
geography , modern history and foreign languages at Rugby. University education 
at Oxford and Cambridge, available only to professing Anglicans, still concentrated 
on A ristotle’s medieval logic and upon classical languages” .
Amongst the 18th century educated classes, of which lawyers were a part, there 
was considerable interest in classical rhetoric ( as indeed there was in the grand tour 
of Italy and the art and architecture of ancient Rome and Greece, which was imitated 
in neo-classicism”-  with the British, at the heart of an expanding territorial and trade 
empire, forming an image of themselves as the new Rome). This was heightened by 
the publication o f the texts on rhetoric by George Campbell in 1776 and Hugh
”  Shelley , it has been calculated, got through some 75 ,000 lines o f  Greek and Latin poetry and 
prose during his tim e at Eton, 1804 -10, many o f  them being constantly repeated. Eton gave 
priority to three authors: Homer, V irgil and Horace. Pote and W illiam s, Eton publishers, produced  
other books o f  classica l authors w hich were used at Eton, Harrow and other schools. The 1806 
edition o f  Potae  G raeci  included extracts, inter alia from Homer, H esiod, Theocrates, Euripides 
and Sappho. Other books published at this time included A eschyles, A esops fables and selections  
from Ovid and Tibullus. Ian Gilmour, The Making o f  the Poets. Byron and Shelley in Their Time, 
P im lico , London, 2003 . Page 100.
”  On the variety o f  schools and education in the 18*** Century see N icholas Hans, N ew Trends In 
E ducation In The Eighteenth Century, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951.
”  Instead o f  going to university. D issenters attended senior classes at the D issenting A cadem ies 
where a much wider curriculum was taught, including English, contemporary literature, history  
geography and po litics. See Irene Parker, Dissenting Academ ies in England. Cambridge 
U niversity Press, 1914. Some nonconform ists attended universities in Scotland, where there was 
also an em phasis on c lassica l languages.
” por an account o f  the range o f  classical influence on Eighteenth Century English society see 
Jeremy Black, Culture in Eighteenth Century England. A Subject f o r  Taste, Hambledon and London, 
2005, Chapter 8. See also, Mark Bradley, Classics and Imperialism in the British Empire, Oxford 
U niversity Press, 2010, which explores interactions between classics and imperialism during the 
heyday o f  the British Empire from the late 18*** to its collapse in the 20**^  Century.
Philosophy o f  Rhetoric, 1911, Funk and W agnalls, London and N ew  York.
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Blair in 1783 ” , both figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. Earlier, during the 
1760s, Adam Smith had written and lectured about rhetoric theory 63
Because rhetoric from classical times was an important influence on advocates 
and advocacy in Britain during the 18*, 19* and even parts o f the 20* Century, 
Appendix 1 contains an excursus on classical rhetoric which is intended to provide 
readers with a helpful background.
Forensic speeches, o f the classical variety, were distinguished by the length 
and complexity o f their sentences, many allusions to Greek and Latin literature and 
by strict subordination o f style to sense, at least in the best advocacy. In the worst, 
concern to create an impression o f balance and articulation over-rode presenting 
arguments clearly and accurately The subtlety and complexity of this style, rich 
in alliteration, antithesis, parallelism  and other rhetorical figures o f thought and 
language, can sometimes obscure the meaning o f particular passages from modern 
readers not highly trained in Latin and Greek syntax, and who are obviously 
unable to hear the deliverer's tone and inflection of voice and to observe his facial 
expressions and bodily gestures”  .
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres  ( with an introduction by Linda Ferreira-Buckley and S. 
M ichael Halloran), 2005, South Illinois U niversity.
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, 1985, Indianopolis, Liberty C lassics. A lso see, J.C.
Bryce (Ed ) Rhetoric and Belle Lettres, 1983, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.
”  Robert Graves, a classica l scholar as w ell as a n ovelist, presents M odestus, in Count B elisarius,  
C assells, 1938, Chapter 2, as a person in c lassica l times  who was given to strained rhetorical 
oratory, overly concentrating on style and numerous allusions, considered by him to assist 
clarity, an opinion not shared by certainly m ost listeners.
”  Being absent when oratory o f  whatever style is delivered was considered by Sir Norman  
Birkett, more than h a lf a century ago, in a Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club o f  the 
Faculty o f  Law in the U niversity o f  Birmingham, 7**' May, 1954:
“For the g rea t  utterances when reca l led  are without the f i r e  and g low  o f  the a d v o c a te ’s 
presence;  the dram atic  se tt ing  has vanished; and the m agica l moments have irrevocab ly  gone. It 
is c lear that the thing s a id  can hardly be sep a ra ted  from  the moment o f  its say ing  and g re a t  
advocacy  reaches its heights only at the very moments o f  its performance. It is des ign ed  and  
in tended f o r  one pa r t icu la r  occasion. Then and then only are to be seen the many elements which  
in combination make advocacy  what it is. The advocate  h im se lf  with his own d istinctive  
personality ,  his quick mind and understanding heart, his readiness, his resources, his courage;  
the pa r t icu la r  occasion with all its dramatic p oss ib il i t ie s;  the pa r t icu la r  theme, whether noble  
and lofty or tragic  and pitifu l:  the fo rm  and beauty o f  the words the advocate  employs; the f i r e  
and g low  and vehemence; the gestures, the voice, the expression -  all these things are f o r  the 
moment, and once gone, are gone beyond  recall. That is why the modern reader  o f  p a s t  fo re n s ic  
ora tory  fa l l s  to wondering  how those triumphs were ever achieved. It is not merely  that the 
oratory  su i ted  to one age is quite unsuited to another; it is that the one v i ta l  element o f  true  
a dvocacy  is m iss in g ”.
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The great exponents o f the ‘c lassicar style of forensic advocacy, in the later 
18th century were the trial managers, officers appointed by the High Court of 
Parliam ent to prosecute in impeachment proceedings,Edmund Burke (1729-1797)), 
Charles James Fox (1749-1806) and Richard Brinsley Sheridan (1751-1816), who 
were politicians as well as lawyers (Sheridan, o f course, was also an accomplished, 
though by far from affluent, playwright and friend o f the Prince o f Wales), in the 
impeachment trial before the House o f Lords o f W arren Hastings for alleged 
m isdeeds in India” . Hastings faced seven charges. After a trial which extended 
from 1788 to 1795 he was finally acquitted o f them all. The speeches made by 
Edmund Burke and Richard Brinsley Sheridan contained strong appeals to the 
emotions of their listeners. In a period which was certainly not embarrassed by 
sentiment, advocates, understood the truth o f Lord Chesterfield’s letter to his son 
written in 1746” .
“Wherever you would persuade or prevail, address yo u rse lf to the passions ; it is
by them that mankind is to be taken. I  bid you strike at the passions  I f  you can
once engage p eo p le ’s pride , love, pity, ambition (or whichever is their prevailing  
passion) on your side, you need not fea r  what their reason can do against y o u ”.
This is part o f Sheridan’s opening which he, in finely wrought and studied 
sentences, sought to excite strong feelings of hostility against W arren Hastings:
“The coolness and reflection with which this act was managed  proves the
prisoner to be that monster in nature, a deliberate and reasoning tyrant; other
”  See M arshall, P J. The Im peachment o f  Warren Hastings,  Oxford U niversity Press, 1965. A lso  
see F. E. Smith, The First Earl Birkenhead, Famous Trials, Hutchinson and Co, Ltd, 1930, The 
Trial o f  Warren Hastings,  pp. 151- 166, for a concise and live ly  account and for criticism  o f  the 
trial managers: But it is one thing to deliver a philipp ic , another to manage a p rosecu tion  (Page 
161). For a b rief history o f  im peachm ent trials in Britain and the United States, see Andrew  
W atson, Impeachments -  Past, P resen t and Future?  Justice o f  the Peace 1999, V ol. 163, pp. 468- 
472 and pp. 491 -494 .
”  From D ublin Castle on the 8**^  February, 1747. Unable to locate in L ord  C h es te r f ie ld ’s Letters,  
J. M. Dent and Sons, reprinted in 1975, but quoted by Richard DuCann, The A rt  o f  the Advocate,  
R evised  Edition, Penguin B ooks, 1993, page 193.
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tyrants o f  whom we read ............. were urged on to their crimes by the impetuosity o f
passion. High rank disqualified them from  advice, and perhaps, equally prevented  
reflection. But in the prisoner we have a man born in a state o f  mediocrity ; bred to 
a mercantile life; used to system, and accustomed to regularity; who was 
accountable to his masters and therefore compelled to think and deliberate on 
every part o f  his conduct. It is this cool deliberation I  say, which renders his 
crimes the horrible and his character the more atrocious”.
Edmund Burke's 15 speeches in the prosecution o f Hastings show much o f the 
influence o f Demosthenes” . The peroration of his final speech, much admired as a 
piece o f discourse, contains many tropes, figures of thought and of diction as 
taught in the handbooks of classical rhetoric including Cicero and Quintillian” .
The trial managers were also quite willing to use theatricality to achieve their 
objective. According to an account given by Edward Gibbon, Sheridan affected to be 
so overcome by the horrors described in his opening speech that he concluded it by 
collapsing into Burke’s arms’°. Nor was drama restricted to the floor of the House of 
Lords. It was reported on another occasion that Sheridan’s famous and glamorous
”  George Kennedy, C lassica l rhetoric  and its Christian and secular tradition from  ancient to 
modern times, Croom-Helm, 1980, pp.231-232 . For a more detailed description o f  m ethods 
em ployed by D em osthenes, see Hans Julius W olff, Demosthenes as A dvocate: The Functions and  
M ethods o f  L egal Consultants in C lassica l Athens, in Edwin Carawan, Oxford readings in the 
Attic  orators,  Oxford U niversity Press, 2007 , Chapter 5. M ichael Grant, Cicero S e lec ted  Works, 
Penguin, 1960, page 30, considered that Burke’s attack on Warren H astings owed much o f  its 
balance, symmetry and resonance to Ciceronian oratory  and noted that Burke exp lic itly  referred  
to Verres, the corrupt governor o f  S ic illy , who was successfu lly  prosecuted by Cicero.
”  Just to present one example, Burke, at the conclusion o f  a speech which lasted four days, set out 
a number o f  separate and quite distinct reasons to convict Warren Hastings:
“I  impeach Warren Hastings, Esquire o f  high crimes and misdemeanours.
I  impeach him in the name o f  Commons o f  Great Britain in Parliament assembled, whose  
Parliamentary trust he has betrayed.
I  impeach him in the name o f  all the Commons o f  Great Britain, whose national character he has 
dishonoured.
I  impeach him in the name o f  the peop le  o f  India whose laws, rights and liberties he has 
subverted, whose properties  he has destroyed, whose country he has la id  waste and desolate.
I  impeach him in the name and by virtue o f  those eternal laws o f ju s t ice  which he has violated.
1 impeach him in the name o f  human nature itself, which he has cruelly outraged, injured and  
oppressed, in both sexes, in every age, rank, situation, and condition o f  l i fe ”.
Classical rhetorical devices used here include anaphora, where a phrase, I  impeach him, is repeated 
at the beginning o f  successive lines and tricolon, a sentence o f  three clearly defined parts o f  equal 
length usually independent clauses and o f  increasing power, in the fourth sentence.
See Fintan O’Tool, A tra i to r ’s kiss : The life o f  R ichard Brinsley Sheridan 1751 -  1816. Granta 
Books, 1998.
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wife, the singer Elizabeth Linley, fainted in the middle o f one of Burke’s speeches 
detailing the torture of Indian women ’* .(Histrionics from advocates and members of 
the audience was, o f course, not entirely unknown in classical times, see Excursus in 
Appendix 1.)
Henry Brougham (1778-1868), who become Lord Chancellor o f England from 
1830 to 1834, practiced as a barrister from 1806, after his call to the English Bar. 
Brougham's greatest forensic triumph is generally held to have been the cross- 
examination of unsavoury witnesses and his magnificently eloquent closing speech 
in the "trial", before the House o f Lords in 1820, of Queen Caroline, accused by her 
husband George IV of infidelities as a ground for annulment of the royal marriage 
The peroration of his final speech was said to have been written and rewritten by him 
seventeen times. His speeches were heard, and later read, with enthusiasm. The 
peroration from his opening speech has often been quoted:
“Such my lords is the Case now before you! Such is the evidence in support o f  this 
measure - evidence inadequate to prove a debt -  important to deprive o f  a civil right 
-  ridiculous to convict o f  the lowest offence -  scandalous i f  brought forw ard to 
support a charge o f  the highest nature which the law knows -  monsterous to ruin the 
honour, to blast the name o f  an English Queen ” ’I
Following Caroline's acquittal. Brougham became one of the most popular figures 
in Britain. His forensic style, which was to affect other advocates of the time, was 
influenced by the oratory of classical antiquity, particularly that of Demosthenes and 
Cicero, about whom he wrote 'articles in the Edinburgh Review. He also published 
translations of Demosthenes’s "Chersonese oration” and "On the Crown’”'*.
’* Bernard K elly, Famous Advocates and their Speeches, London, Sweet and M axwell, 1921, page 
12 .
”  See Arthur Aspinall, L ord  Brougham and the Whig Party  (originally published in 1927), Nonsuch  
Publishing, 2005, Chapter 6. Sir George Hayter’s very large and detailed oil on canvas. The Trial o f  
Queen Caroline, painted between 1820-1823, may be seen in the National Portrait Gallery, London. 
”  Speeches o f  Henry L ord  Brougham, Adam and Black, Edinburgh, 1838, vol 1, page 227. It was 
quoted in Hornal V Neuberger Products Ltd. [1957] 1 Q. B. 247 a case concerning the burden and 
standard o f  proof in c iv il actions, by Lord Justice Hodson, page 263.
’ *^ In his masterpiece “On the Crown”, Dem osthenes (384-322B C ), who is generally considered to 
have been the greatest o f  all Greek orators and an inspiration to Cicero in Roman tim es, defended  
Ctesiphon, who had been charged by Aeschines on a legal technicality with offering a golden crown 
to Dem osthenes to honour him for his services to their city o f Athens. Ctesiphon was acquitted, thus
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Amongst his admirers, Brougham was considered to be the "Solon, Lycurgus, 
Demosthenes o f  the British Senate and Courts ”
Thomas Erskine, his triumphs and the morality of advocacy.
Brougham was a great devotee o f the late 18th century barrister, and fellow Scot, 
Thomas Erskine (1750-1823) and published commentaries on his speeches’^ . As a 
leader of the English Bar, Erskine ”  was profoundly influential on Courtroom 
oratory. It was the judgment of Lord Campbell, in his Lives o f  the Lord Chancellors 
that as an advocate Erskine was "without an equal in ancient or modern tim es”
His memory and reputation endured throughout the 19th century”  and in the early 
20th century. Bernard Kelly ”  variously described him as "that heaven horn
also vindicating Dem osthenes, and A eschines, a rival orator and supporter o f  Philip II o f  
M acedonia, was forced into exile. This was achieved not by the sort o f  measured and reasoned  
argument that Socrates might have em ployed but by brilliant rhetoric and the ability to condense 
long and com plex episodes in a few  masterly dramatic phrases. In the Attic plain tradition, 
D em osthenes’s style was relatively straight forward, though he made use o f  his body to accentuate 
his words. George Keeton {Harris on Advocacy  Eighteenth Edition, Stevens and Sons, 1943 ,Chapter 
1), commenting on D em osthenes’s denunciation, saw it as an acknowledged m odel o f  the 
prosecutor’s art, although it contained much that would not be permitted under modern advocacy; 
“he used every trick in the o ra to r ’s art - suggestion, abrupt transition from second  to th ird  person  
and back again, pre judice  (  against one o f  low alien birth), and the implied comparison between the 
mediocre talents o f  Aechines and his own brilliance to bring his accuser to confusion”. From the 
18**' Century generations o f  those attending public schools and grammar schools in Britain studied, 
read and translated the speeches o f  Dem osthenes, Socrates, especially The Apology  with its appeal 
to reason rather than em otion, and those o f  Cicero, particularly his speeches against the anti­
republican conspirator Cataline, in which he used similar forensic methods to those o f  
Dem osthenes.
”  Bernard K elly, Famous A dvocates and their Speeches,  Sweet and M axwell, London, 1921, Page 
82. Henry Brougham’s oratory, in and out o f  court, and ability in law was not universally lauded. 
W illiam Hazlitt, the essayist, wrote, in his Spirit o f  the Age,  published in 1825, “Mr Brougham  
speaks in a loud and unmitigated tone o f  voice, sometimes almost approaching a scream. He is 
fluent, rapid, vehement, f u l l  o f  his subject, with evidently a grea t deal to say, and regardless o f  the
manner o f  saying i t  As a lawyer, he has not hitherto been remarkably successful. He is not
profound in cases and reports, nor does he take much interest in the particular cause or show much 
adroitness in the management o f  i t ”. W illiam Hazlitt, Spirit o f  the Age, now published by K essinger  
Publishing Co, 2004, Mr Brougham, pp. 136-137.
See, for example. The Speeches o f  the Right Honourable Lord  Erskine When at the Bar, with a 
P reparatory  Memoir by the Right Honourable Lord  Brougham. Edited and published by James 
Ridgway. 4 Volum es. London, 1810.
”  On the career o f  Thomas Erskine, see John Hostettler, Thomas Erskine and trial by jury,  
Chichester, Barry Rose Law Publishers, 1996.
”  Volume VI (1845)
”  In late Victorian tim es. Sir James FitzJames wrote, Erskine was the most popu lar  and effective  
advocate who ever appeared  before the English Bar. Sir James FitzJames Stephen, A H istory  o f  The 
Criminal Law o f  England. M acM illan and Co, 1883, Chapter XXII, page 454.
”  Famous A dvocates and their Speeches, London: Sweet and M axwell, 1921, Chapter One, 
Historical Introduction.
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advocate”, the "Demosthenes o f  the English B a r” and "a gen ius”. Erskine's greatest 
achievements were as a jury - lawyer. His speeches are characterized by vigour 
cogency and lucidity, and often by real literary merit. As a young man, he had 
contributed to his self education by extensive reading, particularly in English 
literature. Whilst posted to Minorca, as a commissioned officer in the army, Erskine 
closely read Shakespeare, Dryden and Pope®*. Perhaps this, and a lack of formal 
education beyond a preliminary stage (it was said that, as a result of a patchy 
education, due to the limited financial resources of his family which, though 
aristocratic, had fallen hard times, his Latin was never more than moderate and that 
he had no Greek whatsoever®’), may explain why he made few allusions to Greek and 
Latin classics and little use o f ancient styles of oratory but concentrated on English 
literary worth in his speeches.
An aspect of Erskine's advocacy, held in much esteem by Brougham, was his 
courageous and passionate close identification in court with the causes he 
represented. Erskine's successful defence against nine counts of treason, before an 
Old Bailey jury in 1794, of Thomas Hardy, a principal member o f the "Friends of 
The People", which was allegedly planning an armed revolt similar to the French 
Revolution’in Britain, and who had helped form a group called the London 
Corresponding Society. Hardy, a shoemaker by trade, consistently maintained his 
objective was parliamentary reform. Sir John Scott, appointed Attorney General 
during the previous year and who subsequently rose to Lord Chancellor, known as 
Lord Eldon, directed the prosecution which lasted five days. He opened with a 
speech that was nine hours long and included a minute examination of Hardy’s deeds 
and the reading o f seized papers. Next came the prosecution witnesses, government 
spies and others arrested, but who had been intimidated into turning King’s evidence. 
Erskine’s opening speech was seven hours in length. He destroyed the Crown’s case 
reminding the jurors that treason was strictly to plot against the sovereign’s life and 
could not consist of merely offending the government. The prosecution had made 
much o f Hardy’s “further intentions” beyond parliamentary reform. Erskine told the 
jury that they had to concentrate on facts, not on probabilities. “I am not vindicating 
anything that can promote disorder in the country” he said, “but I am maintaining
®* Richard Hamilton, A ll Jangle and Riot- a b a rr is te r ’s history o f  the Bar, Professional Books, 1986, 
page 144.
82 Sean Gd\Ao,Thomas Erskine: Saviour o f  English Liberty,  Freeman, July 1989, V o l.39, N o7.
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that the worst possible disorder that can fall upon a country is when subjects are 
deprived of the sanction of clear and positive laws”. The seized papers according to 
Erskine indicated a desire to reform parliament, not to overthrow it. The credibility 
and consistency of the Crown’s witnesses were strongly attacked. After concluding 
his opening speech with a voice dying away to a near whisper, he called witnesses 
for the defence. Following closing speeches, the jury, after deliberating for three 
hours, returned an acquittal. At the time Erskine’s opening speech was widely seen 
as a forensic masterpiece, combining, in beautiful language, appeals to emotion with 
the reason o f hard logic. In our age, one writer®’ considered it "perhaps the greatest 
ever delivered in an English court and certainly the greatest that anyone has found  
in the voluminous series o f  the State Trials
The government continued with its prosecutions for treason. Next was that of 
John Horne Tooke, an elderly clergyman and philologist who had corresponded with 
Dr Johnson and was a friend and colleague of Whig leaders. Showing astute tactics, 
Erskine let Horne Took largely conduct his own defence. At one crucial point, 
however, Erskine took firm command by asking the Prime Minister, compelled to 
attend by a writ, if  he and Horne Took had once collaborated in introducing a 
Reform Bill. Pitt uncomfortably equivocated and the public gallery erupted with 
laughter. The jury found Horne Took not guilty in eight minutes .In the wake of the 
acquittals of Hardy and Horne Took, a jury trying John Thelwall, a young agitator 
who genuinely did admire the Jacobins in France, nearly automatically found him 
innocent. In this, and the two earlier trials, Erskine gave his services free of charge. 
His forensic efforts undoubtedly helped curb the repressive measures taken of the 
Pitt Ministry taken in response to the insecurity and hysteria in Britain in the 
aftermath of the revolution in France. Shortly after Thelwall’s trial other prisoners 
were released. Certain of obtaining convictions the government had drawn up 800 
arrest warrants, o f which 300 were signed. They were now abandoned. After 
studying Erskine’s speeches in cases of the highest political importance. Sir James 
FitzJames Stephen found that, although he was "fearless” and "independent”, he
®’ Sean Gabb, Thomas Erskine: Saviour o f  English Liberty, Freeman, July 1989, Vol 39, N o 7., page
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hardly ever collided with the judges by misrepresenting the law or attempting to 
induce juries to break it®'*.
Reflecting on Erskine’s career, which notably included successfully defending 
Lord George Gordon in 1781 on a charge of High Treason, after the enormously 
destructive anti-Catholic Gordon Riots in London, and representing Thomas Paine, 
in a case he did not win, indicted for seditious libel in i792, some®’ have seen his 
genius not so much in his sentences, which could strike as insipid, but in taking what 
was confused or obscure and making it absolutely plain, and in the arrangement of a 
great mass of points into one smooth and persuasive flow of argument. This allied to 
a clear and melodious voice (interestingly he carefully trained him self out of any 
traces of a Scottish accent, possibly because English jurors might otherwise have 
considered him uncouth and less persuasive, remembering adverse remarks made 
about David Hume and Adam Smith o f the Scottish Enlightenment when south of the 
border ®°) facial expression and gestures, calculated to reinforce the effect of his 
speech, combined to make him almost irresistible in argument. In addressing juries 
Erskine frequently began by displaying modesty, even self -  deprecation, and ended 
in a similar manner, emphasising that it was the evidence, not his endeavours, which 
demanded the verdict he sought ®’.
®'* Sir James FitzJames Stephen, A History o f  The Criminal Law o f  England, M acM illan and Co, 
London 1883, Chapter XXII page 454. In his view , in nearly thirty years as a barrister and a judge, 
counsel generally took the law as they found it and did not invite jurors to ignore it. He also, 
however, presents illustrations when they did. They are drawn, before his time as a barrister, from 
the famous trials for libel which led to F ox’s Libel Act 1792, the trials o f  the Chartists in 1841,
1842 and 1843, the later trials for trade conspiracies and from a long series o f  Irish trials starting 
after 1798 rebellion.
®’ See, for examples: C arrol C. Arnold, Lord  Thomas Erskine Modern Advocate  in Thomas Benson  
Edited Landmark Essays on Rhetoric, Hergamoras Press, California, 1993, pp.89-105, especially  pp. 
97-98 ; and Sean Gibb, Thomas Erskine: Saviour o f  English Liberty,  Freeman, July, 1989, Volume 
39, N o 7.
®° John Andrew Hamilton, Thomas Erskine, First Baron Erskine (1750-1823), Dictionary o f National 
Biography, 1885-1900, Volume 19, pp.437-438. Whilst a gentleman commoner at Trinity College , Cambridge , 
in 1776, Thomas Erskine won a prize in English declamation. Also see Sean Gibb, ibid. O f note, it is said that 
nowadays within the British advertising industry the most appealing and trustworthy accents are 
Scottish.
®’ The fo llow ing, at the end o f  his closing speech for Lord George Gordon, is an example o f  the use 
o f  this oratorical device, not unknown in ancient Rome :
Gentlemen, I  f e e l  entitled  to expect both from  you and the court the grea test  indulgence and  
attention. I  am indeed a grea ter  object o f  your compassion than even my noble f r ie n d  whom 1 am 
defending. He rests in conscious innocence and in w ell-p laced  confidence that it can suffer no 
strain in you r  hands. Not so with me. I  s tand before you  a troubled, and, I  am afraid, a guilty man, 
in having presu m ed  to accept the awful task which I  am now called  upon to perform - a task which  
my learned  f r ie n d  who spoke before me, though he has ju s t ly  risen by extraordinary capacity  and  
experience to the highest in his profession, has spoken o f  with distrust and diffidence which 
becomes every Christian in a cause o f  blood. Mr Kenyon has such feelings, what must be mine! Alas
4 8
In defending those charged with grave crimes, Erskine, Brougham and other 
counsel were prone to flights of rhetoric and dramatic description, to histrionic tricks 
and even tears. Sarcasm and aggression directed by them towards witnesses was also 
quite frequently employed. Characteristic o f Erskine’s advocacy was his repeated 
invocations of the deity. It has been said of him that "there was a special vigour 
firing  all o f  E rskine’s eloquence that bespoke a self-righteousness rooted in intense 
religious zeal rather than the law book learning o f  the law yer” ®®.
According to Lord Campbell, in his Lives o f  the Lord Chancellors^^, Erskine 
would take pains to dress him self when out o f London on circuit in a way to attract 
the favourable attention of the juries he was to address.
Erskine’s defence of Thomas Paine in 1792 had a significant effect on the 
practice of advocacy which endures to this day as a distinctive feature o f the Bar, 
known as the “Cab-rank” rule. In that year Paine, a radical writer whose writings had 
done much to support the American Revolution at critical times, was charged with 
seditious libel arising from publication of Part II of his work The Rights o f  Man.
This book, a bestseller which sold the then huge number of one and a half million 
copies, was critical of the monarchy and the aristocracy, proclaimed the need for 
universal public education, for children’s allowances and old age pensions, for 
public provision o f work and wages for the unemployed and for the financing of 
these measures by a progressive income tax°°. His trial was listed in absentia before 
the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Kenyon, and a Special Jury, selected by Crown lawyers 
and commenced on 18* December 1792.
Paine, wisely as it transpired, on the advice of the poet and artist William Blake 
and the moral philosopher Jeremy Bentham, had already left the country for what he
gentlemen who am I? A young man o f  little experience, unused to the bar o f  criminal courts, and  
sinking under the dreadful consciousness o f  my defects. I  have, however, this consolation, that no 
ignorance nor inattention on my p a r t  can poss ib ly  p reven t you  from  seeing, under the direction o f  
the judges, that the Crown has established no case o f  treason. Extract printed in S. C. Sarkar, Hints  
on Modern Advocacy and Cross-Examination, S. C. Sarkar and Sons (Private) Ltd, Calcutta, 1924, 
4*** Edition, pp. 172-173.
®® David M ellinkoff, The Conscience o f  a Lawyer, 1973, St Paul, West Publishing Co, page 247. The 
author draws attention to what Erskine said in his prosecution o f  the publisher o f  Tom Paine’s Age  
o f  Reason  ( Erskine lived by the Cab-rank Rule, see below ) The peo p le  o f  England are a religious  
people, and with the blessing o f  God, so fa r  as is in my power, I  w ill  lend my a id  to keep th em  SO . 
Rv W illiams (1797), 26 How. St.Tr.653, 668 (1816-1826).
Volume IV, referred to by Richard Du Cann, The Art o f  the Advocate,  Penguin Books, 1993, page 
53.
°°See Geoffrey Robertson, The Justice Game, London, Chatto and Windus, 1998, 478-480 and also  
Andrew Watson, A dvocacy f o r  the unpopular. Part 1, Justice o f  the Peace, V ol. 162, 1998, 476-480  
at 477-478.
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thought was the safety of Revolutionary France, although later he was to be proved 
cruelly, and nearly fatally, wrong.
Thomas Erskine, who was not strongly in sympathy with his views, received a 
brief to act for Paine. Erskine’s friends, who believed he might soon be appointed 
Lord Chancellor, urged him not to accept. In reply to one friend, he was reported as 
having said, “But I  have been retained, and I  will take it by G od” Erskine’s 
decision to act for Tom Paine certainly cost him a valuable retainer as an adviser to 
the Prince of Wales In the course of his speech to the special jury at the Old 
Bailey, criticized by some as largely a hymn of self-praise and for hardly offering 
jurors any arguments against convicting Paine ^ , Erskine said:
“I  will fo r  ever, at all hazards, assert the dignity, independence and integrity o f  
the English Bar, without which impartial justice , the most valuable part o f  the 
English Constitution, can have no existence. From the moment that any advocate can 
be perm itted to say he w il l , or will not stand between the Crown and the subject 
arraigned in the court where he daily sits to practice, from  that moment the liberties 
o f  England are at an end. I f  the advocate refuses to defend, from  what he may think 
o f  the charge or o f  the defence he assumes the character o f  the Judge; nay, he 
assumes it before the hour o f  judgment: a n d , in proportion to his rank and 
reputation puts the heavy influence o f  perhaps, a mistaken opinion in to the scale 
against the accused, in those favour the benevolent principle o f  English law makes 
all presum ptions ”
The Special Jury found Tom Paine guilty of seditious libel even before the Lord 
Chief Justice had an opportunity to sum up the case .He was sentenced to outlawry, a 
punishment medieval in origin, under which he was to be put to death if  he returned 
to England and his property was seized. The cab-rank rule expounded by Erskine, 
building on pre-existing rules of professional etiquette, fared considerably better.
John Hostettler, Thomas Erskine and trial by jury ,  Barry Rose, Chicester, 1996, Chapter 8, page 
91.
^  See Andrew W atson, A dvocacy f o r  the Unpopular,  Justice o f  the Peace. Volum e 163, 1998, pp. 
478-480.
^ For example Geoffrey Robertson, The Justice Game, Chatto and Windus, London, 1998, page 378. 
This v iew  is not shared by Hostettler, «5 Erskine and trial by ju ry ,  Barry Rose, Chicester and 
Sean Gabb, Thomas Erskine: Saviour o f  English L iberty  Freeman, July 1989,V o l.39, No7, who 
summarise Erskine's arguments to the jury. See page 96 and pp.3-4 respectively.
Speeches o f  the Right Honourable Lord Erskine, James Ridgway, 1810, Volum e 1, pp. 90-91.
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Like hackney carriage drivers who are obliged to convey all those who can pay their 
fares, the essence o f the rule is that barristers (it has never applied to solicitors) are 
obliged to act for all who have the wherewithal to instruct them, in areas of law in 
which they are competent, no matter what they personally think about the client or 
his or her case. The cab-rank rule was rapidly adopted as a moral basis for advocacy 
and was much championed by Lord Brougham in its early years A frequent toast 
at barristers’ dinners was ‘T o  Erskine and Independence”. The rule, deriving from 
1792, operates in England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Republic of 
Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa and a small number o f other 
countries It was not without its detractors who, far from seeing it as a noble ethic 
to ensure that even the grossly unpopular should not go unrepresented, perceived the 
rule to be pure convenient self interest by the Bar enabling its members to take any 
case they pleased for remuneration. Some reference^^ was made to Jonathan Swift 
(1667-1745) in G ulliver’s Travels in which he said of lawyers:
“they were a society o f  men bred up from  their youth in the art o fproving  by 
words multiplied fo r  the purpose that what is white is black and black is white 
according as they are p a id ”
As in earlier times, lawyers in the 18^ *^  Century were the object of popular 
suspicion William Hogarth, Isaac Cruickshank, James Gillray, Thomas 
Rowlandson and others, satirized the legal profession (either asleep or, worse, 
distracted by matters most uncourtly) as they did aristocrats, the French and 
politicians.
See, for instance. Brougham’s speech to the House o f  Lords in 1840, 55 Parliamentary Debates,  
House o f  Lords (5*** Series) August 10, 1840, cols. 1401-2. Cited by David Pannick, Advocates,  
Oxford University Press, 1992. page 141.
Andrew Watson, Advocacy f o r  the Unpopular,iwsûcQ o f  Peace, Volum e 162, 1998. page 476.
See Richard DuCann, The Art o f  The Advocate, Peguin, 1993, page 14.
Jonathan Swift, Gullivers Travels, 1726. Reprint, Harmondsworth Press, M iddlesex, 1985, page 
291. Detractors who were educated in the classics doubtlessly also referred to Hom er’s Illiad:
Yea, when men speak, that man I  most detest  
Who locks the verity  within his breast.
^ See Kirsten Olsen, D aily  Life in 18'^ Century England, The Greenwood Press, Westport, 
Connecticut, 1999, pp. 204-220. A number o f  caricatures and cartoons o f  lawyers from the period 
are shown in this book.
It has been said the cab-rank rule contributed much to advocacy strengthening it 
by the experience of acting both for the Crown and defendants and for plaintiffs and 
defendants in civil matters
The British nobility during the 18^  ^ Century were forced to recognize the great 
lawyers as their equals because Parliam ent was The High Court o f Parliament and 
politics were conducted in legal terms. The development o f advocacy affected the 
House o f Commons, where a great speech could be decisive in winning a vote, as 
mueh as the courts: one closely affected the other. In both the eloquence o f an 
Erskine too easily still sank to mere abuse. Use of impressive forensic skills in 
parliamentary debates, however, helped propel Spencer Perceval (1762-1812) up 
through the legal offices o f Solicitor General and Attorney General to become 
Prime M inister (1809-1812)^'. In the 19^  ^ Century barristers were to account for 
one fifth of the members of the House of Commons, were well represented in every 
government and provided a steady flow of recruits to the House of Lords
Romilly and Copley.
Another barrister, praised in his time, whose style of advocacy is credited with 
having influenced others in the late 18th century was Sir Samuel Romilly (1757- 
1818). Well educated and a good classical scholar he was called to the bar in 1783 
and soon developed an extensive, and highly lu c ra t iv e p ra c t ic e ,  mainly in 
chancery matters. His great abilities were recognized by the Whig party. He was 
made solicitor general in 1806 in the cabinet of Lord Grenville and remained until it 
fell. Thereafter, he devoted his great eloquence to exposing the barbarity of the 
criminal law , under which, in the “Bloody Code”, a vast number of offences (nearly 
two hundred) were punishable by death, and campaigning for its humane reform. In 
this, and as a barrister, he was said to have ''marshalled his premises and deduced his 
conclusions with mathematical precision, and his diction was as chaste as his logic
Interview with Anthony Arlidge QC. Held on SO**' October, 2007.
A lan Harding, A Socia l H istory  o f  English Law, Penguin, 1966, page 291.
D aniel Duman, The English and Colonial Bars in the Nineteenth Century, Croom Helm, 
London, 1983, Chapter 6.
Daniel Duman, r/ze English and Colonial Bars in the Nineteenth Century, Croom-Helm, London, 
1983, page 145.
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was cogent. The unerring instinct with which he exposed a fa llacy united to no small 
power o f  sarcasm and invective, made him form idable in reply while the effect o f  his 
easy and impressive elocution was enhanced by a tall and graceful figure, a 
melodious voice and features o f  classical regularity''
John Singleton Copley, Lord Lyndhurst (1772 -  1863), who, in 1827, 1834 and 
1840, became the only North American born Lord Chancellor to date, was 
recognized as a great advocate in patent cases. Unusually for one who specialized in 
civil matters, he also excelled in criminal trials. A Luddite machine breaking case, 
Rv Ingham  *°^ at Nottingham Assizes in 1812, in which his client was charged with 
hostile activities towards ‘proprietors of a silk and lace cotton factory’, saw him take 
the point that one of the two factories involved made cotton lace, and the other silk 
lace; neither o f them made ‘silk and  cotton lace’*°^  On this technical point the 
indictment facing the prisoner was bad and consequently he was acquitted. At that 
time the rules of criminal pleading remained very strict*®^ . Copley was carried 
shoulder high in triumph by his friends, work flooded in and the next year he was 
appointed a serjeant. In 1816 Copley’s civil practice was boosted by his advocacy in 
Boville and Moore and Others, before Chief Justice Gibbs and a special ju ry  in the 
Court of Common Pleas at the Guildhall in London*®*. He successfully defended an 
action brought against his clients for infringement of a patent. Copley gained 
distinction for the clear way he explained the intricacies of the machine concerned, 
having intensively studied it for two days’ previously in Nottingham 
Copley’s defence of Arthur Thistlewood and James Watson at the Old Bailey in 1817 
attracted much publicity. In December 1816, a mass meeting took place at Spa
Dictionary o f  National Biography (Ed Sidney Lee, 1897), V ol. 49, page 190. See also R.A. 
Melikan, Romilly, Sir Samuel (1757  -  1818), published 2004, Oxford Dictionary o f  N ational 
Biography. For more on the lifeand achievements o f  Sir Samuel Rom illy, see John Hostettler, 
Champions o f  the Rule o f  Law, Waterside Press, 2011, Chapter 11.
105 Unreported in the law reports.
Dictionary o f  National Biography, Volume IV pp. 1108, T.M.
Richard Hamilton, All Jangle and Riot, Professional Books, 1986 pp. 261-262. H owever, after the 
Criminal Procedure Act 1851 trivial indictment flaws and variances no longer won an accused his or 
her freedom - see Bentley, David, English criminal ju s t ic e  in the nineteenth century, Hambledon 
Press, London, 1998, Chapter 13, and later. Chapter 3.
*®* Unreported in the law reports, but a short hand note was taken by W. B. Gurney and printed by
G.W oodfall for the use o f  the P laintiff in 1816.
Copley was able to convince the court that the P la in tiffs  machine was only an improvement on
the Spinning Jenny invented by Mr Heathcote, some years ago, who was then enabled to obtain 
substantial reward forhis invention. National Dictionary o f  Biography,  Volum e IX, page 1109.
T.M.
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Fields**®. A revolutionary organization, the Society of Spencean Philanthropists, 
planned to encourage rioting at this meeting and then take control of the government 
by seizing the Tower of London and the Bank o f England. The meeting was 
dispersed by the authorities and the leaders, including Thistlewood and Watson, 
arrested and later charged with high treason. Against much evidence, Copley secured 
their acquittal. His performance was greatly acclaimed. Lord Campbell, who was 
present at the Court of Kings Bench Westminster, described his address to the jury, 
of which unfortunately no written record survives, "as one o f  the ablest and most 
effective ever delivered in a Court o f  Justice ” and “ the whole as a close chain o f  
reasoning on the evidence as applicable to the charge ***. Compliments were paid to 
him including comparisons to Cicero, again reflecting the influence of the classics in 
that that age **^. Throughout his career at the bar, Copley enjoyed a reputation for 
tempered advocacy', he was said to he scrupulous and dignified, an excellent speaker 
with a talent for cross-examination , who never overstepped the bounds of 
courtesy***.
Advocacy from Ireland.
In 1793 711 barristers practised in Ireland, compared with only 604 for the 
whole of England and Wales**'*. The busy centre of Irish law, the Four Courts in 
Dublin, had acquired something of a reputation as a theatre where parties, witnesses 
and barristers frequently had groups of cheering supporters and where cases often 
involved a noisy battle of wits and free trading of insults. A good barrister was 
considered a major prize and many women attended the Four Courts with the hope of 
seeing their heroes in action. The Act of Union with Great Britain in 1800, and the
**® See M alcolm Chase, Arthur Thistlewood, radical and revolutionary, Oxford Dictionary o f  
N ational Biography.
*** Lord Campbell, Lord  Chancellors and Keepers o f  the Great Seal o f  England. John Murray, 
London, 1869, Volume VIII, Chapter 2, page 17.
**^  Dictionary o f  National Biography  Volume IV, page 1109.
*** Gareth Jones, Copley, John Singleton, Baron Lyndhurst (1772 -  1863), published 2004, Oxford 
Dictionary o f  National Biography and see Sir Theodore Martin, A life o f  L ord  Lyndhurst from  letters  
and pa p ers  in possession  o f  his fa m ily  . John Murray, London, 1883.
**'* A B rie f  history o f  the Irish Bar from  the 18'^ Century to the Present. The Bar Council o f  Ireland, 
2012. By 1835 in England and W ales the number in practice had increased to 1,300 and in 1846 had 
grown to 3,080, including 28 serjeants at law and 74 Queens Counsel.
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disappearance of the Parliament of Ireland *** had been resolutely opposed by most of 
the Irish Bar. This led to many eloquent and persuasive speeches on the subject and 
to Dublin becoming a “great school o f  oratory, in which all the graces and treasures 
o f  language , intellect and learning were united to sway or to convince” These 
developments in oratory were transferred to forensic address in the courts.
The type of forensic address to juries was typically, emotive, flamboyant, 
delivered with gusto and contained a profligacy o f words. A simple statement of 
facts was seldom enough. An illustration of this form of advocacy may be seen in an 
excerpt from a speech by John Philpot Curran (1750- 1817) in 1804 ( Curran, the 
“Irish Erskine” was a leading member of the Irish Bar and had defended with 
brilliance, though without success, the United Irishmen, following their failed 
uprising in 1798 ). A master of rich word painting, fiery denunciation, use of 
ridicule, pathetic description and gifted with a prodigious memory, enabling him to 
deliver vast speeches without any note, Curran acted in 1805 for a young and poor 
clergymen, the Reverend Massey, whose twenty four year old wife had been 
allegedly enticed from him, although she appeared to go quite voluntarily, by the 
rich and elderly Cornish aristocrat, the Marquess of Headfort. The Marquess and the 
cleryman’s wife made off together whilst her husband was preaching in church on 
Sunday:
“The Cornish plunderer intent on sp o il, callous to every touch o f  humanity, 
shrouded in darkness, holds out fa lse  lights to the tempest-tossed vessel [the wife], 
and lures her, and her p ilo t [the husband] , to that shore on which she must be lost 
fo r  ever; the rock unseen, the ruffian invisible, and nothing apparent but the 
treacherous signal o f  security and repose; so this prop o f  the throne, this p illar o f  
the State, this stay o f  religion, this ornament o f  the Peerage, this common protector
***See Maire and Connor Cruise O’ Brien, A Concise History  Thames and Hudson, 1985,
Chapter 5.
Bernard K elly, Famous advocates and their speeches, London: Sweet and M axw ell, 1921, page 
19. The essayist, W illiam Hazlitt, writing in 1825, saw Irish oratory rather differently: It is a sort o f  
aeronaut; it is always going up in a balloon, and breaking its neck, or coming down in a parachute.  
It is f i l l e d  fu l l  with gaseous matter, with whim and fancy, with alliteration and antithesis, with  
heated passion  and b loa ted  metaphors, that burst the slender, silken covering o f  sense; and the airy  
pageant, that g li t tered  in empty space and rose in all the bliss o f  ignorance, f lu tters  and sinks down  
to its native bogs. A little further Hazlitt writes o f  Irish orators p lay in g  with words, ranging them 
into all sorts  o f  fantastic  combinations. W illiam Hazlitt, Spirit o f  the age. Republished by K essinger  
Publishing Co, U SA, 2004, page 133. It is not possible to discover the extent to which H azlitt’s 
opinions were shared.
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o f  the p eo p le ’s privileges and o f  the Crown’s prerogative, descends from  these high 
grounds o f  character to muffle h im self in the gloom o f  his base and dark designs , to 
play before the eyes o f  the deluded wife and the deceived husband, the fa irest lights 
o f  love to the one and the hospitable regards to the other, until she is at length 
dashed on that hard bosom where her honour and her happiness are wrecked and 
lost fo rever ............... ”
As can be seen, allusion is piled on analogy, metaphor and simile and syllogism 
is strongly present. These were elements in English advocacy of the time, but they 
were taken further in Ireland***.
Like the Scots, the Anglo-Irish were an important source of barristers for the 
English Bar, either by Irish barristers choosing to practise there or by young men 
qualifying directly to become barristers in London **®. They frequently took the style 
o f advocacy in Ireland with them, contributing to that in England. One example of 
this was Charles Phillips (1787 -  1859), called to the Irish Bar in 1812 and who was 
admitted to that in England at Middle Temple in 1821. He was Curran’s biographer*^® 
and friend. Phillips, with his florid advocacy, became the leading criminal barrister 
at the English Bar.
Catholics had been prevented from being lawyers since 1688. The Catholic Relief 
Act o f 1791 allowed them to be called to the Bar of England and Wales (similar Acts
**^  See F. Roderick O ’ Flanagan, The Munster Circuit, Sampson, Low, Marston and Searle, London, 
1880, Chapter XIV Immorality Rebuked
*** The Reverend M assey was awarded £10,000 by the jury. In both Ireland and England actions for 
criminal conversion crim con, by which a cuckolded husband was allowed to sue his w ife ’s seducer 
for damages, usually attracted many spectators in court and were w idely reported in the newspapers 
( See Ben W ilson, The Making o f  Victorian Values: Decency and Dissent in Britain: 1789-1837, 
Penguin, 2007 , Chapter 5.) Cases were often brought as a prelude to an action for a divorce mensa  
et thoro, e ffectively  a claim for judicial separation. In England they were heard by a specia l ju r y  o f  
gentlemen o f  fortune, ( Lord M ansfield encouraged their use.) consisting o f  twenty four jurors 
selected  from freeholders o f  substance, knights and urban gentry. Damages set by them could be as 
great as £15 ,000 , indicating the high value placed on a gentlem an’s honour. Once awarded the 
defendant either paid up, came to an arrangement with the husband or was arrested, his goods seized  
and put into a debtors prison. The Divorce Reform Act 1857 abolished the action o f  criminal 
conversion in England and W ales.
For another exam ple o f  Curran’s richly worded and em otive advocacy to a special jury, see an 
extract o f  his speech, contained in Great Orators, Statesmen and Divines,  Edinburgh, W. P. Nim m o, 
Hay and M itchell, 1914, pp. 75-79, on behalf o f  M ichael Hamilton Rowan, indicted for seditious 
libel, delivered 29*** January, 1794. Curran also makes generous allusions to Leonidas and Sparta.
**® Bernard K elly, Famous Advocates and their Speeches, Sweet and M axwell, London, 1921, page 
19.
*^® Charles Phillips, Curran and his contemporaries. W illiam Blackwood, 1850.
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permitted them to join the Bar o f Ireland (ini 792) and the Bar o f Scotland (ini 793)). 
Following the Catholic Relief Acts appreciable numbers o f Catholic Irishmen started 
to practice at the Irish Bar. Perhaps the most renown o f these was Daniel O’ Connell 
(1775-1847). In 1794 he was admitted to Lincoln’s Inn. Two years later O’Connell 
transferred to the K ing’s Inn, Dublin and was called to the Irish Bar in 1798. For the 
next decade he practiced mainly in the south of Ireland and established a great 
reputation for eloquent advocacy in court which, on occasion, was also combined 
with considerable daring and some theatricality*^*. Like Curran, he was not 
embarrassed to use emotion on jurors. A great many anecdotes circulated about him. 
When defending in case of murder, O’Connell was repeatedly interrupted by a 
hostile but inexperienced judge. Rather than tolerate what he saw as badgering 
O’Connell told the judge "since you refuse me permission to defend my client, my 
Lord, I  leave his fa te  to your hands, his blood be upon your head i f  he is 
condemned”, and left the courtroom. The judge was apparently so terrified that he 
acquitted the defendant*^\ In another murder case, the key piece o f evidence was a 
hat identified by a prosecution witness. On cross-examination, O’Connell held up the 
hat and “read” the defendant’s name from the inside. He asked the witness to 
confirm that the name was on the hat when it was discovered, and the witness had 
not merely written the name on the hat. Then, he held up the hat, which had no name 
in it, and demanded that the case be closed*^*. In the political sphere, O’Connell later 
used his lawyer’s forensic and organizational skills in campaigning for the removal 
of barriers to Catholics holding public office in both England and Ireland ( achieved 
in the Catholic Emancipation Act 1829) and for the repeal o f the 1800 Act of Union 
between Great Britain and Ireland. His work for these causes outside and inside 
Westminster, where he was the wild card in politics, made him the first key figure of 
Irish national awareness since the failed uprising against British rule in 1798.
O f his oratorical ability it was said:
“He had the power to make other men hate or love, laugh or weep, at his good  
pleasure...Daniel O ’Connell, by virtue o f  being more intensely Irish, carrying to a
121
122
National Dictionary o f  Biography, Volume XIV, pp. 816-817.
Patrick M. Geoghegan, King Dan, The Rise o f  D aniel O ’ Connell 1775-1829,  Gill and 
M acM illan, 2008, Page 78.
*'* Ibid, Page 77.
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more extravagant pitch all Irish strength and passion and weakness, than other 
Irishmen, led and swayed his people by a kind o f  divine, or else diabolic r igh t”
O’ Connell was aware of the danger of being carried away by his own oratory and 
was seen, on occasions, to have a piece o f paper before him on which was written:
"A speech is a good th in g , but never forget the verdict is the th ing”
Importantly Catholic Irish barristers, began to join the English Bar and young 
talented Catholic Irishmen to qualify as English barristers without first becoming 
barristers in Ireland*^® Whilst their forensic oratory had at times direct, forceful, 
tumultuous and passionate aspects, its practitioners drew on a spoken and literary 
tradition, as deep and abundant as that of the Anglo-Irish, and which valued graces, 
treasures and lyricisms of language allied to intellect and learning Their presence 
at the English Bar stimulated and influenced the style of effective advocacy*^*. In the 
late 19^  ^Century this was particularly true o f Charles Russell, called to the bar at 
Lincolns Inn in 1859, and who, after a distinguished career, became Lord Chief 
Justice of England in 1894, the first Catholic to hold that position for many 
centuries*^®.
Jewish members of the legal profession.
John M itchell, Jail Journal, \^5A, N ew  York, The Citizen, page 15.
Richard Du Gann, The A rt o f  the A dvocate, 1993, Penguin Books, page 196.
Bernard K elly, Famous A dvocates and their speeches, London, Sweet and M axw ell, page 12 and 
page 18.
Some had an awareness o f  Brehon law, Ireland’s indigenous system o f  law dating from Celtic 
tim es, which survived until the 17**' Century, when it was finally supplanted by English Common 
Law. It was administered by Brehons, the successors to Celtic druids. Their role was to preserve and 
interpret the law rather than expand it. Great attention was paid the use o f  elegant language in 
judgem ents, which were som etim es delivered in verse. See Laurence Ginnell, The Brehon Laws: A 
L egal Handbook, T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1894. A lso  see John K leefeld, From Brehons to 
Brouhahas : P oetic  Im pulses in the Law. a paper delivered at the Institute o f  Advanced Legal Studies 
on 17**' June, 2009.
*^ * In 1835 the number o f  barristers originating in Ireland and practicing at the English Bar was 21 ( 
8.7 o f  the total). By 1885 the figure had risen to 50 (7.9 o f  the total). The corresponding statistics 
for barristers o f  Scottish origin are 10 ( 4.1) in 1835 and 37 (5.9 o f  the total) in 1885, Daniel 
Duman, The English and C olon ial Bars in the 19‘^  Century, Croom H elm ,I983, page 12. The 
influence o f  both greatly exceeded their numbers.
*^® See Chapter 4.
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Francis Henry Goldsmid (1808 -  1878) was admitted to Lincoln’s Inn in 1833. He 
was the first Jewish barrister and became a QC in 1858 **°. In a century which saw . . 
the removal of legal disabilities against Jews, more entered the legal profession as 
barristers and solicitors, expanding the pool of talented advocates, and some became 
eminent judges. Amongst them were Judah Phillip Benjamin, Sir George Jessel, 
Arthur Cohen and Rufus Isaacs ***. Particularly because integration, and through it 
success, was emphasized, especially amongst established Jewish families, patterns of 
speech in c o u rt, as in other places of public life , did not depart from the mainstream
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William Blackstone, literature and poetry.
Regarding other factors in the development of advocacy in the late eighteenth and 
early 19th century, the publication by William Blackstone ( greatly influenced by 
Lord M ansfield’s wide learning and forceful thinking), of his Commentaries on the 
Laws o f  England ,in four volumes originally between 1765 and 1769, was o f much 
significance.
At the age of 15, William Blackstone ( 1723- 80), having been an outstanding 
pupil at Charterhouse School and noted as a promising poet, entered Pembroke 
College, Oxford , where he wrote poetry and a treatise on architecture. He became a 
fellow of All Souls in 1743. After graduating in civil (Roman) law at Oxford 
University Blackstone was called to the Bar at Middle Temple and practiced common 
law. Difficulty in obtaining clients and a preference for academic life prompted him 
to abandon the bar and return to Oxford. Prominent in college business and 
university politics, he also began a popular course o f lectures on English law and 
government, subjects not previously taught at Oxford or Cambridge, then the only 
universities in England. The success of these lectures led to his appointment in 1758 
to a newly endowed professorship of English Law***.
**® Louise S Goldsmid ( his W ife), M em oirs o f  Sir Francis G oldsm id Bart, 1882, C Kegan Paul and 
Co.
*** Arthur Goodhart, F ive Jewish Law yers o f  the Common Law, Oxford University Press, 1949.
**^  Interview with Gerald Rabie, SO**' July, 2009.
*** W ilfred Prest, Blackstone and his Com m entaries, Hart Publishing 2009, Introduction.
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Blackstone’s course of lectures formed the basis of his Commentaries which 
comprised the first methodical treatise since the Middle Ages on common law, 
suitable not only for lawyers, but also for a lay readership. As an exposition of 
English law it was a phenomenal success read widely not only in Britain but also the 
colonies. An edition published in Philadelphia in 1771 sold at least fourteen hundred 
copies **\Written in a clear, dignified, graceful and attractive style, which put them 
within the category of literature, though loosing no opportunity for embellishment, 
Blackstone’s Commentaries performed for educated society much the same service 
as was rendered to the people of ancient Rome by the publication o f previously 
unknown laws; they were provided with a good general knowledge ***. They also 
became an important, though not uncontroversial, element in the education of 
lawyers In the opinion of Bernard Kelly the elegance of style o f the 
Commentaries "enriched the vocabulary o f  the Bar, and so may be said to have 
influenced in a very high degree the oratory o f  the Courts, which from  this time 
forw ard  became increasingly ornate ” **’ .
An increasing tendency to quote from poetry added further to more decorous 
advocacy***. By the late 18^  ^ and early 19^  ^ centuries, the store of verse on which it 
was possible to draw had grown considerably with the works of the Romantic poets, 
including Wordsworth, Coleridge, Blake and later Shelley, Keats, Byron and Heine. 
Allusions to the still evolving novel could also sharpen an appeal to emotion**^. 
Pieces from Byron and Sir W alter Scott came to be considered by barristers as
**'* On the reception o f  Blackstone in the United States, see Shick v. U nited States, \9 5  US 65, 66 
(1904) and Lawrence M. Friedman, A H istory o f  Am erican Law, Simon and Schuster, 1973, pp. 88- 
89.
*** Some what later they were to be caricatured by Jeremy Bentham as reactionary, glorifying the 
status quo and opposed to all reform: see Wilfred Prest, William Blackstone and the H istorians, 
History Today, July 2006.
**® John Scott, Lord Eldon, who served as Lord Chancellor ( 1801-1806 and 1807-1827 ), was 
particularly critical and said that lawyers had been made cheap by learning the law from 
B lackstone’s. He asserted the superiority o f  Coke on L ittleton  written by Sir Edward Coke and first 
published in 1629. As a student, John Scott had abridged this work for his own use. Bernard K elly, 
Famous A dvocates and their Speeches, London, Sweet and M axw ell, 1921, page 18.
**^  Bernard Kelly, Famous A dvocates and their Speeches,LoTidon: Sweet and M axwell, 1921, page 
18.
*** Bernard K elly, Famous A dvoca tes and their Speeches, London, Sweet and M axwell, 1921. The 
author wrote, pp. 20-21, “The Courts o f  law could not hut im itate the general sp ir it which shone  
fo r th  in speeches and addresses o f  the highest excellen ce”.On  the use o f  poetry and other literature 
before jurors in the Nineteenth Century see also J.A. Foote, P ie  po w d er from  the Law Courts, John 
Murray, London,1911, pp. 85-90.
**® On the use o f  19*** Century sentimental novels in speeches to jurors see M ichael M illender, The 
Transform ation o f  the A m erican Crim inal Trial 1790-1875, Doctoral Dissertation, Department o f  
History, Princeton University,Chapter 7.
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especially helpful in awakening generous sympathies of jurors. It can be surmised 
that Sir Walter Scott, who was not only a great imaginative writer but also a devoted 
practical lawyer and Clerk of Session of the Scottish Supreme Court, would have 
thoroughly approved of the purposes to which his work was put. Indeed in Guy 
Mannering he put the following words in the mouth of Counsellor Pleydel
“A lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic -  a mere working mason; i f  
he possesses some knowledge o f  these he may venture to call h im self an architect’d.
The Romantic movement and the Gothic novel , pioneered by Horace Walpole in 
The Castle o f  Otranto (1794) and Ann Radcliffe, The Mysteries ofU dolpho  ( 1794 ) ,  
represented a move by sections of educated society away from cold classical 
formalism, so dominant in education and intellectual thought and endeavour, towards 
wider interests and deeper sympathies, thus widening the scope in forensic oratory 
for appeals to emotion *'**.
Shaping o f stare decisis.
The Eighteenth Century was not only when more refined language and literary 
allusions became available for use by advocates, but also when important changes in 
legal argument employed by advocates took place.
Although by the Seventeenth Century, the start o f which this thesis begins, courts 
were paying more attention to precedents, valuing them more significantly than ever
Walter Scott, Guy M annering, 1815, P. D. Garside edition, 1999, Page 259.
In his Rhetoric, Aristotle identified three modes o f  persuasion : Logos, the art o f  deductive 
logical proof ; Pathos, playing on the audience’s em otions to put them in a certain frame o f  mind 
and Ethos which relies on the good character o f  the speaker to influence others. ( See Appendix I o f  
this thesis. ) Clearly appeals to emotion by advocates alluding to literature correspond with Pathos. 
Citing literature also relates to Ethos in that it invokes the authority o f  the author, or subject, o f  the 
work, who may be greatly respected, and enlists him or her in the advocate’s cause.( A ristotle, 
him self, categorized literary figures as ancient w itnesses. ) A lso, in the eyes o f  jurors, it may have 
enhanced the advocate as a literate and learned person, even i f  some members o f  the jury were 
unfamiliar with the literary references made. In 18**' and 19*** Century society, marked by great 
social deference, this may w ell have been highly significant in persuading jurors who were often  
less educated than the advocate. For those o f  similar education to the advocate, citations from 
literature they knew may have confirmed, psychologically , that advocate was one o f  them and, 
therefore, should be trusted.
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before, judges did not consider themselves bound by individual previous court 
decisions. Emphasising their obligation to abide by statutes , they declined to follow 
precedents referring to the Roman Law maxim judicandum est legibus non exemplis ( 
adjudication is to be according to declared law , not precedent) and their consciences 
if  they thought a judgement of another court was erroneous*'*^.
Not until the Eighteenth Century did the modern doctrine of stare decisis , ie earlier 
decisions must be followed when the same points arise in litigation, begin to take 
shape, a process that that was not complete until the first decades of the next 
century*'**.
The consequences for advocates of precedent moving from the periphery to 
the nub of the common law system were substantial *'*'*. Submissions before courts 
had to be constructed much more on the authority of cases, as the building bricks of 
legal argument (rather than broad legal principles ). This necessitated greater 
research before hand of law reports to identify those that appeared relevant because 
of their factual similarity. If  previous cases did not entirely resemble the facts of the 
present case, compelling reasons had to be put why they should, nonetheless, be 
followed. Conversely, arguments had also to be fashioned to persuade judges to 
distinguish past cases on their facts that were unfavourable to their client’s position.
*^*^ See N eil Duxbury, The nature and authority o f  preceden t, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 
Chapter 11, pp.31-37.
*^** J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal H istory, Butterworths, 2002, Chapter 12, pp. 195- 
201. See also Gerald J. Postema, Philosophy o f  the Common Law, in The Oxford H andbook o f  
Jurisprudence and P hilosophy o f  Law, ed. J. Coleman and S. Shapiro, Oxford University Press, 
2002, pp. 588-622 at 589. For the somewhat later crystallization o f  sta re  decisis  in the United  
States, see Frederick G. Kemplin, P receden t and Stare D ecisis: The C ritica l Years, 1800 to 1850 
(1959) 3 American Journal o f  Legal History, pp. 28-54.
*'*'* See Laurence Goldstein edited P receden t in law , Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987: The Rule o f  
P receden t, Theodore M. Benditt, pp. 89-106; T/jeor/es o f  A djudication  and the Status o f  S tare  
D ecisis , Peter W esley-Sm ith, pp.73 -87 and Changes in the D octrine o f  P recedent during the 19^ ^
Century, Jim Evans, pp. 35-72.
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Chapter Two : Prohibition Against Counsei in 
Felony Triais and the Consequences of its Erosion
Many believe that English justice has always possessed certain fundamentally 
fair qualities, including a right to legal representation in court. It, therefore, often 
comes as a quite a surprise, if  not a shock, to learn just how little opportunity existed 
well into the 19th century for professional advocacy on behalf o f defendants, known 
as “prisoners” until the last century, in serious criminal trials. Until the reign o f King
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Henry I (1100 to 1135), persons tried both for felonies, serions offences rendering 
those guilty liable to loose everything, including their lives, and for misdemeanours, 
lesser matters, were allowed to make their defence in court by counsel. The Leges 
Henrici Primi, written in the early twelfth century, referred to circumstances in 
which an accused was or was not entitled to counsel. It shows that persons indicted 
for felony were not *'**. Somewhat strangely, the prohibition did not extend to trials of 
misdemeanours: the accused was entitled to a full legal defence, although the right 
was seldom exercised if  he or she had allegedly committed only a petty crime. One 
reason for the apparent anomaly o f retaining entitlement to representation in 
misdemeanours may have been that they included civil or regulatory offences such as 
failure by landowners to maintain roads; lawyers had long been involved in matters 
where the legal issue centred on property rights 
Justifying the rule in the early 17^  ^ Century, Lord Coke *'*'* said that:
“No counsel is allowed in cases o f  felony, because the evidence ought to be so clear 
that it cannot be contradicted”.
In adopting this passage in the murder trial before the House of Lords in 1678 of 
Lord Cornwallis*'** ,Lord Nottingham, the Lord High Steward, stated:
*'** See Leges H enrici Prim i : E dited  With Translations and Com m entary by L J  Downer, Oxford 
University Press 1972. See also Frederick Pollock and W illiam Maitland, The H istory o f  English  
Law B efore the Time o f  E dw ard  7^',1898, Cambridge University Press, pp. 99-101. The rule was 
justified  in a leading 13*** Century case about rape when a prisoner was told because the K ing is a 
p a r ty  in this case  ( all felony cases were brought in his name ) and sues ex officio, fo r  which reason  
it is not p ro p er  that you  should  have counsel against the king. Year Books 30 and 31 Edw. 1. (R olls 
Series) pp.529-30. A narrow exception to the rule against representation for felons and traitors 
existed where a case gave rise to a debatable point o f  law. The reports for 1309 -  10 record that a 
lawyer appeared on behalf o f  a defendant when a point o f  law was concerned. Herman Cohen, A 
H istory o f  the English Bar and A ttornatus to 1450, Sweet and M axwell, London, 1929, page 210. 
For more on how this exception was interpreted, see S.C.F. M ilsom , H istorica l Foundations o f  the 
Common Law, 1981, Butterworths, London, p.413.
*'*® Barristers, whose advocacy work was therefore confined to civ il disputes and misdemeanours, 
were not generally recognized as forming a distinct order o f  legal practitioners in the same way as 
attorneys and sergeants until roughly the eve o f  the C ivil War (1642-1649). The main force which  
opened up the courts to barristers, thus expanding the opportunity for advocacy in civ il cases, was a 
huge growth in the volume o f  litigation during the second h a lf o f  the 17*** Century, as the econom y  
developed further. The quantity o f  business handled by the two major central courts o f  Common 
Pleas and Kings Bench more than trebled in this period. W ilfred Prest, The R ise o f  the B arrister: A 
S ocia l H istory o f  the English Bar 1590-1640  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, page 5.
*'**' The Third P art o f  the Institu tes o f  the Laws o f  England, W. Rawlins, London 1644, page 137.
*'** See Colin Rhys Lovell, Trial o f  Peers o f  G reat Britain, The American Historical R eview , V ol 55, 
N o l (Oct 1949) pp. 69-81.
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“No other good reason can be given why the law refuseth to allow the prisoner at 
the Bar counsel on matters o ffact, in the result o f  which his life may be concerned, 
but only this, because the evidence by which he is condemned ought to be so very 
evident, and so plain, that all the counsel in the world should not be able to answer 
zf" *4*.
In the late 17^  ^ Century dissatisfaction intensified after a succession of 
celebrated state trials which involved miscarriages o f justice**®. By the Treason 
Trials Act of 1695 *** counsel was allowed to make a full defence, including 
addressing the jury, for the accused, who was also permitted to have a copy of the 
indictment against him five (later extended to ten ) days before trial. In 1708 a 
prisoner was permitted to have a list o f witnesses against him and a list of the jurors 
in the case **^. These rights, however, only applied to persons accused of treason and 
other state crimes***. In the 18th and early 19th century Thomas Erskine, Henry 
Brougham (see preceding Chapter) and other barristers appeared in such cases. 
Prisoners in ordinary trials continued to be denied the right to counsel. In the early 
part of the 18th Century the nature o f trial on indictment showed marked 
inquisitorial features, very different from today. Judges were highly interventionist 
and could exercise considerable influence over the ju ry ’s verdict. Although 
prosecutions were in the name of the King, there was no system of public 
prosecution and most prosecutions were conducted by victims of crimes or by private 
individuals acting for them**'*. Most cases were simple confrontations between 
alleged victims and those they accused, orchestrated by the judge and without the
*'*® Quoted by Lord Lyndhurst in his speech to the House o f  Lords on the second reading o f  the 
Prisoners Counsel B ill and reported in the M orning C hronicle  on Friday 24**' June 1836. For a 
similar justification to that given by Lord Nottingham, som e decades later, see W illiam Hawkins, 
Treatise o f  the P leas o f  the Crown, London, 1721, book 2, page 400.
**® For an account o f  these, during the reigns o f  Charles II and James II, see Sir James FitzJames 
Stephens, A H istory o f  The Crim inal Law, V ol. I, Chapter XI, pp 369 -  416.
***7 W illiam III.C.3.
**^  Anne, c. 27, s. 14. In 1702, it was also enacted, by 1 Anne, st. 2, c 9, that in cases o f treason and felony the 
prisoner’s witnesses should be sworn, as well as witnesses for the Crown. See, A llyson N. May, The O ld  
Bailey Bar 1783 -  1834  : Copy o f  1997 thesis held at L incoln’s Inn Library, page 4.
***The fact they were not extended to all felonies demonstrated to Sir James FitzJames Stephens the 
slightness to which p u b lic  attention was then, or indeed till a fa r  la ter time, d irec ted  to the defects 
o f  the crim inal law. Sir James FitzJames Stephens, A H istory o f  The C rim inal Law o f  England, 
MacMillan and Co, 1883, Chapter XI, page 417.
**“* When counsel was instructed to prosecute their role, from at least Tudor tim es until changes in 
procedure and the law o f  evidence in the 18**' Century, appears to have been to draw pointedly to the 
attention o f  the prisoner every part o f  the case against him. Cross -exam ination o f  w itnesses was 
predominantly undertaken by judges. Sir James FitzJames Stephens, A H istory o f  the C rim inal Law  
o f  England, M acM illan and Co, 1883, Vol. I, Chapter XL
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help o f lawyers on either side. The Judge examined and cross-examined the 
prosecutor, the accused and the witnesses and frequently gave a running commentary 
as the case unfolded to the jurors, who quite often interrupted to ask questions. 
Prisoners were afforded the opportunity of questioning the prosecutor's witnesses 
and to answer evidence given against them. From 1702 they were also permitted to 
call witnesses as to fact and those who could testify as to their general character and 
reputation***. Unlike prosecutors, however, they could not compel their witnesses to 
attend, and since trials were not scheduled, defendants did not know when witnesses 
needed to be in court. The immediate and unrehearsed responses by the accused to 
the evidence as it was presented was widely held to he the best indication of 
innocence or guilt **®. It was felt that the accused him self would give a more open 
and honest account of the truth than could he supplied by a lawyer speaking for him 
or her.
As the 18th century unfolded there was an increase in the use o f prosecution 
counsel, partly as a result o f increasing wealth of those who brought prosecutions. 
Prosecutors had always been allowed to have lawyers but very few did so until the 
1720’s and 1730’s. Their use was encouraged by the growing government practice, 
which began in the late 1690’s, of funding prosecutions for the most serious 
offences, such as seditious words and libel, treason, coining and violent offences 
including murder, rape and robbery. Once present in court, the use of lawyers seems 
to have been adopted by the prosecutors in other types of cases**’. Engagement of 
lawyers was further encouraged by a statute o f 1752 which allowed the courts to 
reimburse prosecutors’ expenses if  the prosecutor was poor and a conviction was 
obtained. A 1778 statute extended payment o f expenses to all prosecutors of 
successful cases. Amongst Judges, this led to a sense that imbalance and unfairness
*** Neither category o f  witness was permitted to give sworn evidence. This placed them at a lower 
level than prosecution w itnesses, whose testim ony was on oath . See G.Fisher (1997), The J u ry ’s 
Rise as L ie D etector, 107 Yale Law Journal, p. 603.
**® J M Beattie, Scales o f  Justice: D efence Counsel and the English C rim inal Trial in the Eighteenth  
and N ineteenth C enturies, Law and History R eview , V ol 9, N o2, pp. 221 -  267; pp. 230- 32.
**’ Numbers o f  counsel instructed to prosecute property crime increased with the formation in large 
numbers throughout the country o f  A ssociations for the Prosecution o f  Felons. These were 
established to spread the cost o f  investigating crime and paying legal fees. See John Hostettler and 
Richard Braby, Sir William G arrow, H is Life, Times and F ight fo r  Justice. Waterside Press, 2009, 
p .31.
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existed against prisoners***. To redress the scales they began, without legislation, to 
allow accused felons to employ counsel as early as the 1730s at the Old Bailey in 
London and the Middlesex Sessions. Counsel appeared on sufferance of the bench 
and were limited to examining and cross-examining witnesses, a task previously 
performed by the Judge, and to arguing points of law. In the trial o f Elizabeth 
Woodcock, for instance, tried in 1754 for stealing a few shillings from a drunken 
man in an alehouse. Lord Chief Justice Ryder stopped the case after the alleged 
victim ’s evidence had been undermined by counsel on her behalf **^. The number of 
trials, however, at the Old Bailey in which counsel was actually employed by 
prisoners was very small during the middle decades of the 18^ ** Century and never 
rose above one or two in every session. Undoubtedly many would have been 
prevented or deterred from employing a barrister by the fees but also by what a 
lawyer might do, particularly as many did not appear to have gone out of their way 
to make much out of their limited opportunities to defend their clients *®°. Things 
altered radically in the 1780’s. In 1786 nearly two hundred men and women on trial 
for felonies at the Old Bailey had the help of lawyers. Whilst still only amounting to 
one fifth of those tried that year, it represented a sudden and very striking increase in 
cases defended by counsel and in the number of lawyers practicing at the Old Bailey. 
The fraction of prisoners represented grew to a quarter by 1800 *®*. Importantly, the 
increased employment of lawyers by prisoners was accompanied by a clear shift in 
their behaviour and attitudes, particularly in their determination to act as advocates.
*** See John H. Langbein, The O rigins o f  the Crim inal Trial, Oxford ,2003, pp. 171-172. A lso John 
Beattie, G arrow  fo r  the Defence, History Today, Feb. 1991, V ol. 41, Issue 2, page 50 and A llyson  
N. May, The Bar and the O ld  Bailey, 1750-1850, University o f  North Carolina Press, 2003, page 25. 
**® L incoln’s Inn Library, Harrowby M SS, doc. 14, pp. 4 - 6 .
*®® John Beattie, G arrow  fo r  the defence. History Today, Feb 1991, V ol.41, Issue 2, page 49. 
According to Professor Robert Shoemaker, o f  Sheffield University and co-founder o f  the Old B ailey  
on Line Project, there is some evidence that in the 18**' Century prisoners in Newgate Prison, which  
was full o f  prisoners awaiting trial, some o f  whom had been tried before in Old Bailey, the 
M iddlesex Sessions Court in Clerkenwell or elsewhere, and with convicted prisoners awaiting 
punishment, shared information about law, procedure and tactics and even conducted mock cross- 
examinations and closing speeches. The very effective cross-exam ination o f  w itnesses against her, 
bringing out numerous inconsistencies in their evidence, and polished closing speech o f  Sarah 
M alcolm, an Irish laundress tried for three murders in 1733, was attributed by Professor Shoemaker 
to this informal form o f  advocacy training. Largely because o f  her efforts her trial lasted nearly five  
hours; the average length in the 18**' Century being half an hour. After a much longer period o f  
deliberation than usual, the jury, nonetheless, found her guilty and she was subsequently executed. 
Voices from  the O ld Bailey, Series Two, Episode Four, Whose Law was it anyway?, BBC, Radio 4, 
August, 17**', 2011.
*®* David Bentley, English C rim inal Justice  in the 19'^ Century, Hambledon Press, 1998, page 108.A 
similar growth in representation by counsel had occurred in provincial practice. See P. King, Crime, 
Justice and Discretion in Engtland, 1740-1820. Oxford University Press, 2000, p .228.
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Still not allowed to address the jury on their clients’ behalf or comment on the 
evidence, they became much more anxious to take advantage of the opportunities 
afforded by cross-examination o f prosecution witnesses in felony trials. Cross- 
examination became the prime focus for those with a strong sense of duty to defend 
their clients and was marked by growing assertiveness, increased sharpness, more 
use of sarcasm, and a preparedness to continue in the face of judicial hostility: a 
more committed advocacy Because of the prohibition on defence speeches, the 
significance o f a question had to be apparent from the question itself and it has been 
suggested that this is  one reason why it became permissible to ask leading 
questions in cross-examination There is little doubt that cross-examination 
provided lawyers the opportunity to develop their taste for advocacy, or that this 
stage of the trial changed remarkably in the 18^  ^Century. Barristers also involved 
themselves more in legal argument to challenge the validity of indictments, which 
had at the time to be very carefully drawn and often after their cross-examinations 
made submissions on the admissibility o f suspect evidence such as: hearsay; 
confessions; that given by witnesses prosecuting for reward, for example thief— 
takers, those income directly depended on successful prosecutions and the 
testimony of accomplices who had been promised they would not be prosecuted.( 
Indeed it was mainly because of concerns about perjured testimony and deliberate 
perversions of the truth, which plagued criminal justice in the 18^  ^Century, that
David Cairns, A dvocacy and the M aking o f  the A dversaria l C rim inal Trial, 1800- 1865, Oxford, : 
Clarendon Press 1998, page 31. This form o f  advocacy entered new territory, going far beyond 
counsel asking prosecution w itnesses polite questions, the hallmark o f  most advocacy before the 
1780s. See Geoffrey Robinson in Forward to John Hostettler and Richard Braby, Sir William  
Garrow, H is L ife,Tim es and F ight fo r  Justice. W aterside Press, 2009.
David Caims, Advocacy and the Making o f  the Adversarial Criminal Trial, 1800-1865, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, page 49. See also John Hostettler and Richard Brady, Sir William Garrow. His Life,Times and Fight fo r  
JwV/ce.Waterside Press, page xiv. Some judges nonetheless continued to doubt the propriety o f  
defence counsel putting leading questions in cross-exam ination ( Rv Hardy (1794) 24 St Tr 199 ) 
and objection was still being taken to it as late as 1836 ( Parkin v Moon (1836) 7 C& P 408.
The slightest flaw  in an indictment then could result in an acquittal. The com plexity o f  drafting 
indictments is illustrated by the four volum es, each numbering over 700 pages, o f  indictment 
precedents com piled by John Silvester, a contemporary o f  W illiam  Garrow, infra, at the Old B ailey. 
Som etim es persons attending court in the public gallery, more and more seen in the 18**^  Century as 
part o f  gentlem an’s education, and keen to contribute to increasingly legalistic debates would 
interrupt to identify defects in indictments and put forward points in favour o f  prisoners. Douglas 
Hay, P roperty  A uthority and the Crim inal Law, in Douglas Hay et al ., A lb io n ’s F atal Tree, 
Penguin, 1988, page 33.
From 1692, Parliament passed a series o f  statutes rewarding the apprehension and conviction o f  
people guilty o f  serious crimes. Special proclamations added further rewards . The government 
might pay as much as £140 for catching and convicting a highwayman and £420 for three. These 
sums contributed to perjury by thief- takers. Exposure o f  false convictions procured by them led to
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judges first permitted prisoners to be represented by counsel in the 1730’s 
Submissions to the Judge by barristers on law were sometimes, in reality, points 
made to sway jurors who heard counsel's arguments Of assistance to advocates 
acting for prisoners was, certainly by the 1780’s, judges were directing jurors that 
defendants had a presumption of innocence and the onus lay on the prosecution to 
prove its case. Hitherto this had been seen as an aspiration, rather than a legal
axiom*®*.
Prominent amongst those undertaking this more ardent advocacy was William 
Garrow (1760- 1840). Called to the bar in 1783, at 23 years of age, he immediately 
began to practise at the Old Bailey and on the Home Circuit. In his first year, he 
appeared in nearly a hundred cases at the Old Bailey. More than 80 percent of these 
were for the defence. Well over half his clients were acquitted. During Harrow’s first 
ten years at the bar he was instructed in more than a thousand criminal cases *®®. 
Becoming a shooting star, Garrow came to dominate the criminal bar in his day 
becoming a King’s Counsel in 1793. Although possessed of a commanding presence 
in court and a keen mind, his pre-eminence was built on devastating cross- 
examination. William Garrow set a pattern in examining unreliable witnesses to 
expose weaknesses in cases against his clients. He frequently battered prosecution 
witnesses with relentless questioning. Sarcasm was often cruelly employed. 
Sometimes he indulged in playful repartee with witnesses, or was amusing at their 
expense; the object of both being to diminish their credit and lessen the weight of
scandals. See John H Langbein, The O rigins o f  A dversary Crim inal Trial, Oxford, 2003, p p .148 - 
150.
*®® A lso to limit this m ischief, judges introduced a rule which required corroboration o f  accom plice  
evidence in the 1740’s.The rule existed for about 40 years. See Albert Alschuler, Comments on the 
O rigins o f  the A dversary C rim inal Trial, The Journal o f  Legal History, Volume 26, N o l,  April,
2005 pp. 79 -  85. In 1786 three proscriptions against lying on oath, taken from the Old Testament, 
were painted on the w alls o f  the Old Bailey, The Times, 28*** April, 1786.
*®’ David Bentley, English C rim inal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, Hambledon P ress,1999, page 
108.
*®* Court records show similar directions on the standard and burden o f  proof were being given by 
judges in M assachussetts a decade earlier. John H. Langbein, P riv ilege  and Common Law, in 
Richard H. Helm holz et al ., The P rivilege A gainst Self-Incrim ination: its origins and developm ents. 
University o f  Chicago Press, 1997, page 234 By contrast, depicting a common view  in the 17*** 
Century, it is perhaps worth noting that in the trial o f  Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 one o f  Sir Edward 
Coke’s colleagues for the prosecution told jurors that the defendant had to prove his innocence. The 
effect this had on them cannot be measured, but they returned a verdict o f  guilty in barely fifteen  
minutes.
*®® The Old Bailey Papers record many o f  W illiam Garrow’s cases from 1784 to the early 1790s. 
Hundreds o f  these are now readily available from the website The Proceedings o f  the O ld  B ailey, 
London 1674 to 1834. GBP Online, (www.oldbailevonline.org ) Records o f  his cases on assize  
circuits are also occasionally available.
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their evidence. He treated all witnesses in the same manner. In particular he was 
indifferent to elevated social position and with it any notion that this gave witnesses 
greater honour and credibility and therefore should not be vigorously probed *’® 
Garrow could indeed be rude to witnesses: in one case a witness employed in the 
kitchen of the prosecutor was addressed by him variously as cook, Mrs Cook and 
cookey, rather than by her name *’*. The most abusive of his cross-examinations , 
however, were o f those who came into court determined to lie for reward 
Garrow’s behaviour occasionally led to rebukes from opposing counsel or judges *’* 
but what is striking is the extent to which his conduct was tolerated by the judiciary. 
In addition to his powers of cross-examination, Garrow was a master of court 
procedure. Further he was learned in criminal law and, on the basis of a strong 
knowledge of past cases, able to argue legal points, especially those concerning 
evidence, often displaying great rhetorical skill
The quality of William Garrow’s court advocacy was enhanced by a willingness 
to meet his clients, often in disease ridden prisons, to discover more about their 
cases and to take instructions from them. This was rare amongst his contemporaries, 
who usually left such work to attorneys*’* . After becoming a King’s Counsel in 
1793, Garrow’s criminal work diminished, although he continued his highly 
profitable career in the civil courts. He later entered Parliament and was 
subsequently appointed Solicitor General and afterwards Attorney General. Garrow 
also served as a judge. In his time at the criminal bar William Garrow’s style of 
advocacy was both admired and emulated by many of his contemporaries. As a figure 
in history and law Garrow was essentially forgotten in the 1840s. Rediscovery of 
him began in the 1990s. Since then the first ten years of his career in the
*’° An example o f  Garrow’s indifference to high social status in the conduct o f  cases is given by 
John Hostettler and John Braby, Sir William Garrow, His Life, Times and F ight fo r  Justice, 
Waterside Press, 2009 pp. 63-65: Baron Hom peschv. The farmer and his dog. Greatly angered, the 
Baron challenged Garrow to a duel, which he declined. The landed gentry and gentlem en were 
especially  threatened by his courtroom tactics which they saw as a threat to their honour.
*’* Twite, Old Bailey Session Papers 1788, no.480, pp. 597-601.
*’  ^A llyson May, A dvocates and Truth -S eek in g  in the O ld  B ailey Courtroom, The Journal o f  Legal 
History. Volume 26, No 1, April, 2005, page 73. See also John Hostettler and John Braby, ibid, pp. 
54-59, who present a series o f  cases in which Garrow cross-exam ines both professional and first­
time thief-takers.
*’* For instance in the Trial o f  W illiam  Bartlett OBP Online (w w w .oldbailevonline.org ) 11*** 
January,1786. R e f:tl7 8 6 1 11-30.
*’■* John Beattie, G arrow  fo r  the defence. History Today, February 1991, V ol.41 , Issue 2.
*’* John Hostettler and Richard Braby, Sir William Garrow, H is Life, Times and F ight fo r  Justice, 
Waterside Press, 2009, page xiv.
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development of the criminal trial has become much discussed*’®. More than any 
other, motivated by practical concern to win cases by the best means available, 
rather than a grand reforming plan, Garrow is now recognized to have largely 
established the art of cross-examination, the essential feature of adversary trial. His, 
and other’s, insistent questioning of witnesses raised matters of immediate concern 
to judges. These were resolved by them in post-circuit meetings at Serjeant’s Inn *”  . 
Here rules of evidence, essential in an adversarial system, were laid down, including 
those dealing with hearsay, accomplices and best evidence. These rules, born in 
response to advocates, were further developed in the 19^ ** Century and, in themselves, 
became an increasing influence on the practise of advocacy.
In Harrow’s own time, some were incensed by what they considered to be his 
belligerence, bad manners, coarseness o f language and willingness to make sport of 
those he cross-examined. The aggressive advocacy adopted by many criminal 
barristers from the 1780’s may have contributed to a widespread sense that there was 
something almost ungentlemanly about the trade. Certainly, they were parodied in 
the press. Contempt for the skills of criminal practitioners is apparent in the 
Dictionary of National Biography entry for George Bond (1750-1796 ) famous in his 
day as a barrister at the Surrey Sessions : "He belonged to a class o f  lawyers now 
happily approaching extinction , whose ch ie f strength consists in playing upon the 
susceptibilities o f  ignorant juries. Enthralled by his course and vulgar humour, the 
jurors o f  his native county, Surrey, were almost at his mercy, and tradition says that 
a not uncommon form  o f  verdict at the Surrey Sessions was “ We fin d  fo r  Serjeant 
Bond and costs ” *’*.
*’® For an account o f  Garrow’s rediscovery see John Hostettler and Richard Braby, Sir William  
Garrow, H is Life, Times and Fight fo r  Justice, Waterside Press,2009, pp.ix-xii. G a rro w ’s Law , a 
four part, much acclaimed, prime time BBC TV dram a, shown during Novem ber, 2009, starring 
Andrew Buchan as W illiam Garrow, substantially based on cases in which Garrow appeared, has 
firmly placed him in popular history. For an article on Garrow, From the Bar to the sm all screen , by 
Mark Pallis, the Legal and Historical Consultant to G a rro w ’s Law, see Counsel, January 2010, 
pp.27-29.
*”  J. M. Beattie, Scales o f  Justice:D efence Counsel and the English C rim inal Trial in the E ighteenth  
and Nineteenth Centuries, Law and History R eview , 1991, vol. 9 (2) p .224.
*’* Quoted by Allyson May, The Bar and the Old Bailey 1750-1850, University o f North Carolina Press, page 
140. After surveying the careers o f  members o f  London’s nascent criminal bar, A llyson  May ( 
A dvocates and Truth -  Seeking in the O ld B ailey Courtroom , The Journal o f  Legal History, Volum e  
26, N o l, April, 2005, pp.72-73. ) considered them in a more kindly light. R egardless o f  their not
unnatural in terest in earning a l iv in g  on the w hole  they were p rin c ip led  men rather than the
thugs and bullies  portrayed in the press. They b e lieved  that the la w y e r ’s duty is to  his client, and  
that it was not co u n se l’s duty to pre ju dge a client.
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Unlike Garrow, most barristers who worked at the Old Bailey were not set to be 
leaders of the legal profession. Criminal work occupied a relatively lowly place 
within the broader legal profession. Many practitioners sought to move on to civil 
work or had to practise in other metropolitan courts to earn a living*’®. Some of the 
successful barristers became judges and, from the criminal bench, perpetuated the 
culture and ways they had helped to create.
The shift from a type of trial with clear inquisitorial aspects towards an 
essentially adversarial one had a number of consequences: criminal trials became 
more structured with distinct prosecution and defence cases, rather than a rambling 
altercation between the accused and witnesses **° ; evidential objections by counsel 
became more frequent *** ; with a greater recognition of the burden o f proof 
defendants did not need to take any part in their defence until the completion of 
prosecution case, by which time the full prosecution case would be known, and not 
speak at all if  counsel could establish grounds for acquittal at that stage; and a 
significant movement in power took place towards lawyers from judges, whose role 
began to increasingly resemble that of an umpire, or trial manager.
The continuing prohibition on counsel making speeches to the jury, i.e. a fu ll  
defence , was to some extent mitigated by barristers circuit etiquette which required 
that prosecuting counsel be restrained in ju ry  addresses, or sometimes completely
*’® See A llyson N.M ay, The Bar and the O ld B ailey 1750-1850, University o f  North Carolina Press, 
2003, Chapter 3.
**° David Cairns, A dvocacy and the M aking o f  the A dversaria l C rim inal Trial, 1800-1865, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, page 30. See also David Lemmings, Crim inal tr ia l procedu re  in 18 ‘^  Century 
E ngland : Thelm pact o f  Lawyers, Journal o f  Legal History, Vol 26, N o l ,  April 2005, pp. 73-82. Sir 
James FitzJames Stephen estimated that allow ing a w itness to tell his own story had been replaced, 
in trials involving counsel, by rules o f  examination in ch ief preventing the asking o f  leading  
questions ( those which suggest the desired answer) by the beginning o f  George I l l ’s reign (1760). 
According to him, this practise, which still exists, was introduced to keep w itnesses to the point and 
was a recognition that all evidence must be confined to the issue, a rule he saw as com ing from the 
civil to the criminal courts in the early eighteenth century. Sir James FitzJames Stephen, A H istory  
o f  The C rim inal Law o f  England, MacMillan and Co, London, 1883, Chapter X ll, pp. 430-431.
*** By 1790 courts enforced a rule excluding proof o f  a defendant’s prior criminal acts and other 
proof o f  bad character . They also follow ed a rule against admitting involuntary confessions, 
including those obtained by threat or promise o f  favour. (W arickshall’s case, 1 Leach, 263 decided  
in 1783, is one o f  the earliest cases on this subject.) Although the rule requiring corroboration o f  
accom plice evidence, introduced in the 1740’s, was abolished in the 1780s, judges cautioned jurors 
against giving too much weight to uncorroborated accom plice testim ony. The hearsay rule now  
operated, subject to several exceptions, and was justified  on the basis o f  the right to cross-exam ine  
w itnesses. Further, judges told juries to convict only on proof o f  guilt beyond reasonable doubt. See 
Albert A lschuler, Comments on The Origins o f  the A dversary Trial, The Journal o f  Legal History, 
Volum e 26, N o l ,  April, 2005, pp. 79-85. The existence o f  these rules helped shape the practice o f
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abstain from making one Also defence counsel were given considerable latitude 
in their styles o f cross-examining prosecution witnesses such as their questioning 
might incorporate a far from impartial summary of evidence. Further, it became 
allowed for a prisoner's statement, which opened the defence case, to be drafted by 
counsel giving it more of a defence, and less of a testimonial, quality. A number of 
legal historians*** believe that the absence of counsel able to conduct a full defence, 
fu ll defence counsel, made jurors more inclined to acquit out of sympathy for 
prisoners unable to defend themselves adequately and because of a knowledge of the 
penalties that were possible on conviction.
It is of note that, despite the use o f counsel to cross -exam ine prosecution 
witnesses and argue points of law on behalf o f prisoners, the length of trials 
remained very short. A good example of this brevity is the Old Bailey trial, in 
January 1790, of William Hayward, a coachman, who was charged with stealing a 
harness worth ten pounds from his master, William Champion Crespigny, Esquire, of 
Cavendish Square **\Mr Hayward was represented by William Garrow, who had 
received a full and well researched brief drawn up by a solicitor. Nearly all the trial 
was taken up by evidence given by Mr Crespigny, his servants, and a coachmaker 
who had sold the harness at Mr Hayward’s request. All were closely cross-examined 
by Garrow, especially Mr Crespigny who was subject to a barrage o f questions. Mr 
Hayward said nothing on his own behalf and called no witnesses. Little was said by 
the judge about the evidence. The jury reached their verdict without leaving the 
room. Mr Hayward was acquitted. The trial lasted less than half an hour. According 
to a study conducted on trial proceedings at the Old Bailey, albeit some years later, 
this short amount of time may in fact have been longer than most trials ***.
advocacy. Hitherto, it had been strikingly little constrained by rules o f  evidence. See Sir James 
FitzJames, A H istory o f  The Crim inal Law o f  England, MacM illan and Co, 1883, Chapter XL 
*** David Cairns, A dvocacy and the Making o f  the A dversaria l C rim inal Trial, 1800-1865. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, pp. 39-46.
*** J. M. Beattie, Scales o f  Justice; Defence Counsel and the English Crim inal Trial in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Law and History Review , Vol. N o2, pp. 254-257. David  
Cairns also considers the severely restricted role o f  counsel inclined juries to show a 'favou rab le  
disposition” towards prisoners and to leniency. A dvocacy and the making o f  the A dversaria l 
Crim inal T ria l,1800-1865, Clarendon Press, Oxford, page 53 and page 55.
**'* David Beattie, G arrow fo r  the defence. History Today, Volum e 41, Issue 2. Feb 1991.
*** See Trial Procedures, Introduction to Old Bailey Session Papers On Line, w w w .oldbaileyonline. 
org . Astonishingly in 1833, it was calculated that the average trial at the Old B ailey took eight and 
a h alf minutes, although it is unknown whether this calculation was made only on cases where 
prisoners had no help from counsel.
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Judges’ permission for prisoners in felony cases to have counsel examine and 
cross-examine witnesses allowed more scope in forensic advocacy and increased the 
overall amount o f it.
Fox's Libel Act 1792, defamation and civil juries in Scotland- expanding the 
scope for advocacy.
In 1792 Fox's Libel Act was passed which enabled juries to determine what was 
criminal libel, as well as the fact of its publication. Previously what constituted a 
libel was a matter for the Judge alone to rule upon. The statute resulted in a further 
opportunity for advocacy with counsel making eloquent, vehement and rhetorical 
addresses in defence of the subject’s liberties. An example o f this was Henry 
Brougham in his successful defence of the radical brothers John and Leigh Hunt 
against a charge o f libel for publishing criticism of the government for severe 
corporal punishment, in the armed forces, where it was prevalent.
During the Nineteenth Century the civil law of defamation, with its division, 
after 1812 between libel and slander **®, developed very considerably and with this 
came an increase in actions before juries in courts **’.
By a number o f Acts between 1815 and 1830, juries in civil cases were 
introduced into Scotland, widening the role of forensic advocacy there too. In the 
main this was welcomed by members of the Faculty of Advocates, whose number 
had doubled over two decades before 1815 ***.
The Prisoners' Counsel Act.
**® Embedded in the law by the Court o f  Common Pleas case o f  Thorley V L ord  K erry  1812 4 Taunt 
355.
**’ Interview on 12*** March, 2008 with Paul M itchell, o f  the School o f  Law, Kings C ollege, London 
and author o f  The M aking o f  the M odern Law o f  D efam ation, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005.
*** For reasons underlying the introduction o f  jury trials in Scottish civ il cases, see N icholas 
Phillipson, The Scottish  Whigs and the Reform o f  the Court o f  Session, 1990, Edinburgh, The Stair 
Society.
74
A number o f prosecutors began to depart from the restraint expected in felony 
cases by using their opening statements in cases not merely to outline the facts, but 
to slant the case against the defendant. Also in the 1800’s, and very likely as a 
response, certain barristers , notably including William Garrow, asserted that they 
would make observations to juries on behalf o f prisoners The co - ordinated and 
well resourced court prosecutions by the Bank of England and other banks of forgers 
and coiners, during and in the years immediately after the Napoleonic Wars, further 
convinced many judges of the fairness of allowing prisoners to be fully represented 
by counsel
Between 1821 and 1836 repeated parliamentary attempts, beginning with a Bill 
introduced by William Martin, perhaps now best remembered for pioneering 
legislation against cruelty to animals, were made to remove the felony prisoners' 
handicap of not being allowed to have counsel address the jury on their behalf. The 
rule was even enforced against children and the infirm. England and Ireland were the 
only European countries denying prisoners the right of a full defence and were also 
out of step with the practice in the United States and the colonies. The arguments for 
reform left many in Parliament and the Bar unmoved What is striking about the 
campaign to allow counsel to address juries fully was that it was largely driven by a 
small number of Whig politicians, chief amongst them being Henry Brougham. There 
is little evidence that it was sustained by popular support, contrasting heavily with 
other reforms contributing to the dismantling the old regime, such as widening the 
electoral franchise, the abolition of slavery. Catholic emancipation, and restrictions 
on the width of the death penalty Nonetheless, a Bill, introduced by William 
Ewart to remove the restriction received Royal Assent in 1836. In the House of 
Commons Daniel O’Connell, who, like Ewart, was much influenced by Jeremy
In the Trial o f  John Taylor, W illiam Garrow declared, “what the law o f  England w ill not permit 
me to do d irectly  [By which he meant address the jury. ], I w ill do indirectly, where I can.” Quoted 
in P. King, Crime, Justice and D iscretion  in England, 1740-1820, Oxford, 2000, page 229.
A llyson May, R eluctant A dvocates: The O ld B ailey Bar and the P riso n ers’ Counsel Act, 1836. 
Paper delivered to the Institute o f  Advanced Legal Studies, London, 26**’ March, 2006. A lso A llyson  
May, The Bar and the Old B ailey, 1750-1850, University o f  Noth Carolina Press, 2003, page 27.
On the prosecution o f  coining and forgery see Randall McGowan, From P illory  to G allows.
The Punishment o ffo rg ery  in the age o f  the fin an cia l revolution. P ast and P resent. 199,165 (1) pp. 
107- 140.
For a full analysis o f  arguments for and against allow ing felony prisoners a full defence,and a 
description o f  the campaign to change the law, see A llyson May, The Bar and the O ld  B ailey 1750- 
1850, The University o f  North Carolina Press, Chapel H ill and London, 2003, Chapter Seven. See 
also David Bentley, ibid, page 105 for a useful summary.
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Bentham, spoke strongly on its behalf, alleging several instances where a speech 
from counsel would have saved the accused from unmerited conviction. Sir Frederick 
Pollock, later to become Lord Chief Baron, described the existing state of affairs as a 
disgrace to the country. After securing a great majority, the Bill went up to the 
House of Lords where it received considerable support, particularly from the Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Lynhurst and the Lord Denman, the Lord Chief Justice.
Earlier in 1836, the campaign to permit prisoners to have a full defence by 
counsel had received strong backing in the Second Report o f Her M ajesty’s 
Commission on Criminal Law, published earlier that year. The Commissioners, 
Thomas Starkie, Henry Bellenden Kerr, Andrew Amos and John Austin, much 
swayed by Brougham, discarded the old notion that the judge was in anyway counsel 
for the prisoner and emphasized the power of competent advocacy to uncover the 
truth:
“The advocate possesses more certain means than the Judge, o f  distinguishing 
between true and fa lse testim ony, between that which is substantial and that which 
is merely colourable. When the charge is false, he possesses through his intimate 
knowledge o f  the real facts  , an almost infallible key to the truth; he can show that 
all the evidence truly given is consistent with the innocence o f  the accused, and is 
prepared to examine into and comment upon those discrepancies upon which 
innocence must frequently depend fo r  its manifestation ” .
The Commissioners had also heard much hostile evidence from members o f the 
judiciary and counsel. Indeed most barristers and judges were against granting a full 
defence in felony trials. The gist of much of the opposition appears in submissions to 
the House of Lords Committee on the Prisoners’ Counsel Bill made by Charles 
Phillips, who had dominated the Old Bailey Bar since the 1820’s and in letters he 
wrote to Henry Brougham. Phillips and his colleagues believed that the adversarial 
process in civil cases and trials of misdemeanours often resulted in verdicts against 
the evidence, rather than increasing the number of true ones. He predicted that the
A llyson May, Reluctant A dvocates: The O ld B ailey  Bar and the P riso n ers’ Counsel Act, 1836. 
Paper delivered to the Institute o f  Advanced Legal Studies, London, 26*  ^March, 2006.
In Parliamentary Papers : Reports from Commissioners: Church, Education, Law etc, 36 (London, 
1836), page 193.
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same would happen in criminal cases with juries being misled in much lengthened 
trials. Charles Phillips was concerned that cases would be coloured by the 
prosecution to the disadvantage of prisoners and that professional rivalries between 
barristers would be fought out in court. Also, as prosecutors generally had more 
resources, prisoners would suffer by having the best talent deployed against them. 
Because future employment depended on success, barristers briefed by the 
prosecution might behave with less moderation. Permitting counsel to speak for their 
clients in felony trials, Phillips wrote to Brougham, would:
“Make life and liberty subjects o f  a trial o f  skill. Verdicts will often depend , not on 
innocence , but on eloquence. Those who are employed as advocates must act as 
advocates and the most awful o f  considerations may become the victim o f  sophistry. 
Look at your Courts o f  Common Law- one fourth  o f  their time consumed in motions 
fo r  new trials, on the ground that the verdicts were given against the evidence. How 
obtained? The speech o f  Wilde did it I !” .
According to him, “four fifths of the practical men” ( barristers with a criminal 
practice) were against the changes sought. His view may n o t , however, have been 
shared by the majority of junior barristers at the Old Bailey
Some other established members of the criminal bar may have resisted reform mainly 
out of self interest: Allowing defence counsel to address the jury could be expected 
to greatly increase their workload with little prospect of remuneration for it, given 
the limited means of most of their clients.
The Prisoners' Counsel Act, when a Bill, suffered amendments in Parliament.
The most important dissension was about whether defence counsel should have the 
last word. In civil cases and misdemeanours, where speeches for the defendant were 
permitted, the barrister for the p la in tiff , or prosecutor was allowed to reply at the 
end of the trial if  the defendant had called any evidence. To avoid the possible 
destructive consequences of a reply, the defence frequently adduced no evidence.
Charles Phillips, the ‘Garrow’ o f  the 1830’s, was em ployed in over 2,300 cases at the Old B ailey  
between 1825 and 1834 and had an active criminal practice on the Oxford circuit as w ell.
University C ollege London: Brougham papers, volum e 24, page 444.
It is possible they believed the reform might lead to more briefs from prisoners and, therefore, it 
was in their advantage to support it. D ivisions o f  opinion in the bar were discussed by A llyson  May 
in Reluctant A dvocates: The O ld  B ailey Bar and the P r iso n e rs’ Counsel A ct 1836. a paper delivered  
to the Institute o f  Legal Studies, London, 26*  ^March, 2006.
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The speech in civil cases was ''counsel's most potent opportunity to influence the 
jury. Here counsel in a civil trial would attack, doubt, interpret, defend and reason 
upon the evidence; praise, justify, excuse, p ity  or sympathise with the client; and 
challenge, cajole, persuade and lead the ju ry  by their noses to a verdict in his 
client's favour. The speech was so highly valued in civil trails that defence counsel 
'^were often prepared to call no evidence, so as to deprive the p la in tiff’s counsel o f  a 
reply and ensure the defence had the last w ord” Clause 2 o f the prisoners' 
Counsel Bill would have given counsel for the prisoner the right to the final word in 
a closing speech whether or not he had called any evidence in his defence, but it was 
struck out by the House of Lords; thus putting the rule in felonies on the same 
footings as misdemeanours.( It was not to be until the Right of Reply Act in 1964 
that defendants were unconditionally given the last word in criminal jury trials.) 
The Prisoners' Counsel Bill was changed because Judges felt that giving the 
defendant the closing word might place them in the awkward position of having to 
correct the view of defence lawyers when summing up a case and might give the 
jury  the impression they were biased against the prisoner.
By letting the defence counsel address the jury  in felony case, the Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act took criminal trials away from the traditional notion of a sober 
investigation of truth and made them more akin to a civil trial: a contest between 
professional advocates with both sides striving for a verdict in their favour. In this 
fight, the Act strengthened the hand o f the defence advocate in that it gave the 
accused the right to inspect and copy depositions o f evidence taken by magistrates 
at committal proceedings. Counsel now had a better picture of the prosecution’s 
case against their clients and could plan accordingly, with less chance of being 
ambushed by fresh evidence. The statute made possible the rise of the form of 
criminal trial with which we are familiar today, with its underlying assumption that 
the truth is the product of adversarialism. This significant change in procedure was 
to profoundly affect advocacy.
David Cairns, A dvocacy and the M aking o f  the A dversaria l C rim inal Trial, 1800-1865. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1998., page 55.
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The first case in London after the implementation of the Prisoners’ Counsel 
Act was heard on 14^  ^ October, 1836. In R v M ’Pherson, John Adolphus, counsel for 
the prisoner, was reported as saying that it was a most important alteration in the 
practice o f the criminal law and he hoped it would prove as great a blessing to the 
community as the benevolent persons who framed and supported it could expect 
For the great majority of prisoners, who could not afford to instruct counsel, it 
proved no blessing and was cruelly irrelevant. In murder cases, judges increasingly 
assigned counsel, unpaid, to prisoners who could not afford them, a practice they had 
begun in the 1820’s. Judges, however, varied in their willingness to do so and 
counsel was rarely assigned in trials for offences other than murder. The assistance 
they could render was often limited by being brought in at the eleventh hour
Because o f the prosecution's right o f reply to defence evidence under the 
Prisoners' Counsel Act 1836, defence counsel often voluntarily excluded evidence 
to ensure they had the last word before the Judge summed up the case to the jury.
In most cases the defence consisted of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses 
and a closing speech. This "encouraged aggressive advocacy which was likely to be 
anticipated and matched by prosecuting counsel” who dispensed with their 
traditional restraint in conducting cases. As mentioned earlier, some prosecutors 
even before the reform of 1836 were abandoning restraint and this had been one 
reason put in support of the change in procedure. More aggressive cross- 
examination by defence counsel, particularly those in the Old Bailey, often 
employing speculation, sarcasm, abusiveness and nastiness, had begun in late 18th 
century. This greatly intensified after the Act.
M orning Chronicle, 14th October, 1836.
David Bentley, English Crim inal Justice in the N ineteenth Century, Hambledon Press, London, 
1998, page 108.
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Chapter Three : Victorian Advocacy -  Emotion, 
Melodrama, Floridity and Juries.
Early Victorian advocacy to persuade juries, in both criminal and civil cases 
had much of the theatrical about it. Barristers knew they could acquire fame 
through their performance in court and the public at large regarded the courts as 
legitimate places of entertainment, a situation that was to continue for many 
decades. In The Victorian Bar , J. R. Lewis^°* wrote about a "long affinity between 
stage and bar” ; how there was a well-established tradition o f barristers on the 
circuits presenting amateur theatrical performances, especially of Shakespeare, and 
how several leading counsel claimed earlier professional experience of the boards
. As in the Four Courts in Ireland, the public in England booed and hissed, 
applauded their favourites, cheered and catcalled. Doorkeepers to the principal 
courts sometimes charged for entry to the show. Trials of public interest at the Old
David Cairns, A dvocacy  and the M aking o f  the A d versa ria l C rim inal Trial, 1800-1865. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, page 125.
The Victorian Bar, London, Robert Hale, 1982, page 13.
The link between advocacy and acting was acknow ledged by B asil Montagu in E ssays and  
S election s, London, W illiam  Pickering, 1837. In expounding the duty o f  an advocate owed in c iv il 
cases to his client, he wrote, at pages 266 to 267, “except when a m an’s life  was at stake, it was 
expedient that a judge and a jury should hear the opposite statem ents o f  men better able than 
individual suitors to do justice to their respective causes. The advocate might in the course o f  his 
duties be required to profess that which he did not feel and to support causes in which he did not 
believe or which he knew to be wrong. This, how ever, was nothing hut a species o f  acting  w ithout 
an avow al that it is acting  .The advocate did not mix h im self either with his client or his cause; 
he lent his exertions but not h im self. He exercised no discretion as to whom to plead for ; to do so 
would prejudice the suitor” .
Som e barristers wrote plays. One, for instance, was Thomas N oon Telfourd (1795- 1854), perhaps 
best remembered for his defence o f  Edward M oxon, charged with blasphem y for publishing a 
popular com plete works o f  Percy B ysshe Shelley, in 1840. A classica l scholar, Telfourd produced  
Ion, a tragedy based on a drama from Euripides, performed in Covent Garden in 1836, and The 
A thenian C aptive. Both were rich in sentiment, which was so popular in the 1830’s. His G lencoe  
was a tragedy based on Scottish history. Noon Telfourd had been the pupil o f  Joseph Chitty ( 
below  at note 200), renown for tearful melodrama in court. Thomas N oon Telfourd becam e a 
Judge o f  Common Pleas. A portrait o f  him hangs in M iddle Tem ple.
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Bailey, which with enlargement by statute of its geographical jurisdiction in 1834 
became the Central Criminal Court, were an event in the social world, attended by 
large, and occasionally aristocratic audiences^°\ Sometimes, as part o f their 
training, prospective barristers underwent a declamatory course at a drama school 
along with young hopefuls for the stage. This contributed to a style o f court 
advocacy that was “melodramatic, declamatory and lachrym ose” .Emotion was 
heightened by frequent appeals to God and for the heavens to show, by some sign, 
the client's purity of heart and deed. Barristers sometimes deployed humour, often 
involving that Victorian form of wit the pun, popularized by the poet Thomas 
Hood, amongst others, and for which their was great appetite, and richly present in 
burlesque theatre^°\ A number used gestures, that would have been at home in that 
exaggerated art form, such as elevation o f the eyebrows or knowing glances to 
jurors to credit them with an intelligence not to be taken in by a witness in the box. 
Some had the ability by a wink or gesture to make the whole court erupt with 
laughter thereby leading jurors away from damaging points in issue Certain 
barristers could shed tears to compound their emotional defences o f lay clients
Bernard K elly, Famous A dvoca tes and their Speeches, Sw eet and M axw ell 1921, page 21. 
Steven Cowan, a historian o f  education and o f  the labour m ovem ent at the Institute o f  Education, 
London ( Interviewed on the 6**’ June, 2 0 10 .), explained that many people would use watching  
court proceedings as a so rt o f  base fo r  their self-edu cation . The presentational style o f  barristers 
had been co p ied  in the late 18'^ C entury by rad ica ls  like John Thelw all{ who was su ccessfu lly  
defended at court by Thomas Erskine, see Chapter One.) and in the fo llo w in g  century w ent on to 
influence the ra th er loquacious de livery  o f  the early  so c ia lis ts  and trade  unionists who w ere  so  
keen to im press their hearers w ith  the depth o f  their education.
J.R. L ew is, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale, London, 1982, page 120.
Henry James Byron, 1835-1884, who, after abandoning his studies at M iddle Tem ple for the 
Bar, found great playwriting success in burlesques and other punny plays. The pun appeared much 
in the humorous magazines he edited.
Showing that by the second h a lf o f  the Twentieth Century this technique had largely  
disappeared, G eoffrey Robertson QC,: Sir John M ortim er, crea tor o f  R um pole o f  the B ailey, 16*^  
January, 2009 , The Times Obituary, recalled how, alm ost a lone at the bar, the late John 
Mortimer QC, perhaps best known for the Rum pole books, cou ld  laugh a case out o f  court, 
especia lly  in his closing speeches. G eoffrey Robertson frequently appeared in court as John 
M ortim er’s Junior.
°^’ One such was Sir Fitzroy K elly who later became Solicitor General, Attorney General and 
eventually jo in  the Bench as C hief Baron o f  the Exchequer. He cried very conspicuously in the 
course o f  his highly sentimental defence o f  the notorious murderer John Taw ell in 1845 (Taw ell 
was the first suspect to be arrested after his description was telegraphed from one part o f  the 
country to another) . In this he was far from alone. The E xam iner o f  2 4 ‘^  May, 1856 reported that 
since the tr ia l o f  Thurtell, there has hardly  been a rem arkable case in which counsel fo r  the
p r iso n er  has not w ept fo r  his client, or p ro te s te d  his solem n b e lie f  in his in n ocen ce   The case
o f  Thurtell, in which Joseph Chitty, who had a huge junior practice and was a prolific writer o f  
legal textbooks, shed copious tears for his client, took place in 1823/24, som e years before the 
Prisoners’ Counsel Act. It was alm ost the last famous trial under, what Eric W atson, The tr ia l o f  
Thurtell and Hunt, in the Fam ous E nglish Trial Series, W illiam  H odge and Co, Edinburgh and 
London, 1920, described as the o ld  Tudor p ro ced u re  and the presiding judge as in qu isitoria l. It
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So great was the association between acting and performance by barristers in front of 
j u r i e s  that the Spectator in 1849 suggested it might be sensible to transfer the courts to 
the theatres "which would be more convenient in more ways than one, the Judge, counsel 
and other performers would welcome the better ventilation, and the orchestra would be on 
hand to accompany Mr. Charles Wilkins and the other eloquent gentlemen in the chanting 
parts o f  the oratory” . Similarly Punch, some years earlier, had informed the public that 
an application was about to be made for a regular licence for the "Criminal Drama at the 
Great National Theatre Royal, Old Bailey”. A  cartoon following this announcement 
showed the Central Criminal Court disguised as a kind of showman's booth, with a large 
painted canvas displaying a sensational murder trial in progress, the judges all ranged, the 
galleries packed and the defending counsel in tears
Melodrama, as a form of theatre, had become popular from the late 18^  ^Century and 
lasted until the early 20^  ^Century. The first drama in Britain to be labelled “melodrama” 
was Thomas Holcroff s A tale o f Mystery in 1802. Melodrama consisted of short scenes 
interspersed with musical accompliment and was characterized by simple morality, good 
and evil characters and exaggerated acting style^*°. Characters were stereotypical and 
usually a villain, a wronged maiden and a hero appeared. The emotions of the actors were 
played out in the music and accompanied by dramatic tableaux. Because of musical 
interludes, melodrama was not considered a “play” and thus evaded the Licensing Act 1737, 
which, until its repeal in 1843, restricted plays to two London theatres only -  in Drury Lane 
and Covent Garden, where chiefly Shakespeare was performed, although modem dramas 
were sometimes staged. Early melodrama aimed to appeal to working class audiences. 
Heroes and heroines were almost invariably working class and the villains aristocrats, or 
members of the squirarchy. Reflecting the fascination of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, 
and others of the Romantic movement, in nature and exotic travel, settings of early 
melodramas were often mined castles and wild mountains. In the choice of these locations 
there was also clearly a connection with the Gothic novel, a strong theme of which being 
jeopardy of the innocent. The 1820’s and 1830’s saw a craze for domestic melodrama and 
for real life horror stories. “Maria Martin or Murder in the Red Barn”, was based on the true
was the first trial by n ew spaper  and the first in w hich there was any serions co llis ion  betw een  
judges and the press about the latter’s investigations and reporting o f  proceedings.
Quoted by J. R Lewis, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale, 1982, page 14. Sergeant Wilkins, earlier in 1849, 
represented Mr. Mannings who had been charged jointly with his wife for the murder o f her lover. Wilkins 
sought to place the entire responsibility on Mrs. Mannings, see later.
Bernard Kelly, Famous Advocates, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1921, page 23.
See M. W. Disher, Melodrama: Plots that thrilled. New York MacMillan, 1954.
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story of the murder of a young girl in Suffolk in 1827. Later in the century, popular novels 
were also turned into melodramas Synonymous with stage spectacle, exaggeration, and . 
dripping in sentimentality, melodrama’s popularity cut across social class .
From the 18th century and well into the 19^  ^century, stage performances of 
Shakespeare for mass audiences bore many similarities with melodrama complete with 
soliloquies as declamatory turns, music, scenery, thunder, lightening and wave machines 
Burlesque also helped to satisfy a huge growth in demand for theatrical entertainment in the 
early 19^  ^Century and beyond . A burlesque took a well- known play, story, opera or 
pantomime and satirized it in an exaggerated style with music^ *'^ . Political and social events 
were also “burlesqued”. Leading Victorian pantomime writers started writing burlesques 
and filling them with puns and word play loved by audiences of the time. Many men who 
sat as jurors, were drawn to, and influenced by, what they saw in popular theatre ( hundreds 
of theatres were built in Victorian Britain ) and by what they read in popular novels ,where 
melodrama and rich sentimentality were often important ingredients; a fact not lost on those 
who addressed them as counsel
Juries.
Eighteenth Century courtroom oratory in state trials, where defendants had the 
right to full defence counsel, and that heard in civil trials, where special juries 
were empanelled, often involved jurors, with some classical learning, because of 
their social and educational backgrounds'^ This was not shared by the vast majority 
o f Victorian common jurors - jurors selected from the general pool of those eligible 
for service defined by a property qualification - who tried most o f those indicted 
for felonies and civil matters. A small number o f prisoners, on either their own
s" Dion Boucicault’s hugely successful adaptation in 1852 o f Alexander Dumas’s The Corsican Brothers is 
an example.
S'S Queen Victoria watched seven performances o f Boucicault’s The Corsican Brothers or The Fatal Duel: 
Richard Fawkes, author o f Dion Boucicault -  A Biography, speaking at Victorian Fancies, National Theatre, 
London, 2010.
S'S Terence Hawkes, Meaning by Shakespeare. London: Routledge, 1992.
S'** See V. C. Clinton- Baddeley, The Burlesque Tradition in English Theatre, Methuen, 1952; also see Robert 
Tanitch, The London Stage in the Nineteenth Century. Haus Publications, 2010.
S'S Wilkie Collins (1824-1889), the author o f melodramatic, “sensationalist” and widely read novels, 
including Basil, The Woman in White and The Moonstone, and plays, had studied at Lincolns Inn to become a 
barrister.
216 See Chapter One, C lassics and rhetoric .
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application or that of the prosecutor, were tried by special juries, composed of 
persons of the rank of esquire or above, bankers or merchants. It could reasonably 
be supposed that they would have been exposed to public school, if  not university, 
classical education, as would those of the growing middle classes who had attended 
grammar schools. The popular poetic work o f Thomas Macauley Lays o f  Ancient 
Rome (1842), and later the Victorian - Hellenistic verse of Alfred Tennyson and 
others, did much to expand awareness o f classical themes amongst a wider 
population Also, for those lacking a Latin education, a knowledge of Roman 
historical events was available in Edward Gibbon's Decline o f  the Roman Empire , 
much read in the N ineteenth Century, despite its controversial view of religion, and 
John Dryden’s translation o f P lutarch’s Lives^'l English translations of the Greek 
and Roman myths were also readily obtainable, including Alexander Pope’s Iliad  
and the Odyssey in rhyming couplets, George Chapman’s Homer and John 
D ryden’s Virgil. The importance o f Greek, Latin and the classics for early 
Victorian gentlemen, or those aspiring to that status, is brought out in the novels of 
Charles Dickens including D avid Copperfield  and Great Expectations
Complaints were made about the low intellectual quality of common jurors It 
was said that educated men were rarely found on them. Indeed an article in the Law 
Times o f 1849 asserted:
A sign ificant result o f  M acaulay’s M inute on India, which dealt with what should be taught in 
educational institutions in India, was that know ledge o f  Shakespeare achieved great prom inence 
in the sub-continent and found its way into general and court oratory there.
Roman H istory was central to a number o f  popularly read novels including Edward Bulwer- 
L ytton’s The L ast D ays o f  P om pey, published in 1834, and A ntonina or the F all o f  Rom e, by 
W ilkie C ollins ( 1850). Myths and history o f  ancient Greece and Rome were an important theme 
in N ineteenth Century Art. Prominent amongst artists steeped in tradition o f  admiration for 
classica l antiquity were Frederic Leighton, J.W. W aterhouse Lawrence Alma -  Tadema who 
produced many admired and much exhibited works. C lassical myths, Greek and Roman history, 
and its reception and influence in lO"* Century Britain, were som etim es burlesqued, notably in 
stage productions by Robert Brough.
The O dyssey  was translated in the 17*'' Century by Chapman in iambic pentameter and the I lia d  
in iam bic heptameter. Editions o f  Chapman’s H o m er’s Hymns, the G eorgies o f  V irgil, H e s io d ’s 
W ords and D ays, H ero and L eander, and J u ven a l’s S a tires  were published in the 19"* Century.
See also Christopher Stray, C la ssics  Transform ed, Schools, U n iversities, and S o c ie ty  in 
E ngland, 1830-1916 , Clarendon Press, 1998, Chapter 3, who explained how p o ssession  o f  
know ledge o f  Latin, Greek and the C lassics meant m em bership o f  an e lite  and was a barrier for 
those w ithout it. This was re-iterated in an interview  with Mr Stray, held on the 2*’*' July, 2010 . 
Sam uel Sm iles in S e lf  H elp , published in 1859, Chapter XI, g ives exam ples o f  persons, 
including the young Sam uel R om illy ( Chapter One o f  this th esis), who had risen far above their 
hum ble origins by acquiring Greek, Latin and the C lassics.
To Serjeant W ilkins was attributed the famous remark that his excuse for drinking a pot o f  
stout at midday was that he wanted to fuddle his brain down to the intellectual standard o f  a 
British jury. J. R. L ew is, The V ictorian Bar, Robert H ale, London, 1982, page 69.
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“The composition o f  the ju ry  list seems to be conducted on the principle o f  
selecting the most uneducated and incompetent persons in the county with the 
requisite property qualification ”
Shortly afterwards, a further piece in the same journal claimed that every 
lawyer could recall at least fifty instances which revealed the ju ry ’s lack of 
understanding
Common law juries largely consisted of shopkeepers and small farmers . A 
practice o f not including special jurors on common jury  panels existed. School 
education did not become available to all children , even in an elementary form, 
until 1870. It is, therefore, safe to assume that many o f those who qualified as 
common jurym en would barely have been literate and may well have found it 
difficult to assess the evidence in more complex cases
The great majority o f persons exempted from jury  service came from the educated 
and prosperous . Those who were not exempt could buy their way out o f it 
comparatively easily. The law ’s insistence on land as the basis of qualifying for 
jury service excluded men whose wealth consisted of personal property. An 
awareness by advocates o f a lack of education amongst common jurors, it is 
submitted, was a great influence on the style and content of advocacy in the 
Nineteenth Century
Anonymous (1847-48), 10 Law Times 319.
^  Anonymous( 1848-49 ). 11 Law Times 425. In sim ilar vein the Jurist , 11"* A u gu st,1849, 
regretted that ju r ie s  w ere usually com posed  o f  p erso n s w ith a sca rce ly  sufficien t education  to  
understand the ord inary con versa tion a l language o f  edu ca ted  men and quite incapable  o f  any 
close or acute reasoning.
David Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, Hambledon Press, London, 1998, page 
92. For a description o f  how juries in other jurisdictions o f  the British Empire were com posed see  
Richard V ogler, The In tern ation al D evelopm ent o f  the Jury: The R ole o f  the B ritish  E m pire, 
International R eview  o f  Penal Law V o l.72, 2002. The article outlines the transplantation o f  
English common law juries overseas with colon isation  and Empire, beginning with North 
America.
A. H. M anchester, A M odern L ega l H istory o f  E ngland and Wales 1750 - 1950, London: 
Butterworths, 1980, pp.90 -99.
Section 2 o f  the 1825 Juries A ct ( 6 George IV .), A ct fo r  consolida ting  and am ending the
Laws re la tive  to Jurors and J u r ie s”, set out persons who were exempt. The list included: Peers, 
Judges, M inisters o f  R eligion , Serjeants and Barristers, Members o f  the Society o f  D octors o f  
Law, A dvocates o f  C ivil Law, Attornies, Solicitors and Proctors, Officers o f  the Courts, Coroners, 
Gaolers, Surgeons, D octors, Apothecaries, Members o f  the Army and Navy, Ship P ilots, Royal 
H ousehold Staff, O fficers o f  Customs and E xcise, Sheriffs O fficers, High Constables and Parish  
Clerks.
The Juries Act 1825 Sections 1,8 and 50 and afterwards by the Juries Act, 1870, Section  7.
For disquiet about the standards o f  jurors, see the Second Report o f  the Common Law  
Com m issioners, 1836. Concern about the poor quality o f  com m on law jurors persisted for 
decades. The Juries Act 1870 declared that special jurors were not to be exem pt from com m on
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A common denominator between most jurors was knowledge of Christianity 
hence allusions to, and quotations from, the Bible were made by barristers to 
common juries^^^, rather than drawing on the classics. The style of oratory generally 
in England had been affected by the rise o f Methodism and by the Evangelical 
revival in the previous century; the deliberate appeal o f great 18th century religious 
preachers such as John W esley and George W hitfield, and their early 19th century 
successors, to wide audiences, sometimes in the open air and numbering tens of 
thousands, gave political and forensic oratory, as well as preaching, a new 
forcefulness as well as emotional appeal. It was said of George W hitfield (1714- 
1770), who exerted a major influence on pulpit oratory in the 18^  ^ and 19^ ^
Centuries on both sides o f the Atlantic, that his preaching, in an overwhelmingly 
commanding voice, was singularly lucid and simple and that he seldom troubled 
listeners with complex argument and intricate reasoning. Simple Bible statements, 
apt illustrations and personal anecdotes, were commonly used as was strong pathos 
and frequent resort to weeping. It was reported he could raise tears in his audience 
by the merely pronouncing the word M esopotamia That many jurors were used 
to this form of religious address was appreciated by barristers who consciously, or 
subconsciously, adapted it to their use
juries, but the practice continued. Proposals by the Attorney General, made between 1873 and 
1874, to bolster the common jury by making it necessary to include four special jurors and to give  
powers to trial judges in felony cases to direct trial by special jury foundered. David Bentley, 
E nglish  C rim inal Ju stice  in the N ineteenth  Century, Hambledon Press, 1998, page 93.
229 V ivid  exam ples o f  references to the B ib le and the A lm ighty m entioned in this thesis include 
Charles Phillips defence o f  Francois C ourvoisier in 1840, this Chapter, Edward K enealey’s 
defence o f  Thomas Castro / Arthur Orton ( 1873- 74), also in this Chapter, further in this Chapter, 
the speeches o f  Thorne -C o le  to jurors at the London Sessions in the 1870s and 1880s, and 
D igby- Seymour for defendants in the 1867 Fenian Trial in M anchester, Chapter Four.
For more on George Whitefield see, J.C. Ryle, C hristian  L eaders o f  the 18'^ Century, Banner o f  
Truth, 1869, E stim ation  o f  W h ite fie ld ’s M inistry. According to Sim on Schama, evangelical 
passion, which rem ains a b rillia n t s tra n d  in the w eave o f  A m erican d iscou rse  and rhetoric, goes 
back to the Great Awakening in the 1740s when flo ck s th rilled  to M eth od ist p rea ch ers  such as 
G eorge W hitefield. M ile High Stadium, The Times, August, 2008 . Further, on the Great 
Awakening and its affect on Am erican D iscourse, see Christopher Grasso, A Speaking  
A ristocracy , U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, 1999, Chapter 2.
Serjeant Charles W ilkins, d  1857, was renowned for his ability to rouse em otions through 
colourful speech, florid over-em phasis, flam boyant gestures, use o f  the bon m ot and for playing  
on the passions and the prejudices o f  the jury. J. R. Lewis described him as epitom izing the early 
V ictorian years o f  the Bar ( The V ictorian Bar, Robert Hale, London, 1982. page 68. ) . His 
advocacy drew on his earlier public performances as a W esleyan preacher in M ethodist Chapels, 
ale house com edian and actor.
W ords, phrases and rhymns from the King James B ible, first published in 1611, had long becom e 
part o f  English speech in and out o f  court (See M elvyn Bragg, The B ook o f  Books : A B iography  
o f  the K ing Jam es B ib le , BBC B ooks, 2011 .). It is worthy o f  note that Gilbert Gray QC (1929- 
2 011), one o f  the B ar’s greatest jury advocates in the last decades o f  the 20"* Century, was said to 
have based his rousing courtroom style on the rolling cadences and richness o f  language he had
8 6 :
Restrictions on the extent of forensic licence.
In the "trial" of Queen Caroline, in 1820, an investigation before the House of Lords 
to determine the truth of allegations of adultery against her, Henry Brougham, set out the 
principle that it was the duty of the advocate:
“To save his client by all expedient means, to protect that client at all hazards and costs 
to others and among others to himself... ”
Brougham derived this precept of individual heroism in advocacy from earlier state 
trials where special efforts and unflinching loyalty by barristers (for example that shown by 
Thomas Erskine) to their clients were required. After barristers were given the right, under 
the Prisoners' Counsel Act, 1836, to directly and uninhibitedly address juries in felony cases 
some counsel interpreted Brougham’s broad "all expedient means" description of the 
advocates duty to his client as a licence to try to win by any effective’ means. Other 
barristers formed a more restrained view about what was permissible, adopting that part of 
Lord Langdale’s speech in Hutchinson v Stephens in 1837 in which he emphasized that 
an advocates zeal should be qualified by "considerations affecting the general 
considerations o f  justice ”. The question of how far counsel could go was discussed much in 
the mid-19th century An early contribution was made by Charles Dickens in his novel 
Pickwick Papers, published in 1837. Although a civil case for breach of promise to marry 
Dickens's character Serjeant Buzfuz ^^ i^n Bardell v Pickwick abuses his right of free 
speech before the jury by rhetorical excess, theatricality and gratuitous insults .
heard as a boy in his local Salvation Army Hall and M ethodist chapel ( D aily Telegraph,
Obituary, April, 26"*, 2011) .
Henry Brougham, Speeches o f  Henry Lord Brougham, Edinburgh, Adam and Black, Volume 1, page 105. 
”^ (1837) 1 Keen 659.
For accounts o f this, see Jan -M elissa Schramm Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature and 
Theology Cambridge University Press, 2000, Chapter 3 and Allyson May, The Bar and the Old Bailey, 
University o f North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill and London. 2003, Chapter 8, also includes discussion on 
acceptable limits o f advocacy before the Prisoners’ Counsel Act, 1837.
See Sir William Holdsworth, Charles Dickens as a Legal Historian, Chapter Bardell and Pickwick, New  
Haven: Yale University Press, 1928.
From the 13"* Century Serjeants-at-law were the highest order o f counsel, and as a class formed a 
professional collegiate society centred at Serjeants Inn. They became identifiable by a coif, or black patch on 
the crown o f the wig. Until 1845, when it was abolished by Act o f Parliament, Serjeants held a valuable 
monopoly o f practice as leading counsel in the Court o f Common Pleas. Elevation from barrister to Serjeant 
was a mark o f professional success and allowed greater fees to be charged. A serjeant was allowed to sit in 
the House o f Lords, though not allowed to speak. Judges in the three superior courts o f Common Law were 
chosen from the serjeants. Following custom, if  a barrister below the rank was selected he would formally be 
appointed as a serjeant before being sworn as a judge. In the Nineteenth Century there were seldom more than 
forty serjeants in existence at one time. The Judicature Act 1873 removed the requirement for a barrister to
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The Old Bailey trial, in June 1840, of Francois Courvoisier, a Swiss valet, indicted for 
the murder of his master Lord William Russell at his house in Park Lane, was attended by 
persons of high society and much reported in all the major newspapers. This case focused 
public and professional attention on what was acceptable in full defence advocacy and 
sparked a debate on the subject which lasted over ten years. Courvoisier was defended by 
the Anglo-Irish barrister Charles Phillips (1787- 1859). As a barrister in Ireland, on the 
Connaught Circuit, Phillips had established a genius for florid oratory, fiery denunciation 
and pathetic description principally in seduction and breach of promise cases, where strong 
appeals to emotions could be made. He transferred to the English Bar in 1821. At first, seen 
as too rich in description and imagery, he was not an immediate success before English 
juries and was given the title of Councillor O’Garnish by some of his colleagues. An 
opponent in one case, none other than Henry Brougham ( who later became his friend), 
spoke to the jury of the horticultural address o f  my learned friend^^^ .Phillips’s fortunes 
turned and he soon acquired a very large practice at Middle Temple, perhaps partly as a 
result of a growing appreciation by juries of a more passionate style of address . He came to 
be regarded as one of the greatest forensic orators of the age.
In passion, declamatory eloquence and liberal embellishment of speeches by floral 
language, rather than a great knowledge of the law, Charles Phillips was certainly not alone, 
but he was the leading light His intonation, physical presence and ability to cross- 
examine led to many briefs at the Old Bailey and London Sessions. Despite opposing full 
representation by counsel to prisoners in 1836, see earlier. Chapter 2, he nonetheless took 
full advantage of it.
become a serjeant before attaining a place on the Bench. This, combined with the earlier loss o f their 
monopoly in the Court o f Common Pleas, and the rise o f the rank o f Queens Counsel, especially since the 
early 1830’s, when numbers appointed multiplied (see Daniel Duman, The English and Colonial Bars in the 
Nineteenth Century, Croom Helm, 1983, page 35.), as the sign o f professional distinction, led to the order o f  
serjeants being widely viewed as anomalous. It was dissolved in 1877. Serjeant’s Inn in Chancery Lane was 
sold and the proceeds divided between the thirty six former members. The QC’s became the inheritors o f the 
prestige o f the serjeants. ( Baker, J.H. The Order o f  Serjeants at Law: A Chronicle o f  Creations, with Related 
Texts and a Historical Introduction. London, Seldon Society, 1984). For an account o f Serjeants in Ireland, 
see Hart, A. R. A History o f  The K ing’s Serjeants at Law in Ireland. Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2000.
Madeline House and Graham Storey suggest that Dickens modelled Serjeant Buzfuz on Charles Phillips. 
Dickens’s Letters, Volume 11, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965, pp. 86 - 87.
David James O’Donoghue, Charles Phillips, Dictionary o f National Biography, 1885-1900, Volume 45. 
The Georgian Era Memoirs, London: Vizetelly, Branston and Co, 1833, page 522.
Charles Phillips was noted for his use o f illiteration, as his opening o f a libel case in 1830 shows:
Who shall estimate the cost o f  a priceless reputation -  that impress which gives this dross its currency,
without which we stand despised, debased, depreciated..............
Quoted by Richard DuCann, The Art o f  the Advocate, Penguin, 1993, page 217..
Bernard Kelly, Famous Advocates and their Speeches, Sweet and Maxwell, 1921, London, page 19.
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In defending Courvoisier, Phillips not only represented the defendant as not guilty to the 
jury, after Courvoisier had privately admitted to Phillips that he had committed the crime on 
the third day of the trial, but also sought to blame another servant, who was completely - 
innocent, and accused the police of planting evidence of guilt in the defendant’s rooms. In 
his closing three hour speech Phillips told the jury that the author of the crime was 
known to God alone. "The almighty God above knows who did this deed o f  violence ” . Very 
soon after his conviction , Courvoisier's confession to Phillips became public and was 
reported in the The Times A virulent reaction to Phillips's speech, made in the full 
knowledge of his client’s guilt, followed in the daily press and the periodicals. Some 
barristers were also uncomfortable with the idea that counsel made aware of his client’s 
guilt must continue to defend him on the basis he was innocent.
In large editorial articles, which appeared regularly for several weeks after the trial, the 
influential weekly periodical ûiq Examiner called Phillips’s line of defence the lie of 
defence and roundly condemned him for exceeding the limits of forensic licence on his 
clients behalf:
“Whether all this accords or not with professional morality, it is not for us to decide; 
but i f  it does, the public will probably be disposed to think that the profession should 
change its name from the profession o f law to the profession o f the Lie.
We should like to know the breadth o f the distinction between an accomplice after the 
fact and an advocate who makes the most unscrupulous endeavours to procure the acquittal 
o f a man whom he knows to be an assassin ”
Charles Dickens wrote two letters on the subject of the Courvoisier case to the 
M o r n i n g  C h r o n i c l e . In the first ( dated 2 June, 1840.) he accused Charles Phillips of 
damaging the very morality of advocacy. A rapid response came in a letter to the paper 
from a Lawyer o f  Middle Temple, likely to have been Phillips, stressing counsel’s obligation 
to obtain, by every means, his client’s acquittal .If this could not be achieved, then counsel 
should at least ensure his client was “legally convicted”. Dicken’s promptly reacted with a 
second letter, dated the 26^  ^June, in which he accepted the importance of an independent bar
Partly reproduced in David Cairns, Advocacy and the Making o f  the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800- 
1860, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998, Appendix 3. The controversy over Phillip’s behaviour is discussed in 
pages 1 2 9 -  136.
Courvoisier’s Confession o f  Guilt, The Times, 22"'' June, 1840.
The Examiner, 28"* June, 1840.
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and the right of counsel to take a brief from any client and, within bounds, to do his best to 
save him^ "*^ , but strongly denied “ the right to defeat the ends o f truth and justice by wantonly 
scattering aspersions upon innocent people
In 1845 what was described as the War between the Bar and the Press occurred. Arising from 
a small dispute between Seijeant Telfourd and The Times, it rapidly escalated into a major 
skirmish. The Examiner again portrayed the lawyer as a liar^ '*^ . Punch produced numerous 
jokes at the expense of the bar. Seemingly striking at the very idea of paid advocacy, or at 
least its contemporary practice, the recently founded satirical journal presented barristers 
thus:
“ And yet these men are but creatures o f  the Attorneys: they go where the latter bid
them  I f  an honest man is to be bullied in a witness-box, the barrister is instructed to
bully him. I f  a murderer is to be rescuedfrom the gallows the barrister blubbers over him, as 
in Tawell’s case; or accuses the wrong person, as in Courvoisier’s case. I f  a naughty woman 
is to be screened, a barrister will bring Heaven itself into court, and call Providence to 
witness that she is pure and spotless, as a certain great advocate and school-master abroad 
did for a certain Queen Caroline. They are sold to the highest bidder these folks o f  the long 
robe ”
Not purely confined to criminal matters, the issue of putting forward a case counsel 
knew to be false arose again during the 1840s In 1847, Digby Seymour {later, see 
Chapter 4) in the Mirfield Murders Case, attempted to entirely fix the blame on his client’s 
co-defendant, who was separately represented, for a murder with which they were charged.
Dickens never appeared to waver in this belief. In Great Expectations, written nearly twenty years later, the 
importance o f cross-examination, as a means o f avoiding injustice, is shown by the stranger’s cross-examination 
o f Mr Wopsle. A Dicken’s Anthology, Selected by Sidney Macer-Wright, Heron Books, 1957, Brow Beating as 
a Fine Art, pp. 55-59.
For example see. The Bar and the Press, The Examiner, 16"* August, 1845.
247 jyjj. Punch to the Gentlemen o f the Press, Punch, 1845, pp.64-65. ( Mr Punch may have been W. M. 
Thackeray. ) Sir Fitzroy Kelly’s tearful and sentimental defence o f the notorious murderer John Tawell in the 
same year had attracted much criticism. See, for example. The Times (From the Examiner) March 3 T* 1845. Mr 
Punch’s reference to “ a certain great advocate and school master abroad” can only be to Lord Henry 
Brougham.
The nature o f the duty owed by counsel to a guilty client did not form part o f the politicians’ discussion at 
the time o f the passage o f  the Prisoners’ Counsel Act 1836 : Allyson N. May, The Bar and the Old Bailey, 
1750 -  1850 Chapel Hill 2003 pp. 202 -3)
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It was widely rumoured that he had confessed to Seymour before the trial began that he 
alone was responsible for the crime. Digby Seymour denied that the confession took place . . 
He admitted that he had strong reason to believe his client was guilty, but justified his 
conduct on the grounds that he had no evidence irreconcilable with the guilt of the other 
defendant His explanation drew much hostility from the press. Another, and colourful, 
example of counsel putting forward something he knew to be untrue, which was condemned 
by the Judge, jury, press and legal journals alike, occurred in 1853 when a barrister called 
William Sleigh defended a burglar by saying he had an arrangement to meet the lady of the 
house in bed. This was entirely Sleigh’s invention and he publicly defended his conduct in 
doing so
The case of Mr and Mrs Mannings ini 849 again focused attention on the duty of counsel 
to his lay client. The Mannings were charged with murdering their lodger, Patrick O’ 
Connor. The trial was much reported and commented upon Both were found guilty and 
hanged. Mr Manning was represented by Serjeant Wilkins and his wife by William 
Ballantine, then the leading practitioner at the Old Bailey, where the trial took place.
Wilkins defended Mr Mannings by seeking to blame his wife ( who like Courvoisier 
happened to be Swiss ) and mounted a violent attack on her. Ballantine declared he would 
not follow these tactics .
“I  will do that which it is my duty as an advocate ; hut i f  my duty as an advocate 
requires that I  should cast upon the male prisoner the sort o f observations and accusations 
which have been made against the woman, I  would feel that my profession was a disgrace , 
and the sooner I  abandoned it fo r one more creditable , the sooner I  would be a respected, 
an honourable, and an upright man, and placed in a better position to respect m yself’
Allyson May, The Bar and the Old Bailey 1750-1850, pp.224-225.
Andrew Watson, Changing Advocacy, Justice o f the Peace, Volume 165, 22"" September, 2001, page 748. 
Before reaching thirty, William Campbell Sleigh (1818-1887, called to the bar at Middle Temple in 1846), 
had been married three times, divorced twice and bankrupt two times. These details were brought to public 
attention in 1853, but did not prevent him being created a serjeant at law in 1868, the same year he patented 
an invention for an improved appliance fo r  protecting trousers from  mud.
See for example the Examiner, 27* October, 24* November and 8* December, 1849
The Times, 27* October, 1849.
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Ballantine’s behaviour was praised widely while that of Wilkins much criticized. Debate 
about the licence of counsel was re-kindled, in the course of which Phillips’ conduct of 
Courvoisier’s defence was again scrutinized
Harsh and widespread criticism of saving clients by all expedient means, or rather its 
distortion to mean winning by any available means, led to the notion becoming discredited 
within the profession. There was an acceptance of views expounded by William Forsyth in 
Hortensius or the advocate, An historical essay on the Office and Duties o f  an Advocate 
(1849) In essence, Forsyth approved the line taken by Lord Langdale,in 1837, that the 
advocate "cannot acquire rights greater than are possessed by his principal. He may not 
assert that which he knows to be a lie. He may not connive, much less substantiate a fraud”. 
5'ome time later, the Bar expressed a similar, but binding, opinion on the correctness of 
counsel defending on a plea of "not guilty" a person charged with an offence, when he had 
confessed to counsel he was guilty of the offence charged Applied retrospectively in 
Courvoisier it would have meant that Phillips was right in testing the strength of the 
prosecution evidence against his client, but wrong in suggesting his innocence. Roughly by 
1850, the bar had come to accept the full defence in felony trials introduced by the 
Prisoners’Counsel Act 1836, to which it had been largely opposed, and also that justice was 
promoted by ensuring that a morally guilty client received a fair trial in which evidence 
against him should be properly proved The latter was supported in the legal periodicals
but not the popular press The question of the morality of forensic licence, especially 
advocates acting for defendants whom they knew, or suspected to be guilty, appears in 
Victorian novels
Jan -M elissa Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, page 118.
London: John Murray, 1849, page 436.
Sir Gervais Rentoul, The Art and Ethics o f  Advocacy, Haldane Memorial Lecture 1943, pp. 18 -19.
See Allyson May, The Bar and the Old Bailey, 1750-1850, University o f North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 
and London, 2003, Concluding Chapter.
See Allyson May, The Bar and the Old Bailey, 1750- 1850, University o f North Carolina Press, 2003, pp. 
228-233.
Jan-Melissa Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature and Theology, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, pp. 117-144.
In Anthony Trollope’s Orley Farm ( published in monthly shilling parts between 1861 and 1862), for 
example, the central theme is the looming and actual trial o f Lady Mason for perjury, committed many years 
earlier in a bitterly fought court battle about the validity o f a codicile, which she had forged, to her late 
husband’s will. After his closing speech on her behalf, in the later criminal trial before the jury, Mr Fumival, 
her leading barrister, sits down:
"'‘And y e t as he sat down he knew that she had been guilty I To his ear her guilt had never been confessed; but 
y e t he knew that it was so, and knowing that, he had been able to speak as though her innocence were a thing 
o f  course”. (Anthony Trollope, Orley Farm, London: Folio, 1993, page 617).
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For many members of the Bar cases such as Courvoisier and the Mirfield murders 
illustrated that interviews between counsel and criminal clients were to be discouraged as 
tending to destroy the impersonal nature of advocacy and, moreover, to avoid being put in 
situations of great embarrassment. Such a view was still to be found well into the 20* 
Century.
Objections raised by the press and public to needless attacks by barristers on the 
character of witnesses or parties also played a significant part in restraining the 
bar’s forensic licence. Standards of etiquette were formulated, which were later 
entrenched as rules of professional conduct, requiring counsel, so far as possible, 
to be satisfied that allegations were true before putting them to witnesses.
Judicial limitations on the licence of advocates.
Judicial pronouncement further limited counsel's licence in felony cases. In the trial 
of the strychnine poisoner William Palmer in 1856 the Chief Justice, Lord Campbell, 
politely rebuked Sergeant Shee (later to become Mr Justice Shee ), who the prisoner’s 
leading counsel, for expressing his personal opinion of Palmer's innocence. Shee had 
said, in a closing speech which had included an appeal to the heavens and was widely 
seen as brilliant specimen of legal oratory:
“I  commence his defence. 1 say in all sincerity, with an entire conviction o f  his innocence 
I  believe that never was a truer word pronounced than the words “Not Guilty to the 
Charge ”
Patrick Hastings, later. Chapter 9, for instance, steadfastly refused to see his clients in the cells at court. In 
this he was not alone. ( Explained in an interview, on the 30* October, 2007, with Anthony Arlidge QC, who 
was called to the bar in 1962, Treasurer o f Middle Temple in 2003, and widely held to be the leading barrister 
in England and Wales in criminal defence work.)
Palmer, a young surgeon, was tried at the Old Bailey for the murder by strychnine poison o f a betting man 
at Rugeley. The case excited enormous interest and was much reported, not only in Britain but also 
throughout Europe, because o f the use o f what was then an obscure drug and the general air o f mystery 
surrounding the affair. So great was feeling against him in Staffordshire that Parliament passed a special Act ( 
19& 20 Viet. C.16 ) permitting cases to be transferred to London where there was a clear risk o f prejudice 
against a prisoner locally.
William Shee (1804- 1868), the son o f Irish parents, was the first Catholic barrister to be appointed a judge 
o f the superior courts since James II. The high point o f his career as a barrister was his defence o f  Palmer.
Rv Palmer: Verbatim Report. Transcribed by Mr. Angelo Bennett o f  Rolls Chambers, Chancery Lane, 
(London: J. Allen, 1856 ), page 175.
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The Lord Chief Justice told the jury :
“I  most strongly recommend to you that you should attend to everything that Serjeant 
Shee said to you with the exception o f  his own private opinion. It is my duty to tell you that
opinion should not be any ingredient o f  your verdict it is the duty o f  the advocate to
press his argument on the jury, but not his opinion ”
In telling the jury that Sergeant Shee's opinion ought not enter into their verdict, the 
Lord Chief Justice was reiterating a principle that had been established in the state trial o f , 
Thomas Paine in 1792 when Erskine had said to the jury:
“I  will now lay aside the role o f  the advocate and address you as a man ”.
This was met with the judge by:
“You will do nothing o f  the sort. The only right and licence you have to appear in this 
court is as an advocate ”
In an earlier case ,when he defended the Dean of St Asaph in 1784 , Erskine openly 
placed himself in even closer personal alliance with a client and his cause Indeed in the 
case which first brought him to public notice , the trial of Captain Baillie in 1778, Erskine
had said "I speak not as an advocate alone. -  I  speak to you as a man ” Erskine
drew a distinction between ordinary cases , when a lawyer ought not to argue his personal 
opinion , and cases affecting the public right where it would be wrong not to do so.
Verbatim Report, pp. 307-308.
R V Paine (1792) 22 How.St. Tr.358,412 (1816-1826).
Rv Shipley (1783-1784), 21 How.St.Tr 847 (1816-1826). Erskine’s client was indicted for seditious libel.
Prosecuting counsel said to the jurors: “I  declare upon my honour that I  not only think it is a most
enormous, and most mischievous libel”. ( page 889.) In reply Erskine sa id  “following the example o f  my
learned friend, who has pledged his personal veracity in support o f  his sentiments, I  assert, upon my honour 
to be unaltered, and I  believe I  may say, unalterable opinion, form ed upon the most mature deliberation ; 
and I  choose to place that opinion in the very front o f  my address to you, that you may not, in the course o f  it, 
mistake the energies o f  truth and freedom fo r  the zeal ofprofessional duty. This declaration o f  my sentiments, 
even i f  my friend had not set me the example by giving you his, I  should have considered to be my duty in this 
cause ” ( page 899.) He ended his closing speech by “ As a friend o f  my client, and a friend o f  my
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Injection of a lawyer’s own personal opinion has been identified with an older tradition of 
advocacy which did not find the practice objectionable, but quite proper, doing what the 
layman often thinks the lawyer does anyway -  personally vouch for the client and his case
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The rule forbidding advocates to express personal opinions in their clients’ cases, 
expounded by Lord Kenyon in 1792 in the Thomas Paine trial, was frequently broken in 
the Nineteenth Century. Lord Brougham and Thomas Denham voiced personal support for 
Queen Caroline when defending her in 1820. In 1837 the Legal Observer bemoaned that 
young barristers, in particular, were inclined to the very grave error of avowing personal 
belief in the causes of their clients and the credibility of witnesses and other evidence. Such 
behaviour, which in the periodical’s view often carried great weight with juries, involved 
the advocate in a lie, blunted his sense of right and wrong and brought the profession into 
public disrepute.
Lord Campbell’s re-assertion in Palmer’s case of the prohibition of personal belief in 
cases was accepted by the bar, as a point of professional etiquette, in felony cases. Any 
doubt that it did not apply to civil cases was dispelled ten years later in the case of the self 
styled “Princess Olive”, who sought, unsuccessfully, to establish her membership of the 
Royal Family. Much of her claim depended on some documents . Her counsel, Walter 
Smith started to assert his belief on his word and honour as a gentleman that they were 
genuine when Lord Chief Justice Cockburn interrupted him with:
1 insist on your not finishing that sentence. It is a violation o f  a fundamental rule, which 
every advocate ought to observe, to give the jury your personal opinion 
The main practical consequences of this fundamental rule of advocacy were that advocates 
ceased to overtly vouch for their clients and prefaced their comment and opinion to jurors 
with the words "you may think that......
country, I  shall fee l much sorrow, and yourselves will probably hereafter regret it, when the season o f  
reparation is f le d ”. ( page 929) Excerpts from David Mellinkoff, The Conscience o f  a Lawyer, pp. 245-246. 
David Mellinkoff,, The conscience o f  a lawyer, 1973, West Publishing Co, St Paul, pp. 237-247.
Legal Observer 15 (1837): 216-217.
Ryves and Ryves v The Attorney General (1866) in The Annual Register, vol. 108, pt II, page 255.
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Scenes in court and discourtesy.
Not only was bullying cross-examination of witnesses an aspect of advocacy in the 
early decades of Queen Victoria's reign , and those closely preceding them, but so was 
rudeness to Judges and fellow barristers. Numerous slanging matches occurred amongst 
counsel themselves and between barristers and Judges, who were not always able to control 
them . On occasions the conduct of counsel was so bad that jurors sometimes actually 
stood up in protest . Bad behaviour was not confined to the Old Bailey Bar, which for 
many years had enjoyed a foul reputation, or even the criminal bar. Mr. Sergeant Adams, 
sitting as a judge at the Middlesex Sessions in the 1840s and 1850s “appeared only to 
occupy the bench as a mark for the impertinence of barristers". Frequent scenes between 
Judge Chilton and the Bar at Greenwich were reported in the Kentish Mercury in 1847. In 
1848 the Recorder of Hull Sessions was reduced to tears by the disrespect of a barrister 
called Dearsley. A vendetta, involving barristers and Judge Ramshay, occurred in the 
Liverpool County Court in 1850 and 1851 Quarrels between Counsel in court were not 
uncommon and were satirised in cartoon form in one edition of Punch with the caption 
Unseemly Squabbles^^^. The Bar was scandalized in 1847 when two Chancery Queen's 
Counsel exchanged blows in open court^^^ Richard Bethell (who, in time, as Lord 
Westbury, became Lord Chancellor of England ),renown for his sharp tongue, once had 
his noise bloodied by opposing counsel as they walked from the courtroom. On another 
occasion he was challenged to a duel by another opponent over an argument which had 
occurred in a case. He did not accept It was, however, the Old Bailey that consistently 
retained the worst reputation for unpleasant disputes between counsel and between bench 
and Bar. It is not entirely facetious to suggest that a florid style of oratory, and some 
scenes in court, was to some extent connected to the lunches supplied daily, at the 
expense of the sheriffs, in the Old Bailey and other courts. At the Old Bailey two dinners
David Bentley, English CriminalJustice in the 19' Century, Hambledon Press 1998, Chapter 11.
For these and other examples o f similar behaviour see J. R. Lewis, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale, 
London, 1982, pp. 22-27.
Reproduced as a photographic plate, Illustration 8, in J.R. Lewis, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale, 
London, 1982.
The Times, 27* July, 1847.
See J. R. Lewis, TheVictorian Bar, Robert Hale, London, 1982, page 24. There was a precedent for 
duelling. In 1816, John Adolphus, who acted for the defendant in the first case after the Prisoners’ Counsel 
Act was implemented in 1836, quarreled with another counsel, Peter Alley, in a late Old Bailey trial. 
Unable to settle their differences, the pair fought a duel with pistols in Calais. Both survived, though 
A lley’s arm was injured. See James P. Gilchrist, A Chronological Register o f  Principal Duels. Bulmer and 
Nicol, 1821, page 252.
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attended by judges and counsel, were served. The first was at three ‘o’ clock, forjudges 
and aldermen sitting in the evening and counsel ( evening sessions were abolished in 1844 
and with them the 3pm lunch which was transferred to earlier in the afternoon) and the 
second at five ‘o’ clock , for those coming off duty. These meals usually comprised 
beefsteaks and marrow- puddings and were accompanied by plentiful supplies of port and 
sherry. They were expensive for their providers. Mainly on account of this, by 1877, at 
the Old Bailey, they had become mere epicurean memories ’^^ .The Honourable Charles 
Ewan Law, the Recorder at the Old Bailey ( 1835- 1850 ), was described as dignified in 
manner before dinner always. Earlier, some of the utterances of Serjeant Arabin, who 
sat as a judge at the Old Bailey from 1830 to 1839, had either the distinct whiff of alcohol 
about them, or signs of a more deep seated confusion. Examples include:
No man is f i t  to be a cheesemonger who cannot guess the length o f  a street and
I f  ever there was a case o f  clearer evidence than this ofpersons acting together, this was
that case
The quality of advocacy may not have been added to by tiredness. While the legal 
terms lasted, the courts sat for very long hours^^\ On the very last day of term, they 
might sit until midnight to clear their lists of cases.
Bernard Kelly, Famous Advocates and their Speeches, Sweet and Maxwell, 1921, pp.21 -22 .
William Ballantine, A B arrister’s Life, (1880), page 66. A contemporary o f Ballantine wrote the 
following about the Old Bailey meals and their effect on standards: The Dinners were good, the wines 
abundant, and the results visible at the evening sittings. A barrister who had been cross-examining, and  
speaking fo r  eight hours, was not unlikely to take a little wine fo r  his stom ach’s sake, and was sometimes 
called down to defend a prisoner without any clear notion that he was not to prosecute. The ju ries who 
came to sit at five, o f  course had dined, and living men have seen a judge (not one o f  the fifteen) descend  
the stairs, holding fa s t by the banister, not in wantonness o f  care, afterwards trying prisoners, when unable 
to read the dispositions accurately, or to understand the witnesses answers y e t getting through the work 
from  memory and habit. The witnesses, who had been waiting all day in the O ld Bailey public houses, were 
often very drunk. One Alderman must always be in the court ; no one knows why, but such is the law, and  
his worship was frequently in a state o f  modified sobriety. Quarrels o f  the most discreditable order might 
be expected from  a court so com posed. It is better not to attempt a description o f  the rows. Those who 
have been present at them w ill remember; those who have not would disbelieve. Mr Adolphus and his 
Contemporaries at the O ld Bailey, Law Magazine, 34 (1846) pp 62- 63.
Richard Hamilton. All Jangle and Riot, Professional Books, 1986, page 271. For other pronouncements 
made by Serjeant Arabin, and anecdotes told about him, sitting as a judge, see Sir Robert Megarry, 
Arabinesque at law, 1969, Wildy, Simmonds and Hill. In i? v Harris ( Cited by Megarry as Arab.AP., ex 
rel W. B.1834), Charles Phillips, counsel for the prosecution and Serjeant Arabin,sitting as a judge, 
conducted a conference after which the prisoner pleaded guilty. Arabin said to Phillips, you must distinctly 
understand that I  know nothing o f  the arrangem ent. In an example o f rudeness from counsel to the bench, 
not unknown at the time, Phillips replied. Yes my lord it is thoroughly understood that your Lordship 
knows nothing. ( Megarry page 6 )
Allyson May, The Bar and the O ld Bailey, University o f  North Carolina Press, 2003, pp.171-172 and 
John H. Langbein, The Origins o f  the Adversary Trial, Oxford, 2003, page 25.
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Standards were not helped either in criminal and civil matters by the practice of many 
barristers wandering from court to court and taking contemporaneous instructions , to 
the detriment of those whose briefs they had accepted earlier^^^ Often leading barristers 
had numerous cases on the daily cause list, a feature which endured for the rest of the 
century and beyond. To cover them required juniors, who often did most of the work. 
Juniors and clients would sometimes complain of leaders rushing into court and taking 
control of their cases with little idea of what had happened in their absence.
Largely as a result of public disapproval, which impacted on the Bar's evolving 
etiquette, the conduct of barristers at the Old Bailey and elsewhere gradually improved 
over the second part of the 19th century The process was not without a number of 
setbacks. In 1876 , for instance, at the Middlesex Sessions Court, Ribton Cooper was 
reported to have shouted at opposing counsel, William Sleigh, Its no use you putting on 
those monkey faces with me ! In the commotion that followed, the judge ran out of the 
building and did not return until the uproar had subsided However vastly far more 
serious had been Dr Kenealy QC’s conduct in defending Arthur Orton , the Tichborne 
claimant, on counts of perjury at the Old Bailey in 1873-1874. The trial lasted 188
Richard DuCann, The Art o f  the Advocate, Penguin Books, 1993, pp.40-42
Edward Purcell, recollecting the criminal bar, in the late 1870’s and early 1880’s, when he began his 
career, wrote : “The coarseness, vulgarity and violence that made “O ldB ailey barrister” an opprobrious 
description were fa s t dying out, but were not extinct. The older generation persis ted  in their bad old  
ways, not by any means m ollified by finding their business passing to younger men o f  a “different typ e”. 
Forty years at the Criminal Bar; Experiences and Impressions, Fisher Unwin, London, 1916.
J. R. Lewis, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale, London, 1982, page 120.
Edward Vaughan Kenealy was born in Cork in 1819, educated at Trinity College, Dublin, called to the 
Irish Bar in 1840 and then to the Bar o f  England and Wales, at Middle Temple in 1846, where he rapidly 
rose and became a silk in 1868, working in London and also on the Oxford Circuit. He was eloquent ( 
perhaps rather waspishly, J.B. Atlay, the distinguished barrister and author o f  Famous Trials o f  the 
Century, 1899, Grant Richards, London, page 354, wrote he was the master o f  a tremendous flo w  o f  words, 
and o f  the gift which in Irishmen is sometimes eloquence, in Englishmen invariably bathos.) energetic, 
tenacious and courageous and possessed a stock o f quotations and knowledge o f poetry for the benefit o f  
jurors. Despite these skills he had a reputation for lacking discretion, inclination to completely disregard 
the feelings o f  opponents, making reckless and unsupported statements and failing to appreciate that 
quarreling with judges was only effective if  the jury was on his side. ( J. R. Lewis, The Victorian Bar, 
Robert Hale, London, 1982, page 116. See also B. W. Kelly, Famous Advocates and their Speeches, Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1921 pp 113-118.
After the death, in 1866, o f the eleventh baronet. Sir Alfred Tichborne, whose family was o f  ancient 
lineage, originating before the Norman Conquest, Arthur Orton, alias Thomas Castro, who had been a 
butcher in Australia, came forward and claimed to be Sir Alfred’s elder brother, Roger Charles. He had 
been educated at Stoneyhurst College, served in the Army and was thought to have been lost at sea, o ff the 
coast o f South America, in 1854. Lady Tichborne recognized him as her son, despite his coarseness o f  
speech, ignorance o f French (Roger Charles had as a child been brought up in France) and the Classics, 
lack o f  knowledge o f family history and military matters and difference in appearance to Roger Charles. 
Other members o f the family were unconvinced. When Lady Tichborne died, Orton sought to claim his
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days, of which 66 days were occupied with speeches by counsel. Instead of seeking to 
rely on the standard and burden of proof to show that the prosecution’s case was too 
uncertain to justify a conviction, Kenealy, inexplicably, took on the onus of trying to 
prove that the defendant was Roger Tichborne. His theory, without any evidence behind it 
, was that the Tichborne family and their Crown advisers, were guilty of bribery and 
conspiracy. Henry Hawkins opened for the Crown with a short dramatic speech and then 
called his witnesses. In cross-examination, many of them were subjected by Kenealy to 
wild and offensive accusations, often completely unconnected with issues in the case, and 
fierce vituperation when they objected. Henry Hawkins constantly protested; the judges ( 
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn and Justices Mellor and Lush ,sitting in banc.) intervened; 
there were also clashes with the special jury. The trial descended into a continual scene of 
outburst, protest and quarrel. There was no improvement when Kenealy opened his case 
and presented his witnesses. His closing speech lasted for twenty one days. Very little of 
it was concerned with a summary of the evidence and with putting a consecutive and 
coherent case before the jury He started by calling on God:
“I  commence my observations in defence o f  the accused by reverently invoking the 
Supreme Judge o f  the Universe that, in this mighty trial. He may give us that light which 
is His own essential attribute; that He may guide us by us by wisdom, by impartiality, by 
the spirit ofjustice -  justice , the most celestial o f  all human qualities -  unto a true 
verdict on the issue between us; that we may not be misled by any temporal consideration.
inheritance. To fight his case in court and gain support he sold shares in his hoped for fortune and toured 
music halls where he denounced the British establishment before working class audiences. The case o f  
Tichborne v Lushington, in the Court o f Common Pleas, began in 1871 and lasted 102 days ( See J. Atlay, 
Famous Trials o f  the Century, London, 1899, Grant Richards, pp.263-283 ) .  The Claimant was represented 
by Serjeant Ballantine, whose opening speech lasted a day and a half and Hardinge Giffard. The 
Defendants retained Sir John Coleridge, who cross-examined for twenty two days, and Henry Hawkins. 
The jury considered the Claimant was not Roger Tichborne and, with his consent, counsel elected to be 
non-suited. The trial cost the Tichborne family nearly £92,000, making it the most expensive in Victorian 
Britain. (The National Portrait Gallery, London, possesses a lithograph o f  the court scene, entitled Scraps 
in Court, -Tichborne v. Lushington, made by Andrew Maclure in 1871.Amongst others, Arthur Orton, 
William Ballantine, William Bovill, Henry Hawkins, and John Coleridge are depicted.) At the end o f  the 
civil trial, Arthur Orton was committed, by Sir William Bovill, Chief Justice o f the Common Pleas, to 
stand trial for perjury at the Old Bailey where Dr Kenealy led his defence. The claimant was convicted and 
sentenced to 14 years penal servitude. Before imposing this long, and it has been said, in view o f  Kenealy’s 
behaviour, possibly vengeful sentence. Lord Justice Cockburn said that the Claimant set a w ind blowing 
through England that will take a generation to quiet. Because o f widespread fascination with the 
aristocracy, and that the story was replete with ingredients o f  a great Victorian novel, including money, 
class, drink, family squabbles, long lost heirs and intricate legal doings, both cases received intense press 
publicity and were much discussed at all levels o f  society. Interest has persisted with a comparatively 
recent film. The Tichborne Claimant, loosely based on the facts o f the cases, being produced in 1998.
J. B. Atlay, Famous Trials o f  the Century, Grant Richards, London, 1899, page 379.
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by fear, by favour, by affection, to deviate in the least degree from the glorious path o f  
sun-bright rectitude, but that we may, all o f  us bear in mind, according to the justice we 
mete out here, so shall be the justice administered to ourselves in the dread hereafter. 
There is not one o f  us that will not have to stand before that awful throne, which 
shimmers fa r  away in the future, to answer fo r  life on earth; there is not one o f  us who 
will not have to give a reason fo r  the motives by which he was influenced in all the
essential acts o f  his existence...................................................................
Dr Kenealy later alleged: Lord Chief Justice Cockburn had prejudiced the case; that 
the prosecution was the most corrupt and wasteful since the Stuart period; and that 
forgery, perjury and bribery were the tools of verminous witnesses for the Crown In
his closing speech for the prosecution, Henry Hawkins spoke of ^ 'Justice being insulted in 
her seat”. Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, in summing up, described Kenealy’s advocacy as 
“one unceasing torrent o f  invective, o f  dirty, fou l slime ” . The jury convicted the
prisoner on all counts and formally complained, in writing about Kenealey’s conduct after 
the case had finished:
“ PFig f in d ................; that the charges o f  bribery, conspiracy and undue influence made
against the prosecution in this case are entirely devoid o f foundation, and we regret 
extremely the violent language and demeanour o f  leading counsel for the defendant, and 
his attacks on the counsel fo r  the prosecution, and on several o f  the witnesses produced 
in the cause ” .
The way Kenealy ran the defendant's case led to many questions and comments in the 
legal and general press about the role of advocacy and forensic excess - themes that had 
been much heard earlier, especially in the 1840’s , following the granting of full defence 
by counsel in felony cases in 1836. Questions were also asked about how determined the 
bar was to root out conduct like that which had been exhibited recently and, more 
fundamentally, should the regulation of advocacy be left in its hands. In Kenealy’s case 
the bar acted swiftly and decisively. His fellow barristers on the Oxford Circuit called
Address to the jury on behalf o f  Thomas Castro/ Arthur Orton, Old Bailey, 1874. Reproduced by 
Bernard Kelly, Famous Advocates and their speeches, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1921, pp. 116-117.
In J. B. A lley’s opinion, never was a prisoner’s chance o f  acquittal more recklessly sacrificed to the 
almost insane vanity and headstrong willfulness o f  counsel, ibid  page 379. In what might be seen as some 
mitigation on his behalf, Francis Cowper ( Holker and Kenealy, Graya, No 67, Easter 1968, page 17 ) 
suggested that ill-health ( Kenealy suffered from diabetes ) partly accounted for his impossible conduct.
J.B. Atlay, Famous Trials o f  the Century, Grant Richards, London 1899, page 380.
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upon him to answer allegations before the Bar Mess that he had spoken to witnesses in a 
way that exceeded the licence granted to the bar and had ^''exhibited improper demeanour 
to the bench ” . Dr. Kenealy declined to appear and was expelled In practical terms
this meant no junior barrister on that Circuit could work with him Next, the Benchers
of Gray’s Inn held an inquiry into his conduct, the outcome being that he was removed 
from being a bencher and disbarred from further practice, then an extreme step ,especially 
when a Queen’s Counsel was concerned . It may be that excesses of counsel and the 
inability of some judges to deal with them, especially in the 1840’s, memories of which 
were revived by Kenealy’s conduct in R v Castro, explained The Barrister’s Dream in 
The Hunting o f  the Snark , by Lewis Carroll, in 1876. In the fifth part of this nonsense 
poem the barrister:
“dreamed that he stood in a shadowy Court,
Where the Snark, with a glass in its eye.
Dressed in gown, bands and wig, was defending a pig  
On a charge o f  deserting its s ty”.
In a later verse the snark tells the jury “My poor client’s fate now depends on your 
votes” The verse continues:
“Here the speaker sat down in his place.
And directed the Judge to refer to his notes 
And briefly to sum up the case ”.
The next verse reads:
“But the Judge said he never had summed up before;
So the Snark undertook it instead.
And summed it so well that it came to far more 
Than the Witness ever had said! ”.
J. B. Atlay, Famous Trials o f  the Century, Grant Richards, London, 1899, page 385.
Reported in the Law Journal, April if*', 1874.
On the role o f Circuit bar messes, where barristers frequently dined, in fostering a professional spirit 
amongst them and in maintaining standards, see A. H. Manchester, A Modern Legal History o f  England 
and Wales 1750-1950, London, Butterworths, 1980, page 68.
For an account o f  the proceedings in Gray’s Inn, see. Sir Malcolm Hilbery, The Kenealy Scandal, 
Graya,No 62, Michaelmas Term, 1965 pp. 125-137.
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Remembering the late 1870’s and 1880’s , when he was beginning his forty year 
long career as a barrister before the criminal courts, Edmund Purcell wrote of the:
''bludgeon being too often the weapon o f  the advocate. The judge was denounced and 
insulted; the witnesses, especially the police, were accused o f  willful perjury ;the address 
to the jury was clamour and vituperation. It was only gradually that subtlety and 
plausibility took the place they now occupy in the armoury o f  the advocate ”
Judges, particularly at the London Sessions, often encountered great rudeness from 
the Bar. Purcell recounted:
"Bench and Bar, “Scenes in Court” were frequent headings in the newspapers; 
observations were made to the judge, which today would scarcely be credited. I  have 
heard Thorne Cole, a loud-voiced advocate, who was a terror to Sir P. Edlin, in 
addressing the jury, compare him somehow to Nebuchadnezzar and denounce him as the 
coiled-up boa-constrictor, who was about to spring on the unhappy prisoner”
Describing Thome-Cole, Purcell wrote, “His strength was not so much in winning 
acquittals as in giving his clients as it used to be described a “glorious funeral”. He was 
fu ll o f  noise and declamation; shouted and beat the desk with a vigour that made poor 
Edlin start and tremble with the dread o f what was coming next. His powers o f  
vituperation, often quite original, relieved his speeches from the monotony o f  mere 
abuse ”
Certain judges, in an age before the Court of Criminal Appeal and hence almost 
absolute masters of their courts, were not always known for impartiality. Some frequently 
intervened during proceedings and tinged their summings up to assist the prisoner. Rather 
more, however, including Sir Peter Edlin, did so to thwart his or her case. In such 
circumstances attaeks on judges can be explained as counsel attempting to aet in the best 
interests of prisoners.
The movement in the later 19^  ^Century towards courtesy in eourts may to some extent 
have resulted from the steadily growing dignity of the bench, especially since the
Forty Years at the Criminal Bar; Experiences and Impressions, Fisher Unwin, London, 1916, page 48. 
Purcell, ibid, page 49.
Edmund Purcell, Forty Years at the Criminal Bar, Page 28
The Court o f Criminal Appeal was established by the Court o f Criminal Appeal Act 1907; rights to 
appeal to it, either against conviction or sentence, were given to those convicted on indictment.
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Judicature Acts of 1873-5 which transformed the civil court structure. A rise in their 
standing has been seen as responsible for increased judicial control over legal proceedings 
and for a greater acceptance of that control by the Bar than earlier in the century
Important changes in procedure and evidence affecting advocacy in criminal 
trials.
An aspect of advocacy in the criminal courts that persisted until the middle of the 
Nineteenth Century, was the requirement that written indictments had to be very tightly 
drawn. The law required indictments to be certain. Both the offender and the offence had 
to be accurately described and in minute particularity. Even in simple cases indictments 
would be long documents. Complex rules of criminal pleading governed this area 
Amendments were not permitted so the effect of counsel being able to point to a defect 
was that a prosecution would fail. It would also collapse if there was a variance between 
the indictment and the evidence ealled to support it. In order to minimise the risk of this 
happening the pleader would usually include in the indictment a number of alternative 
counts founded on the same events scarcely different from each other except in small 
particulars but designed to eover all possible combination of facts the evidence might 
prove. This approach, however, tended to lengthen the size of indictments and increased 
the ehances of formal errors within them.
Where a defect or flaw existed in an indictment, or the indictment varied between the 
evidence, counsel for the prisoner would normally take the point by a motion in arrest of 
judgement after the verdict had been delivered. Many displayed great ingenuity in their 
arguments. Unmeritorious acquittals did occur The issue caught the public eye in 1841 
when Lord Cardigan was tried at the Old Bailey for the murder of ‘Harvey Garnett 
Phipps’. It was proved that he had killed ‘Harvey Garnett Phipps Tuckett’. The judge had 
no option but to direct the jury to aequit him leaving Lord Cardigan free, fifteen years 
later in the Crimean War, to lead the calamitous charge of Light Brigade into the Russian 
guns, remembered by the poetry of Tennyson.) . Calls for root and branch reform were
G.W. Keeton, Harris on Advocacy, Stevens and Sons, 1943, page 10.
See Chitty, Practical Treatise on Criminal Law, 1st Edition 1816, pp. 168-304.
For some examples see David Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, Hambledon 
Press, 1998, page 135.
Richard DuCann, The Art o f  the Advocate, Penguin Books, Revised Edition, 1993, page 93.
103
made in the press and the Criminal Law Commissioners in their Eighth Report (1845) 
considered there was a clear need for change. Reform eventually came in 1851 with Lord 
Campbell’s Criminal Procedure Act. This statute: set out a list of defects that should not 
invalidate an indictment specified that all formal objections had to be made before the 
jury was sworn and not afterwards and gave the court power upon such objections to order 
the indictment to be amended Also, where variance occurred between the indictment 
and the evidence called to prove it, the judge was given power to amend the indictment if 
any variance was not material to the merits of the case and did not prejudice the prisoner 
in his defence Further, the Criminal Procedure Act simplified forms of indictment for 
certain offences including murder, manslaughter and theft and forgery of documents 
After the Act trivial indictment flaws and variances no longer resulted in acquittal and 
barristers had to adjust to this in their practice of advocacy.
Slightly later there were other changes in procedure to which advocates also had to 
adapt. During the first half of the nineteenth century many judges, reacting to the 
prosecution’s refusal to call a witness whose name appeared on the back of an indictment, 
would call the witness themselves or insist that the Crown tender them for cross- 
examination. After 1860 this practice ceased.( Nonetheless, the Crown was obliged to 
have at court witnesses it decided in its discretion not to call in case the defence wished to 
do so.) This change put counsel for the prosecution in a stronger position to run his case 
as he saw fit. At a time when calling evidence by the defence gave the Crown the last 
word with the jury, counsel for the prisoner had to weigh the tactical advantage of having 
the final speech against what might be gained by calling any of these witnesses.
A Crown witness who proved hostile by going back on what he or she had said at 
committal would be confronted with his deposition and warned by the judge against 
perjury. In 1865 the Crown’s hand was strengthened by being given the right to cross- 
examine witnesses found to be hostile on their depositions
Affecting the task of advocacy by counsel acting for the Crown and for prisoners 
was greater acceptance by judges at trials of circumstantial evidence -  relevant indirect 
evidence which allows a court to infer the existence , or non-existence, of a fact in issue.
See The Times leader, 3 T ‘ December, 1841.
Section 24.
Section 25.
Section 1.
Sections 4 and 5.
It was not, however, until the Indictments Act 1915, that prolixity o f indictments was addressed. 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1865, Section 3.
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The sensational trial and conviction in 1864 of Franz Muller for murder in a railway 
carriage was a landmark case in this directionnel CounseLnow had to submit before judges 
that pieces of evidence were , or were not, sufficiently relevant to be admitted as 
circumstantial. If allowed into trial it became necessary for them to the make the most of, 
or to minimise, its significance before jurors.
The removal of the ‘Bloody Code’ and consequences for advocacy.
When the Nineteenth Century began well over two hundred offences were 
punishable by death under English law.n° .^ Frequently judges and jurors, who considered 
capital punishment too severe in cases before them, undervalued stolen goods to below 
the amount for which it could be imposed. To avoid the death penalty being passed some 
jurors found prisoners not guilty. The majority of those who were convicted of capital 
crimes were spared execution by royal discretionary pardon and sentenced to 
transportation or imprisonment. Some received no punishment at all. In making decisions 
about pardoning the King-in-cabinet considered the prisoner’s character, the nature of the 
offence, the strength of the evidence against him or her and the prevalence of the 
particular crime. The recommendation from the judge was decisive in most instances 
.The death penalty was removed for pick-pocketing in 1808. In the 1820’s, during the 
period Robert Peel was Home Secretary, major dismantling of the ‘Bloody Code’ took 
place . Within five years in excess of one hundred felonies were declared non-capital. The 
paee of reform was continued in the 1830’s and by 1840 the number of capital offences 
was confined to seven. It was reduced to four in 1861: murder, treason, arson in royal 
dockyards and piracy with violence.
See Leslie Blake, Famous cases: R v Muller- The nature o f  circumstantial evidence. Estates Gazette, 
October 14*1 1995.
Two years later, in i? v Exall (1866) 4 F&F 922, Lord Chief Baron Pollock, most probably remembering 
the intricacies o f  Muller’s case, famously likened circumstantial evidence to “a rope o f several cords”: 
“Owe strand o f  the cord might he insufficient to sustain the weight, but three stranded together may be o f  
sufficient strength. Thus it may be in circumstantial evidence - there may be a combination o f  
circumstances, no one o f  which would raise a reasonable conviction or more than a mere suspicion; but 
the three taken together may create a conclusion o f  guilt with as much certainty as human affairs can 
admit o f ’..
°^^ In the years after 1660, the number o f capital offences increased from about 50 to around 160 in 1750 
and rose further. See W R Cornish and G de N. Clark, The Era o f the Bloody Code, Law and Society in 
England 1750-1950, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1989, pp. 544-568.
W R Cornish and G de Clark, ibid, page 564.
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Penalties substituted for offences which previously carried the death penalty were 
transportation , until its abolition in 1867, and imprisonment. Judges were given much 
discretion, which they tightly guarded, on the severity of sentence. Given this, it became 
increasingly important for counsel to put before them, as compellingly as possible, 
mitigating factors, about both the offence and the prisoner, that might reduce punishment. 
It might reasonably be surmised that the greatly expanded width of sentencing powers 
following the removal of the ‘Bloody Code’ promoted the development of the speech in 
mitigation. Rather surprisingly, what evidence there is points to the rarity of pleas in 
mitigation throughout the Nineteenth Century^**. The author of a recent papeH*l which 
drew on the results of a study of trials for felonious assault, formerly a capital offence, 
reported that most counsel tried to put as many features that could be seen as mitigating 
before the jury in the course of the trial. This appeared to be in the hope that, if  they were 
not inclined to acquit entirely the prisoner, jurors might find him or her guilty of a lesser 
offence, especially if at least some evidence had been given of provocation or 
intoxication. If the accused was convicted of an offence there seemed little need to cover, 
in a separate plea in mitigation before the judge, ground that had already been co v ered ^ .
311 David Bentley, English Crim inalJustice in the Nineteenth Century, Hambledon Press, 1998, page 279. 
Dr Phil Handler, Penal Reform and Trial Practice in England, 1808-1861. Paper delivered on 6**' 
February, 2008 at the Institute o f  Advanced Legal Studies, London.
Interview with Dr Handler held on 6* February, 2008.
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Chapter Four : Advocates of their time but signs of 
changes in styies before Juries.
In the second half of the 19th century, roughly until the beginning years of the 
1880’s, the dominant style of advocacy before juries in criminal and civil cases 
remained melodramatic, declamatory and lachrymose Aggressive and intimidating 
cross-examination of witnesses took place, sometimes, unless restrained by judges, 
descending into bullying^*^. Questions asked often had more to do with a blunderbuss
J. R. Lewis, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale, London, 1982, pp.119-120, describes how prospective 
barristers would sometimes attend a course on declamation with John Cooper, who had given up the 
stage him self to teach young hopefuls. His classes on declamation were attended by a mixture o f  aspiring 
barristers and actors. Recollecting the criminal bar in the 1870’s and early 1880’ s, Edward Purcell,
Forty Years at the Criminal Bar, page 27, wrote o f m a n y  advocates who deliberately took a dramatic 
approach to advocacy and were p repared  to adopt mannerisms, tricks o f  speech and gestures to heighten  
the effect o f  their p leas  and o f  the prevailing fondness fo r  n o ise”.
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn’s comments in 1874 on the treatment o f witnesses indicate this was 
particularly bad in England:
“I  have w atched closely the administration o f  justice in France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Italy, and  
a little in Spain, as w ell as the United States, in Canada, and in Ireland, and in no p lace  have I  seen 
witnesses so badgered, brow beaten, and in every way so brutally m altreated as in England. The way in 
which we treat our witnesses is a national disgrace, and a serious obstacle, instead o f  aiding the ends o f  
justice. In England the most honourable and conscientious men loathe the witness- box. Men and women 
o f  all ranks shrink with terror from  subjecting themselves to the wanton insult and bullying misnamed  
cross-examination in our English courts. Watch the tremor that passes the fram es o f  many persons as 
they enter the witness box. I  remember to have seen so distinguished a man as Sir Benjamin Brodie  
shiver as he entered the witness box. I  dare say his apprehension amounted to exquisite to rtu re” .
Calling forjudges to exercise more control over the way cross-examination was conducted, the Lord 
Chief Justice continued:
“Witnesses are ju s t as necessary fo r  the administration o fju stice  as judges or jurymen, and are entitled  
to be treated  with the same consideration, and their affairs and priva te  lives ought to be held  as sacred  
from  the gaze o f  the public as those o f  the judges or the jurymen. I  venture to think that it is the duty o f  
the ju dge to allow no questions to be pu t to a witness, unless such are clearly pertinent to the issue 
before the court, unless such as are clearly pertinent to the issue before the court, except where the 
credibility o f  the witness is deliberately challenged by counsel and that the credibility o f  a witness
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than with a precise forensic weapon. Closing speeches were frequently long and 
repetitious. Appeals to emotion, and prejudice, usually reaching their peak in the 
peroration, were often greater than those to reason. The Diety and the Bible were 
regularly invoked. Vivid and floral language was employed and poetry liberally put to 
use to awaken generous sympathies. Special juries, in particular, would be treated to 
quotations from, and allusions, to English literature, history and the classics. This style 
of advocacy was parodied in Gilbert and Sullivan's Trial by ju ry  - a short comic 
operetta, first staged in 1875, about a trial o f an action in the Court of Exchequer for 
breach of promise to marry
Advocates of their time.
Mentioned is now made of some prominent advocates of the period, whose cases 
were greatly reported and whose style, because of their successes, influenced those of 
other barristers. In a small profession which lacked formal training in advocacy, 
watching and emulating the style and techniques of leading advocates was central to the 
education of younger lawyers.
A writer of several books on Welsh literary history, and originally employed in 
the Printed Book Department of the British Museum, John Humphreys Parry (1816 -
should not he wantonly challenged on slight grounds”. Irish Law Times, 1874, quoted in Francis L. 
Wellman, W ellman’s A rt o f  Cross -  Examination, 4**' Edition, 1936, pp. 188-189.
Nearly a decade after Lord Justice Cockburn’s comments, and demonstrating continuing concern about 
cross-examination. Sir James FitzJames Stephen, who at the time had nearly thirty years experience in 
the courts firstly as a barrister and then a judge, wrote, in similar terms, that “ it was the highest 
importance that judges and counsel bear in mind the abuse to which cross-examination is liable and 
should do their best not to ask questions conveying reproach on character, except in cases in which 
there is a reasonable ground to believe that they are necessary”.
Like Cockburn, Stephen was not only exercised about the subject o f  questions put to witnesses but also 
the way in which they were asked. '’’'Cross-examination is not infrequently converted into an occasion fo r  
the display o f  wit, and fo r  obliquely insulting witnesses. It is not uncommon to pu t a question in a form  
which is in itse lf  an insult, or to preface a question or receive an answer with an insulting observation. 
This naturally provokes retorts, and so cross-examination so conducted ceases to fu lfil its legitimate  
purpose and becomes a trial o f  w it and presence o f  mind which may amuse the audience, but is 
inconsistent with the dignity o f  justice, and unfavourable to the object o f  ascertaining the truth ” . 
Stephen principally blamed judges for this state o f  affairs by not stopping examinations unnecessary for 
any proper purpose and for failing to prevent questions in improper forms. Sir James Fitz James Stephen, 
A H istory o f  The Criminal Law o f  England, MacMillan and Co, 1883, Chapter XII, pp. 435 -  436.
George Gilbert, when a practising barrister on the Northern Circuit, later as a magistrate for 
M iddlesex and who also involved him self in much litigation about his work, would have been familiar 
with courtroom advocacy o f  his time. It is said he compiled his notes for Trial by ju ry  in 1868. Still 
performed today, it is often produced in the Royal Courts o f  Justice, or Bow Street Magistrates Court, as 
part o f  the annual Covent Garden Festival.
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1880) decided to qualify for the Bar. He was called at Middle Temple in 1843. With a 
pleasing heavy set appearance, a deep Welsh voice and clear talent, especially for cross- 
examination, he achieved rapid success and soon built up a large practice at the Old 
Bailey, the Middlesex Sessions and on the Home Circuit, of which he soon became an 
acknowledged leader In 1856, he was made a serjeant. Amongst the great cases in 
which he figured, were for the prosecution in the trial of the Mannings in 1849, charged 
with the brutal murder of their lodger, the excise man O’ Connor ( Chapter 3), and for 
the defence of Franz Muller in 1864, indicted with the murder of Mr Briggs on the 
underground railway In 1873 -74 he appeared for the prosecution in Regina V 
Castro, the Tichborne claimant perjury trial. Parry was considered to have a great deal 
of Charles Dickens’s Buzfuz about him but his theatrical performances won him 
considerable support and work from attorneys and were copied by others at the bar. His 
opponent in many cases, William Ballantine, described Parry’s noise and thunder as 
"passion passing fo r  eloquence” .Despite this, J Alderson Foote , in his book of 
reminiscences of decades of practice as a barrister in Victorian England wrote : 
"Parry was an oldish man when I  remember him, but to my mind he was the most 
persuasive advocate that ever addresses a jury. He had not the overwhelming force o f  
Russell, nor the incisive persistence in cross-examination o f  Hawkins, nor the silver 
tongue o f  Coleridge: who were all in their own peculiar style unapproachable. But he 
had persuasion, which after all, is the end to which other qualities are the means; and I  
doubt i f  any other advocate o f  his day could have shown a higher average o f  
successes ”.
William Ballantine(1812 -  1887) became a barrister of Inner Temple in 1834 
Long before he was appointed a serjeant in 1856, he established himself as one of the 
leading criminal advocates of his day at the Old Bailey, where he remained for his 
working life, surpassing others in cross- examination and retention of essential facts
B. Kelly, Famous Advocates and their Speeches, LondoniSweet and Maxwell, 1921, page 109.
His closing speech for Franz Muller was widely praised as a memorable piece o f  advocacy (Kelly, 
ibid. Page 109. ), especially those parts which dealt with: the influence o f  the press on public ( the jury’s 
) opinion; that counsel’s personal opinion was to be ignored; and for circumstantial evidence to be 
complete.
J. R. Lewis, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale, London, 1982, page 62
See . J. R. Lew is, ibid, page 63.
John Alderson Foote P ie pow der from  the Law Courts: being dust from  the law courts, collected, and  
reco llec ted  on the Western Circuit by a circuit tramp., first published by John Murray, London, 1911, re­
published by EP Publishing, Yorkshire, Chapter IV page 81.
B. KtW y,Fam ous Advocates and their Speeches London: Sweet and M axw ell,1921, page 124.
For many years he dabbled in the theatre and journalism. Ballantine’s clients were 
numerous and ranged from Prince Louis Napoleon (Napoleon III of France) to the 
Gaekwar ( Prince ) of Baroda, tried in 1875 with attempting to poison the British 
Resident. For this case he received £10,000, then an enormous sum. He appeared for the 
claimant in Tichborne v. Lushington which straddled 1871 and 1872 . Attracting crowds 
and huge press interest, the case hinged on whether the claimant, Arthur Orton, was or 
was not the missing aristocratic heir, Roger Tichborne. Its outcome led to Orton’s later 
trial for perjury. His manner in court tended to be less passionate than some of his more 
florid rivals such as Parry. Ballantine’s voice, however, was notable for its hesitancy 
and drawling tone, said to be "half infirmity, ha lf affectation” It has been claimed 
that he was the inspiration for Anthony Trollope’s Chaffenbrass in Orley Farm
Another prominently successful barrister of the time was Montagu Williams 
(1835 -  1892). Prior to being admitted to the bar, Williams, who at Eton had been a fine 
classics scholar with a particular enthusiasm (later to be heard in the courts ) for Horace, 
had pursued a number of occupations including acting Before and after becoming a 
barrister he wrote for the stage, including two farces, A fa ir  exchange and Easy Shaving. 
Williams had a ready address and was skilled in marshalling circumstances favourable 
to his client He mainly appeared in the criminal courts. His style , perhaps 
unsurprisingly, was artificial, theatrical and prone to purple p ass age s^^ .^ In the Turf 
frauds case of 1877 three Scotland Yard detectives and a solicitor were tried for 
complicity in the frauds of two notorious criminals, Kurr and Benson, who had already 
been sentenced for defrauding an old French lady The two were produced from 
prison to give evidence against the detectives. Montagu Williams, defending one 
detective, said this of the criminals:
J. R. Lewis, The Victorian Bar Robert Hale, London, 1982, page 63. Bernard Kelly, ibid, page 124, 
also noted a certain hesitation  but also wrote o f  his great charm o f  manner.
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Details o f  these and o f  his very early years are presented in Montagu W illiam s’s memoirs, Leaves o f  
a Life being the Reminiscences o f  Montagu Williams QC, MacMillan and Co, 1893, Chapters I — VI.
B. Kelly, Famous Advocates and their Speeches, LondoniSweet and M axw ell, 1921, page 127.
Two good examples o f  his style are given in the Appendix to W illiam s’s Leaves o f  a Life. The first 
(Pp. 335-348.) is his address to the jury on behalf o f  Percy Lefroy, tried in 1881 for the murder o f  
Frederick Gold on the London to Brighton Railway. According to W illiams, this was "the m ost 
sensational tr ia l” o f  his career. Lefroy was convicted and hanged. The second (Pp. 348-363.) is 
W illiam s’s jury speech, which he delivered over two days, for George Lamson, a surgeon tried, 
convicted and executed in 1881 for the murder by poison o f  his young brother in law. The case was very 
widely reported in the press.
For an account o f  this case, in which Williams had defended another prisoner, one Murray, see 
Montagu W illiams, Leaves o f  a Life, Chapter XXXIII, pp. 217-222.
“Excellent in vice and exquisite in fraud  -  the cunning o f  a cat teeming from  the eyes o f  
one; the oily soft serpent-like treachery o f  deceit trickling down from  the mouth o f  the 
other
A  few years earlier, in similar vein. Sergeant Vaughan had poured scorn on a witness by 
saying:
"And then we come to Brown. Ah, there the impudent and deceitful fellow  stands, ju s t 
like a crocodile, with tears in his eyes and his hands in his breaches pockets”
Montagu Williams prided himself on being able to assess how receptive jurors 
were to his advocacy and accordingly what more, if  anything, was required. On this 
subject, in his Reminiscences, he wrote^^°:
“An advocate who has had large experience (especially i f  that experience has been in 
criminal cases), can pretty well, when he has finished speaking, tell which way the jury  
incline. It was the custom o f mine to try and make sure o f  two or three o f  the most likely 
men first, and then to devote my attention to the others. Sometimes one man in 
particular would present special difficulties. It would be easy to see that he had form ed  
an opinion adverse to my client, and was resolved not to be influenced by what I  was 
saying. There was nothing fo r  it but to patiently hammer away. I  found it was h a lf the 
battle to rouse him from his indifference, and to thoroughly arrest his attention ; while , 
o f  course , i f  he once opened his mouth to make an inquiry, and thus gave me an 
opportunity o f  addressing m yself directly to him , I  could usually count upon his 
allegiance. It was sometimes my experience , too , th a t, when it came to considering the 
verdict, one or two strong men would easily carry their fellow  -  jurors along with 
them ”.
In Reminiscences, Williams approvingly described Serjeant Ballantine’s ability 
to delight jurors by firing o ff a number o f  small jokes  in his speeches, something he had 
observed early in his career as a junior to Ballantine in a case on a bill of exchange.
Robert Walter, Random Recollections o f  the M idland Circuit (1869), Chiswick Press, page 13.
330 Montagu W illiams, Leaves o f  a Life, MacMillan and Co, 1893, page 87.
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Montagu Williams was noted for using humour in court to aid his persuasiveness. He 
recorded, “I  have noticed, indeed that jurors in a court o f  law, as also the ushers, are 
always convulsed with laughter on the smallest possible provocation”
The ill-fated Edwin James (1812-1882) QC, upon whose rather florid 
countenance it was said Charles Dickens based his description of the barrister Stryver in 
a Tale of Two Cities, and for a time Radical MP, was another with words. After his call 
at Inner Temple in 1835, he gradually built up a considerable practice in the criminal 
courts. He excelled in forcible address especially in cases where passion or prejudice 
might be relied on to sway the verdict of a common jury His most famous defence 
was that of the refugee Dr Simon Bernard, tried, in 1858, for conspiring to assassinate 
Emperor Louis Napoleon III of France (“The “Orsini Conspiracy”). Edwin James’s 
speech on behalf of his rather sinister client was a masterpiece of florid and rhetorical 
advocacy. It was laced with “glittering steel” and “mounted lancers” -  the words had 
little to do with the issue in hand but, jurors passions aroused with fears of a French 
invasion, were rewarded by Bernard’s acquittal which led to frantic scenes of rejoicing 
at the Old Bailey and outside. Passionate advocacy by James, on another occasion, led 
to the judge suggesting, in view of comments made by counsel, that the Archangel 
Gabriel should be called to the witness box Three years after defending Dr Bernard, 
the popular advocate was disbarred by the Benchers of Inner Temple for dishonourable 
conduct in financial transactions and was later declared bankrupt. Just before these 
events occurred it was said the government was contemplating appointing him as 
Solicitor General. James left London for New York where he put himself to work at the 
New York Bar, as well as appearing on the stage at the Winter Gardens Theatre.
Digby Seymour (1822-1895) QC, an Irishman, also stands out for the use of 
flamboyant language which was successful before juries even in technical cases. As a 
member of the Historical and Literary Institution of Dublin he had produced an essay on 
the genius and study of rhetoric. Public speaking was regarded by him as a subject for
Montague Williams, Leaves o f  a L ife  MacMillan and Co, 1893, pp.50-51.
Bernard Kelly, Famous Advocates and Their Speeches, Sweet and M axwell, 1921, page 119. 
J R Lewis, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale, London, 1982, page 120.
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careful cultivation and constant improvement. He was briefed in a compensation claim 
concerning some grass- fields near Neasden , where a large number of carriage -horses 
had been allowed to graze. Digby Seymour made a colourful speech, not entirely empty 
of patriotic sentiment, about:
“Arab steeds with flowing manes and panting flanks, careering over these fields as 
though they had been in the desert” .
His opponent, however, was a great expert in compensation cases like this and 
reminded the jury that they had to consider:
(a) the value of the land
(b) the number of years’ purchase that should be given on it
(c) special principles of discount which applied, and so forth.
Out of his depth, a horrified Digby Seymour asked a junior counsel, who he was
leading, what to say. His junior answered "D on’t worry about that rot .just give them
some more o f  those Arab steeds with their panting fla n ks”. This he did and won the 
highest compensation that had ever been awarded for land in the locality .
Digby-Seymour’s capacity for emotive denunciation was shown in his address to 
the jury in the Fenian Trial in Manchester, November 1867. Although he was 
instructed as one of the counsel for three Fenians, Irish nationalists, charged with 
murder, following bombings in the city, Digby-Seymour was at great pains to 
disassociate himself with the Fenian cause:
“O f all the curses that ever fe ll on my unhappy country, Fenianism is the blackest 
and the worst. Famine may desolate and destroy; a pestilence may mow down its 
hundreds or its thousands, returning spring will renew the crops o f  the earth, and a 
refreshing atmosphere will subdue the pestilence. But Fenianism is a blighting 
curse, a cancer, fastening itself to the fairest spots o f  an otherwise fa ir  island, and 
looking fo r  its mischief and exerting its influence upon the most vital parts o f  my 
native country” .
Arab Steeds. Viscount Alverstone’s Recollections o f  Bar and Bench (1914),cited by Richard 
Hamilton, A ll Jangle and Riot, page 270.
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A little later he continued:
“There is not a politician in my native land who has not denounced it; not a capitalist 
who is not afraid o f  it, nor an alter throughout the country which has not cursed it! The 
clergy have spoken o f  it as, in times o f  old, the Levitical priesthood and the priesthood 
o f  the East spoke: ‘ Go forth into the wilderness thou leprosy. Unclean!
Unclean! ”
Another highly considered member of the bar was Henry Hawkins who, like 
Edwin James, had made his name as a criminal advocate in securing acquittals in the 
Orsini Conspiracy (1858) and also in the prosecutions that followed the collapse, in 
1866, of the Overand Gurney discount house Like Montagu Williams, he had an 
interest in the stage. This assisted him to develop a graphic power of characterization 
which was frequently employed before juries in richly dramatic speeches. Lacking a 
classical education, and thus unable to make allusions to antiquity and the great oratory 
and literature of the past, he compensated by treating jurors with confidences , assuming 
them to be worldly men like himself, convincing them he was no different from them 
and making many references to horse-racing, then the leading gambling sport. Jokes 
were told by him to good effect. He had an extraordinary ability, by a wink or a gesture, 
to plunge courts, judge, jury, counsel and audience, into uproarious laughter, putting the 
jury into good humour and distracting them from damaging pieces of evidence ^^lUnlike 
some others, who relied on a mixture of vanity, flair and memory, he was thorough in 
his preparation and worked hard, although on those occasions when he did not know his 
brief he appeared to manage competently Hawkins had a reputation as a rough cross­
examiner. This was borne out in the case of Tichborne v. Lushington in 1871-72 where 
he behaved with such aggression towards the Claimant’s witnesses that some of them 
refused to attend the later criminal trial for fear of facing him again. Repeatedly in
Reproduced by Kelly, Famous Advocates and their Speeches, London: Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
1921,p p .l32-133 .
J. R. Lewis, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale, London, 1982,, pp. 70-71.
J. R. Lewis, ibid, page 15
An aspect o f  Hawkins’s abilities marvelled upon by Sir Edward Clarke in his unfinished short treatise 
on advocacy, published some years after his death as an Appendix to E. W. Fordham, Notable Cross- 
examinations, 1951.
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Tichborne v. Lushington Hawkins used the weapon of selecting one small item from a 
witnesses evidence and on which to concentrate his energies, examining it in minute, * 
and often embarrassing detail. One of the issues in the case was whether the real Roger 
Tichborne had tattoo marks on his arm like those of the claimant. A man called Boyle 
claimed to have seen such marks when Tichborne pulled up his sleeve to rub his arm. 
Hawkins put these questions:
Hawkins: “Do you know why he rubbed his arm?”
Boyle: “I suppose it itched. I do not know”.
Hawkins: “But what you think when you saw him rubbing his arm?”
Boyle: “I thought he had got a flea”.
Hawkins: “A flea! Did you see it?”
Boyle: “No, of course not “.
Hawkins: “Whereabouts was it? Just show me (The witness pointed to his upper arm). 
What time was this?”
Boyle: “Ten past eleven” .
Hawkins: “On the second occasion did you think it was a flea again?”
Boyle: “I suppose so ....”
Hawkins: “What time was it? About the same time?”
Boyle: “Yes”.
Hawkins: “Ten past eleven?”
Boyle: “YES”.
Hawkins: “Then all Lean say is, he must have been a very punctual old flea”
It was said that Hawkins often rose to his feet with no firm ideas of the way his 
cross-examination should proceed; he had to rely on experience and instinct which was 
sometimes spectacularly correct "^*1
Hawkins, along with many other of his contemporaries, acknowledged that little 
children in court could rend the hearts of jurors in criminal and civil cases and indeed
Reproduced by Richard Du Cann, The A rt o f  the Advocate, Pelican Books, 1980, page 126.
See Henry Hawkins, Reminiscences o f  Henry Hawkins, Baron Brompton, E dited by R ichard Harris, K  
C, E. Arnold, 1904, republished by Kessinger Publishing, USA 2004, especially Chapter XIV: ‘The case 
o f  Mr Faker and the Welsh W ill’, in which, through testing his evidence in cross examination, Hawkins 
exposed a well-known dissenting clergyman, thus destroying the p la in tiffs  case, called as a witness by 
his opponent Edwin James.
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encouraged their presence In his Reminiscences Hawkins describes how he 
defended a man who had suddenly, and without any apparent reason, killed his wife. 
Securing his acquittal was helped by the evidence of a Vicar, who explained he had 
regularly attended church for thirty five years. In his view even greater assistance had 
been rendered by the presence in court of the prisoner’s intensely sobbing children . 
Henry Hawkins conceded that their excessive grief might not have been all it appeared 
to be after hearing that just a few days before the trial they were playing on an ash-heap 
in the village where they lived, swinging around a dead cat with a string about its neck, 
and singing:
“This is the way poor Daddy will go!
This is the way poor Daddy will g o !”
Away from juries, Hawkins had little reputation in arguing law before the appellate 
courts. After seventeen years as a QC, Hawkins was elevated to the Bench in 1876.
Willie Mathews was another barrister with a sense of drama. He had been the 
pupil of Montagu Williams. A child of the stage, the son of the playwright Charles 
Williams, he had a flow of language and a passionate earnestness that juries found 
irresistible, despite an unusual habit, which was possibly cultivated to hold the attention 
of listeners, of beginning a sentence with an accusative case and ending on a 
preposition. J.A Foote, KC., who knew Mathews on the Western Circuit, in his book 
“Pie Powder” speaks of Mathews’s "fervid eloquence which became the admiration and 
despair o f  his rivals and contemporaries” and adds, "He was the only advocate I  have 
ever known who could make a juryman shed tears, and on one occasion at least I  have 
seen him perform the same operation in cold blood upon a reluctant judge ” In his 
memoirs, Travers Humphreys, an eminent QC and later High Court judge, recounts how 
he had also seen a judge and jury being reduced to tears by Mathews "^*1
This was, o f  course, appreciated at least since the days o f  ancient Rome, see Appendix 1, Excursus: 
Classical Rhetoric.
Chapter 5. J.Murray, 1911.
P ie Powder, J. Murray, 1911, Page 32. On the following page, Foote wrote about hearing Mathews 
addressing a common jury in a "torrent o f  burning eloquence, probab ly  incomprehensible to most o f  
them, but nonetheless im pressive”.
Travers Humphreys, Criminal Days, Hodder and Stoughton, 1946 pp. 68-69.
Signs of Change.
Even though histrionics continued to thrive amongst these leaders of the bar and 
were copied by some juniors, signs of change began to appear. Men like Hardinge 
Giffard, who became Lord Halsbury and Lord Chancellor for a total of eighteen years 
John Holker, later to be appointed Attorney General, Charles Russell, a future Lord 
Chief Justice, and Edward Clarke began to significantly change the style of advocacy. 
Their approach, which was increasingly emulated by others at the Bar, was "quieter, 
more learned and less inclined towards violent appeals to emotions and florid  language 
and quoting widely from popular verse and literature ” Less concerned with relying 
on the tricks of the Victorian stage, they also were developing a more dignified and 
controlled manner in their conduct towards each other and to witnesses. These barristers 
tended to select the best arguments from their client's case and to drive these home 
forcefully to jurors, rather than saturate them with rhetorical elaboration of all 
conceivable points. They also avoided tiring juries with needless repetition.
Hardinge Giffard ( 1823-1921 ), who narrowly escaped a pistol bullet fired by a 
deranged clergyman in the Old Bailey in 1854, was recognized for his judgement, power 
of expression, freedom from speaking nonsense, not talking for talking’s sake and for 
his ability to grasp all the facts of complicated cases He accepted a wide variety of 
briefs and in London divided his time between the Chancery bar and the Old Bailey. His 
courtroom demeanour was often understated, even stilted "^*1
See John Hostettler, Lord Halsbury, Barry Rose, 1998.
J. R. Lewis, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale, London, page 120.
Such qualities were praised by the eminent solicitor William Freshfield in a letter he wrote to Giffard 
in 1883, and cited in Lewis J. R. The Victorian Bar, page 163. He was said to be blessed with great 
powers o f memory to such an extent that he could read a brief without making a single note and 
conducted one heavy case without taking the ribbon o ff the papers in court; they were later found to have 
only one thing written on the outside: a list o f  the trains back to London. Richard Hamilton, A llJan g le  
and Riot, Professional Books, 1986, page 177. Another, although somewhat later, advocate, who was 
also renown for a phenomenal memory was Sergeant A. M. Sullivan, the last Sergeant at the Irish Bar 
who died in 1959. It was said o f  him that he never needed to refer to papers in court. Brian Gibbens, 
Elements o f  Modern Advocacy, New Law Cassettes, Butterworths, London, 1979. M inimising the need to 
read papers, enabling barristers to maximize time looking at witnesses, judges and juries, was often seen 
as a valuable persuasive technique in advocacy, projecting confidence and sincerity o f  b elief in a client’s 
case. Indeed in his short treatise on advocacy Sir Edward Clarke, infra, remembers being told by Harry 
Hawkins, earlier, to never examine or cross-examine from  your b r ie f Know your b r ie f and examine from  
your head. He recalled this as one o f  the most useful p ieces o f  advice 1 ever re c e iv e d .
R. F. Heuston, Lives o f  the Lord Chancellors 1885-1940, Oxford, 1964, 12. Hardinge Giffard, 
although generally eschewing it, did vividly employ theatrical emotion and drama, presumably for 
entirely tactical reasons, in his six hour speech before lay magistrates at Market Drayton in i867. He was 
instructed to halt the prosecution o f  Edward Eyre, the former governor o f  Jamacia, for murder, arising 
from his bloody suppression o f  the Morant Bay uprising in 1865. At one stage, Giffard broke down in
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Recalling his association with Hardinge Giffard, Sir Edward Clarke, ini 916, wrote:
“It is now fifty  years since I  made his acquaintance at the Old Bailey where he had a 
most lucrative practice. It was then a rough place and some o f  the older men had habits 
o f  cruel and offensive cross - examination and violent and unscrupulous advocacy, 
which Giffard’s influence and example did much to banish from  our criminal courts. He
was not a great defender o f  prisoners: Ballantine and Parry had the most
important defences but Giffard was constantly appearing in important prosecutions
. To listen carefully to the whole o f  a case when Giffard prosecuted with Poland fo r  his 
junior and Russel Gurney was the presiding judge, was the best lesson a young barrister 
intending to practice in the criminal courts could possibly have^^^’\
John Holker (1828-1882) did not attend university and was articled to a 
Westmoreland solicitor before being called to the Bar at Gray’s Inn, at the then 
comparatively late age of 26, in 1854. He began to specialize in patent cases and then 
commercial law more generally. The Tichborne cases, in which he was not involved, did 
mueh to promote his career: As they oceupied many of the leaders of the bar, solicitors 
had to look elsewhere for forensic ability. This resulted in Holker being thrust to the 
fore. There he thrived, with a great knowledge of business and of how businessmen 
thought, suppressing all oratory, claiming little or no knowledge of law and always 
putting the most common place view of a case to a jury. "A great getter o f  verdicts, the 
impression he made on a jury was that his client had a firs t -  rate case and was to be 
pitied fo r  having such a second rate advocate A contemporary wrote of him; "this 
tall plain Lancashire man never seemed to labour a case nor to distinguish him self by 
ingenuity or eloquence, but through whom the justice o f  his case appeared to shine 
through a somewhat dull but altogether honest medium ”. He had the art o f  never 
seeming to be cleverer than the people he was addressing J. A. Foote , who had also 
encountered him, wrote, he was massive and deliberate, with a hesitating delivery that 
amounted at times to a stammer, but he could address a jury  as i f  he was one o f
tears and called on God before resuming his appeal to the biases o f  rural magistrates. Eyre was not 
committed. ( See Korstal, R. W. A Jurisprudence o f  Power; Victorian Empire and the Rule o f  Law. 
Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 302-310.)
Reproduced by J R Lewis, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale, London, 1982, pp .163-164.
AW  Cockburn QC. An Address on Advocacy to the Christ Church Law Club, May 15th 1952. 
Published by the University o f  Southampton
1 1R
themselves, and won their confidence by his apparent sincerity rather than by a parade 
o f  oratorical power The appearance of great candour was his most valuable asset in 
advocacy . In court it was said he would accept suggestions from juniors and solicitors 
clerks marking him out from many barristers of the old school, who had much of the 
prima donna about them . Sir John Holker became Solicitor- General under Disraeli’s 
administration in 1874 and was briefly Attorney General. After the fall of the 
Conservative government, he was appointed a Lord Justice of Appeal.
Charles Russell (1832-1900), born at Ne wry in Ireland, became a solicitor in 
1854 and soon became noted for vigorous advoeacy in the county courts. He was called 
to the English Bar at Lincoln’s Inn in 1859 and soon became established in the North of 
England. His chief rival on the Northern Cireuit was John Holker. In his early days, 
perhaps keeping with the spirit of the times, flashes of temper were seen and many 
angry exehanges with opposing eounsel, judges and jurors occurred. This was to change 
and as the years passed he won great admiration for his advocacy. Russell’s powers of 
eross- examination were acclaimed as those of genius^ '^*, whilst in the art o f forcibly 
stating a case to a jury he was extraordinary, said to be beyond every advocate in living 
memory In the opinion of J Foote, who heard him eonduct cases, Russell was an 
elemental force. In similar vein Travers Humphreys, who had also observed him, wrote:
“What one remembered after witnessing one o f  his great performances was not the 
admission extorted from a witness, the astuteness o f  the questions put in cross- 
examination , or even the eloquence o f  speech to the ju r y , but the atmosphere which the 
man created. Whoever was the judge, from the moment Russell got going he dominated 
the court ” .
Mr Balfour Browne K.C. Quoted by Francis Cowper, Holker o f  G ra y’s Inn, Graya 14, Easter 1934, 
page 71 .
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J. A.Foote, Pie pow der from  the Law courts, John Murray, 1911, page 177. 
Francis Cowper, o f  G ray’s Inn, Graya 14, Easter 1934, page 72.
Charles Russell’s biographer, R. Barry O’ Brien wrote: It was a fin e sight to see him rise to cross- 
examine . His very appearance must have been a shock to the witness, - the manly, defiant bearing, the 
noble brow, the haughty look, the remorseless mouth, those deep set eyes, widely opened, and that 
searching glance which pierces the very soul. “R ussell”, sa id  a member o f  the Northern Circuit, 
“produced the same effect on a witness that a cobra produced on a ra b b it”. R. Barry O’Brien, O ’B rien ’s 
Life o f  Lord Russell, Smith, Elder, 1901, page 101. John Singer Sargent’s large portrait o f  Charles 
Arthur Russell, Baron Russell o f  Killowen, painted in 1899, hangs in Lincoln’s Inn.
B. Kelly, Famous A dvocates and their Speeches, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1921, page 135.
Criminal days, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1945, page 91.
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Unlike many of his contemporaries, he did not attach much importance to what 
he jokingly called "rhetorical firew orks”, believing that juries were becoming 
increasingly suspicious of florid oratory and theatricality and preferred to base their 
decisions on what they believed to be solid facts . Again, distinguishing himself from 
many others, Russell always meticulously prepared his cases so that when he was in 
court he could watch the jury and the judge in everything they did, however trivial it 
might seem. He was always ready and alert and would not hesitate to stand up to any 
judge if  he thought the rights of the advocate were being invaded Russell was made a 
Queen’s Counsel in 1872. Such leaders of the Bar as Serjeants Ballantine and Parry and 
Henry Hawkins QC found in him a very formidable rival. Russell was engaged in many 
well known cases, but his most famous were the successful defence of the Irish 
Nationalist leader Charles Stewart Parnell, before the Parnell Commission in 1888, and 
the defence of Florence Maybrick at the Liverpool Assizes in 1889 who was convicted 
of murdering her husband by poisoning him with arsenic Sir John Russell was 
Attorney General in the Liberal Governments of 1885 and 1892 and was appointed Lord 
Chief Justice in 1894, the first Catholic to hold that office for centuries.
The late Victorian period saw a number of contests in court between Sir Charles 
Russell and Sir Edward Clarke. Edward Clarke ( 1841-1933 ) was not from a privileged 
background, beginning his working life as a shop assistant in a silversmiths run by his 
father. Although lacking money, influential friends, connexions with the law and social 
standing, he had a driving ambition to excel first by becoming a barrister and then by 
entering politics. After periods as a writer at East India House and a law reporter, he 
raised sufficient funds to enter Lincoln’s Inn as a student and to be called to the bar in 
1864, aged 23. Small criminal cases came his way. In time they were followed by 
weightier matters. Solicitors noticed his skill in persuasively presenting medical 
evidence and cross-examining doctors - both the result of vast preparation before trials^®” 
. The case which established him was that of Harriet Staunton in 1877, when Clarke was
R. Barry O’ Brien, his biographer, said to Russell, "Your methods are altogether different, you do not 
as a rule manoeuvre, you go straight at the witness. Russell replied: With an English ju ry  it is different. 
They are busy and they want to go away quickly. M ere finesse they do not appreciate; go straight at the 
witness and at the point; throw your cards on the table. It is a simple method and 1 think it is a good  
m ethod”. O ’B rien’s Life o f  Russell, Smith, Elder, 1901, pp.100-101.
Lord Norman Birkett, Six Great Advocates, Penguin, 1961, page 71.
See Lord Norman Birkett, ibid, pp. 71-80. Also, for a highly readable account o f  the trial, F. E. Smith, 
Famous Trials, Hutchinson and Co, Ltd, 1930, Mrs Maybrick, pp. 399- 412.
Edgar Lustgarten, R v The Stauntons, part o f  the Old Bailey Series, broadcast in 1970 on Radio 4.; 
tape kindly lent by Mr Leslie Blake, Senior Lecturer, Department o f  Law, University o f  Surrey.
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36. He was briefed to defend Patrick Staunton on a charge of murder. The kernel of the 
Crown’s case was that a woman of limited mental powers had been neglected and 
starved to death over months by her callous husband, Patrick, and his relatives, to 
obtain her small inheritance. Public outrage and interest in the trial was intense. Despite 
much undermining by Clarke of medical evidence on behalf of the Crown, all four 
defendants were convicted and sentenced to death after a summing up by Mr Justice 
Hawkins (Henry Hawkins, earlier) pointedly against the defendants'^* . Clarke’s closing 
speech had a very great effect on the country and propelled him up to advocacy’s top 
rank. His early desire for political fame was abandoned. During his remaining thirty 
seven years at the bar he appeared in many famous and sensational cases. Against Sir 
Charles Russell in 1886, he obtained a verdict of not guilty for Adelaide Bartlett who 
was charged with murdering her husband with chloroform. In 1890 he appeared in the 
Parnell Divorce suit. The following year Sir Charles Clarke represented the plaintiff in 
the Baccarat case in which the Prince of Wales gave evidence. He fought for Oscar 
Wilde in his three trials at the Old Bailey in 1895. And in 1896 he appeared for Dr 
Jameson, who was prosecuted in London after the Jamieson Raid in South Africa.
Clarke was a fine speaker and had taken lessons in voice production and public 
speaking. He knew the value of pause and of a change in tempo Unlike others of the 
period, "he had inherited few  o f  the declamatory, lachrymose, resonant talents o f  the 
early Victorian Bar Clarke relied on persuasion in his speechmaking, an appeal to 
logic that sprang from a deep sincerity, rather than almost wild appeals to emotion. 
Unlike many barristers, he seldom employed ridicule Juries found for him because 
they believed he believed. The extract below is part of a peroration from a closing 
speech at the Old Bailey in 1872 when he defended Police Chief Inspector of Police, 
also by the name of Clarke, charged with conspiracy to defeat justice. For the time, it 
shows a restrained use of emotion:
“Gentlemen you, I  know, will do your duty; but while it is part o f  your duty clearly and 
peremptorily to pronounce guilt where guilt is well established, it is the highest and 
best privilege that you to scout from the judgment seat the perjured witness, and to send 
out the innocent man with an unchallengeable verdict o f  Not Guilty to hold up before
Following a public outcry, and a petition signed by over seven hundred doctors that the cause o f  
Harriet Staunton’s death was not starvation but tuberculosis, they were reprieved.
Travers Humphreys, Criminal Days, Hodder and Stoughton,, page 92.
J. R. Lewis, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale , London, page 141.
DuCann, Edward, The A rt o f  the Advocate, Penguin Books, 1993, page 144.
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his fellows. Judge in this case as you would he judged. Use diligence, discretion, and 
discrimination in dealing with the verdict; and I  do hope confidently - 1 trust it is not 
the mere advocates feeling that speaks in my words at this moment -  that Clarke may go 
out from  this court, not discharged because a jury  could not agree; not with some 
bastard verdict o f  not proven to hang round his neck fo r  the rest o f  his life, the 
irremovable stigma o f  suspicion o f  crime; but with the straightforward, honest Not 
Guilty that sends him back to his friends an honoured man; that sends him back, fo r  the 
rest o f  his life, to enjoy the love, obedience, honour, troops offriends, and all that 
should accompany old age; to leave his children when he goes an heirloom richer than 
wealth can purchase, grander than power can create -  the splendid heritage o f  an 
unsullied name”
Edward Clarke’s unfinished short treatise on advocacy, only published some years 
after his death shows he employed in both cross-examination and speeches, the two 
forming what he called "a combined address to the ju ry ”, subtle psychology and close 
attention to those details his preparation and management of the case in court led him to 
believe would concern jurors;
“The cross-examination o f  the chief witness fo r  the plaintiff is always o f  great importance 
It is the firs t opportunity which counsel for the defence has o f  indicating, instead o f  
presenting, because the most skillful and effective cross-examination is that which 
interests the jury and sets them thinking what the answer to the p la in tiffs  case, or the 
case fo r  the prosecution, can possibly be , and by the selection o f  and arrangement o f  the 
facts referred to, suggests the defendant’s case instead o f  stating it.
Presently comes the speech in which the defence is formulated; and i f  listening to that 
speech, a juryman says to himself, “Why that is just what occurred to me when the witness 
was in the Box, ” the verdict, so fa r  as he is concerned, is safe. The conclusion which his 
own intelligence has suggested must be right”
Quoted by Richard Du Cann, The A rt o f  the Advocate, ibid, page 218.
In the form o f an Appendix to E.W. Fordham, Notable Cross-examinations, Constable and Company, 
1951.
Elsewhere in his treatise, Clarke criticizes Sergeant Parry, earlier, for often spoiling shrewd and 
powerful cross-examinations by violence and harshness to witnesses. John Duke Coleridge (1820-1894), 
eventually Lord Chief Justice o f England, was praised for his ingenious and painstaking cross-examination, 
in which the more closely a witness was entangled the more suave and gentle Coleridge’s manner became. 
Clarke, however, described, as "studiously unfair", Coleridge’s habit o f  repeating a witness’s answer or 
quoting it in a subsequent question but not exactly as it had been said, though insufficiently altered to
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In the assessment of Lord Birkett:
“In an age when advocacy was held in great esteem, nobody ever equalled Clarke in 
marvellous persuasive power. Some o f  his learned brethren excelled him in some 
spheres. He lacked, fo r  example, the overwhelming elemental force o f  Charles Russell 
and could not rival his incisive, persistent, penetrating power o f  cross -  examination. 
Others perhaps had a greater sense o f  the dramatic or were more truly versatile; but 
Edward Clarke had the supreme gift -  the advocate’s pearl o f  great price -  the gift o f  
persuasion. This, when all is said and done, is the gift to which all other qualities o f  the 
advocate are subordinate: and it was by this gift that Clarke won his enduring fam e ”
Norman Birkett (1883 -  1962), was called to bar in 1913. He never saw Edward 
Clarke in action, but recalls that older barristers, whenever conversation turned at the 
Inns of Court or in the Bar Messes on circuit to great advocates, spoke of him with 
admiration and wonder. It is, therefore, very likely that his highly successful advocacy 
was an influence on them in the later Victorian period and after.
It is perhaps not too fanciful to suggest that the more restrained advocacy before 
juries that was emerging may have been influenced by the style of an earlier barrister 
James Scarlett (1769- 1844), Lord Abinger (1835), who was appointed Lord Chief 
Baron of the Exechequer in 1834. Invariably mastering each brief sent to him, not taking 
more that he could really attend to having a deep knowledge of the law and
attract comment from opposing counsel or judges, as a means o f quietly getting the witness to give his or 
her case away.
Six Great Advocates, Penguin, 1961, page 38.
Sir Malcolm Hilbery ,born in the same year as Lord Birkett, in a speech, entitled Duty and A rt in 
Advocacy, at Gray’s Inn, delivered in 1938 when he was a High Court judge, {Graya  No XX, Easter ), 
recounted how, as a young boy, he had seen. Sir Edward Clarke in the Kings Bench: "It has rem ained a 
viv id  memory and a model to this day". Travelling back in generations, and showing how young 
advocates may to some extent be influenced by older and outstandingly successful ones, Edward Clarke 
him self professed, in his short treatise on advocacy, Fordham, ibid, admiration for William Ballantine, 
Henry Hawkins and John Duke Coleridge.
It was said o f  James Scarlett, in contrast to many o f his colleagues, that 
"One o f  his great merits was that when he was engaged in a cause his services might always be relied  
on. He disdained to adopt the vicious practice  o f  some barristers, then fa r  too common, o f  wandering  
from  court to court and taking contemporaneous briefs in all, to the damage o f  those whose briefs they 
had accepted”. Unattributed quote in Richard DuCann, The A rt o f  the Advocate, Penguin Books, 1993, 
pp.40-42. The habit, to the detriment o f  the quality o f their advocacy, o f  leading silks to accept, when
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consummate advocacy soon made him one of the leaders of the bar. A particular talent 
was getting witnesses to tell their stories as if  for the first time. In marked contrast to 
many of his contemporaries, Scarlett’s highly winning method of addressing juries did 
not involve rhetorical expedients but choosing the very best argument on his client’s 
behalf and putting it with all his ability in a well modulated musical voice, paying strict 
attention to facts and good diction. His manner was relaxed and his tone conversational. 
Of Scarlett’s achievements with juries a number of stories are told, some of which 
contrast him with Henry Brougham. One has it that at the end of a Yorkshire Assizes a 
lawyer found himself in the company of a juryman. The lawyer asked the juror what he 
had thought of leading counsel . “ ' Well’ said the juryman ‘that Lawyer Brougham be a 
wonderful man ; he can ta lk , he can: but I  don’t think nowt o f  Lawyer Scarlett. Indeed 
replied the lawyer, but you have given him all the verdicts Oh, there’s nothing in that 
said the juror, he be so lucky, you see, he be always on the right side”
In later Victorian and in Edwardian times Sir James Scarlett’s accomplished 
advocacy was seen as instructive in a number of practical books for barristers beginning 
their careers. For example in 1894, on cross-examination, Henry Hardwicke, (drawing 
on Edward W. Cox, The Advocate: His Training, Practice and Duties, published in 
1852 wrote:
"In cross -  examination he outstrips all that have ever appeared at the British Bar; not, 
perhaps, in one single quality -  for while some have excelled him in strength and force, 
others have left him behind them in craft and wit. His superiority, however, as an 
accomplished cross-examiner -  as one combining the best qualities fo r  the office, and 
making the best use o f  them at the best time and to the best effect -  must on every hand 
be admitted. His brow is never clothed with terror, and his hand never aims to grasp the 
thunderbolt; but with the gentlemanly ease, and the polished courtesy, and the Christian 
urbanity and affection, with which he proceeds to the task, do infinitely more mischief to 
the testimony o f  witnesses who are striving to deceive, or upon whom he finds it 
expedient to fasten a suspicion . He has often thrown the most careful and cunning o ff 
their guard, by the very behaviour from which they inferred their security. Seldom has
they were in court, as many small briefs as their clerks could collect is also mentioned by Sir Edward 
Clarke in his short unfinished treatise on advocacy, ibid.
A. W. B. Sampson, Biographical D ictionary o f  the Common Law, Butterworths, 1984. For Scarlett’s 
own assessment o f  his advocacy, in a biography written by his son, see Peter Campbell Scarlett, A 
M emoir o f  the Right Honourable James, F irst Lord Abinger, J. Murray, 1877, Chapter 18.
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he discouraged a witness by harshness and never by insult: and to pu t men upon the 
defensive by a hostile attitude, he has always considered unwise and unsafe. Hence he 
takes those he has to examine , as it were, by the hand: makes them his friends, enters 
familiar conversation with them, encourages them to tell him what will best answer his 
purpose, and thus secures a victory without appearing to commence a conflict”
On closing speeches before juries, Hardwicke said:
“The advocate should address the jury  ju st as he would address a friend in the street 
upon a matter o f  business . When he meets a friend  he talks to him familiarly and uses 
plain language and homely illustrations, and does not leave him unless he makes 
him self understood. This is the way in which Lord Abinger dealt with his juries, and was 
the chief reason he almost invariably defeated the brightest ornaments o f  the English 
bar who were more eloquent and more learned than himself, but who did not have the 
faculty o f  communicating their knowledge in this w ay”
J. Crockford, London.
The A rt o f  Winning Cases, or Modern Advocacy: A P ractical Treatise on Preparation fo r  Trial and  
the Conduct o f  Cases in Court, New York, Albany Banks and Bros, 1894, passage quoted in The 
Examination o f  Witnesses in Court, by F J Wrottesley, Sweet and Maxwell 1910, pp. 147-148. 
Hardwicke, The A rt o f  Winning Cases, New York, Albany Banks and Bros, page 281.
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Chapter Five : Decline of jury trials In the civil and 
criminal courts and other key developments.
Opportunities for passionate appeals to emotion, floral passages and theatrical 
gestures much reduced as trial by jury in civil actions declined. Juries were little used in 
the new county courts which were set up in all areas by the County Court Act 1846 
They were intended, in the words of the County Court Act 1846, which introduced them, 
fo r  the more easy recovery o f  small debts and demands, in England. Solicitors, given 
full rights of audience in these courts, acted for the majority of persons represented 
there. Indeed from an early date, solicitors became established who specialized in 
advocacy before each county court Parties to disputes could give evidence and 
represent themselves. In 1867, 542,569 causes were determined in the county courts;
See A. H. Manchester, A Modern Legal H istory o f  England and Wales 1 7 5 0 -1 9 5 0 , Butterworths, 
1980, pp. 118-120.
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only 856 of these were tried by a jury Foreshadowing the bar wars between 
barristers and solicitors in the later Twentieth Century about rights of audience in court, 
the Bar bitterly resented what they saw as a major intrusion by solicitors into their 
domain of advocacy In the legal press, favourably disposed to the interests of 
barristers, articles casting aspersions on the quality of solicitor advocates persistently 
appeared. One asked “whether their loud shop -  boy manner, sharp and incisive as it 
may be, would not be tolerated at the Bar? As attorneys they are eminent, as barristers 
they would collapse ” . But by and large the bench and solicitors got on very well and
the judges expressed their opinion that the solicitors managed highly competently 
The County Courts were a success. In their first seven years no fewer than 3,575,205 
cases were entered there and it was clear they were meeting a real need. Accordingly 
their financial jurisdiction was gradually increased: in 1850 to £50; and in 1903 to £100. 
Further, Parliament significantly added to the importance of county courts by giving 
them jurisdiction in bankruptcy in 1869^^ ;^ in 1880 cases under the Employers’ Liability 
AcF^ ,^ which in 1897 became the Workmen’s Compensation Act^^, in its time a fruitful 
source of litigation; and in 1890 the winding up of companies with capital not more than 
£ 10,000'*'.
In 1854 the Common Law Procedure Act permitted issues of fact in the higher 
courts to be tried by judges alone, albeit with the consent of the parties. Section One of
H. Kirk, Portrait o f  a Profession. A H istory o f  the S o lic ito r’s Profession,! 100 to the Present Day, 
London, Oyez Publishing 1976, Chapter 8, page 157.
A. H. Manchester, ibid, page 95.
For example in Advocacy in The County Courts, A Letter to Sir Alexander Cockburn, MP., Her 
M ajesty’s Attorney-General, by A Barrister o f  The Inner Temple, London: S.Sweet, 1851, the 
anonymous author called for the exclusion o f  solicitors from the County Court, advocacy ‘'being no p a r t  
o f  an a ttorney’s business. With him lies the collecting o f  evidence and preparing all the prelim inary and  
practica l details in the action and the selection o f  the barrister who shall advise him on any questions o f  
legal intricacy, and finally conduct the cause in court. The great principles ofju d ic ia l practice, the deep 
research and knowledge o f  cases, the form s through which truth and argument are made to prevail, all 
lie beyond his province and rest pecu liarly with the counsel, whose business it is to study and practica lly  
learn the most effective mode o f  marshalling the evidence collected, and the best course through which 
m atters o ffac t may be presen ted to a jury, or points o f  law argued before a ju d g e ”, (pp. 9-10.) Further 
(page 14), the author severely criticized attorneys who had begun to specialize in advocacy in the county 
courts. They are described as "an inferior class o f  attorneys, who fin d  it worth their while to attend and  
to act, not only on their own account, but as agents to other members o f  the profession, who have not 
time to give their attention to county court practice, but who are willing to share the fee s  allow ed under 
the A c t”.
Law Magazine and Review, vol4 (NS), page 89.
H. Kirk, Portrait o f  a Profession, Oyez, London, page 158.
Figure presented by H. Kirk, Portrait o f  a Profession, Oyez, London, 1967, page 158.
The Bankruptcy Act 1869, Section 4
The Employers Liability Act 1880, Section 6.
See Workmen’s Compensation Act 1897, Schedules 1 and 2 which confirm the jurisdiction o f  the 
County Court.
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the Act said that the “verdict” of the judge was to have the same effect as the verdict of 
the jury. Some judges were initially bewildered by the dual role placed upon them 
Judges under the new procedure adopted a discursive form of judgement in which 
findings of fact intermingle with comment, combining in one piece the trial judge’s 
notes on the evidence, directions on the law, the court’s decision and often the 
arguments of counsel'*’. Whilst the chief focus was on law and facts, the discursive 
nature of judgements permitted judges scope, where they were thought apt, for some 
references to the classics, Latin, works of English Literature and history, although few 
could possibly have approached the County Court Judge , on whom the lawyer and 
humourist Theo Mathew (1866 - 1939) based one of his Forensic Fables, who “5 0  often 
cited apposite extracts from  the works o f  Cicero, Ben Jonson, Rabelias, Tennyson, and 
other authors both ancient and modern that in order to get them down correctly each o f  
the reporters had been compelled to purchase a copy o f  the book o f  quotations in which 
the sound lawyer discovered them ” '**.
Prior to the passing of the Judicature Acts (1873-1881) trial by jury took place 
in well over 90 per cent of cases in the superior courts '*^ ; the period afterwards saw 
growing disuse of jury trial Unlike jurors, judges sitting alone in the High Court or 
County Court, despite Lord Bramwell’s dictum that “oMg third o f  every judge is a 
common ywror”'^‘had little taste for sensational appeals, flowery language and 
theatricality, but did have a high appreciation of law, fact and logical structure. 
Accordingly advocacy before them adjusted in style and shortened in length. Knowing
'*' Companies Winding Up Act, 1890, Section One.
'*^  J. A. Foote, Pie Powder, John Murray, London, 1911, pp. 84-85 tells an amusing story o f  a judge who 
was unsure whether he should find the facts as he him self thought or as he thought a common jury would 
have found.
'*’ J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal H istory, Fourth Edition, Butterworths, 2002, page 93.
'** The Sound Lawyer Who M ade A G ood Resolution, published in 1926 and reprinted in Forensic Fables 
(Complete Edition) 1999, Wildy and Sons Ltd, London, page 97.
'*^  R. M. Jackson, Incidence o f  Jury Trial During the Past Century (1937-38) 1 Modern Law Review  
132.
The decline was steep. According to the Law Journal, cited by J. R. Lewis, The Victorian Bar, 1982, 
Robert Hale on page 128, some 94 per cent o f defended cases in the 1879 Queen’s Bench were before 
juries; by 1892 the proportion had fallen to 54 per cent. It has not been possible to locate this edition o f  
the Law Journal in either the libraries o f the Inns o f  Court or the Institute o f Advanced Legal Studies 
London. Connor Hanley, The Decline o f  the Civil Jury in Nineteenth Century England, Journal o f  Legal 
History, Vol. 26. Number 1, April 2005, pp. 253-278, considers the seeds o f  the decline o f  jury trials in 
the superior courts were sown during the two decades that preceded the Common Law Procedure Act 
1854. In his view three factors combined to undermine use o f  the civil jury: increased recognition o f  the 
integrity o f  the judiciary by lawyers ; efforts made by lawyers to professionalise the practice o f  law; and 
the successful introduction o f  juryless trials by the Couty Courts Act, 1846.
Referred to by William Renwick R iddell, Common Law and Common <Se«5e,Yale Law Journal, Vol. 
27, No 8 (June 1918), page 996.
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when to press an argument, when not to and carefully gauging, by various subtle means, 
how submissions were being received by judges became essential. In his book of 
reminiscences on forty years of life at the Bar published in 1911 J Alderson Foote QC 
wrote ''Evolution has produced a new type, and the common- law leader is no longer 
o f  a different type o f  species from  his brother who practices in equity” The change 
was commented upon by George King, in a rather humorous piece written in 1896 .
He informs readers of a former Scottish judge of former times who, on being offended 
by an advocate’s lack of use of emotive language before him said:
“Declaim Sir! Why do you not declaim? Speak to me as i f  I  were a popular assembly”.
King goes on :
“This love o f  declamation is not shared by judges o f  the present day, whose continual 
interruptions in cases tried without juries make it impossible fo r  counsel to indulge in 
any taste fo r  rhetoric. Non -jury cases have vastly increased in number, and, in 
conjunction with the growth o f  the technique o f  the law has brought into existence a 
race o f  severely argumentative advocates whose somber language never learns to stray 
outside the dry sequestered vale o f  the law ”.
In strong agreement with this view, Foote wrote:
Piepowder, John Murray, London, 1911, Chapter IV, page 83.
Equity practitioners almost never addressed juries ( Section 3 o f  the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 
extended jury trial to Chancery, but no such trial took place until 1867 and very few followed. ) and 
consequently their style o f  advocacy, with its concentration on the law, had been markedly different 
from those appearing in common law matters; nor did they usually cross- examine witnesses or go on 
circuit- see Edward He ward A Victorian Law R eform er. A life o f  Lord Selborne, Barry Rose Publishers 
Ltd, 1998, page 44. For a less than flattering description o f  Chancery advocacy in Victorian times see 
Foote’s memory o f  Sir Horace Davey {Pie pow der, page 173).William Ballantine, the eminently 
successful common law Serjeant, wrote in his memoirs {Some Experiences o f  a B arrister’s Life, R. 
Bentley, 1880, page 103) "In the equity courts the notion o f  cross-examination is ludicrous; it has, 
however, the merit o f  being thoroughly inoffensive ”. What was seen as ineffectual cross- examination in 
Chancery was criticized as well by Henry Hawkins, Reminiscences o f  Henry Hawkins (Baron Brampton) 
1904, Reprinted by Kessinger Publishing, USA, 2004, page 310. Lawyers who conducted the very few  
cases that came before the ecclesiastical courts also did not do so before juries. Indeed much was done 
by affidavit and written submissions. (Interview with Dr Charlotte Smith, o f  Reading University School 
o f  Law, after she her paper. The Judicial Committee o f  the Privy Council as the Final Court o f  
E cclesiastical Appeal, delivered at the Institute o f  Advanced Legal Studies on 28 ‘^  February, 2008.)
Lawyers and Eloquence, William Andrews ed The Lawyer in History, Literature and Humour, 
William Andrews and Co, 1896, page 260.
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“The decadence o f  the orator is thus the natural consequence o f  the evolution o f  the 
modern trial. Judges sitting without juries, official referees, and professional 
arbitrators have curbed the fancy and emasculated the eloquence o f  the ambitious 
advocate; and ( perhaps influenced by the 18^  ^Century verse of an Elegy written in a 
country church-yard, by Thomas Gray, whom he admired and sometimes employed in 
speeches before juries ) many a mute, inglorious Erskine has doubtless pined in 
obscurity, or withered speechless at the portals o f  the Commercial Court. A very 
learned official referee is reported lately to have said that the language o f  metaphor 
fatigued him; and even common jurymen, taught by their betters, yawn cynically when 
the poor flowers ofpresent -  day eloquence are offered fo r  their delectation. Thus to 
fin d  the ideal advocate, one would look fo r  a chartered accountant, accustomed to read 
the lessons in his parish church ”
Summary trials before magistrates and their consequences.
A  key feature of the 19th century criminal procedure, was the growth of the 
summary trial, a non-jury criminal trial before justices of the peace. The speed of justice 
was greatly accelerated by the Criminal Justice Act in 1855 which provided that in 
cases of simple larceny (theft) not over five shillings, or attempted larceny from the 
person or attempted larceny, the defendant might be tried by magistrates, instead of a 
Judge and jury- if they thought fit and the defendant agreed. This measure led to a big 
decline in jury  trials Throughout the remaining years of the 19th century, there 
followed an expansion in the number of offences, previously only tried on indictment by 
a judge and jury, that were made "either way" matters, that is triable by magistrates with 
their consent and of the accused Prisoners often consented because of the lesser 
sentencing powers of magistrates, compared to those at the Assizes or Sessions, and to 
save time they might have to spend in prison waiting for their trial A consequence of 
these reforms in criminal procedure was a decrease in the overall scope for dramatic
J. A. Foote, Pie Powder, John Murray, 1911, page 86.
Described by A. H. Manchester, A Modern Legal H istory o f  England and Wales 1750-1950, 
Butterworths, 1980, page 161 as a turning poin t in the history o f  the criminal process.
See R.M .Jackson, Incidence o f  Jury Trial during the P ast Century. (1937-38) 1 MLR 132. In 1854 
trials on indictment (jury trials) numbered 29,359 whilst in 1856 the figure was 19,437. (page 136.)
The Criminal Consolidation Acts, 1861, which conferred yet more powers on magistrates, marked the 
beginning o f  this further movement. For other measures see, Jackson, ib id .
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advocacy in front of jurors. Almost without exception, solicitors acted for the small 
proportion of defendants who were represented in summary trials. Their right to 
represent parties at petty sessions ( magistrates’ courts) had been given statutory 
backing in 1848 The petty sessions became the base upon which many a young 
solicitor established his practice. Cases there were reported in detail in the local press 
and the solicitors whose names appeared most often with the most success had an 
advertisement previously only available to members of the Bar. Work at petty sessions 
began to grow substantially; the motor car making a significant contribution; control of 
the liquor became increasingly important after 1879; power to make separation and 
maintenance orders was given in 1878 and the enforcement of welfare and public health 
legislation of the period was a matter for the magistrates. The combined effect of the 
expansion of the jurisdictions of the county courts and petty sessions and of the social 
and economic changes of the time meant there was a vast amount of work in advocacy 
available to solicitors in the places where they practiced for which they had no need of 
the help of counsel or London agents
Because magistrates were more like judges, indeed stipendiary magistrates were 
professional judges, advocacy in their courts usually lacked the histrionics and powerful 
emotional appeals heard by juries. An advocacy handbook published in 1881 strongly 
advised solicitors to concentrate on the facts and the practical
Specialist statutory tribunals.
Nineteenth Century governments faced considerable challenges from the rapid, 
novel and profound changes in economic and social conditions resulting from the 
industrial revolution. From the 1830s specialist statutory tribunals were conceived and 
adopted as the principal method of both implementing new regulatory legislation and 
resolving disputes between the state and the subject, or between the subject and the 
subject. The tribunal’s legal nature and its procedures were debated and refined during
A. J. Ashton, As I  went on my way, Nisbet and Co, London, 1924, page 248.
& 12 Vic c43, section 12.
H. Kirk, Portrait o f  a Profesion, Oyez, London, 1976, page 162.
Douglas Morley Ford, Solicitors as Advocates, London: Shaw and Sons 1881: Part I deals with 
summary matters and Part II with actions in the county court.
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the Victorian period Tribunals were selected in preference to courts because they 
offered greater speed, less expense and could be locally based. Moreover, they could be 
staffed by lay members with specialist knowledge, as opposed to by judges who, 
although highly competent in law, procedure and evidence, lacked expertise in other 
complex fields, and capable of reaching decisions on questions of fact, often through a 
chiefly inquisitorial process, for example in assessing rateable value, income tax, 
liability, copyhold matters and the existence of boundaries. (A right of appeal to the 
Quarter Sessions was available.) Some tribunals were presided over by judges. The 
Railway Commissioners, who dealt with compulsory purchase of land and compensation 
when railways were constructed, were the most judicial and barristers appeared before 
them. In effect they were a specialist court.
However most tribunals did not require legal representation - this was seen as one 
of their strengths - save in the most complicated matters. When they were called upon, 
lawyers’ style of advocacy was not of the extravagant kind heard before juries but 
practical and generally unadorned.
The Judicature Acts 1873-1881 and their effects on advocacy.
The years 1873 to 1875 saw the passing of the Judicature Acts, a landmark in 
English legal history and one which was to affect advocacy significantly. By this 
legislation the civil courts were reformed. Replacing twelve unco-ordinated courts with 
overlapping jurisdictions, a new Supreme Court was created consisting of the High 
Court, divided into five divisions, and the Court of Appeal. A further tidying up took 
place in 1880 when the three Common Law divisions were consolidated to produce the 
Court of Chancery, Queens Bench and Divorce, Probate and Admiralty. The 1873 Act 
also prevented the possibility of further clashes between law and equity and established 
a Committee made up of judges to draft procedural Rules of the Supreme Court. In 1876
See Chantai Stebbings, Legal Foundations o f  Tribunals in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, Chapter one. The study focuses on four groups, each with prominent and formal 
adjudicatory functions: the fiscal tribunals, the oldest; the tithe, copyhold and enclosure tribunals, the 
most inquisitorial; the Assessment Committees (rates), the most administrative and the Railway 
Commissioners, the most judicial and court like. See, also, A. H. Manchester, A Modern Legal H istory o f  
England and Wales, 1750 -1950, Butterworths, pp. 150-159, An alternative to courts.
See J. A. Foote, who regretted this. P ie Powder, John Murray, 1911, page 86.
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the House of Lords was made the final court of appeal with judges chosen from the 
Supreme Court, or from members of the Bar of at least fifteen years standing.
The Judicature Acts 1873-75, and the new rules of court appended in the 
schedule to them, reformed written pleadings before trial. The law had previously been 
very rigid concentrating on their form rather than substance. Skillfully employed by 
parties’ lawyers, it could be used to limit greatly matters of law and fact that could be 
heard. Victorian judges had inherited a tradition that lawsuits were like a sporting 
contest; a participant who deserved to win on merit but failed to follow the rules of the 
game could not in fairness be the winner Under the new rules, cases began with a 
Statement o f  Claim briefly stating the facts on which the plaintiff relied and the relief 
sought. The defendant then entered a Defence. This had to be more than a mere general 
denial of allegations in the Statement o f  Claim. The Defence could include a set off or 
counterclaim. After this the parties could either plead new facts or join issue with the 
whole or part of the previous pleading. Objections on points of law could also be 
pleaded. Each pleading was to contain, in numbered paragraphs, the material facts on 
which a party relied, but not the evidence by which they were to be proved. Parties were 
able to raise points of law by pleading or by applying to court to have a pleading struck 
out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action to answer. Very significantly, points of 
law could now be taken at trial even if  not pleaded. Pleadings could be amended even, 
in some circumstances, at trial. Prior to the 1873-75 Acts few pleadings could be 
amended. Observing, in 1887, the consequences of the reforms Lord Justice Bowen, an 
appellate judge, approvingly said law has ceased to be a scientific game that may be 
won or lost by playing some particular move The practice of advocacy was 
considerably affected by these changes. Opportunities for winning cases by taking 
points concerning inadequacies and defects in opponents’ pleadings, on which
John Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4* Edition, 2002, Oxford University Press, 
page 90. Some years after the Judicature Acts and the new rules o f  court. Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, 
who held this office between 1890 and 1894, wrote o f the previous tradition and its effect on advocacy:
The old  p leader attached more importance to the statement than to the substance s ta ted ......................It
had become associated in the minds o f  many men with narrow technicality and substantial injustice. This 
was not the fau lt o f  the common law, but it was the fault, iffau lt it were, o f  the system ofpleading, which 
looked at practically, was a sm all p a rt o f  common law, but very pow erful men had contrived to make it 
appear that it was almost the whole o f  it; that the science o f  statement was fa r  more important than the 
substance o f  the right, and that the rights o f  the litigants themselves were com paratively unimportant 
unless they illustrated some obscure, interesting and subtle po in t o f  the science o f  stating those rights. 
Reproduced in Richard Harris, K.C. Illustrations in Advocacy, Stevens and Haynes, 1915, The O ld  
School o f  N isi Prius Advocacy, Chapter XV, page 120.
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considerable expertise had developed, were much reduced. This necessarily led 
barristers to a greater concentration on matters of substantive law and the quality of 
evidence in trials. The possibility of amending pleadings, and raising matters of law at 
trial which had not been pleaded, gave them a greater flexibility to incorporate new 
evidence and freshly thought legal argument and also more of an ability to respond to 
opponents.
J. H. Baker ,An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th Edition, Oxford University Pres,.2002, 
page 92.
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Chapter Six : The Late Nineteenth Century and the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century.
Four years before the close of the Nineteenth Century, the barrister George King 
recounted how jury advocacy had changed in late Victorian England. After approvingly 
quoting "Theplainest words are theprofltahlist in weightiest matters” he wrote:
“The average barrister o f  today though less addicted to florid  declamation , to lavish 
imagery, is doubtless a more effective speaker than the average o f  fifty years ago. He 
does not compare the reputation o f  a cheesemonger in the City o f  London to the bloom 
upon the peach adding, in the inflated style o f  a famous serjeant, ‘ Touch i t , gentlemen, 
and it is gone fo r  ever ’, but the fa ir  name o f the tradesman is quite as safe , i f  not safer
From Thomas Fuller (1608-1661), the eminent churchman and historian. His works, including The 
Chur ch-H 1st ory o f  Britain from  the Birth o f  Jesus to the Year 1648 and Ephemeris Parliam entaria, or a 
Faithful R egister o f  Transactions in Parliam ent [from 1627 to 1628], with a Forward urging law 
students and lawyers to purchase it, had been read by lawyers since both books were published in the
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in his hands ” In contrast to earlier years, when advocacy to jurors was frequently 
marked by noise and almost endless declamation in very long closing speeches. King 
explained how effective cross-examination and organization of facts and argument had 
achieved greater importance:
“The object o f  much o f  the fine talking o f  days gone was to plunge the jury into a 
turbulent sea o f  irrelevancies, to confuse rather than to convince the minds o f  twelve 
good men and true. What the present leaders o f  the Bar chiefly aim at is a keen cross- 
examination o f  the witnesses and an effective arrangement o f  the facts. Order is 
Oratory’s as well as Heaven’s firs t law
He then recounted a story about the mid Victorian judge Mr Justice Maule, who 
was renown for pointed wit and ( both as a barrister and as a judge) occasional sarcasm 
and sharp temper . After tiring of his inability to understand the opening speech of a 
barrister he is said to have exclaimed:
“I  wish you would put your facts in some kind o f  order. Chronological order is one way 
and perhaps the best; but I  am not particular: any order you like -  alphabetical order i f  
you prefer i t”.
It was King’s opinion that "it is difficult to believe that such a reproof could with any 
degree o f  justice be administered now”.
1650’s and sold in bookshops near the Temple. Interview with Dr Kate Loveland, School o f  English, 
Leicester University, held on 29*  ^April, 2010.
Lawyers and Eloquence, In William Andrews ed The Lawyer in History, Literature and Humour, 
W illiam Andrews and Co, 1896, page 261.
Andrews, ibid, page 262
See Edward Manson, Builders o f  Our Law During the Reign o f  Queen Victoria, Horace Cox, London, 
1895. Although as a judge critical o f  longwinded and unstructured advocacy, there is evidence that 
Edward Maule h im self when a barrister was prone to these traits - J.B. Atlay, The Victorian Chancellors, 
Smith, Elder, 1908, vol 2, pp. 85 -86, records the following outburst from Lord Tenterden, who strongly 
disliked repetition; “You have to ld  us that three times, Mr Maule. ” Maule replied, “Only twice, my 
Lord. ” Robert Walton, Random Recollections o f  the M idland Circuit, Chiswick Press, 1869, ppl50-151, 
recounts that at the end o f  a speech given by Maule in the Bail Court in Westminster Taunton J 
exclaimed “M r Maule, - Mr Maule you have been arguing fo r  the last h a lf hour, and like a child, like a 
child M r Maule. ” Maule replied “1 am well content to be likened to a child, fo r  a child, i f  spared, 
becomes, in p rocess o f  time, a man; but once a bear, my Lord, always a brute. ” See also David F 
Pugsley, Mr Justice Maule and the Western Circuit, The Western Circuiteer, Michaelmas Term 2000, pp. 
14-17.
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He further explained that judges "deeper sense o f  the value ofpublic tim e” led 
them to intervene more frequently when dealing with "barristers .... still to be found in 
the courts in whose mind there lingers the notion that the only way to emphasise a 
contention is to repeat i t” and how they had become much more robust in ordering the 
removal of noisy parties and spectators from court.
Evidence given by prisoners and its consequences.
A  change in criminal procedure in the late 19th century, intended as an additional 
safeguard for the innocent, had considerable consequences for advocacy. Subject to 
some judicial discretion, following the introduction of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act 1836, 
the prisoner could not say anything to the jury. As Mr Justice Coleridge told the accused 
in R V. Boucher (1837)'* '^, "Prisoner, your counsel has spoken fo r  you. I  cannot hear you 
both”. For several years counsel was permitted to state fully the defence which the 
accused had instructed them to make; then that practice was forbidden and counsel 
could only put such defence hypothetically with a result that was often whimsical and 
ludicrous^^^. The Queen’s judges at different times met and laid down rules of 
procedure. The rule which endured until 1898 was that the accused, though defended by 
counsel, might make a statement before his counsel addressed the jury, but if he 
introduced any fresh facts in his statement counsel for the prosecution was entitled to a 
general reply. Perhaps mainly because of this right, the rule was very rarely used.
The Criminal Evidence Act 1898 permitted accused persons to give evidence on 
their own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution Although a 
defendant was not compelled to go into the witness box, and, at first, it seems, a number
Lawyers and Eloquence in William Andrews, The Lawyer in History, Literature and Humour,
William Andrews and Co, London, 1896, page 264.
'**'(1837) 8 Car&P. 141.
Edmund Purcell Forty Years at the Criminal Bar, Fisher Unwin, London, 1916, page 46.
'**'* This practice was allowed earlier in the United States. In 1864 the state o f  Maine passed a statute 
making the accused and his spouse competent but not compellable witnesses. Others followed: 
Massachusetts (1867); New Hampshire and New York (1869) and New Jersey (1871). By 1878 no fewer 
than twenty eight states had enacted similar statutes. A survey, conducted by the Society for the 
Amendment o f the Law in 1878, and published in the Irish Law Times o f  that year (12 Ir LT, 554, 563, 
575 and 593), found the general view in those states was that reform had worked well, wrongful 
convictions had been prevented and that judges and lawyers originally hostile to the change, were now  
convinced o f its advantages and utility. For the long campaign which led to the Criminal Evidence Act 
1898 in England and Wales see David Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, The 
Hambledon Press, London, 1998, Chapters 15,16,17 and 18.
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of judges tried to dissuade prisoners from so doing jurors soon became willing to 
draw adverse conclusions if  he or she did not. Statements made by the accused affected 
the task of counsel as his closing speech to the court would be listened to the in the 
context of evidence given by his lay client. The reform of 1898 therefore loosened the 
control of advocates over the conduct of their client's defence.
Drawing on his experiences as a barrister before and after the Criminal Evidence Act 
1898, Sir Travers Humphreys saw it as revolutionising the style of advocacy for the 
defence in criminal cases Humphreys recounts that during his first ten years at the 
Bar, when prisoners were not competent to give evidence, “ an advocate was free to 
suggest to the jury  any story, in his closing speech, which his ingenuity could devise as 
a possible explanation o f  the proved facts or to insinuate into their minds that element 
o f  doubt which was sufficient to render a verdict o f  ‘guilty ’ unsafe Cases often turned 
into a controversy whether any explanation could be put forward by the defence 
consistent with the proved facts of the case. "This was the chance fo r  a skilful and 
eloquent advocate, and it was upon this topic that the energies o f  some o f  the most 
distinguished orators have been expended”. On insinuation of doubt, he tells of the 
methods, at the London Sessions, of men such as Edmund Purcell, a man who would 
accept “ I P” work ( ‘In Person’ signifying that no solicitor had been employed in the 
case , but that Counsel had received his instructions and fee directly from the prisoner 
or his relatives or friends), and Arthur Hutton,” a superior and rather more expensive 
edition o f  Purcel”, who declined to. E D Purcell is described as well educated, but with 
little knowledge of law, charming of manner, having a soft and pleasing voice and a 
persuasive style of address peculiarly his own.” An astute cross-examiner, he never 
made the mistake o f  saying to the witness “I  put it to you that the fa c t is ”, thereby 
irrevocably pinning him self to a particular state offacts. Purcell would do no more than 
insinuate that there may have been a mistake and many witnesses would concede that, 
as they were not infallible, an error might have occurred, although they did not think it 
had”. Such an admission would be given great emphasis by Purcell in his closing 
speech, where there would be much reference to the jury’s duty to only convict if  the 
case against the prisoner was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Humphreys explained 
how juries not infrequently acquitted when this device was used. However, he also tells 
of how prosecution minded judges sometimes responded by asking the witness -  box
415 Purcell, Forty Years at the Bar, Fisher Unwin, London, 1916, page 47.
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warder to read out to the jury the acquitted person’s record of previous convictions, 
thereby reducing the effect of counsel’s strategy in later cases heard by them. For this 
reason solicitors and counsel would sometimes try hard to have their client’s case heard 
early on a jury’s first day.
After the Criminal Evidence Act came into force. Sir Travers Humphreys recalls 
how in the majority of cases the accused wished to give evidence and that counsel was 
reluctant to dissuade them because if  the trial led to a conviction he would be blamed 
for the result. Persons convicted before were less keen, having unpleasant memories of 
past experiences in the witness box, and more inclined to accept the advice of their 
barrister. Although counsel could not comment on the fact that a defendant had not gone 
into the witness box. Judges could and did. It became usual for Judges, Recorders and 
Chairmen to''‘ point out, with more or less emphasis, that there is one person who knows 
a great deal which the jury would like to know and that is the prisoner” Whilst 
knowing what his client would say in examination in chief, counsel nonetheless 
frequently feared, often correctly, that this version , composed whilst awaiting trial, 
would crumble under cross-examination either from its own inherent weakness, or by it 
being incompatible with a statement made by the defendant to the police at the time of 
his arrest or shortly afterwards. Also if  he gave evidence, a defendant casting aspersions 
on the honesty of prosecution witnesses ran the real risk that any previous convictions 
he had would go before the jury, usually with disastrous consequences. In short, it was 
an out and out pitfall for many defendants'***. Honing skills in re-examination, which has 
to be done by non leading questions, although latitude is sometimes allowed, to limit 
damage caused by prosecution cross-examination of defendants, became a necessity.
According to Humphreys, the main challenge for a criminal advocate became 
accommodating the evidence of his client, called as the first witness for the defence, 
which may have strayed from that in his instructions, particularly because of cross - 
examination, with the facts proved by the prosecution. He thought of this as a “mundane 
task compared with the flights o f  imagination permitted to his predecessors” : In this 
Humphreys was unlikely to have been alone.
*^*^ Criminal Days, Hodder and Stoughton, 1945, pp. 46-49.
*^*’ A. J. Ashton, As I  went on my way, Nisbet and Co, London, 1924, page 255.
'***Sir Patrick Hastings, recognized as one o f  the first half o f  the 20th century's most able advocates, 
wrote many a murderer has stepped joyfu lly  into the witness box and by his own eloquence has prom ptly  
hanged h im self Patrick Hastings, Cases in Court, William Heinemann, 1949, page 11.
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As early as 1851 (1846 in the county courts) parties in civil courts were able to give 
evidence themselves, consequently influencing advocates' presentations of cases there.
Rules about opening speeches.
Advocacy in both civil and criminal courts was affected by rules concerning 
opening speeches. At one time it was common for counsel to range at will among facts 
which could not be proved, but by the beginning of the 20^ ** Century it had become 
established and applied by the courts that an advocate may not open any fact to a jury 
that he is not in a position to prove either by witnesses he is going to call or by 
documents that can be produced.
Edward Marshall - Hall infringed this rule in 1903. He appeared for the former 
secretary of an American lady. He had brought an action against her in defamation, 
based on what she had told her new secretary that the plaintiff was a disreputable person 
and was attempting to blackmail her. Marshall-Hall had been provided with much 
unsavory information about the lady and her sister, none of which he could prove. 
Nevertheless, in his opening he said, perhaps impulsively:
“She [the defendant] cannot fo r  one moment say that she does not know what it is to he 
accused o f  blackmail herself I  may afterwards, gentlemen, have the opportunity o f  
asking her some questions with regard to her views on this particular subject. But be 
that as it may, she is a woman who knows exactly what she means by the word blackmail 
, and she cannot possibly have read all the American Press, dealing with her and her 
s is ter , without knowing what an accusation o f  blackmail really means”.
Marshall - Hall secured a verdict and substantial damages for his client. The 
defendant immediately appealed and the decision was reversed, partly because of the 
scandalous and irrelevant material in his opening speech
Expert Witnesses
During the 19th century, expert witnesses increasingly began to appear in trials. They 
were not universally liked and their motives and honesty suspected. Indeed, Baron
See Richard DuCann, The A rt o f  the Advocate, 1993, Penguin, pp. 81-82.
Bramwell, a rather outspoken judge, invented a classification of perverters of the truth
which was frequently repeated, "liars, d d liars, and expert witnesses”
Advocates had to deal with, and accommodate, their evidence in examination in chief, 
cross-examination and closing speeches. This required familiarity with often complex 
and technical matters and, where necessary, the ability to rationally deal with such 
evidence that was unfavourable to their case: bombast and flamboyancy, in themselves, 
being insufficient. In a widely read practical book on advocacy, published in 1910, by 
Frederick John Wrottesley, who was later to become a Lord Justice, the author, drawing 
on experience accumulated over the years, wrote "the ability to cross-examine 
professional expert witnesses well is rare ”.
He continued:
“The only safe way fo r  an advocate who has an expert to deal with upon cross- 
examination , is to hold him down to the issues involved and not to allow him to cover 
too much ground, nor to argue the case o f  the party who has called his services into 
requisition. Experts are, as a class, shrewd and cunning, and are usually selected on 
account o f  their eminence in their professions , or skill in their advocations, and they 
are presumed to speak guardedly and carefully upon topics with which they have the 
greatest familiarity, fo r  they often stake their reputations upon the result o f  the trial in 
which they are called to testify. Hence the advocate whose duty it becomes to examine 
witnesses o f  the kind, cannot come to the performance o f  his task with too much 
information upon the subject under investigation”
Examination of witnesses : A much more precise art.
Just how far forensic advocacy had moved by 1910 from indiscriminately 
histrionic and instinctual performances, observed throughout the majority of Queen 
Victoria’s reign towards something much more structured and subtle, rational and 
capable of being learned, may be seen by further reading of Frederick Wrottesley’s 
practical book on advocacy. This work was designed to reflect the standards then 
expected by the bar and to be read by members freshly called.
J. A. Foote, P iepow der from  the Law Courts, John Murray, London, 1911, page 180.
Frederick John Wrottesley, The Examination o f  Witnesses in Court, Sweet and Maxwell, 1910, 
London, pp. 93-4.
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The author sets out detailed rules and strategies to be followed for both 
examination in chief and cross-examination. In his chapter on the latter he mentions Sir 
James Scarlett(1769 -1844, Lord Abinger from 183 5 / "  who once said of an eminent 
early 19^  ^Century contemporary that his idea of cross- examination was putting over 
again every question asked in chief in a very angry tone. Wrottesley, who found this 
fault still afflicting certain barristers, wrote:
“The objects o f  a cross- examination are three in number. The firs t is to elicit something 
in your favour; the second is to weaken the force o f  what the witness has said against 
you; and the third is to show that from  his present demeanour or from  his past life he is 
unworthy o f  belief and thus weaken or destroy the effect o f  his testimony. We shall 
endeavour to give in this chapter clear and well-defined strategies fo r  the 
accomplishment o f  each o f  these objects ”.
He continued:
"There are two modes o f  cross-examining a witness pursued by accomplished 
advocates. One is usually termed the savage, and the other the smiling method, and the 
latter is usually to be pursued. An adverse witness can often soften his narrative and 
modify or change many things when asked to explain them and will do so i f  approached 
in the proper way; but i f  the advocate makes an attack upon him he will strive to injure 
his cause as much as possible. Timid or diffident witnesses should not be frightened, i f  
they are honest. With the dishonest witness, however, no severity o f  treatment can 
hardly be too great. But with the female, youthful, modest or aged witness the advocate 
should deal kindly. As a matter o f  policy, aside from  the humanity and cruelty o f  an 
opposite course, it is better to pursue this plan, and even i f  it were not the best policy, 
an advocate can never afford to do anything unbecoming a gentleman in the discharge 
o f  his duties, whatever they may be”
See Chapter 4 for suggestions o f  Scarlett’s possible influence on barristers, including John Holker, 
Hardinge Gifford, Charles Russell and Edward Clarke, who did much to change the style o f  late 
Victorian advocacy.
'^"F.W. Wrottesley, The Examination o f  Witnesses in Court, Sweet and Maxwell London, 1910, page 78. 
Similarly, Sir Cecil Henry Walsh, The Advocate, Pioneer Press, Allahabad, 1916, page 95 wrote the: 
"method o f  cross-examination by direct attack, is as a rule the least successful. It is certainly, the least 
p leasan t to hear, and the least edifying. The insidious, h a lf friendly, half-confidential method is usually 
the more successful, merely because i f  a witness is attempting to deceive, it is more apt to pu t him o ff his 
gu a rd ”.
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After attending to relevant rules of evidence'*"*, Wrottesley then states that : the 
art of cross -examination is not to examine crossly, although it acknowledged that this 
persisted; there should be a good reason for examining a witness and for each question 
asked and a prudent advocate will ask as few as possible; the object of cross- 
examination is not to produce startling effects, but to elicit facts which will support the 
theory intended to be put forward; it is highly important for the advocate to frame his 
questions in plain, simple language adapted to the understanding of the witness; many 
cases are lost by injudicious attacks upon the credit of witnesses; and that no advocate 
should allow himself to become an instrument of vengeance in the hands of his irate 
clients '*".This more measured approach to cross-examination is worlds apart from that 
taken by the Irish barrister Charles Curran (Chapter 1), whose methods were recorded 
with approval by fellow Irishman, and leader of the English criminal bar, Charles 
Phillips (1787-1859), Horticultural Phillips (Chapter 3), and indeed emulated by him 
,and many of others, in the 19^  ^Century. In a speech on Curran, Phillips explained how 
he dealt with untruthful or unwilling witnesses:
“He argued, he cajoled, he ridiculed, he mimicked, he played o ff the various artillery o f  
his talent upon the witness; he would affect earnestness upon trifles, and levity upon 
subjects o f  the most import, until at length he succeeded in creating a security that was 
fatal, or a sullenness that produced all the consequences o f  prevarication. No matter 
how unfair the topic, he never fa iled  to avail him self o f  it; acting upon the principle that 
in law as war, every stratagem was admissible. I f  he was hard pressed, there was no
'*''* An important development in the law o f  evidence affecting advocacy had been the introduction, 
through case law ( A.G. V Hitchcock.(1847) 1 Ex 91 and Palmer V Trower,(1852) 8 Ex. 247 ) and by 
statute ( 28 and 29 Viet. c. 18, s. 6. ) o f  rules which meant, subject to two exceptions ( the fact that a 
witness was convicted o f  a crime and the fact he was biased in favour o f  the party calling him), answers 
given by a witness to questions put to him in cross-examination tending to shake his credit by injuring 
his character were treated as final. See Sir James Fitz James Stephen, A digest o f  the law o f  evidence. 
MacMillan, London, 1877, Chapter XVI, Article 130. Prior to these rules counsel could call witnesses to 
prove allegations made in cross-examination. When they did so, trials sometimes swelled to almost 
unmanageable proportions. For a modern exposition o f  the law concerning collateral facts see Colin 
Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 11**' Edition, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp.343-345.
'*" That bullying, blustering and thumping the table in cross-examination was increasingly seen as out o f  
place is confirmed by part o f a speech delivered by Sir Walter Schwabe K.C., who became C hief Justice 
o f  the Madras High Court in 1921 and served until 1924, in London. He advised advocates to: "Cidtivate 
a pleasant manner and get on as friendly terms as possib le with the witness. Reproving, lecturing, 
bullying were methods now recognized as belonging to a f ir s t generation. One should bring out the 
unpleasant fa c ts  with an air o f  condolence and regret rather than with an air o f  triumph, which might 
raise sympathy and one should never lose o n e’s tem per”. Reproduced in S. C. Sakkar, Hints on Modern 
Advocacy and Cross-Examination, S. C. Sakkar and Sons (Private) Ltd, 4**^  Edition, 1985, page 201.
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peculiarity ofperson, no singularity o f  name, no eccentricity ofprofession, at which he 
would not grasp, trying to confound the self-possession o f  the witness by the, no matter 
how excited, ridicule o f  the audience ”
In the late 19^  ^Century the formulae in cross-examination ‘I put to you’ and ‘I 
suggest to you’ came into use, and remain much heard. There is no need to use these 
words provided the challenge is made clear to the witness and the court when an 
advocate wishes to challenge the truth of a witnesses evidence, or to put to the witness 
what the advocate’s client or witnesses will later swear happened, {putting the case) . 
The alternatives of ‘I put’ and ‘I suggest’ were resisted by some barristers at the time 
because they feared that the use of the personal pronoun would make it appear to juries 
that they were giving evidence, something which along with expressing personal 
opinions, had to be avoided.
In his recollections, starting in the 1870’s, of forty years at the bar, J. Alderson 
Foote, considered examination in chief of witnesses by counsel and recalled:
“The young beginner used at one time to be taught to take a careful note o f  his leader’s 
opening, and to examine the witness from  that rather than from his p ro o f o f  evidence. 
There are obvious dangers in taking this advice, especially i f  the leader has not had ■ 
time to read his brief. It has been said with more apparent reason that it was to meet 
this possible contingency, that the practice o f  entrusting the first and most important 
witness to the hands o f  junior counsel originated” .
Wrottesley, deals with examination in chief ( in the chapter of his work before 
that on cross -  examination); the purpose of which being to "lay before the Court and 
the jury  all that the witness knows about the case which is relevant and material”. 
Again reflecting a change in advocacy practice from that which existed throughout 
much of the previous century, and illustrated by Foote’s memoirs, he attaches great 
importance to the skills necessary for this task, which he saw as demanding great care.
Character o f  Charles Curran, Esq., in Speeches o f  Charles Phillips, Williams, Mason and Co, 
Cincinnati, 1818, pp. 191-196.
427 J.H. Foote, Pie Pow der from  the Law Courts, John Murray, London, 1911 pp. 196-197.
144
Approvingly, Wrottesley quotes from a report, in the Birmingham Daily Post in 
March 1893, of an address on the subject given by Sir Frank Lockwood (1846 - 1897), 
then one of the leaders of the bar:
"He believed that the examination o f  a witness in chief or the direct examination o f  
witnesses, as it was called in Ireland, was very much underrated in its significance and 
its importance. I f  they had to examine a witness, what they had got to do was to induce 
him to tell his story in the most dramatic fashion, without exaggeration; they had got to 
tell him, not to make a mere parrot-like repetition o f  the proof, but to tell his own story 
as though he were telling it fo r  the firs t time -  not as though it were words learnt by 
heart -  but it were a plaintive story, plaintively telling it. And they have got to assist 
him in the difficult work. They had got to attract him to the performance o f  his du ty , but 
woe be to them i f  they suggested to him the terms in which it was to be put. They must 
avoid any suspicion o f  leading the witness while at all the time they were doing it. They 
knew perfectly well the story he was going to tell; but they destroy absolutely the effect 
i f  every minute they were looking down at the paper on which his p ro o f was written. It 
should appear to be a kind o f  spontaneous conversation between the counsel on the one 
hand and the other, the witness telling artlessly his simple tale, and the counsel almost 
appalled to hear o f  the inequity under which his client suffered. It was in this way, and 
in this way alone, that they could effectively examine a witness”.
With approbation, Frederick Wrottesley recounts how Sir James Scarlett, who 
excelled in forensic success, attached great weight to the examination in chief and how 
in his cases he would always examine witnesses himself.
In accordance with what had then become established tactics, Wrottesley wrote 
that much care and attention should be given to the arrangement of testimony: both as to 
the order of questions asked of individual witnesses and the order in which witnesses 
are examined advising putting the most intelligent and most honest witness first and 
saving one of the best for the close.
As mentioned in an earlier section, the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 allowed a 
defendant in a criminal cases to give evidence on their own behalf in trials, often
Wrottesley, The Examination o f  Witnesses in Court, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1910, page 36.
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necessitating re-examination by counsel, in an attempt to undo damage done to his client 
in cross-examination. This clearly gave an incentive to develop skills in this area. To 
reach the desired standard of re- examination in criminal and civil trials, again 
illustrating the extent court advocacy had evolved into a much more planned, subtle and 
precise art, Wrottesley advised'*'^:
“great discretion in asking fo r  explanation o f  what the witness stated on cross- 
examination. He should, before doing th is , be satisfied that the witness can explain, 
satisfactorily, the apparent contradictions in his testimony, fo r  it would be more hurtful 
to call fo r  an explanation, and obtain one that is injurious, than to pass over in silence 
the point not susceptible o f  explanation”.
Drawing further on the report of Sir Frank Lockward’s speech in Birmingham, 
the author gave an example of how not to re-examine a witness'*'”:
“Re-examination -  the putting Humpty-Dumpty together again -  was by no means an 
unimportant portion o f  an advocates duty. Once , in the Court o f  Chancery, a witness 
was asked in cross-examination by an eminent Chancery leader, whether it was true that 
he had been convicted o f  perjury. The witness owned the soft impeachment, and the 
cross-examining counsel very properly sat down. Then it became the duty o f  an equally 
eminent Chancery Q.C. to re-examine ‘Yes’ said he, ‘it is true you have been convicted 
o f  perjury. But tell me: have you not on many other occasions been accused o f  perjury 
and acquitted? ”
More documents and lengthening civil trials.
In his memoirs of forty years of practice as a barrister, published in 1911, J . 
Alderson Foote, reported that many civil trials were lengthening, an important trend that 
was to continue for much of the 20^  ^Century:
'*'” Page 153. 
'*'” Page 154.
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“That an action should occupy a judge fo r  a whole week is nowadays considered 
nothing extra-ordinary. Most seriously contested special ju ry  cases last a couple o f  days 
; and on circuit one constantly sees the firs t common jury  harely finished at the end o f  a 
long day’s sitting”'^ ^^.
The author considered the main reason for this was greater complexity in human 
affairs, rather than greater wordiness and lesser ability of counsel, leading to more 
documents , especially business correspondence, which had to be read by barristers and 
introduced as evidence, addressed in closing speeches and then dealt with by judges in 
summing up. In Foote’s view, the requirement imposed to undertake this sometimes 
rather unexciting but essential practical activity further limited counsel’s scope for 
flights of forensic eloquence.
Decline of classics and other former influences.
J. Alderson Foote noted that classical styles of oratory, which had much 
influenced Burke, Sheridan and Fox in the 18* Century and Brougham in the 19*, were 
little used by advocates before juries and not in front of judges alone. On their power to 
persuade jurors he wrote:
“Who can read the Philippics, or the De Corona, or the denunciations o f  Cataline now, 
and say with truth that he would have recognized the authors as supreme masters o f
eloquence i f  he had not been taught to think so. ”  the Orations have become dry
bones and there is no breath in them ” .
Knowledge and appreciation of Demosthenes, Cicero, and Quintillian had 
declined, even on special juries. It had been greater amongst special jurors rather than 
common jurors because many more of the former had been educated at public or grammar 
schools, where there had been emphasis on the classics. Although Latin remained strong - 
but had begun to be much less quoted in parliamentary debates by end of the 19* Century
J.H. Foote, Piepowder from  the Lawcourts, John Murray, 1911, page 90. 
Foote, ibid, pp.85 -  90.
J.H. Foot, Piepowder from  the Lawcourts, John Murray, 1911, page 88.
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-compulsory Greek had already been abolished, much to the dismay of certain 
headmasters, who concluded it was an explanation for falling standards of eloquence in
435public life
Foote saw no value in using passages from the speeches of Burke, Erskine or 
Brougham before juries: "Take, fo r  instance, Brougham’s speech in defence o f  Queen 
Caroline, or Burke’s impeachment o f  Warren Hastings, or any o f  Erskine’s incessant 
invocations o f  the Deity. Can we honestly say that any o f  these move us to pity, or quicken
us with sympathy, or thrill us with indignation? ...................How turgid it all sounds to us
now! How verbose! How unconvincing! ”
However, casting a practical eye on their persuasiveness, Foote wrote approvingly of 
the "legends o f  Troy, o f  Ulysses, o f  ancient Rome, o f  Olympus and Parnassus and that the 
stars o f  Milton and Shakespeare blaze for ever in the eternal sky”‘^ '^ . Greek legends, 
Shakespeare and Milton were very much part of the school curriculum for those fortunate 
enough to be able to pursue education beyond a basic level.
Certain barristers, especially those steeped in works such as Demosthenes, Lysias , 
Antiphon, Cicero and Quintillian, and who were masters of metaphor and histrionic 
expression regretted what they saw as the decay of eloquence at the bar brought about by 
changed public appreciation of their merit and because of judges sitting without juries 
In some ways talk of the decline of bar oratory in England and Wales resembled theories 
about the fate of rhetorical advocacy in Rome during the Principate, after Quintillian, 
when judges became bureaucratized functionaries with long lists of cases and little regard 
for considerations other than law Parallels were drawn to Rome by some who lamented 
what had occurred in England. Others did not see alteration in advocacy as a
Christopher Stray, Classics Transformed, Clarendon Press, 1998, Chapter 3. This was principally 
because o f the growing number o f working class Members o f Parliament who had not formally studied 
Latin, Greek and the Classics ( Interview with Mr Stray on 2"‘* July, 2010 ) .
Abolition o f the compulsory Greek requirement by Oxford and Cambridge came immediately after the 
First World War: See Christopher Stray, Classics Transformed, Clarendon Press, 1998, Chapter 9.
J. H. Foote, Piepowder from  the Lawcourts, John Murray, 1911, page 88.
Foote, zW , page 89.
For humorous examples o f this see Theo Mathew (1866-1939), Forensic Fables, Wildy and Sons, 1999, 
The Blushing Beginner and The Bearded Juryman ( pp.57-58 ) and The Brilliant Person, The Vulgar 
Individual With A Cockney Accent And Two Malefactors ( pp.305-306 ), both originally published in 1926 .
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deterioration, but rather evolution. They saw advocacy as pre-eminently the art of 
persuasion, not merely classical structures and allusions, purple passages and dramatic 
gestures. This demanded sensitivity to the tribunal, knowledge of law and procedure, 
choosing telling arguments, and ordering them tightly. Bernard Kelly for instance, 
appeared to reflect this view, albeit in his somewhat colourful way, perhaps betraying a 
certain nostalagia for a richer form of language at the Bar. To him the wisdom of the” mighty 
soldier ”, the Duke of Wellington, who advised a young Member of Parliament "to say what 
you have to say, don ’t quote Latin, and sit down ”, had come home to the present 
generation. Although the "Graces were now usually silent amidst the groves o f  Theseus”, 
there had been enormous gains as impassioned rhetoric had frequently been responsible for 
grave errors and miscarriages of justice. Kelly concluded:
“But i f  modern verbal address be less richly endowed with poetic similitudes and 
ornate figures o f  speech than heretofore, it is in many respects none the less worthy o f  
our admiration. For as a rule, it is dignified, coherent, and even, at times, positively 
eloquent. The object o f  every sincere speech, after all, is not to arouse the passions or 
fla tter the senses, but to convince the hearers o f  the truth ”.
See J. A. Crook, Legal Advocacy in the Roman World, London, Duckworth, 1995, Chapters One and 
Two. The author seeks to controvert the view that advocacy decayed and sets out to show how it adapted to 
changed conditions, one o f which was the fading away o f  by the 2"^  Century AD o f  jury courts.
Famous A dvocates and their Speeches, London, Sweet and M axwell, 1921, page 28.
149
Chapter Seven : A spectacular quartet of leading 
barristers and Marshall Hall’s attachment to the old.
At the end of the 19*'’ Century and during the first quarter of the 20*'’ Century, 
sensational trials still attracted intense public interest and remained an important source of 
entertainment. The advocacy of Sir Rufus Isaacs, Edward Carson, F. E. Smith and Edward 
Marshall Hall, who frequently opposed each other, was much reported. The advocacy that 
brought them triumph exerted important influence on other barristers then and after.
Sir Rufus Isaacs (1860-1935) became Solicitor General, Attorney General, Lord 
Chief Justice of England, Ambassador to the United States, Viceroy of India and 
Foreign Secretary' '^*^ The son of a prosperous Spitalfields fruit importer, Rufus Isaacs 
left school at 14 and tried his hand for some years in his father’s business. Afterwards, 
he became a stockbroker. Unable, however, to meet his obligations, he was only saved 
from bankruptcy by loans from his mother, made on the basis he would read for the bar. 
Rufus Isaacs was called to the Bar in 1887 and made a QC in 1898, the same year as 
Marshall Hall. Knowledge of business helped him obtain many commercial cases. But 
soon he became prominent in many memorable jury trials. The first in which he came 
to public attention, through mass newspaper reporting, was the high society Hartop 
divorce case in 1902. His very measured and effective cross-examinations were noted.
In 1904 Isaacs was briefed to conduct a private prosecution of Whittaker Wright, a great 
financier whose vast empire suddenly collapsed. It was alleged he had published false 
balance sheets, knowing them to be false and with intent to defraud. The much 
publicized case, brought by stockbrokers, was enormously complicated. Isaacs 
distinguished himself by the clarity he explained it, in a melodious voice, to a special 
jury during a five hour opening speech and by breaking Whittaker Wright, a formidable
For a very readable short biography o f Rufus Isaacs, see The Charmed Life o f  Rufus Isaacs, 
Society Gazette, 14*^  December, 1988.
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figure, in a mighty cross-examination. The way he conducted this prosecution took him 
to the heights of the bar.
The following year he defended Sir Edward Russell, the editor of the Liberal 
newspaper the Liverpool Daily Post, who faced an indictment for criminal libel brought 
by eight Conservative members of the Licensing Committee of the Liverpool Justices.
In an article written in the Daily Post, Russell criticized the Committee for failing to try 
to reduce the number of public houses in Liverpool, which it had powers to do under the 
Licensing Act of 1904, and said that this was to be expected of friends of the liquor 
trade. Before opening strongly for the defence on the theme of free speech, Isaacs again 
showed his remarkable ability to cross- examine by establishing the proceedings had 
been brought for political reasons. He also obtained a clear admission from Sir Charles 
Petrie, one of the Plaintiffs, that when he read the piece he had not seen it as imputing 
corrupt or dishonest motives to him. After Sir Edward had given his evidence, Isaacs 
made a powerful closing speech in which he invited the jury to follow the view of Sir 
Charles Petrie. They appeared to do this by acquitting Sir Edward Russell. Rufus Isaacs’ 
advocacy made a great impression on a twenty one year old listener in the Liverpool 
Assizes in St George’s Hall -  Norman, later Lord, Birkett, who wrote it undoubtedly 
stirred some o f  those feelings which were ultimately to lead me to the Bar and the courts 
o f  law .
Rufus Isaacs, although he used to appear most in the civil courts, is often best 
remembered for his advocacy in prosecuting Frederick Seddon and his wife ,charged 
with murdering their elderly lodger. Miss Barrow, by poisoning her with arsenic; the 
motive being said to obtain her small fortune. It was Rufus Isaacs’s first and only 
murder trial. By this time, 1912, he was Attorney General. His opponent was Marshall 
Hall, who destroyed the Crown’s identification evidence that Maggie, the Seddon’s 16 
year old daughter, had bought flypapers, from which arsenic could be extracted, from a 
chemists. Further, in a masterful cross-examination, demonstrating his understanding of 
scientific matters, he almost brought the Home Office expert to admitting a vital point 
he was contending. The case looked shaky for the prosecution; indeed an application by 
Marshall-Hall that there was no case for the defendants to answer nearly succeeded. 
However, Frederick Seddon, almost definitely against the advice of his counsel, decided
Lord Birkett, Six Great Advocates, Penguin, 1961, page 62.
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to give evidence himself, as he was entitled to do under the Criminal Evidence Act 
1898. He thereby presented himself to the most accomplished cross-examiner of his day. 
Rufus Isaacs began' '^^h
“Mr Seddon did Miss Barrow live with you from  July 1910 till September 1911? ”
Yes was the answer
He then asked: “DzW you like her? ” At first, perhaps taken a back by its subtlety,
Seddon could only repeat the question, knowing he could not say “Yes”, because the 
jury already knew of her extremely unpleasant character, and that if  he said “No” that 
might strengthen the motive for poisoning her. With sharpness of mind, he said: 
w asn’t a woman you could have been in love with, but 1 sympathized with her deeply”. 
Seddon was cross-examined for six hours during which time he revealed himself to be a 
mean, self-centred, cold and greedy man. By his answers it became clear he was the 
murderer. Rufus Isaacs, despite the fact that the Crown’s evidence was not 
overwhelming (at best it was highly circumstantial), led Seddon, through his questions, 
to convict h i m s e l f H o w e v e r ,  Mrs Seddon , who was also cross-examined by Rufus 
Isaacs, impressed as a simple woman, dominated and used by her husband.
Rufus Isaacs’ cross-examination of Arthur Seddon was cool, calm, incisive, 
tactful, searching, but never oppressive. He conducted himself throughout with an 
unfailing courtesy that was almost deferential His advocacy was very removed from 
the bullying and browbeating of much of that in the 19^  ^Century and in its precision, 
subtlety and cold planning, far apart from the almost indiscriminate use of theatrical 
technique and appeals to emotion then frequently resorted to. Rufus Isaacs was 
described as the mildest mannered man who held a thousand -guinea brief and one o f  
the most effective In his analysis of Rufus Isaacs’s advocacy, Edgar Lustgarten 
attributed his success to a melodious voice, practical intelligence, insight into people, 
grasp of facts and great capacity for preparation. In cross-examination, he did not go in 
for a display of fireworks, or overwhelm, but could undermine. He was not a stirring
Proceedings o f  the Central Criminal Court, 27'^ February, 1912, page 737.
Lord Birkett, Six Great Advocates Penguin, 1961, page 62.
George Keaton, H a rris’s Hints on Advocacy, Eighteenth Edition, 1943, Stevens and Sons, London, 
page 9. For an analysis o f  the case by F. E. Smith, see First Lord Birkenhead, Famous Trials, The 
Seddon Case, Hutchinson and Co, Ltd, Edinburgh and London pp. 365 -384. For additional analysis o f  
Rufus Isaacs’s cross-examination o f  Arthur Seddon’s see Edgar Lustgarten, Advocate Impeccable, BBC  
Radio 4, 1970. Tape recording kindly made available by Mr Leslie Blake, Barrister, Lecturer in Law, 
Law Faculty, Surrey University.
Quotation from Denis Judd, Lord Reading, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982, and used by Richard 
Hamilton, A ll Jangle and Riot, Professional Books, 1986, page 167.
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orator, generally eschewing formal perorations in closing speeches, but lucidity and 
charm compelled an attentive audience
Edward Carson ( 1854 -  1935 ), advocate, politician and Law Lord (1921-29), 
was another leader of the late IS^  ^ and early 20^ Century English Bar Already a QC 
in his native Ireland, as the leader of the Unionists he was later to do much to ensure 
that Ulster remained in the United Kingdom, Carson was called to the bar in Middle 
Temple in 1893 and appointed a QC the following year. He established a reputation as a 
resolute fighter for his client, a master of the epigram and the verbal quip, the possessor 
of a voice that charmed all hearers and the taker of risks that generally came ofU"^  ^Like 
Rufus Isaacs, his greatest strength was in cross -  examination, in which he was pointed 
and persistent, but also generally measured, cool headed and polite, and was able to 
cope even with such masters of words as W. S. Gilbert and Oscar Wilde. In 1895 
Carson was instructed on behalf of the Marquess of Queensbury, to lead his defence in 
Oscar Wilde’s libel action against him; the evidence for which was a card inscribed by 
Queensbury: “For Oscar Wilde, posing as a somdomite(sic)”.Carson had been Wilde’s 
contemporary and rival at Trinity College, Dublin during their student days.
Wilde, with his rapier wit, managed to tease and torment Carson during a long 
cross- examination. Unperturbed, Carson continued and started to question Wilde about 
his acquaintance with a number of named young men. After a confident response by 
Wilde to an earlier question, Carson asked him about a young man, sixteen when Wilde 
knew him, called Walter Grainger.
“D idyou ever kiss that boy? ”
“Oh dear no!” Wilde replied dismissively. He was a particularly ugly boy.
Ignoring the laughter in court, Carson took the answer seriously and swiftly asked,
“ Why did you say he was ugly ? Is that the reason why you did not kiss him? ”
Shaken and realizing his mistake , Wilde tried a haughty response; “Tow are 
impertinent, Mr Carson”, but this was to no avail.
“Why, why, why, why, did you add that?” Carson demanded.
That afternoon, Oscar Wilde’s counsel. Sir Edward Clarke, closed his case without 
calling, as was widely expected. Lord Alfred Douglas, as a witness. Nothing could have
Edgar Lustgarten, Advocate Impeccable. BBC Radio 4, 1970.
See H. Montgomery Hyde, Carson : the life o f  Sir E dward Carson, Lord Carson o f  Duncairn,
Heinemann, London, 1953.
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saved the case for him. Much, however, had been done for Carson as a cross-
examineU^ ®.
Because he appreciated jurors carried with them into the jury room only a small 
fraction of the many words said in a trial, and were not usually used to listening to 
involved argument, Carson would fasten upon words with high impact they would 
retain. He also had considerable ability to condense a whole case into a single pointed 
question at the end of his cross-examination These aspects of his advocacy were 
strongly seen in his defence of the Evening Standard in a much reported action for libel 
brought by Cadburys, the chocolate manufacturers, in 1909 The case arose from an 
article in the Standard which contrasted Cadburys well known Quaker benevolence and 
philanthropy with alleged toleration, and financial support, of a cocoa production and 
trading system, involving brutal slavery, in San Thome, Portuguese Africa
Carson’s last questions in cross-examination to George Cadbury were:
Carson: ''Now I  have come to the en d , and I  ask you only this one question. From 1901 
down to 1908 when you ceased trading, was there anything effective you did at all? ”
Cadbury: "1 think so myself. 1 admit that my efforts resulted in a good deal less than 1 
should have liked, but I  do not admit that I  did nothing at a ll”.
Carson: "Have you form ed any estimate o f  the number o f  slaves who lost their lives in 
preparing your cocoa from  1901 to 1908?”
Travers Humphreys, Criminal D ays, Hodder and Stoughton, 1946, pp.92 -  94.
See, The Trials o f  Oscar Wilde With an introduction by H. Montgomery Hyde, Hodge, London, 1948.
Carson’s gift o f  dramatizing long and complex episodes in a few masterly words may be compared 
with that o f Demosthenes in his speech in defence o f  Ctesiphon and with speeches made by Winston 
Churchill.
Cadbury Bros Ltd  v The Standard Newspaper 1909 (Unreported in the law reports). See: Richard DuCann, 
The A rt o f  the Advocate, Penguin Books, 1993, pp .159-166; Edward Fordham, Notable Cross- 
examinations, Constable, London, 1951, pp. 95 - 96, and John Munkman, Technique o f  Advocacy, 
Stevens and Sons, London, 1951, pp. 101-102. The trial was in Birmingham. The plaintiffs were 
represented by Rufus Isaacs K. C. and John Simon K. C. The jury found for them but Sir Edward 
Carson’s deadly cross-examination had the effect o f reducing the damages awarded to one farthing. Also  
see Lowell J. Satre, Chocolate on Trial: Slavery, Politics, and the Ethics o f  Business, Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 2005.
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C adbury: "No, no, no
Carson’s advocacy, like that of Rufus Isaacs was direct, did not rely on theatrical 
techniques or involve numerous quotations from poetry and allusions to the classics; it 
was not the kind Sir Patrick Hastings less than flatteringly described as "flatulent 
oratory” In the opinion of Lord Birkett, Sir Edward Carson’s advocacy influenced 
Hasting’s own forensic style Certainly he wrote approvingly of Carson in his 
memoirs, published in 1946 :
“Just as Gerald du Maurier sounded the death knell o f  the old-time school o f  
thunderous declamation from  the stage so Edward Carson pu t an end to forensic 
platitudes and passionate but irrelevant perorations from  the bar ” .
The third leading barrister of the period to be considered is F.E Smith, Lord 
Birkenhead (1872 -  1930). He was also a Conservative politician and like his friend 
Carson, attracted to the Unionist cause. Called to bar in 1899, after a period of teaching 
law at Oxford University, Smith was made the youngest Kings Counsel in the country in 
1908 before later becoming the youngest Solicitor General, Attorney General and Lord 
Chancellor, from 1919 to 1922, who, in this capacity, was mainly responsible for the 
great reforms of property law in 1925; achieving all this before the age of 53 He 
rapidly acquired a large practice after arriving at the bar, where he was recognized for 
his extremely quick grasp of the essential facts, knowledge of the law and very effective 
advocacy. Amongst many causes célébrés, he was instructed: for the plaintiffs, in the 
Marconi libel case; on behalf of Ethel Le Neve, the murder’s associate, who was 
acquitted in the trial of Dr Crippen and for the co-respondent in the unwholesome 
Moosbrugger divorce trial in 1913 which was said to have been won by his eloquence
For a description o f how the production and trading system functioned, see Kevin Grant, A C ivilised  
Savagery : Britain and the New Slaveries in Africa, Routledge, 2005
A phrase o f Hastings quoted by David Pannick, Advocates, Oxford University Press, 1992, page 229.
Six Great Advocates, Penguin, 1961, page 29.
Cases in Court, William Heineman, 1949, page 11.
See R. F. V. Heuston Lives o f  the Lord Chancellors, 1885 -  1940, Clarendon Press, 1964, pp. 354 -  
402 .
For F. E. Smith’s own accounts o f  the Marconi case and that o f  Ethel Le Neve, see First Earl o f  
Birkenhead, Famous Trials, Hutchinson and Co, Ltd, Edinburgh and London, 1930, The M arconi 
Scandal, pp. 267- 276, and Ethel Le Neve: Crippen’s Mistress, pp.277-286.
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In 1916, as Attorney General, he prosecuted the Irish nationalist Sir Roger Casement, 
captured attempting to ship German arms to Ireland. Before the First World War, in a 
series of notably successful libel actions, beginning in 1906, Smith acted for the 
industrialist William Lever, later Viscount Leverhulme, against Lord Northcliffe and his 
various newspapers, who ended up paying nearly a total of £220,000 in damages and 
costs, then an enormous amount.
“F E” ‘s style of advocacy, both before judges sitting alone and with juries, was 
said to be clear, direct and “unceremonious” confidently delivered with an almost 
“lackadaisical air”"^ °^. Like Rufus Isaacs and Edward Carson, it was not prone to 
histrionics and blatant general appeals to emotion, frequently intensified by generous 
quotations from literature or verse. Like theirs, his advocacy resembled Sir Edward 
Clarke who, a generation or so before, had broken with the profuse, declamatory , 
melodramatic and meandering style heard throughout much of Victorian Britain. Indeed 
F. E. Smith, after he retired as Lord Chancellor, dedicated his book written about 
famous trials to Sir Edward Clarke and recommended “his standards and methods o f  
advocacy to young gentlemen fitting themselves fo r  practice at the B ar”
His talent to arrange material in cases to its best effect and ability to argue law, 
the result of meticulous preparation, was astounding . Despite his reputation as a witty, 
ruthless and agile cross-examiner, he never sought to score off counsel on the other side, 
except in self -  defence An instance of his wit in cross-examination is given by his 
biographer, Bechhofer Roberts:
Smith asked "Is my client a friend  o f  yours?” “H im ” sneered the witness. "Why, he is 
the village idiot” . “I s e e ”, retorted Smith, "a relation”. Smith’s sharpness, presence of 
mind and ability to lull unsuspecting witnesses onto the rocks, for which he was renown, 
is illustrated by the story, well known to barristers at that time and long afterwards, of 
when he was appearing for a bus company against whom damages were claimed for a 
young man whose arm was said to be permanently disabled after an accident. "How high 
can he lift your arm? ” Smith asked the youth. With a show of great pain he raised his
See: R. F. Heuston,, Lives o f  the Lord Chancellors 1885-1940 , Oxford, 1964, pp. 362-368 for 
details o f  these and other cases in which he appeared.
C. E. Bechhofer Roberts, Lord Birkenhead, Newnes, London, 1936, page 114.
Earl o f Birkenhead, Famous Trials, Hutchinson and Co, Ltd, London, 1930, Dedication. Cases in the book 
are described concisely, and it is written in clear, assured, largely unomamented, absorbing and usually short 
sentences, a literary style similar to the author’s approach to advocacy in court.
462 C. E. Roberts, L ord  Birkenhead, Newness, London, 1936, page 109.
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arm to the level of his shoulder "And how fa r  could you raise it before the accident? ” 
The plaintiff thrust his arm high into the air -  and lost his case
Whilst generally polite to judges and accepting of their authority. Smith was not 
always so, especially in his early career, and in this it might be said he was closer to 
Marshall Hall than Rufus Isaacs and Carson. His exchanges with Judge Willis, at 
Southwark County Court, were reported in the newspapers. One case involved a boy 
who had been knocked over and injured by a tram. Smith appeared for the company.
The judge, perhaps allowing sympathy to overrule his independence, requested that the 
boy, who had been blinded by the accident, be seated on a chair in front of the jury. 
When hearing this, F E Smith sarcastically remarked that perhaps the boy should be 
passed around the jury box. "That is a most improper remark”, exclaimed the judge.
“It was provoked by an improper suggestion ” was the reply.
Judge Willis paused to think of a trenchant retort and said "Mr Smith, have you ever 
heard o f  a saying by Bacon, the great Bacon, that youth and discretion are ill-wedded 
companions? ”
"Yes I  have ”, came an instant reply” and have you ever heard o f  a saying by Bacon, the 
great Bacon, that a much talking judge is like an ill tuned cymbal? ”
“You are offensive s ir!” said the judge.
“ We both are ” , Smith replied: "the difference is that I  am trying to be , and you can’t 
help it. I, who have been listened to with respect by the highest tribunal in the land, am 
not going to be browbeaten by a garrulous old county court judge ” .
On another occasion, after a long argument on a point of procedure. Judge Willis asked 
sarcastically Whatever do you suppose I  am on the Bench fo r  Mr Smith?
“It is not fo r  me, m ’lud, to attempt to fathom the inscrutable workings o f  Providence 
was the reply” .
F E Smith attracted a good deal of criticism later in his career ,when Attorney 
General, for exceeding bar etiquette, requiring restraint by prosecutors, by the vigour 
with which he sought the conviction of Sir Roger Casement, tried for treason before
Roberts, ibid, page 112.
It may be that F E Smith was reacting against the devise, much used by barristers in the 19*** Century, 
o f  bringing into court small children, who were often far from discouraged to hide their distress, for 
sentimental effect on juries.
C. E. Roberts, Lord B irkenhead , Newnes, London, pp.112-113.
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three High Court Judges in 1916 Sir Roger, previously a distinguished British 
diplomat, was of Irish descent. He visited Germany on several occasions seeking to 
persuade Irish prisoners of war to join the Irish Brigade. The intention was to land them 
and supplies of guns in Ireland to help fuel a rebellion. He was arrested in Ireland after 
landing from a German vessel. Smith’s opening speech concluded with the words:
“ The prisoner, blinded by a hatred fo r  this country, as malignant in quality as it was 
sudden in origin, has played a desperate hazard. He has played it and he has lost.
Today the forfeit is claimed”.
When Casement made a statement from the dock, immediately before being 
sentenced to death. Smith walked ostentatiously out of Court. After the Court of Appeal 
subsequently dismissed Casement’s appeal there was great controversy about the 
correctness of the judgement However an appeal to the House of Lords could only lie 
with the permission of Smith, as Attorney General, which was refused
Edward Marshall Hall -  a contrasting advocacy and attachment to 
the old.
R V Casement 1916 32 TLR 601 K.B, Div; 1916 32 TLR 667 ( C. C.A.). Unable to find an English King’s 
Counsel who would accept his instructions. Sir Roger Casement was represented by Sergeant A. M. 
Sullivan, the last o f  the Irish sergeants. The case has been seen as a low point in the cab rank rule, 
adopted since the IS**' Century as a moral justification for advocacy. Chapter 1.
A monumental, and highly detailed, painting, by Sir John Lavery, recording Sir Roger Casement’s 
appeal before five judges in the Court O f Appeal against his conviction for treason, may be seen in the 
K ing’s Inns, Dublin, capital o f  the Irish Republic.
See: Heuston, ibid, pp. 370-381. F. E. Smith, First Earl o f Birkenhead, Famous Trials, Hutchinson, 
Edinburgh and London, 1930, Sir Roger Casement, pp. 237-246, said he was placed in a “singularly 
delicate position” but was convinced there was no substance in the principal point made by Casement’s 
defence that treason could only be committed by a person physically present in the country (Page 244). 
As Attorney General, F E Smith’s fairness as a prosecutor has also been severely questioned in a case 
which took place the following year that o f  the trial o f  A lice Wheeldon, a seller o f  second hand clothes, 
two o f  her daughters, both school teachers and her son-in-law, a lecturer in chemistry, who were charged 
with and convicted o f conspiracy to murder the prime minister, David Lloyd George. At their committal 
and trial. Smith employed highly prejudicial, emotive and venomous language and, it is alleged, 
deliberately suppressed harmful evidence to the Crown in what was in effect a show trial against 
elements hostile to continuing the War; a view confirmed by the release o f  MI5 papers eighty years later.
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In the closing of the 19^  ^Century and first quarter of the 20th, before radio and 
television, when sensational trials were still such an important source of national 
entertainment, members of the public would be enthralled by the cases of Edward 
Marshall Hall, following them in daily newspaper reports and queuing for hours to enter 
the courts where he appeared. His earlier career, built on dramatic handling of 
matrimonial, defamation and murder cases, was nearly ruined in the Chattell libel case. 
Hetty Chattell was enjoying a successful career at the age of 28 when the Daily Mail 
said that a Gaiety Girl called Rosie Boote was her daughter. It was not true; Miss 
Chattell had never been married. The Daily Mail therefore implied she had an 
illegitimate daughter and must be a lot older than she gave the impression. The 
newspaper never apologized. Marshall Hall won £2500 damages for her. The Daily Mail 
appealed to the Court of Appeal where Lord Justice Mathew, who disliked him much, 
bitingly criticised Marshall Hall for remarks to the jury about the Daily M ail’s conduct 
of the case. Lord Justice Mathew’s comments were printed with gusto by the 
newspapers, many of whom had lost defamation cases to plaintiffs represented by 
Marshall Hall. His confidence was shattered and regular clients deserted him. Only by 
selling his large collection of silver was he able to survive the down turn in work 
Marshall-Hall’s spectacular defence, in 1907, of Robert Wood, an artist on trial for the 
Camden Town murder, however, fully restored his practice.
Wood was accused of the murder of a girl called Emily Dimmock, a part time 
prostitute who was found in her room naked and with her throat cut The evidence 
against him appeared strong. A postcard making an arrangement for them to meet was 
found in Emily’s room, and Wood had been identified as both being in Emily’s 
company on the night of her death and leaving the scene of the crime. Marshall Hall 
managed to devalue much of the identification evidence, but a major problem was 
whether to call Wood himself to give evidence, since both Marshall Hall and his 
instructing solicitor agreed that he would make a dreadful witness. When called, he 
was, but this worked in his favour, since he impressed as a gentle, talented, rather
See John Jackson, Losing the Plot, History Today, May 2007. Interview with Mr. Jackson held on 26**' 
November, 2007.
A. E. Bowker, Behind the Bar, 1949, Staples Press, New York, page 27. Harry Furniss’s caricature 
portrait o f Marshall -  Hall, drawn in the 1890’s, kept at the National Portrait Gallery, London, shows 
him inspecting a piece o f  silverware and pockets full o f  others.
The case o f  Robert Wood received huge publicity. A little later, in 1908 and 1909, Walter Sickert, 
important in art in the transition from Impressionism to Modernism, produced, under the title The 
Camden Town Murder, a series o f  etchings and paintings depicting a clothed man lying next to a naked 
woman.
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foolish and somewhat effete young man. Indeed he made his own examination by 
Marshall Hall as difficult as possible Marshall Hall asked at the beginning : “Did you 
kill Phyllis Dimmock?” ( No reply . The witness cast his eyes to Heaven.)
Wood: Rediculous {Arms spread wide)
Hall: “You must answer straight. I will only ask you perfectly straight questions. Once 
again, did you kill Phyllis Dimmock?”
Wood: “No, I most certainly did not” .
Wood was acquitted by the jury who believed him incapable of murder. He was 
the first prisoner who successfully gave evidence on his own behalf under the Criminal 
Evidence Act
It was said of Marshall Hall had he not been a brilliant advocate he would have 
been an equally brilliant actor. He himself said:
"My profession and that o f  an actor are somewhat akin except that I  have no scenes to 
help me and no words are written fo r  me to say. There is no backcloth to increase the 
illusion. But out o f  the vivid, living dream o f somebody else's life I  have to create an 
atmosphere; fo r  that is advocacy ”
His style of advocacy was certainly florid, emotional and theatrical . It 
included passionate pleading, mentions of the Almighty (in earlier life Marshall Hall 
had been a preacher), weeping, allowing tears to stream down his cheeks as he spoke, 
and a variety of methods to distract the attention of jurors from unhelpful evidence 
being given by witnesses for the prosecution such as blowing his nose loudly, inflating a 
rubber cushion, used to ease his suffering from haemorrhoids - a condition unkindly said 
to be an occupational hazard for lawyers- and knocking over a glass of water. He 
favoured grand stage like entrances into courtrooms accompanied by junior barristers
Du Gann, Richard, The A rt O f The Advocate, Pelican Books, 1980, page 88. See also Edward 
Marjoribanks, For the defence : the life o f  Sir Edward M arshall H all, New York : The Macmillan 
Company, 1929, Chapter VIII.
For an assessment o f  Marshall Hall in this case see Basil Hogarth, Robert Wood, 1907, Famous 
Trials, Edited by John Mortimer, Viking Books, 1984, pp.170-212.
Quoted by Mark Lewis, The Great Defender : Sir Edward Marshall Hall, The Law Society Gazette. 
No 27, pp. 35 -37, July, 13*\l988.
In the opinion o f  George Keaton, H arris’s Hints on Advocacy, London, Stevens, 1943, page 9, 
Marshall H all’s style recalled  some o f  our great tragedians .
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and attendants to heighten his dramatic affect on the jury. It was said when Marshall 
Hall came into court every body was conscious of his presence:
"There was a subtle change in the atmosphere, a tightening o f  the tension, an air o f  
expectation, due in some measure to the extraordinary power o f  reputation, but mainly 
to his physical presence ”
In his closing speech on behalf of Edward Lawrence, indicted in 1909, for the 
murder of his lover with a gun, Marshall Hall stood with his arms outstretched and 
asked the jurors to imagine “ a great statue o f  justice holding those two scales with 
equally honest hands ” . He then started to consider the evidence for and against the 
defendant. First one side, and then the other, he told them -  swaying all the while -  
might appear lower and at times it might be impossible to tell which side was closest to 
the ground. As the captivated jurors watched he said:
“Then in the one scale , in the prisoner’s scale , unseen by human eye, is placed that
overbalancing weight, the weight o f  the presumption o f  innocence  it is your duty to
remember the invisible weight o f  that invisible substance ”
He then let one arm drop with a thud to the bench
Although it is a fundamental rule of advocacy that no advocate may state his 
own belief in the innocence of his client, Marshall-Hall, was renown for an ability to 
completely identify himself in court with his clients, said to flow from a sympathy and 
understanding of human frailty. He once wrote:
“ ...if an advocate fo r  the defence can legitimately in his advocacy convey to the ju ry  the 
impression o f  his belief in his client’s case, he has gone a long way towards securing 
their verdict” .
Lord Birkett, Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club o f  the Faculty o f  Law, Birmingham  
University, May, 1954.
Charge o f  Murder. P rison er’s Evidence, The Times, S**' March, 1909, page 5.
Edward Lawrence was acquitted. Edward Marjoribanks, For the Defence: the Life o f  Sir E dw ard  
M arshall H all QC, New York:The MacMillan Company. 1929, pp 256- 64.
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He was also known for his audacious court reconstruction of crimes to emphasize 
to the Jury the importance of seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence. This technique 
was seen early in his career, when he acted the part of Marie Herman, an alleged 
murderess, with an iron bar, to show what he suggested actually took place. Famously, 
thirty years later at the Old Bailey, when he defended Madame Fahmy on a charge of 
shooting her husband, a rich Egyptian bey who had ill-treated her for many years, 
Marshall Ha l l , in his closing speech, crouched in front of the jury with the pistol in his 
hand and pretended to be her in her room at the Savoy Hotel. He next imitated the 
approach of her husband, who was intent on injuring her, and then Madame Fahmy’s 
raising of the pistol as he came in. When he reached the moment the pistol went off and 
the husband fell, Marshall Hall let the gun fall to the floor with an enormous clatter, 
breaking the intense stillness of the court and greatly effecting all present The jury 
accepted her plea of self defence.
Keeping alive the tradition of many 19^  ^Century advocates, he liberally used 
poetry and literature ; a notable example being in the case of Harold Greenwood, a 
solicitor on trial in 1920 at Carmarthen Assizes for murdering his wife with arsenic. 
After dropping his voice to a whisper in his closing speech, Marshall Hall quoted to the 
jury the passage in full from Othello when he entered Desdemona’s chamber which 
begins: "Put out the light, and then put out the light. Still in a low voice, he continued: 
Are you going by your verdict to put out that light? Then in a clear loud tone he said No 
gentlemen o f  the Jury, I  demand at your hands the life and liberty o f  Harold 
Greenwood”. He was acquitted
His most famous defences were of the Seddons (1912), George Smith, the 
“Brides in the Bath” murderer (1915), and of Ronald Light in the “Green Bicycle Case” 
(1920). Knowledge and ability to argue law, it has been said, were of secondary 
importance to him, his being an instinctual rather than planned performance. Marshall 
Hall, himself, admitted he was no great lawyer and when, during the course of a trial, a 
point of law arose he would mutter, in a stage whisper, to his junior "You had better deal
Quoted by Richard Du Gann, The Art o f  the A dvocate, Pelican Books, 1980, page 61.
Lord Birkett, Six great advocates. Penguin Books, 1961, pp.15-17.
Winifed Drake gives a full account o f  this case in The Trial o f  H arold Greenwood, in the Notable 
British Trials series, W. Hodge and Co, Edinburgh and London, 1930.
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with this point it has some law in it”. A  famous example of acting instinctively on the 
spur of the moment, and very effectively, was at the end of his defence of Marie 
Hermann in 1894 Marie Hermann was a 47 year old Austrian born prostitute, much 
devoured by the life she had been forced to lead, who was accused of murdering an 
elderly client, Henry Stephens, whom she had solicited when he was drunk, with a poker 
in her room, after a dispute over payment. Marie Herman was prosecuted by Charles 
Mathews QC, who, earlier in his career, had established a reputation for brilliant cross- 
examination, by asking what appeared to be harmless questions but when taken together 
were quite deadly and also, when prosecuting murder, for dwelling on blood shed by 
victims; this case was no exception .At the end of his closing speech, as he was about 
to sit down, Marshall Hall saw Marie Hermann hunched in the dock weeping . Seizing 
the moment, and without the slightest hesitation, he then said to the jury:
“Remember that these women are what men made them . And do not fo rg e t, even she at
one time was a beautiful and innocent child  Look at h e r , gentlemen o f  the jury, look
at her. God never gave her a chance, won ’tyou? ”
The jury did, found manslaughter and called for leniency .
Another striking example of apparent spontaneity, and willingness to jettison 
carefully laid plans when opportunity presented itself, may be seen much later in 
Marshall Hall’s career in 1924. He was briefed to defend a newspaper in a libel action 
brought by a woman MP who alleged the paper had implied she had entered parliament 
purely to win the title of the best dressed woman member of parliament. Whilst on his 
feet, he stopped in the middle of his speech to the jury because of the two minutes’ 
silence then observed in all courts on Armistice Day. After it had finished he said:
“Members o f  the Jury, we have ju st been celebrating the anniversary o f  the greatest 
national sacrifice which the world has ever seen. We have all suffered loss in the war ;
you have suffered And now, turning from this great national ceremony, we fin d
ourselves in this court, and have to address ourselves to the trifling grievances o f  this
481
See, Richard Whittington -  Egan, G od never gave her a chance -  w ill you ?, New Law Journal, April 
17*\ 2000, page 522.
Richard Hamilton, A ll Jangle and Riot, Professional Books, 1986, pp. 170-171.
Mr Justice Wells was not entirely receptive to their plea and sentenced her to six years penal servitude
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Zaüfy.......
Marshall Hall gained the verdict sought by his client. Interestingly, opinion about his 
speech divided between those who considered that he had done what was necessary to 
win, and hence acceptable, and others who thought it was a nauseating display of 
emotion. The latter view, perhaps, reflected how sensibilities to the use of strong 
appeals to emotion by advocates had changed from Victorian times.
He was criticized, since the very beginning of his career, for being too ready to 
quarrel with judges, although it was said some of the judges were equally at fault and 
that at least one of them may well have been driven by malice
Sir Norman Birkett acknowledged that Marshall Hall: "On his good days could 
dominate the Court and everybody in it, judge, jury  and spectators alike, by the mere 
splendour o f  his presence and the compelling power o f  his forensic oratory”^ ^^ . 
However, he rather qualified Edward Marjoribanks, Marshall Hall’s rather eulogistic 
biographer who likened him to the great Roman forensic orator Hortensius, 
remembered because of his splendid physical presence , public adulation and powers of 
eloquent and persuasive speech- recalling Marshall Hall “ to be the strangest mixture o f  
perfections and imperfections that I  ever knew at the B ar”. A  little further he said:
“Sometimes with his quick and almost uncanny perception o f  the important point in a 
case, he would seize i t , throw away every carefully conceived plan, and win victory 
against all the odds; and then , at other times, when he was at the most important stage 
o f  some other case, he would be suddenly blind to the most obvious considerations. His 
judgment would desert him, and he himself would become quite bewildered and lost”.
To illustrate his point about the unpredictability and flawed genius of Marshall 
Hall, Sir Norman Birkett told how when Sir Douglas Hogg, then Attorney General, was 
asked in 1923 to recommend counsel in the Russell divorce case he said, "There’s only 
one man at the bar who might pull it o ff for you. He might win you a brilliant victory or
Reproduced by Richard DuCann, The Art o f  the Advocate, 1993, Penguin, page 70.
Sir Norman Birkett, Six Great Advocates, Penguin, 1961, page 20.
'‘^ ^Holdsworth Address in 1954, ibid.
Edward Marjoribanks, For the defence: the life o f  Sir Edward M arshall Hall, New York : The
Macmillan Company, 1929.
he might make a terrible mess o f  it; but I  believe that he is the only man who can do it -  
get Marshall H all”. In that case he was successful.
He then compared him to Patrick Hastings (1880-1952), a somewhat later barrister,” 
who was made in quite another mould. There was nothing flamboyant about him. He 
was exceedingly scornful o f  some form s offorensic oratory and never attempted any
flights himself. The strength o f  Hastings lay in quite another direction. He w a s , I
think, the greatest cross-examiner I  ever heard. He could destroy a witness with quite 
shattering power with his direct, incisive and penetrating questions, that came from  him 
with the precision and speed o f  a machine gun. Remorselessly and relentlessly he broke 
down all defences, and when the triumph was complete he would make the briefest 
possible speech and sit down .
An assessment of the advocacy of the four leaders and the influence they 
exerted.
In Chapter Four, it was described how in the later Victorian period men like 
Hardinge Gifford, John Holker, Charles Russell and Edward Clarke began to alter 
significantly the general style of advocacy towards being quieter, more learned and 
inclined less to violent appeals to emotions, florid language and quotations from 
literature and popular verse. These barristers tended to select the best arguments from 
their client’s case and drive them home forcibly, rather than saturate jurors with 
rhetorical elabouration of all conceivable points. Less concerned with relying on the 
tricks of the Victorian stage, they also conducted themselves in a more dignified manner 
towards judges, each other and witnesses. Their triumphs in cases, particularly famous 
ones, consciously or unconsciously, influenced other, often more junior, members of the 
bar to copy their methods increasingly. Painting with a broad brush, and aware o f its 
limitations, it might validly be said that Rufus Isaacs, Edward Carson and F E Smith, 
save for the occasional disrespect he showed to certain judges, were their successors in 
advocacy. They were, however, heirs who took the art further, especially in their use of 
conversational language and in refining skills of careful and precise cross -  
examination, at the expense of long closing speeches; the quieter, but nonetheless more
488 Sir Norman Birkett, Six Great Advocates, Penguin, London, 1961, pp. 9-11 .
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deadly, small snipers rifle with accurate sights was replacing loud, but often inaccurate, 
weaponry.
Marshall Hall’s record of victories before juries in murder trials during three 
decades his intensity and passion, spell binding oratory, capable of sweeping jurors off 
their feet, ability to speak simply and attractively to ordinary people, and his dramatic 
reconstructions place him uniquely in the history of English advocacy in court. It can 
also be said that he fell within the tradition of histrionic advocacy, often declaimed and 
sometimes sprinkled in tears, with its blatant appeal to emotion, that had been witnessed 
so much in the 19^  ^Century Indeed Marshall Hall could be said to be almost its final 
deep gasp. Sir Norman Birkett described Marshall Hall as one of the "last great forensic 
orators ” In a similar vein, George Keeton appraised him "the last o f  the dramatic 
criminal advocates” .
Although overwhelmingly successful before juries, to whom he always really 
spoke even when addressing the judge or cross-examining a witness, Marshall Hall 
often failed to convince the Court of Criminal Appeal and other courts where there was 
no jury. An inability to adapt to these courts by following a more restrained form of 
advocacy, and in presenting clear factual and legal arguments"*^ ,^ led to 
uncomplimentary comparisons being drawn with his contemporaries, not of the 
"histrionic school o f  advocacy”, including Sir Edward Carson, Sir Rufus Isaacs and F E 
Smith who appeared equally at home in any court, with or without a jury. They 
instinctively tailored themselves to the tribunal and in Keeton’s opinion "their advocacy 
was on that account more universal in its appeal”and of greater influence on the 
development of forensic advocacy than that of Marshall Hall. There can, however, be no 
doubt that the legendary “Great Defender’s” exaggerated and exuberant style, which had 
brought him staggering success before juries and immense affection from the bar and 
public at large, did effect the conduct of criminal trials before juries by some barristers 
for years to come. His memory, unlike that of his contemporaries, never disappeared
Edward Marjoribanks, ibid, page 29, describes how Marshall Hall, in 1884, during his first year o f  
being a barrister, went to the Old Bailey and observed Sergeant Ballantine and Montagu W illiams, both 
exemplars o f  florid and theatrical advocacy, earlier, although very much in the advanced stages o f  their 
careers. It may be reasonable to speculate that Marshall Hall was much influenced by what he saw.
Sir Norman Birkett, Six Great Advocates Penguin,,London page 21.
H arris on Advocacy: The Conduct o f  Cases Civil and Criminal, 18*** Edition, Stevens and Sons, 1943, 
page 9.
See Sir Norman Birkett, Six Great Advocates, Penguin 1961, pp. 19-20. Also Richard DuCann, The 
A rt o f  the A dvocate, Penguin, 1993, page 120, “M arshall H all was a supremely good  ju ry  a d vo ca te , but 
he was no la w yer”.
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from the public being revived in the form of a television series in the 1970s, radio 
adaptations by John Mortimer of some of his trials in 1996 and during the early 
2000’s and, to an extent, through Mortimer’s fictional creation, “Rumpole”'*^'*.
In his introduction to the radio adaptations, broadcast in 1996, John Mortimer began by saying that if  
you asked barristers o f his generation what had made them buy a wig and gown they would say it was 
not they thirsted after justice it was because they had read the life and cases o f  Marshall Hall. “Tall, 
handsome, silver-tongued, he could dominate a courtroom and woo a ju ry  as no one has before or 
sin ce” . Michael Vestey, Murder most gripping. The Spectator, November 23* ,^ 1996 . In an interview a 
retired barrister, approximately ten years younger than John Mortimer, ventured that that perhaps the 
most enduring legacy o f  Edward Marshall Hall observed in his career was the adoption by some counsel 
in closing speeches o f the scales o f  justice and the invisible weight o f  the presumption o f innocence 
devise, made well known by Marshall Hall in the Edward Lawrence case. Some barristers in dealing with 
the evidence would perform the scales, whilst others would talk about the scales o f  justice and the 
presumption. (Interview with John Downing, 2"** April, 2007. )
Horace Rumpole, who first appeared on television in the late 1970’s, was said to be composed o f  
fragments o f  real barristers, admired by John Mortimer, including his blind father, the quick tempered 
Clifford Mortimer, remembered for quoting much Shakespeare, and early 19**' Century English poetry, 
James Burge, a flamboyant Old Bailey junior, perhaps most recalled for his defence o f  Stephen Ward 
during the Profumo scandal in 1963 and Jeremy Hutchinson QC, renown for his fearlessness, 
independence and total dedication to often unprepossessing clients. Geoffrey Robertson QC, Rumpole o f  
the Bailey: the very incarnation o f  English liberty. The Times, January 17**', 2009.
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Chapter Eight ;  Major Alterations In Advocacy in 
America Also.
In the 19th century considerable alterations in advocacy took place throughout 
the common law world; not just England and Wales. Major developments occurred in 
the United States, very conspicuously in criminal courtroom advocacy. In that country, 
however, there was nothing similar to the Prisoners Counsel Act (1836) granting 
prisoners charged with felonies full defence by counsel: The right to counsel had been 
guaranteed since the 18th century in all states and under the Bill of Rights.
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Cicero and other classical influences.
Until roughly the mid-19th century most criminal advocacy was largely apologetic, 
deliberately avoiding extravagance, fervour and pushiness. Although by 1800 it had begun 
to be overshadowed in politics and the pulpit by newer models of persuasive eloquence 
which emphasised plainer speech and effective elocution, Ciceronian oratorical 
techniques still strongly influenced lawyers during the opening decades of the 19th 
century.
Use of classical argumentation, allusions and sentence structure dated back to the 
preceding century when much education centred around knowledge of antiquity. Richard 
Davis in his Intellectual Life in Jefferson’s Virginia wrote :
“Americans, Virginians especially, were fully aware offormal critiques o f  the art o f  
eloquence from ancient Greece to their own time. During the latter half o f  the eighteenth 
century colleges taught rhetorical theory, including Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics, 
Cicero’s De Oratore and the critical epistles o f  Horace and L o n g i n u s .
When Davies wrote of  "Americans” and "Virginians” he did not, of course, refer to 
the population at large but to a very small, though highly influential, classically educated 
minority.
The 2"  ^ Century orator, politician, general and writer, Cato the Elder also had a strong 
appeal to Virginians'*^^ whilst Cicero was particularly admired as an orator and 
philosopher in New England "*^1
As the Fathers of the American Republican were no strangers to ancient Rome and 
Greece, it is perhaps not surprising to find references to things classical in the decisions of 
judges in federal and state courts of the new nation. In a study based on the years 1790 -
Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1964, Page 365. Classical influences on early America 
have long been noted. See Mullet, C.F, Classical Influences on the American Revolution, Vol 35 Classical 
Journal, 1939-40, pp. 92-104 and Meyer Reinhold, ed., The Classick Pages: Classical Reading o f  
Eighteenth Century Americans, University Park Pa, Pennsylvania State University, 1975.
On the study o f classical rhetoric in Connecticut, especially at Yale, from where, after the Revolution, 
the number o f graduates going to the bar exceeded those going to the pulpit, see Christopher Grasso, A 
Speaking Aristocracy, University o f  North Carolina Press, 1999, Chapter 8.
See Fredric M. Litto, A ddison’s Cato in the Colonies, William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., Vol., 23, 
1966, pp. 431-449.
Stephen Botein, Cicero as a Role M odel fo r  Early American Lawyers: A Case Study in Early Classical 
Influence, Classical Journal Vol. 73, pp .313 - 321.
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1800, Richard J. Hoffman focused on the Supreme Court of the United States and the 
Virginia Court of Chancery, the latter because of the importance of its first sole 
Chancellor, George Wythe, a man who was significant in national and state politics and, 
as a judge, key to the development of law in Virginia. He was also in the opinion of 
Thomas Jefferson "the best Latin and Greek scholar in the State ” and was dubbed by his 
contemporaries "a walking library”. Hoffman found that the sources and functions of the 
classical references in the judgments of Wythe and the Supreme Court were similar. 
Allusions and quotes were drawn from Greek and Roman literature, history and 
mythology. Any dissimilarity between the two courts came in the frequency of the 
references and in the use of Roman Law. Wythe made extensive use of the classics, 
especially of the Corpus luris Civilis of Justinian, while the Supreme Court justices were 
more sparing in their allusions and made no reference to Roman Law. In neither court 
were references generally made for the mere display of erudition by judges but for literary 
functions that were identical and fell into three broad categories. First specific quotes 
from classical literature were used to express a particular feeling, or sentiment , of the 
user. Second, quotes or allusions were employed as similes. In the third category as an 
extended simile by which ancient events or points of law were used as precedents for the 
holdings or views of judges In both courts the percentage of cases in which classical 
references are present amounted to twenty percent. Interestingly, Robert Hoffman 
examined judgments from the same period by the English High Court of Chancery and 
King’s Bench. Usually each Chancellor and Chief Justice was classically educated, to a 
level beyond most American jurists, and had the ability both to read and write Latin and 
Greek. Some, like Lord Mansfield and Lord Loughborough, were also trained in Roman 
Law. Given this, it could reasonably be expected that their judgments would be liberally 
sprinkled with quotes and allusions from antiquity and contain numerous citations from 
Roman Law. The contrary appears to be the case. Hoffman read Chancery and Kings 
Bench decisions between 1790 and 1800, and occasionally before and after, at random.
Richard J. Hoffman, Classics in the Courts o f  the United States, 1790-1880, American Journal o f Legal 
History, 1978, Vol. 22, N o l, pp.55-84.
Hoffman, ibid, pp.57-58. Chancellor Wythe, in the Virginia High Court o f Chancery, made 85 classical 
references in a total o f 21 reported cases. O f these, 39 appear in the text o f the judgment and 46 are 
contained in notes added either simultaneously or later for publication. In the Supreme Court 12 classical 
references are made in five cases by four Supreme Court justices, one Attorney General and several 
attorneys arguing before the court.
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Against expectations, he found that few classical allusions appeared in them Only 
rarely was Roman Law cited in arguments before the courts or in their decisions and when 
done so it was usually limited to appeals from Ecclesiastical Courts, where Canon Law 
and Roman Law stood side by side.
In seeking to explain the greater use of the classics by the courts in America, 
where in fact fewer judges were classically educated, than those in England, Hoffman 
drew attention to the general nature of polemical literature then in the country. In 
sermons, pamphlets, newspapers and various writings on national affairs classics played 
an important part. Because classics were present in the writings of Americans they could 
also be expected in judicial decisions, seen by Hoffman as a specialized form of 
polemicism. He gives greater weight, however, to two other factors. At the federal level 
judges had to work out the legal relationship between the states, and between a state and 
the federal government. In these respects, Britain, not organized as a federal state, could 
not provide an adequate legal model for the new country. Classics, particularly those 
referring to ancient constitutional arrangements, could and did play a role forjudges and 
lawyers who attempted to deal with various problems that arose. Secondly, the question 
asked within states was to what extent ought English Law and practices be observed? 
Traditionalists thought they should be followed closely. Others, of whom Chancellor 
Wythe was a prominent example, believed that English precedents should not be slavishly 
followed and that Roman law should be the basis of a new system. In this cause they not 
only quoted widely in cases from Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis but also made as many 
classical allusions and references as possible; the intended effect of which being to 
heighten the break with Britain and connect the young republic with something solid from 
the ancient past.
Many lawyers had read Cicero's political works and criminal defences either in 
the original, those entering university would have to demonstrate competence in the 
classical tongues, or, more usually, in translation. A useful source was a popular 
translation, completed in 1740, of Cicero’s orations by William Guthie, a hack Tory 
writer from Grub Street in London. Surprisingly, Guthrie’s fondness for Cicero did not
Richard J. Hoffman, Classics in the Courts o f  the United States 1790-1880, American Journal o f  Legal 
History, Vol. 22. N o l, page 69, does, however identify some exceptions, a notable one being ex parte 
Wrangham, 2 Ves. Jun. 609 (1795), a case involving Trinity Hall, Cambridge. In it Lord Loughborough 
used many classical allusions and quotes. However, Hoffman speculates, this may be that as Visitor for
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prevent him elsewhere lavishing praise on Julius Caesar as "perhaps the greatest man that 
was ever on earth” . First published in 1744, Thomas Gordon, an English libertarian 
polemicist, appended Cicero’s four orations against Catiline, charged with plotting against 
the Roman republic, to his translation of Sallust, where further details of Cicero’s life 
might be obtained. Gordon prefaced his work with a lengthy discourse on what he saw as 
the true principles of government heavily drawing on those of republican Rome. This 
book,which soon travelled to the colonies, is said to have had a decisive influence on 
early American political culture^°^. At university professors of law would combine 
teaching of English common law with Greek democratic principles and Roman 
republicanism in their lectures. This tradition began at the College of William and Mary 
with the appointment of George Wythe as the first professor of Law and Police
Employment in criminal trials.
Following Cicero's methods, many lawyers would inform jurors of their lack of 
experience and limited ability in criminal trials and of how little they were acquainted 
with the defendant, but despite this, a solemn sense of professional duty compelled them 
to represent him or her. After this self-justificatory preliminary, again in the manner of 
Cicero, attorneys would often try to blunt the prosecution evidence with dispassionate 
stylized arguments about human nature and behaviour which they submitted should 
govern the way jurors, assessed the facts. To reinforce what they said about universal 
human conduct lawyers frequently quoted from sentimental novels, at first imported from 
Britain but soon written in abundance at home. By the technique of concentrating on 
general norms of human behaviour, rather than upon the defendant’s discrete acts and 
intentions, lawyers sought to obscure the motives of their clients and encourage jurors to 
interpret the evidence with mercy. As well as throwing this oratorical cloak about their 
clients, lawyers would tell jurors that by finding a defendant guilty they would have 
decided he or she had no sense of right and wrong and were like amoral monsters found
Trinity Hall he was keen to demonstrate that his classical training in Scotland was not inferior to that at 
Cambridge.
Stephen Botein, Cicero as a Role M odel fo r  Early American Lawyers: A Case Study in Early Classical 
Influence, Classical Journal Vol. 73, page 315.
Another much read book in late 18* Century America was John Ward’s System o f  Oratory, first published in 
1759, which drew heavily on Cicero’s oratorical technique.
On the place o f  classical rhetoric in American legal education, see Linda Levine and Kurt Saunders, 
Thinking like a Rhetor, Journal o f Legal Education, Vol. 43 1993, pp. 108 -  122.
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in gothic novels, which were popularly read at the time, and appeared in theatrical 
melodrama
In conducting defences, especially in capital trials, lawyers urged juries to insist on an 
almost absolute standard of proof before convicting their clients and to reject 
circumstantial evidence. Attorneys frequently underlined the gulf between jurors and 
defendants, who were often forlorn and on the margins of society, but, nonetheless, urged 
juries to accept that they had a special time honoured duty, stretching long back into 
history, to treat them, even if  they were not objects of ready sympathy, with fairness, 
humanity and clemency.
Contrasting strongly with the apologetic, dispassionate and formulaic type of criminal 
advocacy established throughout much of America, a small group of attorneys in New 
York, into whose hands much of the criminal work was concentrated during the first 
quarter of the 19th century, developed an ardent form of oratory intended to show 
defendants as deserving of pity, and to inform jurors that displays of mercy would 
encourage obedience and instill morality amongst rootless and impoverished people 
in trouble with the law . Courts witnessed emotional language, flights of rhetoric, 
flashes of humour and even buffoonery. Reports of this distinctive advocacy were not 
always well received by attornies in other parts of the country. To some extent, the "New 
York style" has been explained by the fact that the criminal bar in the city attracted to it a 
number of radicals from England and Ireland, where florid appeals to emotion and zealous 
advocacy, in the spirit of Thomas Erskine and Henry Brougham, were more ensconced.
Major alterations in procedure, evidence and générai oratory.
By the end of the second quarter of the 19th century profound procedural and 
evidential changes had swept across the United States. Appellate courts, convinced in 
their decisions by trial judges and prosecutors, stressed the ability of defendants, as 
bearers of rights and aided by lawyers to enforce them, to look after their own interests 
during jury trials. They also rejected arguments that a guilty verdict could only be 
legitimate if based on direct proof; accepted circumstantial evidence; and, very 
importantly, emphasized that jurors need only heed reasonable doubts, and not demand an 
almost absolute substantiation, when considering the prosecution’s case. Further, appeal
See, Michael Millender, The Transformation o f  the American Criminal Trial 1790 -  1875, Doctoral 
Dissertation, Department o f  History, Princeton University 1996, pp. 92 -  106.
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court judges and writers of treatises on evidence maintained that jurors, through their 
everyday experiences of life, should be sufficiently confident to reach conclusions, even if 
not of complete certainty, about defendants' intentions and mental states from the 
evidence of their words and actions.
American oratory generally in the 19^  ^Century was much influenced by two 
rhetorical texts, both written in the Eighteenth Century Scottish Enlightenment: The 
Philosophy o f  Rhetoric, by George Campbell and Lectures on Rhetoric and Belle Lettres 
by Hugh Blair. Stressing that human beings could discover truth through experience and 
only communicate it by recreating that experience in the minds of their listeners, the 
rhetorician was expected to develop his own understanding by reflecting on experience 
and then to explain such comprehension to an audience by appealing to faculties of mind 
which included understanding and imagination. Following this approach, 19^  ^Century 
American orators often told stories of their experiences and or created “word pictures” to 
impart their ideas. The purposes of rhetoric was not merely to entertain, but to persuade 
listeners towards noble ends.
An essay entitled American Eloquence, from the United States Democratic Review 
written in 1854, described what it considered to be the chief characteristics of American 
oratory including their “Fervor ”, strong “common sense ”, “frank, open business-like 
air ” and appeals to emotion. On the latter, it was said
“Powerful and effective eloquence always has been and always must be addressed 
mainly to the passions or feelings in a m an’s heart. What could all the metaphysical 
subtleties o f  Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus effect, in impelling men to action , or in 
accomplishing any great and grand end, when compared with that warm, gushing 
eloquence, coming from the heart and going to the heart? We care not how powerfully the 
intellect is addressed and stimulated, enlightened and convinced, by argument. But let us 
remember, the work is not effectually done, the grand end and aim o f  eloquence is not 
attained, till the consenting sympathies o f the inner man o f the heart are touched and 
roused and brought into action. True eloquence -  effective, useful eloquence -  must 
appeal to the heart, through the understanding and the conscience. It must open the 
floodgates o f  sensibility within us, and thus bring into exercise our active powers fo r  the
Michael Millender, ibid, pp. 108 -  122.
On the acceptability o f  admitting circumstantial evidence into trials see, for example, the jurist James 
Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, Little Brown and Company,
1898, Chapter VI.
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promoting o f  good or the preventing o f  evil, or else, its real power and utility will he o f  a 
very small amount. And such, we think, in a very grand degree, is the character o f  
American Eloquence ”
Attachment to the classics waned generally in public oratory, although some speakers 
held on to them tenaciously
A sea change in advocacy.
Changes in procedure, laws of evidence and the effect of the prevailing general 
style of oratory produced a sea-change in advocacy in court, at first in the big cities and 
then spreading beyond. Attorneys adopted the mix of flamboyance, appeal to emotion and 
aggression that has been their hallmark ever since No longer able to argue that jurors 
were duty bound to acquit if  there was any doubt in a case, they attempted to move jurors 
with the sincerity of their belief in the innocence of their client and, where possible, by 
closely examining evidence so as to point to different conclusions than those urged by the 
prosecution. Alternative versions, narratives, of what had happened were put forward. In 
doing so they jettisoned earlier objections to circumstantial evidence, the admissibility of 
which had been championed by the prosecution. Very unlike the earlier advocacy, which 
underlined differences between jurors and usually wretched defendants, lawyers started to 
stress the faculty of jurors to know the innermost thoughts and emotions of defendants, as 
well as their own, those of their spouse, or child, or neighbour.
Lawyers began to tenderly paint sympathetic pictures, often in the manner of 
sentimental novelists, of their clients to the jury. Addresses frequently became generously
Volume 34. Issue 1. pp.40-52.
Volume 34. Issue 1. page 45.
One such was William Henry Harrison, elected as President o f the United States in 1840, after a 
campaign in which his Democratic opponents had portrayed him as a simple frontier fighter, and a hard 
cider drinker living in a log cabin. In reality he was from the Virginia planter aristocracy and had studied 
classics and history. Once elected -  and determined to slay this false image -  he delivered a three hour 
inaugural address, on a cold March 1841 day in Washington, which employing many the rhetorical 
flourishes from his classical training and included references to the ancient Athenian constitution. He 
caught a cold . Unfortunately, this later developed into pneumonia and he died soon after.
J. A. Millender, The Transformation o f  the American Criminal Trial 1790-1875, Doctoral Dissertation, 
Department o f  history, Princeton University 1996, Chapter 7. Commercial necessity may well have 
contributed to the major changes in advocacy that occurred. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History o f  American 
Law, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1973, pp. 270 -  275,” saw flamboyance, tricks and courtroom  
antics” adopted in the 19*'' Century by lawyers, and not restricted to criminal cases, as influenced by 
business reasons. Lawyers constantly needed to advertise themselves to attract new clients. Although they 
could place notices in newspapers, word o f mouth was the most effective way. Their style o f  advocacy was 
“wore than a matter o f  personality; this behaviour created reputation; and a courtroom lawyer who d id  
not impress the public and gain a reputation would be hard p ressed  to survive”. ( Page 270.)
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spiced with quotations from literature and poetry and the Bible. Because, as Tocqueville 
had observed, the great mass of people in nineteenth century America were largely 
indifferent to ''what occurred in Rome and Athens” , classical allusions to jurors
became rare. This was not to everyone’s liking
Sensationalism, as a tactic in criminal trails, appeared. Theatrical appeals to the 
emotions of jurors became more charged and were most probably taken to their extreme 
by William E Howe^ *'*, a partner in the infamous New York firm of Howe and Hummel, 
who could, and did, cry "at will" to win the sympathy of the jury. Described as a 
sickening spectacle in A. H. Rovere's astonishing book, Howe and Hummel it often 
carried a jury to extraordinary decisions Howe once, despite his considerable bulk, 
made an entire closing speech on his knees in front of the jury box. Another technique 
was to place the wife and children of the defendant in the front row "to gaze devotedly at 
the man on trial. I f  perchance a particular defendant did not have a pretty w ife , fond  
children , or a snowy haired mother, he was not fo r  that reason deprived o f  the sympathy
Quoted by Stephen Botein, Cicero as a Role M odel fo r  Early American Lawyers, Classical Journal. 
Vol.73, 1978, page 318.
In 1851, a contributor to the Democratic Review  ( The American Bar in 1851, XXVIII, pp. 195 - 2 0 9  ), 
presumably presenting views more widely held, wrote indignantly about a distinct decline in courtroom 
advocacy . In his opinion, the dearth o f  oratory was attributed, in part, to the number o f  inferior men who 
crowd themselves within the bar. ( Page 203. ) Following the election o f  President Andrew Jackson in 
1828, and the introduction o f  Jacksonian democracy, aimed at giving citizens greater participation in the 
running o f their country, admission to state bars became much less stringent. This coupled with growing 
legal business in an expanding economy led to more lawyers, many o f whom had not undergone college 
education, where they would have been exposed to the classics. A further reason for what was seen as a fall 
in standards was said to be a lack o f literary appreciation amongst the mass o f the legal profession, college
educated or not. According to the Democratic Review  commentator, ‘'They study la w  and they study
nothing e l s e   They are content to know the verbiage o f  the law, and they bow reverently to the ipse
dixit o f  ancient compilers o f  rules, and modern digesters ofprecedents. As to studying the classics, they 
were bored sufficiently with them at college. As to Burke and Milton, they throw no light upon the Rule o f  
Shelley’s case, and a lawyer should not waste time upon them. Such members o f  the profession .... w ill 
never cultivate eloquence themselves, nor encourage its growth in others”. The author o f the article in the 
Democratic Review  complained about ‘‘the disciples o f  the “black-letter school” who exerted “a 
pernicious influence”. They were also to be found elevated to the bench ‘'where they are apt to discourage 
the display o f  those gifts in the advocate, o f  which they are destitute, either not appreciating their value, or 
ill-concealing their envy at the superior influence they exert upon jurors and auditors over their own bald  
exhibitions ”. ( pp. 203 -204. ). Further contributing to the neglect o f eloquence in oratory, with some 
notable exceptions, principally works by Kent, Story, Hoffman and Greenleaf, were treatises and text 
books, written in a "disorderly, vague and jejune manner”, with which lawyers and judges stocked their 
minds. (Ibid, page 204).
Over the course o f  his career William Howe represented over six hundred accused murderers -  a greater 
number than the rest o f  the New York Bar combined. See Decadence o f  New York’s Criminal Bar, New  
York Times, 7* September 1902, page 34.
Although Howe’s ability to cry was exceptional, others also used the technique. Indeed in 1897 the 
Tennesseee Supreme Court rejected a claim that public displays o f emotion were wrong and held they 
might be positively good. "Tears have always been considered legitimate arguments before a jury. Indeed  
i f  counsel has them at his command, it may be seriously questioned whether it is not his professional duty
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they might create on his behalf. Howe would simply supply them from the f ir m ’s large 
stable o f  professional spectators”
Theatricality also extended to clothing. At the beginning of a case, Howe would dress 
showily in a dove -grey suit and with much jewellry. As the days passed he shed his 
bright garments for darker suits and ties and stopped wearing watch chains, tiepins and 
rings. By the day the jury would be called on to decide the fate of his client his attire, 
matching his face, would be very sombre^'^.
Originally a Londoner, William Howe (1828-1902) professed on occasions to have 
been employed as a clerk at a barrister’s chambers in the early 1850s, frequently visiting 
courts in the course of his work.^'* It is at least possible to suggest that the histrionic 
advocacy observable in London at the time may have later influenced his style in New 
York^ '^ .
Books began to be produced on forensic address, including an important series 
compiled by Judge J.W. Donovan. The first edition of Modern Jury Trials, published in 
1881, contained some forty condensed trials and ninety pages of descriptive matter, and 
formed a book of 700 pages. Despite being expensive, it sold many thousands of copies. 
Trial Practice and Trial Lawyers followed in 1883 and also met with success. It was 
confined mainly to descriptions of American advocates, preparing cases for trial and the
to shed them whenever proper occasion arises”. Ferguson v. Moore, 39 S. w. 341, 343,Tenn. 1897. Quoted 
by Sadakat Kadri, The Trial A History from  Socrates to O. J. Simpson. Harper, 2006, Page 299.
R. H. Rovere, Howe and Hummel. New York, Farrar Straus, 1947. Powell and Paterson, Cicero the 
Advocate, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, page 33, compare this kind o f appeal to sympathy 
with those made in ancient Rome, where a defendant would appear in mourning, unkempt and dirty in the 
company o f their family and relatives in a similar way. Interestingly, a junior barrister (Anne- Marie 
Critchley, interviewed on 7* September, 2007.) considered most advocates in modem England, whilst 
strongly discouraging displays o f  emotion from them, would encourage defendants’s relatives, respectably 
dressed, to be present before juries.
Francis L. Wellman, Luck and Opportunity, MacMillan, New York, 1938, page 27.
Howe claimed to had read law at Kings College, London and, after graduation, had entered the office o f  
George Waugh ‘ a noted barrister’. There is evidence that he did work for Waugh, who was a solicitor, not 
a barrister, for a number o f  years. In this capacity he attended court often. He also appeared in court as a 
witness in two murder cases and as a defendant in a criminal trial at the Old Bailey in 1854 concerning a 
perjured bail affidavit. Upon conviction, Howe received 18 months hard labour. See, James Morton, 
Uncovering the truth. Law Society Gazette, 18*'' October, 2007, 104/40, page 17.
Perhaps it is not too unreasonable to speculate that the success o f  William Howe’s appeal to 
emotion and theatricality may, somewhat later, have influenced the histrionic styles o f Earl Rogers (1869 - 
1922) in California and William Fallon (1886-27) in New York, the pre-eminent criminal attorneys o f  their 
respective bars. William Fallon, known as the Great Mouthpiece, became the inspiration for Billy Flynn, in 
the popular entertainment films Roxy Hart and Chicago. See Gene Fowler, The \Great Mouthpiece, A Life 
Story o f  William J.Fallon, Covici Friede, 1931. On Earl Rogers see Michael Trope, Once Upon a Time in 
Los Angeles: The trials o f  Earl Rogers, Arthur H. Clerk Company, 2001.
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conduct of court cases. Tact in Court was published in 1885. Deliberately moderately 
priced, and aimed at the great mass of young lawyers, it sold, in various editions, over 
thirty thousand copies in the following thirty years. The work contained a selection of 
short articles by eminent advocates. Amongst a great quantity of advice contained within 
the book was the necessity of thoroughly preparing cases and of formulating a credible 
intelligent theory why a party’s version of events should prevail, suitable confidence, not 
over- confidence, attention to voice, gestures and appearance, avoiding the appearance of 
trickery (rather running against the approach taken by William Howe, although, perhaps, 
his success was in being able to hide it), courtesy to the court and opposing counsel and 
careful selection of language before juries. On the latter A. B. Maynard, in an article 
entitled Tact in Trials wrote:
“I  found farmers had one language, carpenters had another, country merchants had 
another and labourers another -  these are the average jurymen. I  adopted and used their 
catchwords and phrases, not as ‘clap-trap, ’ or a ‘trick’, but to talk to them in their own 
language. Ifound  it took better; they understood me and knew my meaning better. I  never 
lost my suit by a ju r y ’s ignorance o f  what I  contended fo r  ”.
Recognising the respect with which most jurors held judges, Maynard also strongly 
cautioned advocates from arguing with judges once they had ruled on a particular matter.
In Winning cases, by “Different Counsel” the importance of stating facts simply before 
a jury was stressed along with illustrating points by comparisons with which jurors could 
easily identify In this respect, the abilities of Abraham Lincoln’s were much praised 
This article also stressed usefulness of drawing on biblical stories
Tact in Court, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1915, Edition, pp.35-37.
Tact in Court, ibid, pp. 49-54.
It has been said that Abraham Lincoln well understood that a lawyer’s success depended more on his 
popular appeal than on his technical expertise. Charles M. Haar, The Golden Age o f  American Law, George 
Braziller, New York, 1965, page 4.
By the time o f  Donovan’s Modern Jury Trials this had a long history, especially in some States,. In 
discussing 18**' Century Connecticut, where until about 1750 it was common for church ministers to appear
in court on behalf o f neighbours, Sally Hadden, Professor o f  History and Law at Florida State University, 
said that lav 
May, 2010.
wyers consciously adopted ministers’ gestures and flourishes. Interview conducted on the 11*'’
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In To cross- examine well. Judge Donovan urged a restrained form of cross- 
examination:
“Most young lawyers think they appear dull i f  they pass a witness without ‘tearing him 
to pieces ’ under rigid questioning, and fin d  that they have fe d  their enemy at every 
question. Older advocates use this weapon with tact and caution. They have tried the 
sabre exercise too often, and remember the deep scars it produced on their clients”.
A little after he says:
“The fine art o f  cross -  examination is in making your case out o f  an opponents 
witness. This is almost always done by a gentle and delicate leading process coupled with 
concealed kindness that fascinates and encourages, whilst it creates the reasonable doubt 
or supplies the broken thread o f a story that you are seeking to establish” .
Donovan concludes:
‘'There are no better rules o f  cross- examination than five: (1) Know what you need, 
and stop when you get it. (2) Risk no case on the hazard o f an answer that may destroy it 
(3) Hold your temper while you lead the witness, i f  convenient, to lose his. (4) Ask as i f  
wanting one answer when you desire the opposite, i f  the witness is against you: and 
reverse the tactics i f  he is more tractable. (5) Treat a witness like a runaway colt; and see 
he does not get too much start on his master; and i f  he does, let go o f  the reins at the first 
safe turn in the testimony; but i f  you see any object to break his running, call the turn 
quickly ”.
Lawyers who appeared before juries acquired knowledge, not found in books, about the 
way they often worked. In a satire, but which nonetheless reflected reality, written in 
1906, a commentator wrote of a system o f "jury -made lawlessness, or juries imprudence 
, which recognizes rights that are forbidden by law and denies rights that are granted by 
law” . He then set out examples "ofjurisprudence o f  lawlessness” including: "Any man 
who seduces an innocent girl may, without a hearing be sho t, or stabbed to death 
by.... any near relative and In prosecutions fo r  stealing horses, cattle or hogs, the 
presumption o f  innocence is shifted in favor o f  the live stock, and the accused is
presumed to be guilty” . Attorneys who ignored these strong presumptions and other 
"unwritten laws” did so at their peril.
Up until the beginning of the second half of the Nineteenth Century, courts in the 
United States generally conducted hearings in civil matters at a leisurely pace. Marathon 
speeches by counsel were allowed. The federal Supreme Court was described in 1824 as 
"Not only one o f  the most dignified and enlightened tribunals in the world, but one o f  the 
most pa tien t. Counsel are heard in silence fo r  hours, without being stopped or 
interrupted” . In the course of their speeches judges would sometimes deal with 
subjects remote to the matter in hand. The speed of court life hastened greatly as the 
growing economy brought with it burgeoning numbers of cases . To cope with them, 
courts did not have the time to listen to long speeches, even if judges wanted to. Attorneys 
had to adapt to this new reality in their advocacy.
Expression of belief in causes.
As in England and Wales, especially after Courvoisier’s case in 1840 and that of 
William Palmer in 1856 ( both much reported in America), there was discussion in the 
United States about whether advocates should be allowed to express belief in the causes 
of their clients. The first American code of ethics , that of the Alabama State Bar 
Association published in 1887, rejected any distinction between permissible and 
impermissible expressions of belief: All expressions of belief were disapproved: The 
Code stated:
“The same reasons which make it improper in general fo r  an attorney to testify for his 
client, apply with greater force to assertions, sometimes made by counsel in argument, 
ofpersonal belief o f  the client’s innocence or the justice o f his cause. I f  such assertions 
are habitually made they loose all force and subject the attorney to falsehoods; while 
failure to make them in particular cases will be esteemed a tacit admission o f  the client’s 
guilt, or the weakness o f  his cause”
Thomas J. Keman, The jurisprudence o f  lawlessness. Green Bag 18: 588 (1906). Cited by Lawrence M. 
Friedman, American Law in the 20^  ^Century, Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 87-88.
Quoted in Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, Little, Brown and Co, 1922, 
Volume 1 page 467.
Code o f ethics (Ala.) Chapter 18.
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Similarly the American Bar Association, somewhat later in 1908, was unequivocal in 
its prohibition:
“It is improper fo r  a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his client’s 
innocence or in the justice o f  his cause”
While American judges repeatedly reaffirmed the no personal belief rule, there is 
evidence that some lawyers, in civil and criminal cases , disregarded it Wide latitude 
was still permitted to lawyers expressing comments on the evidence.
During the second half of the 19th century, every state in the Union, save Georgia, 
granted accused persons the right to give evidence on oath at their trial Like England 
and Wales, where the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 gave defendants similar rights, 
lawyers in the United States had to adapt their advocacy to take account of this shift in 
procedure which weakened their control over their client's defence. Also during this 
period, US advocates had to adjust to the growing use of expert evidence in court, as did 
their counterparts in England and Wales. Similar to there, it was for a time a habit to 
speak slightingly of the reliability of the testimony of expert witnesses. In one of the 
leading American law magazines a professional expert witness was defined as "a man 
who is paid a retainer to make a sworn statement” .
Plea bargaining.
There is general agreement amongst legal historians that prior to 1800 the distinctively 
American feature of plea bargaining did not exist. Plea bargaining is a process by which a 
person agrees to plead guilty to a criminal charge in exchange for concessions by the 
prosecutor representing the state. The defendant waives the right to tr ia l, loosing any 
chance of acquittal, but usually avoids conviction on a more serious charge. The state on 
the other hand, is not required to go through the expense of a trial. Matters negotiated in 
plea bargaining include reduction in the charges, a specific recommendation to the judge
Canon 15.
David Mellinkoff, Conscience o f  a Lawyer, St Paul, West Pub Co, 1973, Chapter 11.
It was not until 1962 that defendants in Georgia were allowed to testify on oath.
27 Am. Law Reg., iii., footnote., cited by Frederic Wrottesley, The Examination o f  Witnesses in Court, 
Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1910, Chapter 3, page 65.
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on sentence or an agreement not to oppose a request by the defence such as for probation. 
Plea bargaining began to appear in the early or mid-nineteenth century, apparently 
independently in a number of jurisdictions. It became a standard characteristic of 
American urban criminal courts in the last third of that century Various explanations 
why it arose and grew have been put forward They include heavy caseloads of judges, 
swelled by increasing numbers of claims for remedies under newly invented torts, over 
crowded prisons and that plea bargaining conveniently , in a more bureaucratized criminal 
justice system, settled cases where guilt was obvious but problematic to prove, thereby 
lessening risk to both the defendant and prosecution. As most criminal trials were fast 
paced and frequently resulted in conviction, similar to England, plea bargains were an 
attractive alternative, especially for guilty defendants By bargaining they had a hand in 
their own fate, rather than leaving it entirely to the not so tender mercies of the judge and 
jury Attorneys in 19^** Century America, both for the defence and prosecution, as an 
important aspect of their court work, had to develop the ability to negotiate pleas. 
Competence by defence attorneys in composing and delivering pleas in mitigation 
following guilty pleas was essential.
Bench Trials.
In the 19^  ^Century Maryland stood alone in allowing defendants to elect trial before a 
judge without a jury. These became known as bench trials. By the 1920’s, in that state, 
they far exceeded jury trials. Bench trials were particularly popular with those charged 
with sexual offences and black people, both at risk of prejudice from jurors. That judges
See Albert Alschuler, Plea bargaining and its history. Law and Society Review Vol 91 No2, 1979, pp. 
211- 246 ; Lawrence Friedman, Plea bargaining in historic perspective  pp. 247 - 260, same volume ; and 
John Langbein, Understanding the short history o f  plea bargaining, pp. 261-272, also in the same volume.
See Mary Vogel, Coercion to compromise: p lea  bargaining, the courts, and the making o f  political 
authority. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000 and George Fisher, Plea bargaining’s triumph : A 
history o f  plea  bargaining in America, Stanford CA:Stanford University Press, 2003.
Lawrence Friedman, American Law in the 20^  ^Century, Yale University Press, 2002, page 85, wrote: 
"Before p lea  bargaining became routine, these people went to trial- but the trials were quick, slapdash; 
they were typically lawyerless, and many o f  them started and finished within h alf an hour or even le ss” .
Interestingly George Fisher, Plea bargaining’s triumph: A History o f  p lea  bargaining in America, 
Staford CA: Stanford University Press,2003, found, in his research in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, 
after 1866, when defendants were given the right to testify, that the trial rate rapidly decreased and guilty 
pleas rose, presumably because o f more bargains being struck. Although meant to safeguard defendants, 
making them competent to give evidence on their behalf the right to give evidence paradoxically resulted in 
them having less advantage at trial because if  they did not testify adverse inferences would often be drawn 
against them by jurors. Also if  they testified there was then no prohibition on prosecutors commenting on 
their prior silence and questioning them about previous convictions. A reasonable interpretation o f  the 
increase in guilty pleas in Middlesex County is that defendants and lawyers were aware o f  these dangers.
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could dispose of many more cases when sitting without a jury was noted as beneficial. 
Elsewhere there was some constitutional doubt whether a state could allow a defendant to 
waive the right to jury trial. This began to dissolve. In 1927 Michigan permitted the 
practice. Other states followed. The Supreme Court approved of bench trials in federal 
courts in 1930. Eventually almost states came to permit them. In some, Virginia and 
Mississippi are examples, they became very widespread for felony cases Taking the 
jury out of the courthouse had a huge influence on advocacy, as it did in England. Unlike 
jurors, judges had no time for stirring speeches, sensationalism and histrionics. Strict 
attention to evidence and the law was required of attorneys, not appeals to passion, 
sympathy and prejudice
Before lawyers were engaged in significant numbers in managing the legal and 
commercial affairs of the large corporations that emerged in the third quarter of the 19^  ^
Century, the business of lawyering was largely conceived as a courtroom activity, mainly 
carried out by attorneys in sole practice. Good ability in advocacy across a wide variety of 
criminal and civil cases was important for a lavyyer's reputation and success.
Lawrence Friedman American Law in the 20 Century, Yale University Press, 2002, page 87.
Lawrence Friedman, ibid  page 88, mentioned the case o f Richard Loeb and Nathan Leopold in 1924 as a 
rare instance where a strong appeal to emotion was made to a judge sitting alone. Clarence Darrow, on 
behalf o f the two young men, who had murdered a boy, apparently just for the thrill o f  doing so, made an 
impassioned speech in mitigation for their lives drawing on psychiatric reports. They were spared death.
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Chapter Nine : The Silent Revolution in Methods of 
Advocacy.
In 1943, during wartime Britain, G. W Keeton, then Professor of English Law and 
Dean of the Faculties of Laws in The University of London and at the University College, 
London, wrote about "a silent revolution in methods o f  advocacy as practised by the 
English Bar” that had taken place over the previous 50 years. He observed that 
changed standards of professional etiquette and steadily greater dignity of the judiciary
The judge emphasised their youth. Friedman thinks it unclear whether Darrow’s eloquence, which was 
much reported, made any difference.
G. W. Keeton, H arris’s Hints on Advocacy, Stevens and Sons, 1943, page 10.
Certainly by the latter part o f the Nineteenth Century most judges exerted authority over advocates in 
court, something not all o f them had been able to do sufficiently earlier. (See George King, Lawyers and 
Eloquence, In William Andrews ed. The Lawyer in History, Literature and Humour, William Andrews and 
Co, 1896, page 264. ). Contributing to deference and courtesy shown to judges by barristers was greater 
respect for their intellectual and practical abilities as lawyers . Beginning in the 1860’s both Conservative 
Lord Chancellors (Cairns) and Liberals ( Hatherley and Selbome ) sought to professionalise the judiciary 
and to make merit the consideration for appointment to the bench. ( Robert Stevens, The English Judges,
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had led to a vast increase in courtesy between the court and counsel and between counsel. 
Quarrels in court were rare and when they did occur was regarded as a departure from 
professional good manners rather than a normal incident of litigation. ^^ ^All barristers who 
practised in the common law courts were required to choose a circuit in which to work 
and , by convention to dine frequently in the circuit mess. In the last decades of the 19^  ^
Century messes grew stronger in maintaining accepted professional standards of 
behaviour; the expulsion of Dr Kenealy, for his conduct in criminal Tichborne Claimant 
case, from the Oxford Circuit Bar mess in 1874 is an early example of their willingness 
to take severe sanctions if necessary. Institution of a bar mess at the Old Bailey in 1891, 
a step spoken about since the 1840’s to improve standards, may well have contributed to 
better behaviour there . The conduct of prosecutions had also improved. Unlike in the 
previous century, they were no longer carried out in a "sneering hectoring manner with 
witnesses mercilessly browbeaten and bullied i f  the occasion warranted” . The idea of 
the prosecutor acting as a minister of justice, and therefore not striving for a conviction at 
any cost, was now firmly part of the etiquette of the Bar. This limited, if it did not 
eliminate, appeals by prosecutors to jurors' emotions.
It was widely held that Sir Richard Muir ( 1857-1924) was responsible for much of the 
improvement, especially at the Old Bailey - practice there influencing other courts - and 
introduced an atmosphere of fairness and impartiality in prosecutions which had never
Hart Publishing, Oxford and New York, 2005, Chapter One ) The movement towards meritocracy was to 
some extent impeded by Lord Halsbury (Hardinge Giffard) in the seventeen years he was Lord Chancellor 
between 1885 and 1905. His appointments were much criticised on the grounds "he appointed to the High 
Court, and to a lesser extent the county court,men o f  little or no legal learning whose previous career in 
public life had been largely in the service o f  the Conservative Party or else were relations o f  his own ( 
R. F. V. Houston, The Lives o f  the Lord Chancellors 1885-1940, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, page 36. ) 
. From Lord Haldane’s Chancellorship (1912-15) legal and professional qualifications firmly became the 
criteria, though at first the change was not extended to the most senior appointments. However, a little 
later, Lord Sankey, Lord Chancellor from 1929 to 1935, when resignations occurred, replaced five Law 
Lords who had political backgrounds by others whose reputations rested on their professionalism as 
lawyers. ( J. A. G. Griffiths. The Politics o f  the Judiciary, Fifth Edition, 1997, Fontana Press, Page 16.
Also see, Shimon Shetreet, Judges on Trial, 1976, North Holland Publishing Company, pp. 70 -  71. ) 
^^^Great shock was felt when two barristers fought in court in 1907. The incident is described by David 
Pannick, Advocates, Oxford, 1993, page 54.
Allyson May, The Bar and the O ld Bailey, 1750-1850, University o f North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 
and London, 2003, page 242.
William Cornish, The Jury, Penguin Books, 1971 (revised edition) page 168. See also Leo Page First 
Steps in Advocacy, Faber and Faber, 1943, pp.127-128: "Years ago the name “O ldB ailey law yer” was a 
term o f  reproach. It indicated the man who was out to get a conviction even i f  it meant that he had to
descend to any trick or unworthy expedient fo r  the purpose .....................There has been a complete revulsion
from  those days when conviction was the object and the methods by which it was gained were 
immaterial ”1.
been seen before "^*1 Underhandedness or trickiness in the task was said to be alien to him 
As a prosecutor he was regarded as the greatest of his time and represented the Crown 
in every trial of note in the Old Bailey from 1901 until his death. Born in Scotland, the 
son of a shipping broker from Greenock, he went to London with intentions of becoming 
an actor but, after a period working as a parliamentary reporter for The Times, abandoned 
his earlier ambition, turned to law and was called to the Bar at Middle Temple, where he 
later became a Master of the Bench. Muir was known to be hard working with little 
apparent need for conviviality. He usually spent half the night preparing for his cases and 
made notes on small cards with coloured pencils- one colour for examination in chief, one 
for cross-examination and another for possible re-examination. It was reported Muir could 
check up in a moment upon any contradiction or alteration between evidence given by one 
witness and another at the trial and what he had said when at the police court These 
cards were noticed in court and became known as Muir’s “playing cards”. He asked for 
painstaking thoroughness from the police in obtaining evidence. When presenting cases 
he placed much weight on physical evidence and little on eye witness testimony, except if 
it would bolster more concrete evidence. It was Muir who conducted the first prosecution 
involving finger print evidence in 1902 Whilst Richard Muir deliberately avoided 
raising the emotional temperature, it was said that the "lucidity o f  his argument and the 
clarity with which he stated the facts in his opening speeches wove a net so tightly round 
the prisoner in the dock that he could never afterwards escape from i t”
Such was his reputation for meticulousness and great diligence that Dr Crippen, on 
hearing that Muir was to prosecute him, said "I wish it had been anybody else.... I  fear the 
worst”. Muir’s cross-examination of Crippen, before Lord Chief Justice Alverstone in 
Court No 1 at the Old Bailey, was a masterpiece of clear, direct and polite questioning, in 
simple language, each question dealing with one fact at a time, which conveyed to the
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Richard DuCann, The Art o f  the A dvocate , Revised Edition, 1993, Penguin Books, page 115.
See Travers Humphreys, who knew him well. Criminal Days, Hodder and Stoughton, 1946, page 81. 
Travers Humphreys, ibid, page 80.
Harry Jackson was found guilty at the Old Bailey o f  a charge o f burglary o f a house and stealing billiard 
balls. He received seven years penal servitude. The implications o f the new technique were quickly 
realized in prosecutions. The attitude o f some judges to fingerprints was one o f distrust, but the value o f  
this evidence was placed beyond doubt when, in 1910,the Court o f Criminal Appeal upheld a conviction 
based solely on fingerprint evidence (R v Castleton (1909) 3 Cr App R 74).
Richard DuCann, The A rt o f  the Advocate, Revised Edition, 1993, Penguin Books, page 72.
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jury the strength of the case for the prosecution. Characteristically, he saved all comment 
on the answers until his closing speech
Dramatic types of 19th century advocacy, in which counsel was prepared to adopt 
mannerisms, tricks of speech and gestures, parodied in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Trial by 
Jury , to heighten the effect of their plea , Professor Keeton reported in 1943 had become 
almost obsolete:
“A visitor straying into our courts (with the possible exception o f  the Central Criminal 
Court) might be forgiven i f  he imagined himself to be witnessing some unusual kind o f  
company meeting. The tone o f  counsel is conversational and matter o f  fact. There is a 
somewhat misleading air o f  casualness about the proceedings ” .
Sir Norman Birkett, an eminent advocate of the first half of the last century, in an 
address delivered in Gray's Inn Hall said of the altered style of advocacy: "There may 
have been days when a flowery speech was effective, but it is no longer effective. Times 
change; manners change; all things change. Though the advocate o f  today does not seek 
to commend himself by flowery speech, he does seek to be persuasive ” . Advocates now
sought to be persuasive by a conversational matter of fact advocacy making points 
earnestly, and if  necessary, with persistence but rarely indulging in rhetoric in its
Richard DuCann, The Art o f  the Advocate Revised Edition 1993 ,Penguin Books, pp. 126-128. For that 
part o f Muir’s cross-examination o f Dr Crippin which concerned whether the human remains found in his 
house were those o f  Mrs Crippen, a vital question for the jury, see E.W. Fordham, Notable Cross -  
Examinations, Constable, 1951, Chapter XL The influence o f Edward Muir endures. Nearly a hundred 
years later his cross-examination o f Crippin is still held, by authors o f  text books on acquiring the skills o f  
advocacy, to be a model o f cross-examination techniques for both prosecution and defence. See, David 
Ross QC {Advocacy, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.69-70. ), who quotes passages from it and 
Robert McPeake ( Advocacy Manual, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp.179-188.), who reproduces a 
sizeable part. Richard Muir’s preparatory notes for his prosecution o f  Crippin, commended by David Ross 
as “ an example to us a ll”, page 18, were found and published. They appear in Louis Blom-Cooper, The 
Law As Literature, The Bodley Head ,London, 1961,pp. 14-33. Also see a commentary on them by Mr 
Justice JH Phillips, Practical Advocacy, ( 1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 627-629.
G.W. Keeton, H arris’s Hints on Advocacy, Stevens and Sons, 1943, page 10. Nearly three decades 
before, in 1915, in the Fore ward to Illustrations In Advocacy by Richard Harris K. C, Fifth Edition, a book 
mainly for aspiring and newly qualified barristers, George Elliot, K.C. wrote: "It is sa id  by many that 
eloquence is not now encouraged in the courts, that the artifices o f  advocacy are discouraged, that a p lain  
b rie f statement offact, as concise and succinct as the nature o f  the case w ill permit, is the style which best 
commends itse lf to the Bench, and the exigencies o f  time, whether in civil causes or in criminal trials, do 
not perm it o f  those methods o f  advocacy which were so effective in days gone b y ”.
July 1st, 1957, entitled “The A dvocate”, published in Graya, No 46, pp. 89-96. Viscount Simon, in his 
forward to Leo Page’s First Steps in Advocacy, Faber and Faber, 1943, pp. 7- 8, wrote: "A plain accurate 
statement arranged in the right order is worth tons o f  rhetoric. Juries, no less than magistrates and judges, 
want to do right; they are not impressed, any o f  them, by blather and pomposity, but are grateful fo r  clear 
exposition ”.
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pejorative sense of artful bombast and verbal chicanery, and normally avoiding the sorts 
of tricks and effects that were used previously^^®.
Giving the Haldane Memorial Lecture, in the same year that Keeton wrote about advocacy 
in court. Sir Gervaise Rentoul, the Chief Stipendiary Magistrate of London, stated 
anything in the nature o f  theatricality should he avoided , although, in a criminal trial 
some dramatic licence may be permissible when the emotions o f  the jury are highly 
charged” On cross-examination he said: "The old idea that to cross-examine means 
the same as to examine crossly has long disappeared. The successful advocate nowadays 
no longer thumps the desk with his brief; the rapier has taken the place o f  the 
broadsword: Sergeant Buzfuz is dead” .
In 1917 the governing body of the Bar, the Bar Council, adopted a number of rules to 
control barristers when faced with making suggestions of fraud or dishonesty or attacking 
the credit of witnesses they had to cross examine. Subject to minor amendments they 
continue today.
Under the rules barristers could not suggest that a witness, or other person, is guilty of a 
crime , fraud or misconduct of which their client is accused unless such allegations go to a 
matter in issue (including the credibility of a witness) which was material to their client’s 
case and which appeared to them to be supported by reasonable grounds ^^ k Also they 
were prohibited from asking questions which were merely scandalous or intended or 
calculated only to vilify, insult or annoy either a witness or some other person .
Serjeant Buzfuss’s spirit of heavily belabouring witnesses in cross -examination had not 
entirely expired and appeared in a case before a High Court judge and a jury in 1934. The 
higher judiciary, however, showed a determination to send it on its way. The chief 
protagonists on either side of the cause, Mr Lehwess and Sir Herbert Austin respectively, 
were cross-examined. Measured by the shorthand note Mr Lehwess’s examination occupied
Leo Page, First Steps in Advocacy, Faber and Faber, 1943, pp.20-27, considered advocates would most 
likely achieve success by "simplicity, sincerity  and m oderation” in manner and matter and that 
persuasiveness would be much assisted by audibility, clear articulation, inflection to avoid monotony and 
for emphasis and absence o f studied gesture (Chapter 5 ).
On eschewing theatricality, Leo Page, First Steps in Advocacy, Faber and Faber, also published in 1943, 
page 24 wrote: "A law court is seldom a j i t  p lace fo r  stage business . Incidentally, the highly dramatic 
manner is a treacherous tool in inexpert hands. A first-class tragedian moves us with horror and emotion, 
but a second  -  rate perform er excites only our ridicule. So it is in court”.
Sir Gervais 'RQn\ovX,The A rt and Ethics o f  Advocacy, Haldane Memorial Lecture, 1943, page 9.
Now contained in Bar Code o f  Conduct para 708(j) and Written Standards para5.10(h). Also, concerning 
advocacy by solicitors see Law Society’s Code for Advocacy, Part VII para 7.1 (h) .
Now embodied in Bar Code o f  Conduct para 708(h) and Written Standards para 5.10 . See also Law 
Society’s Code for Advocacy PartVII par7.1 (e).
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80 pages; his cross - examination 265 pages. The examination in chief of Sir Herbert Austin 
occupied 39 pages and his cross-examination 148 pages. On matters of law, the case went to 
the Court of Appeal and on further appeal to the House of Lords . The Lord Chancellor, 
Viscount Sankey, agreed with the censure of Lord Hanworth, Master of the Rolls, in the 
Court of Appeal, who had said "There is a tedious iteration in some o f  the questions 
asked, and prolonged emphasis is laid on some matters trivial in relation to the main 
issues. Cross-examination is a powerful and valuable weapon fo r  the purpose o f  
testing the veracity o f  a witness and the accuracy and completeness o f  his story. It is 
entrusted in the hands o f  counsel in the confidence that it will be used with discretion; 
and with due regard to the assistance to be rendered by it to the Court, not forgetting  
at the same time the burden that is imposed upon witnesses. We desire to say that in 
our opinion the cross-examination in the present case did not conform to the above 
conditions, and at times it fa iled  to display that measure o f  courtesy to the witness 
which is by no means inconsistent with a skilful, yet powerful, cross-examination ” .
The Lord Chancellor then went further in his criticism:
“It is right to make due allowance fo r  the irritation caused by the strain and stress 
o f a long and complicated case, but a protracted and irrelevant cross-examination not 
only adds to the cost o f  litigation but is a waste o f  public time. Such a cross- 
examination becomes indefensible when it is conducted, as it was in this case, without 
restraint and without the courtesy and consideration which a witness is entitled to 
expect in a Court o f  law. It is not sufficient fo r  the due administration o fjustice to 
have a learned, patient and impartial judge. Equally with him, the solicitors who 
prepare the case and the counsel who present it to the Court are taking part in the 
great task o f  doing justice between man and man ” .
In the course of a lecture on advocacy at Gray’s Inn in 1938, Sir Malcolm Hilberry , then 
a King’s Bench judge, considered the place of emotion injury trials. In contrast to 
blatantly emotional advocacy, often short on analysis of the facts - or indeed sometimes 
almost completely replacing it- which was much heard in the preceding century, he observed 
that triumphant jury advocacy now made an appeal to reason combined with a subtle, 
restrained and focused appeal to emotion:
M echanical and G eneral Inventions Co. and Lehwess v. Austin and the Austin M otor Co. [1935 ] 
A.C. 346.
M echanical and General Inventions Co. and Lehwess v. Austin and the Austin M otor Co. [1935] 
A.C. 359.
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"You will notice..............  that the successful ju ry  advocate always gives his address
to a ju ry  in the form  o f  a well built argument, while the emphasis and appeal are all 
the time strongly emotional. The facts  are marshalled to form  the steps o f  the 
argument leading to the conclusion that is sought, but the nervous force o f  a 
controlled emotion passes all the while from  the advocate to the jury, flrs t to arrest 
their attention, then to hold it, and finally  to dominate their judgment. It is in such 
work that rhetoric has its place and the sense o f  the dramatic ” .
In a small profession where, until the end of the 1980’s, there was very little formal 
instruction on it, the views of judges on advocacy, and their ability to act on them by the 
way they received advocates in court, and those held by senior barristers, were 
influential, especially on newly called members of the bar, whose main method of 
learning was studying more senior barristers -watching big men in court , following 
the techniques of the successful and avoiding those of the unsuccessful.
Continued decline of jury trials.
In addition to changes in professional etiquette and rules and readier acceptance by the 
Bar of judicial control over legal proceedings, already mentioned, a number of other 
reasons also account for the transformation in style that had occurred. Continued fall in 
civil jury trials undoubtedly played a significant part. Reduction in the use of civil juries 
begun in the 19th century (by the end of that century only half of civil trials in the High 
Court were by a jury) gathered pace during the first half of the 20th century. After 1935 it 
could be asserted that the jury trials in county courts had practically ceased to exist.
At High Court level, the judicature commissioners and a departmental committee 
which reported in 1913 favoured a more restricted right to trial by jury in civil cases. No 
changes were made until the Juries Act 1918, which was principally enacted because of
557 Ibid, page 360.
Duty and A rt in Advocacy, a lecture delivered at Gray’s Inn in Hilary Term 1938, Graya NoXX, Easter, 
page 11. Largely reproduced in Sir Malcolm Hilberry, Duty and Art in Advocacy, Sweet and Maxwell,
1946. Concerning the use o f controlled emotion, Leo Page, First Steps in Advocacy, Faber and Faber, 1943, 
pp. 128-129, wrote; “It is legitimate fo r  defending counsel to use pathos in order to move a ju ry  in the 
interests o f  his client. But it is not considered to be the duty o f  counsel fo r  the prosecution to be vindictive 
or to attempt to excite the indignation o f  a ju ry  against a defendant by rhetoric ”.
As regularly observing the performance o f distinguished barristers in court was described by Leo Page 
First Steps in Advocacy, Page 73.
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shortages of jurors in wartime. The Act provided that all cases in the High Court should 
be before a judge without a jury unless the Court saw fit to order one , subject to the right 
to jury trial in cases alleging fraud, libel, slander, malicious prosecution , false 
imprisonment, seduction, breach of promise to marry, contested matters in divorce and 
heir - ship in probate actions. The pre - Juries Act 1918 position regarding juries was, 
however, restored by the Administration of Justice Act, 1925. Complaints about the cost 
and delays in proceedings at common law led to the re-introduction of restrictive 
legislation in the form of the Administration of Justice Act (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act 1933 . This Act, which encountered very little public opposition, removed an
absolute right to jury trial in the King's Bench Division of the High Court. Trial by jury was 
to be ordered in cases of fraud, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, 
seduction or breach of promise of marriage unless the court was of the opinion that the trial 
required any prolonged examination of documents or accounts or any scientific or local 
investigation which could not be conveniently made with a jury. In other cases the Court had 
a discretion to order a jury. This was applied narrowly Jury trial became more and more of 
a rarity as litigants, forsaking the traditionally rehearsed arguments in its support, increasingly 
opted for trial by judges alone to avoid delay and expense. Indeed seeking trial by jury came 
to be regarded with suspicion: it suggested the hope of confusion in a weak case, or the 
expectation of exorbitant damages in cases involving distressing details or high feelings 
Decline of trial by jury amounted to a revolution in practice . Persuasiveness in front of 
Judges with no jury needed advocates to concentrate clearly on the facts in issue, an ability to 
argue relevant law, and a brisk unrepetitious delivery. It did not require oratorical 
embellishment. A view from the judiciary on this point was clearly put by Mr Justice Hilberry 
in his address on advocacy at Gray's Inn Hall in 1938:
For a closely contemporary analysis o f  the Act’s provisions for civil jury trials see R. M. Jackson, 
Incidence o f  Jury Trial During the Past Century, Modem Law Review, Volume 1, No 2, Sept. 1937, pp. 
141 -  142.
Under the present law. Section 69 o f  the Supreme Court Act 1981, the right to jury trial is limited  
to only four specific areas: fraud, defamation, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment ( Similar 
provisions are contained in the County Courts Act 1984. ) Even in these matters, the right is not 
absolute and can be denied by a judge, under Section 69 ( i ) where the case involves any p ro lon ged  
examination o f  documents or accounts or any scientific or local investigation which cannot 
conveniently be made with a jury.
The temporary prohibition on civil jury service in the Second World War was a later blow from 
which civil juries never recovered. J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal H istory,
Butterworths, 2002, page 92.
A. H. Manchester, A Modern Legal H istory o f  England and Wales 1750 -  1950, Butterworths, 1980, 
page, 95.
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"A Judge is rendered uneasy by oratorical flourishes. Let the language there 
conform to the standards o f  the best prose. In the words o f  Robert Louis Stevenson 
’’Beware ofpurple passages”. Wed yourself to a cold ‘austerity”.. Continuing, Hilberry 
then told an amusing story about Mr Justice Swift
"A counsel, much given to emotional rhetoric began to open a case before the 
learned Judge sitting alone. He had not gone fa r  before he was giving fu ll rein to his 
oratory. Mr. Justice Swift tapped his desk; "Mr. Blank", he said, "there is no jury. " 
There came the appropriate apology but again counsel was soon indulging in rolling 
periods and high-flown declamation. For some time the judge suffered it, then there 
came the tap o f  his pencil on the desk. "Usher", he said, "switch on the light over the 
ju ry  box - Mr. Blank does not believe me" .
Opportunities for criminal trials before juries lessened in 1925 when the Criminal Justice 
Act of that year brought a large number of offences previously triable only by a judge and 
jury within the jurisdiction of magistrates at petty sessions .
Impact of leading members of the bar.
G. W Keeton saw the more restrained and conversational advocacy that had emerged in 
criminal jury trials to have been influenced by the style of advocates in civil cases: "In as 
much as the most influential members o f  the bar who set fashions in advocacy appear 
most frequently in civil cases, the methods followed by them tend to become general”
For more on Rigby Swift see E. S. Fay, The Life o f  Mr. Justice Swift, Methuen, 1939.
In similar vein, though from the perspective o f  the Bar, Sir Patrick Hastings wrote: "The ju d g e  has 
been at the gam e too long. His every instinct struggles against the possib ility  that he may be 
influenced against the true le tter o f  the law by a speech however artistica lly  or im pressively it may be 
phrased. The decision is to be his and his alone; he knows the law, and he desires to know the facts;  
and after that he infinitely prefers to be left a lon e”. Patrick Hastings, Cases in Court, W illiam  
Heinemann 1949, page 10. Lord Bingham, before his retirement as Senior Law Lord, in The Role o f  
the A dvocate in a Common Law System, The Inaugural Birkenhead Lecture Given in Gray’s Inn Hall 
in 2008 ( seventy years after Mr Justice Hilberry’s lecture on advocacy), Graya, No 122, Hilary 2009, 
pp. 17-24, said whilst “ an advocate might reasonably hope to touch the heartstrings o f  the ju ry  more
readily  than those o f  a ju d g e   even ju dges were not the unfeeling decision-m aking machines they
might som etim es appear; they responded to considerations o f  ju stice  and injustice, right and wrong, 
human fra ilty  and human need; there was often treasure there, which understated eloquence could  
unlock”. When interviewed at the House o f  Lords on 23'** October, 2007, Lord Bingham said it would 
be wrong to think that judges in earlier times were never influenced by such considerations, carefully 
and subtly put by advocates.
192
. As an example of this, he mentions the effect of Ruflis Isaacs, the great majority of whose 
cases were civil. When he was a Law Officer and appeared in criminal cases. Sir Rufus was 
never rude to the prisoner in his cross-examination. Rather, he was courteous, almost 
deferential, but the effect of his questions was to build up a case of deadly significance, as 
was clearly seen in his prosecution of the poisoner Arthur Seddon in 1912 (Chapter Seven). 
Keaton saw these traditions being carried over to the present day and "being firm ly  
established in our advocacy”.
Two influential and fashion setting members of the Bar during the first half o f the 
20^' Century were Patrick Hastings and Norman Birkett, each will now be discussed.
Sir Patrick Hastings and his effect on advocacy.
Sir Patrick Hastings (1880- 1952), who was made a King’s Counsel in 1919, became one 
of the leading barristers of his time, and, at the top of his profession, earned very considerable 
fees . In 1912 he led for the defence of John Williams in the Eastbourne “Case o f  the 
Hooded Man ”, which made national headlines. Although Williams was convicted,
Hastings’s highly intelligent and focused defence strategy was much admired. His practice 
afterwards was almost completely in the civil courts in divorce, libel and fraud cases, often 
before juries. Mostly unlike other barristers, his style of advocacy, may, to some extent, 
have followed Charles Russell and Edward Carson, at least in cross-examination He was 
known to be contemptuous of the passionate appeals made to juries by advocates like 
Marshall Hall. Hastings was a master of direct forcible speech without any embellishments or 
ornamentation and recognized the immense value of brevity. According to Sir Norman 
Birkett, a friend and who frequently opposed him in court, Patrick Hastings was not a great 
speaker in the conventional sense:
"He was certainly not in the tradition o f  Sheridan, Charles James Fox and Edmund 
Burke. He was not a great reader and his mind was not stored with the riches o f  
English literature or the great speeches o f  orators in ancient and modern tim es”. (This
566 gjj. Yhomas Skyrme, The Changing Image o f  the M agistracy, MacMillan Press, London, 1979, page. 
5. See, also, R. M. Jackson, Incidence o f  Jury Trial During the P ast Century, Modern Law Review, 
Vol. 1, no 2, September, 1937, page 137.
G.W. Keeton, H a rris’s Hints on Advocacy, Stevens and Sons, London. 1943, page 11.
Hastings’s biographer, H.Montgomery Hyde; Sir P atrick  Hastings. His Life and Cases, Heinemann, 
1960, stated that for many years he earned more than £40,000.
Birkett, Six G reat Advocates, Penguin, page 23.
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may, partly, have been because of an interrupted public school education at Charterhouse. 
When the Second Boer War, 1889- 1902, broke out he had enlisted in the British Army)” It 
was quite characteristic o f  him that he should affect to be scornful offorensic oratory 
o f  the flamboyant range because it was quite alien to his style o f  advocacy, and really 
outside his range; fo r  in all that he did he seemed to want to put him self in a category 
o f  his own ” .
In his openings, whether for the plaintiff or the defendant, he was never long and rarely 
stylish. In print, the words chosen would appear to be random. Such an impression would 
have been entirely false as they were selected with great care to bring the case within the 
limits that Hastings wished to be set for it. He was able to do this by having complete 
mastery of his brief .
Hastings stood straight and still in court, kept his eyes fixed on whoever he was 
speaking to, very rarely gestured with his hands, and avoided distractions, sometimes 
made deliberately by other barristers, such as jangling coins in his pockets, fiddling 
with the ribbon on a brief or taking numerous drinks of water from a tumbler. He 
always spoke in a good clear voice. Great preparation ensured he was in complete 
command of his brief, had no need to refer to papers during trial and could carefully 
observe the jury for small but significant signs^^ .^
His examination in chief, resembling much that favoured by Sir Frank Lockwood 
(Chapter Six), appeared to be a conversation with the witness. Hastings would smile at some 
answer as though it had come to him by surprise, when it was really the answer he wanted 
and expected.
The outstanding strength of Hastings was in cross-examination. His frequent 
opponent. Sir Norman Birkett, recalled:
"He could destroy a witness with quite shattering power with his direct, incisive 
and penetrating questions that came with the precision and speed o f  a machine gun.
Birkett, ibid, pp. 23-24.
Richard DuCann, The A rt o f  the A dvocate, Penguin, Revised Edition, 1993, pp. 84 -  85.
Brian Gibbens QC, who, early in his career, watched Patrick Hastings in court, compared him with 
other advocates who perpetu a lly  turned to the ju ry  when they were examining w itnesses. He recounted 
that the intensity o f  H astings’s gaze and manner towards hostile witnesses was devastating. Brian 
Gibbens, Elements o f  M odern Advocacy, New Law Cassettes, Butterworths, London, 1979.
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Remorselessly and relentlessly he broke down all defences, and when the triumph was 
complete he would make the briefest possible speech and sit down” .
Hastings regarded cross-examination as "the great, perhaps the final, test o f  
advocacy”. Although he said that he selected the one essential element, without which all 
others are completely useless, he wished to deal with, Hastings claimed that he did not 
prepare specific questions beforehand. He preferred to wait until such time he had carefully 
decided, by listening to examination in chief, whether a witness, “was truthful or 
dishonest, stupid or cunning, intelligent or fo o lish ” The ability to assess accurately 
and almost instantaneously the personality and mentality of the witness facing him was to 
him the key skill in cross-examination; very different to the indiscriminate and loud 
“blunderbuss” approach in cross-examinations, much heard in Victorian times and earlier.
On his experience of being cross-examined by Hastings, in the libel case of Laski v The 
Newark Advertiser and Parlby in 1946^’k in which he sued the Nottinghamshire paper in 
libel for a report that he advocated violence to achieve socialism at a public general election 
meeting in Newark, in 1945, Harold Laski wrote:
“He performs his war dance about you like a dervish intoxicated by the sheer 
ecstacy o f  his skill in performance, ardent in his knowledge that, i f  you trip fo r  one
second, his knife is at your throat He moves between the lines o f  sarcasm and
insult. It is an effort to tear off, piece by piece, the skin which he declares no more 
than a mask behind which any man o f  understanding could have grasped the foulness  
o f  your purpose. He treats you not as a human being , but as a surgeon might treat 
some specimen he is demonstrating to students in a dissecting room ” .
Like Sir Edward Carson, whose style may well have consciously or sub-conscientiously 
shape his own, Patrick Hastings excelled in the arts of denigration, especially ridicule
Norman Birkett, Address to the Holdsworth Club o f  the Faculty o f  Law, University o f  Birmingham, 
7*''May, 1954.
Sir Patrick Hastings, Cases in Court, Pan Books, 1954, pp. 252 -  254.
Unreported in the law reports, but see a verbatim account published by the Daily Express London ,1947. 
Richard DuCann, The A rt o f  the A dvocate, Revised Edition 1993, Penguin Books ,1993,, page 21. 
Marshall Hall, from whose style and approach Hastings wished to distance him self, employed this 
weapon only very infrequently.
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Writing in the 1960’s, the eminent barrister and writer on advocacy Richard DuCann QC 
(1929 -  1994) considered Patrick Hastings was the finest cross-examiner before the English 
Courts in the 20^  ^Century. Nonetheless, he strongly criticized him for ruthlessness and gross 
discourtesy which was unfair to witnesses and on occasions led to courts drawing the wrong 
conclusions Concerning this behaviour, which went un-rebuked wherever he practiced, 
DuCann gives the example of Hastings’s cross-examination of Air Marshall Sir Hugh Vivian 
de Crespigny, who had been the Labour candidate for Newark and present when Laski spoke 
at the meeting. DuCann. presents the whole of the short cross-examination :
Hastings: "Do you recognize this expression: ‘It did not lie in the mouth o f  any 
member o f  the Tory party, who helped to organize the mutiny in the British Army 
over Home Rule in 1914, to discuss the question o f  violence? Do you remember 
anything like that being said by anyone”?
Sir Hugh.- “No I  do n o t . That does not mean it was not sa id ”.
Hastings: "Many things may have been said that you did not hear? ”
Sir Hugh: "Sir Patrick  ”
Lord Chief Justice Goddard: "Will you try and answer the question Yes or No. We 
really must try and get on with this case”.
Sir Hugh: "There was nothing vital that I  would not have heard”.
Hastings: " If  you did not hear it, how did you know whether it was vital or not? ”
Sir Hugh: "I must ask your permission to elucidate this so as not to give the wrong 
impression... ”...
Hastings: "No thank you ” (sitting down)
Slade: "I have no questions in re-examination ”
In effect, Hastings had refused to let the witness give the evidence he wanted to and 
also, of course, the jury the opportunity of hearing it^ ^k Remarkably, Gerald Slade KC, 
leading counsel for Laski, and later a Judge of the High Court, did not seek to rectify 
this in re-examination, nor did Lord Chief Justice Goddard intervene.
At one point DuCann describes his style as brusque and tyrannical, The A rt o f  the Advocate, 
Penguin ,1993, page 154.
DuCann, zZj/V, pp .l 16 -  117.
For a verbatim account o f  the case see Laski v Newark Advertiser L td  and Parlby. Published by the 
D aily Express, London, 1947.
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Sir Patrick Hastings was invariably short in cross-examination, partly, perhaps because of 
a realization that a jury may quickly spot an advocate’s failure to undermine a witness and as 
a result attach a disproportionate importance to his or her evidence. He also had the gift, 
possessed by Carson(Chapter Seven), of crystallizing in a few questions the whole of the 
case he wished to advance and the bravery to do so:
“The ability to p ick out the one real point o f  a case is not itse lf enough; it is the 
courage required to seize upon that point to the exclusion o f  all others that is o f  real 
importance . Painstaking solicitors will place before counsel perhaps fifty  different 
points, all o f  them prepared with skill and care; it must indeed cause bitter 
disappointment to fin d  them disregarded and the whole trial proceeding as though 
there was only one solitary element that was really worthy o f  consideration. It 
requires some courage in an advocate to stake his own opinion perhaps against that o f  
all who are assisting him; it is a great risk. But in a proper case he must be prepared  
to take i t” .
Infelicitous or inappropriate replies of witnesses were quickly seized upon. A distinctive 
feature of Hastings’s style of cross-examination was use of comment after a witness had 
answered a question. Many of his contemporaries refrained from any comment on answers 
given in cross-examination until their closing speech. Sir Edward Carson, who Hastings 
greatly admired and was said to be influenced by, almost always put his comments within the 
framework of his questions. Hastings was different and showed this clearly, in 1913, soon 
after being made a Kings Counsel, when he was called upon to cross-examine Bob Sievier 
who had brought an action in libel against Richard Wootton, a race horse owner and traineri^k 
Sievier, a pugnacious, witty and flamboyant character, represented himself. Carson, who had 
been leading Hastings, was called to Ireland in the middle of examining the plaintiff. In cross-
Richard DuCann, TTze o/zAe/Ii/vocfl/e, Penguin, 1993, pp .116-117.
^*^P. Hastings, Cases in Court, William Heinemann London, 1949, page 252. An indication o f  Patrick 
Hastings’s attitude in court towards solicitors’ views on how cases should be run was given in an 
interview with Angela Delbourgo, a barrister and a lecturer at the College o f  Law in London. She had 
known an elderly solicitor who, in his youth as an articled clerk, once accompanied Hastings in court 
and sat in front o f  him. The young man was told by Hastings he had one, and only one, function -  to 
push a big pile o f  precariously balanced books onto the floor when given a dig in the shoulders, so as 
to make sure the judge was awake when he put his best point. Interview on 31®* October, 2007.
Sievier v. Wootton, 1913.3 KB 499. See also H. Montmomery Hyde, 1960, Sir Patrick Hastings ,his life 
and cases, London, Heinemann, pp. 76-77.
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examining Sievier, Hastings matched every jest with biting comment as this brief extract 
shows:
Hastings: "Did you marry your firs t wife in 1882”?
Sievier: "Unfortunately fo r  me, I  d id ”.
Hastings: "Unfortunately fo r  her, too. Did she divorce you in 1886, four years later?” 
Sievier; “ She d id”.
Another vivid example, mueh later in his career, is provided by Hastings’s 
treatment of one of the witnesses in the Harold Laski libel ease:
Hastings: "Did you hear anything o f  this sort: Great changes were so urgent in this 
country that i f  they were not made by consent they would be made by violence? ’ Did 
you hear him [Laski] say tha t”?
Witness: "No, not in those words ”.
Hastings: "Dear, oh dear, Mr Laski seems to be so unfortunate. He must have been 
very good at hearing himself; he said that is what he did say... ”.
Richard DuCann considered the "modern fashion ” for advocates to include comment 
either direct or indirect in cross-examination was largely due to the influence of Hastings 
style Hastings , almost without exception, made his last question in cross-examination a 
comment. This, too, was copied by other barristers.
In his closing speeches to juries, Hastings spoke in a simple conversational 
narrative, no tortuous sentences or elegance of expression, analysed the facts and 
made no attempt at passionate persuasion. At all times he was able to convey to jurors 
he was in earnest, not merely playing a part, and that he respeeted their independence 
and judgement. Leeturing, eajoling or flattery were never resorted to. The closing 
speech was the main place for him to use his great ability to capture the essence of a 
case in just a few words.
584 The A rt o f  the Advocate, Penguin, Revised Edition, 1993, page 128.
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It was a device of Hastings, before juries, to lay elaim to the virtues of plain speech, 
straightforwardness and brevity. This is prominently illustrated in his closing speech 
in the Laski case when he began by saying:
"May it please Your Lordship: Members o f  the Jury, I  can start what I  have to say 
to you with perhaps the only bit o f  good news you have heard so far. That is that 1 only 
going to address you fo r  a few  minutes. L want to explain why, because I  do not want 
you to think, and I  hope you will not think, that the value o f  anything that is to be said  
to you is to be measured by the number o f  words”.
In order to create the impression that he was about to make an appeal to their 
reason, rather than the sort of emotional address which had once been popular in 
courts, he continued:
“You may remember in the old days it was the habit o f  advocates sometimes to make 
long and eloquent speeches on all sorts o f  subjects, including comments on the 
Goddess o f  Justice who sits with scales above the court......
The technique of emphasizing to jurors, early in a closing speech, that reason would be 
engaged became much used, especially after the triumphs of Hastings and other leading 
advocates who employed it. The reality, though, is that emotion is frequently disguised by 
advocates as reason.
Three quarters through his speech Hastings said:
“I  told you I  was only going to be a few  minutes . I  have been fifteen , and I  am afraid 
that is too long. I  wish you good luck that Mr Slade will not be four times as long . 
Whether you will get that good luck or not, I  do not know. I  doubt i t”.
In the event Slade spoke for two hours. In contrast to the tight, well constructed and stylish 
speech of Hastings, his was spiritless, diffuse and very repetitive. Given the jury’s decision
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against Laski, which left him with enormous costs, Slade’s performance came to be seen as a 
lesson how not to make a closing speech .
Whilst the rather cheap gibe against opposing counsel was not widely used, the practice of 
promising to be brief, keeping it, thus creating the impression of a reliable guide through the 
evidence, and drawing a comparison, usually implicitly, with the greater length of an 
opponent’s closing speech, hoping to create resentment for the time taken, was a well tried 
method and one that was reinforced by Hastings’s successes in major cases.
A further tactic, frequently employed by him, to gain advantage over opponents by 
blunting the effect of theirs, was to claim (falsely) that final speeches had little or no 
effect on the outcome of cases. Again this is illustrated in Laski, when towards the 
start of his speech, Hastings told the jury:
“1 may say after long experience that I  have never known a case in which anything 
I  have said has had any affect on a ju ry  one way or another, and therefore I  have 
come to the conclusion that the shorter the time I  take in saying it the better fo r  
everyone
According to Richard DuCann, an unfortunate legacy of Hastings was that many modem 
advocates took him seriously in doubting that closing speeches had any effect on the outcome 
of cases. They treat it as ''the advocate's eleventh commandment that they do not and 
stumble through the odious task o f  addressing the Judge or jury, boring themselves 
almost as much as their audience ” .
Whilst Patrick Hastings did much to distance himself from the forensic approach of 
Marshall Hall they shared, despite being supremely good jury advocates, not being especially 
learned in the law In this he was not seen as a model at the bar. Nor was he for his 
occasional losses of temper and display of personal sensitivity; traits also in common with 
Marshall Hall. This is perhaps best illustrated by another passage from the Laski tria l. During
Richard DuCann, The A rt o f  the Advocate, Revised Edition, 1993, Penguin Books, London , page 
201 .
DuCann, ibid, pp. 191-192.
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his cross-examination of Laski, then the Chairman of the National Executive Committee of 
the Labour Party, Hastings, who had been appointed Attorney General in the first Labour 
Government in 1924, but left active politics a few years later, broke off in the middle of a 
question:
Hastings:”  are there any privileged in the Labour Party? ”
Laski: "Why indeed, Sir Patrick, when you were a member ”
Lord Chief Justice Goddard: "No, Mr Laski 
Hastings: "Do not be rude
Laski: "That is the last thing I  want in the w orl”.
Hastings: "It may be difficult fo r  you to be courteous, but do not be rude 
Laski: "Not in the least”.
Hastings: "You are rude to everyone are you not? ”
Laski; ”I  do not think so
Sir Patrick Hastings, in the introduction to his memoirs, published in 1949, wrote
“For my part, the greatest change that I  have noticed during the past 40 years lies 
amongst members o f  my own profession. Ponderous oratory, once so popular, and 
based undoubtedly upon C icero’s orations, has completely disappeared. Just as 
Gerald du Maurier sounded the death knell o f  the old time school o f  thunderous 
declamation from  the stage so Edward Carson pu t an end to forensic platitudes and 
passionate but irrelevant perorations from  the bar. That such a change is an 
improvement no wearied juryman would deny”.
There can be little doubt that Patrick Hastings, through his numerous triumphs at 
the Bar, influenced advocacy in a number of ways including: the practice of cross- 
examination and closing speeches: the need for carefully chosen words, to support a
Richard DuCann, The A rt o f  the Advocate, Revised Edition, 1993, Penguin Books, page 199.
Cases in Court, London: Heinemann, pp. xi- xii.
To support h im self through his studies at the Middle Temple Hastings worked as a journalist 
specializing in theatre gossip and reviews and in 1925, whilst contemplating an alternative career as a 
playwright, wrote The River, which was produced in London that year.
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well thought out strategy, and to use them with economy and without unnecessary 
repetition; forcible and direct delivery without adornment; and an emphasis on an 
appeal to reason, rather than apparent emotion. His plain,conversationaland highly 
concentrated, rather than diffuse, form could well be seen as taking advocacy further 
than had been begun by Edward Carson, Rufus Isaacs, and F E Smith. The success of 
Hastings before juries, it is argued, indicates not only how he was able to speak in the 
language of his time but also his ability to understand the sensibilities of jurors, who 
were now so very different, for a variety of social factors, from those in earlier times.
It is possible to speculate that his association with drama criticism and writing plays 
him self may have aided his comprehension of the contemporary mind.
Norman Birkett.
Lord Birkett( 1883-1962), more widely known during his lifetime as Norman Birkett, K. 
C. was called to bar in 1913, took silk in 1924 and became a judge in the Kings Bench 
Division in 1941. He was one of the British judges at the trial of major war criminals at 
Nuremberg. Afterwards, he was made a Lord Justice of Appeal. When at the Bar he 
established a great reputation as an advocate in the civil and criminal courts and was much in 
demand . Notable civil clients included Lady Gladstone, Lady Mountbatten and Mrs 
Wallace Simpson. He appeared either for the prosecution or the defence in a number of 
murder trials and sensational criminal cases. Shortly before his appointment to the High Court 
Bench, as was the custom, at least until the 1960’s, for eminent QCs about to be elevated to 
the judiciary to be given a notorious murder case, he was presented in 1931 with the brief to 
prosecute Rouse^^% a motorist alleged to have murdered his passenger and then set fire to his 
car to destroy the body and the evidence. An expert engineer for the defence gave evidence 
about the fusion of two bits of metal, thereby establishing a powerful point for the accused. 
Birkett rose to cross-examine.
“W hat” he asked in his precise, musical way,” is the co-efficient o f  brass? ”
The witness replied "1 do not know ”.
W hilst as KC, his income averaged £30,000 annually : H. Mountgomery Hyde, Norman Birkett: The 
life o f  L ord  B irkett o f  U lverston, Hamish Hamilton, 1964.
591 At Northampton Assizes commencing on the 21/* November, 1931.
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The question had taken the expert completely unaware. It made him so wary of Birkett, that 
when he was asked: "You are an engineer, aren’tyou? ” he said "Isuppose so !” Quickly 
and devastatingly, Birkett had destroyed his credibility entirely
Birkett and Hastings were regularly pitted against each other much in the same way as 
Edward Carson and Rufus Isaacs in the previous generation and more recently Edward 
Marshall Hall and Henry Curtis Bennett had been. Birkett’s biographer, H.Mountgomery 
Hyde, described how differences in forensic methods employed by the two advocates were 
reflected in their respective styles of cross-examination, each equally effective and produced 
similar results:
“Hastings, with his beetling eyebrows, would f ix  an unfortunate witness with a severe 
look. ‘ Now , let me see, Mr A. ’ he would say and proceed to fire  questions at him in 
such quick succession that he sometimes laid him self open to the charge o f  bullying. 
His friend  Roland Pertwee, with a euphemistic touch, has described his manner in 
handling witnesses in court as ‘cool, concise and gently cynical’. Birkett on the other 
hand, had a more sauve and polished approach, as well as perhaps a deceptively 
friendly one . ‘I  wonder i f  you can help me, Mr. A. ? ’ he would usually begin. But the
admissions which he gradually and eventually elicited, ........, could pulverize a
prevaricating or untruthful witness as completely as H astings’s more robust methods 
o f questioning” .
Birkett’s destruction o f  the engineer’s credibility in i? v Rouse ( Unreported), by asking a very 
basic question an expert may not remember, became famous at the Bar and the technique subsequently 
emulated, with varying degrees o f  success, in cross-examining experts in numerous fields. Indeed it is 
still influential. Keith Evans, in his book. Advocacy in Court, Blackstone Press, 1995, which is w idely  
read by bar students, and recommended reading at a number o f  colleges where the Bar Vocational 
Course is taught, uses it as an example o f  how to challenge a w itnesses’ expertise by making an in- 
depth study o f  just one tiny area on which to question at the beginning o f  cross-examination: ''‘N obody  
-p e r h a p s  not even the ultimate leader in the fie ld - knows everything about his subject", pp .165-166.
H. Montgomery Hyde, Norman Birkett:; The Life o f  L ord B irkett o f  Ulverston, London, Hamish 
Hamilton, 1964, page 221.
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Later in his life he lectured, broadcast and wrote about advocacy. It can be said with 
certainty that he too influenced other advocates in the first half of the 20^ Century and 
beyond.
In an address to the Holdsworth Club of the Faculty of Law in the University of Birmingham 
in 1954 Lord Birkett outlined much of his views about the advocacy he had delivered and 
liked to hear as a judge. He acknowledged the vast importance of: mastering the facts of the 
case; knowledge of the relevant law; the special qualities needed for examination in chief 
and cross-examination and re-examination; the selection and formulation of the arguments; 
the widely differing styles of advocacy required for particular tribunals, whether they be 
judge alone, or judge and jury, or appellate courts; and the construction and arrangement of 
opening and closing speeches. However, Birkett considered the over-riding quality to be -  
command of language:
“I f  the argument o f  the advocate is presented in clear and choice language which 
seems to come naturally and easily from  the speaker ,and i f  in addition the advocate 
can make use o f  what appears to be quite natural gesture, the very argument itself 
seems more persuasive
Differing somewhat from Sir Patrick Hastings, who spoke forcibly without elegance of 
expression, ornamentation and embellishment, Birkett believed that:
“in the main task o f  advocacy, the exposition, the narrative, the summing-up, the 
persuasion, the advocate may use, and I think ought to use, the full range of our wonderfully 
flexible English speech. For there is no speech to equal it in its amazing richness o f  
expression..........
Therefore, he held the advocate should be a student of words, knowing something at least of 
their history, sound, meaning, associations and, above all, the use that great masters of the 
tongue have made of them. In this respect Birkett considered it well to know the Authorised 
Version of the Bible, the Book of Common Prayer, and have a knowledge o f "the great 
triumvirate, Chaucer, Dryden and Shakespeare -  who did so much to mould the 
fashion the language ”e, and of writers like Swift, Sterne and Defoe,” the great stylists
Delivered onTth May, 1954.
Birkett excelled in the ability to obtain convincing evidence from witnesses by speaking to them plainly and 
in simple sentences . Edgar Lustgarten, Sir Norman Birkett, BBC Radio 4, broadcast in 1970.
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To him, even in casual conversation, natural and graceful English was a desirable 
accomplishment, which most people found pleasant and a surprising number secretly wished 
to attain themselves "And how much more is it to be desired when the whole purpose o f  
the advocate is to gain the ends he seeks by the impression he creates upon the 
particular tribunal before which he appears
Factors influencing the style of advocacy that had become established.
Other, deeper reasons, contributed to the mainly conversational and matter of fact 
advocacy that had become established. Taste for melodrama, strong sentiment and froth, 
much represented in Victorian drama and literature, had waned in the late 19^  ^Century and 
was displaced by a more restrained and reflective aesthetic with an emphasis on realism. In 
the 1890’s drama in Britain, through George Bernard Shaw and others including Henrik 
Ibsen, the pioneer of modem realistic drama, became a forum for considering moral, political 
and economic issues
In this dissertation’s brief excursus , it was explained that almost since rhetoric began 
there was disagreement between those who saw it as a means of authenticating tmth and those 
who saw it as a method of deception, sometimes termed “false rhetoric”. Although the 19* 
Century was a deeply oratorical age, as the century wore on, rhetoric came to be popularly 
seen in a negative light. Two instances perhaps best illustrate this .As early as the 1860’s, 
Thomas Huxley (“Darwin’s Bulldog”) accused the opponents of Darwin’s theory of evolution 
of hiding behind rhetoric. In a famous speech in 1879, Disraeli, in possibly an example of the 
pot calling the kettle black, said of Gladstone, then the Prime Minister, that he was:
"A sophistical rhetorician, inebriated with the exuberance o f his own verbosity ,and  
gifted with an egotistical imagination that can at all times command an interminable 
and inconsistent series o f  arguments to malign an opponent and to glorify him self” .
In an address, entitled Advocacy and Acting, to the Oxford University Law Society, delivered in 
1966, Sir James Stirling, then a High Court Judge in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty D ivision, 
saw changes in styles o f  advocacy paralleling styles o f  acting: in both spheres the grand manner and 
the purple patch becoming unfashionable at roughly the same time. However he does not develop his 
thesis further. Verdict, VOL. 2. NO. 1. 1966. pp. 7 - 9 .
Appendix 1.
Quoted in The Times, London, July 29*\ 1879.
Drawing from drama, and indicative of feeling towards rhetoric at the beginning of the 
20* Century, Harley Granville-Barker, in his 1905 play. The Voysey Inheritance, about the 
effects of corruption in a family firm of solicitors, has the bluff army major. Booth, say on a 
number of occasions. Do not speak rhetoric to me!, when he thinks others are not being 
straight forward with him.
Dramatic types of advocacy , in which counsel adopted mannerisms , tricks of speech, 
gestures, aggression and sometimes insults, became seen as a part of rhetoric, in the 
pejorative sense of artful bombast and verbal chicanery, and for that reason were widely 
disapproved. Jurors became far better informed than before, capable of seeing through it and 
resentful when empty rhetoric was tried on them. It may well be that the success of men such 
as Hardinge Giffard, John Holker, Charles Russell, and Edward Clarke was partly because 
they recognised the change in the mood of the public towards rhetoric and altered their 
advocacy accordingly in the later 19* Century.
As a consequence of 19* Century reforms, education was available to more people 
Universal elementary school education, with its emphasis on the “3 Rs” (reading, writing and 
arithmetic), was introduced in the I860’s. Although teaching ended at an early age, the basic 
literacy and numeracy provided by it gave many the means of obtaining further knowledge 
Parliament’s decision in 1857 to create public lending libraries provided an important 
source. The growing number of national and municipal museums and galleries helped 
stimulate intellectual curiosity. Working class self improvement, though unevenly spread, 
was another significant cause of increase in overall educational standards^ ***.
See Michael Hyndman, Schools and Schooling in England and Wales, a documentary history, Harper and 
Row, 1978, especially Chapter 10, with a chronology o f principal educational reforms in the 19* and 20* 
Centuries.
^  In assessing factors which led to a general improvement in educational standards in the 19* Century, 
Professor Rosemary Ashton ( University College London, Department o f English Language and Literature, 
interviewed on 13* November, 2007 ) considered publication and wide circulation o f pamphlets, magazines and 
books, with the purpose o f educating persons o f modest learning, was o f significance. Such works were 
produced cheaply by commercial publishing houses, including John Murray, exploiting contemporary advances 
in printing technology and distribution . Informative and sometimes entertaining, works were also published by 
non commercial organisations whose aim was to promote education amongst the masses. Prominent amongst 
these was the Society for the Diffusion o f Useful Knowledge which operated during the first half o f the century.
Jonathan Rose, The Intellectual Life o f  the British Working Classes, Yale University Press, 2001, based upon 
the evidence o f almost two thousand published and unpublished memoirs from 19* and 20* Century Britain, 
portrays a picture of a working class determined to achieve self-education by reading literature, including the 
Roman and Greek classics, going to concerts and the theatre - Shakespeare and other classical dramatists 
attracted enthusiastic and rowdy working class audiences, learning to play musical instruments, setting up 
mutual improvement societies and establishing the Workers Educational Association in 1903. In an interview, 
held at the Royal Society, London, on 2”“^ July, 2010, Professor Rose agreed with the thesis that jurors drawn 
from a more educated society than previously could reasonably be supposed to have expected more o f an appeal 
to reason and to examine evidence more closely than before. He saw working class and lower middle class self -  
education contributing to this.
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Dozens of new private schools, often modelled on Thomas Arnold’s Rugby School, to cater 
for the sons, and some daughters, of the growing middle class were opened in the latter part 
of the Nineteenth Century. These added to the general level of education in society.
Beyond elementary education, the content of many school curriculums expanded to 
encompass the burgeoning sciences with their rational enquiry. Increasing amounts of 
knowledge were disseminated in newspapers and , in the next century, by wireless. By the 
1880’s Darwin’s theory of evolution had entered popular culture ^  . Religious certainty, 
because of scientific explanation - succinctly put, Darwin’s books drove a cart through an 
older book - began to lessen from mid Victorian times. For this and other reasons, it 
diminished still further in the remaining part of the century and after^°\ The sort of 
impassioned appeal before juries to the deity, quotations and stories from the bible, so much 
used earlier, could no longer be relied upon. In short, jurors with broader perspectives 
expected more of an appeal to reason from advocates in a conversational and matter of fact 
manner, rather than one histrionically directed at their emotions and faith From the 1920’s 
it has been suggested that distaste for the continental European demagogues, such as Hitler, 
Mussolini, and Franco, with their power by oratory and theatre to move audiences in terrible 
directions, may also have contributed to jurors suspicions of obvious rhetoric The 
advent of radio broadcasting led to widespread abandoning of grand declamatory forms of 
public oratory in favour of a more personal "fireside" approach. It may be reasonable to 
suggest that this further helped the cause of conversational, rather than declamatory, 
advocacy before juries.
In the first capital defence case he conducted on his own, that of Marie Herman in 1894, 
an Austrian prostitute charged with killing a client, Marshall-Hall, with tears streaming dovm 
his face, told the jury in his peroration: "Remember that these women are what men made 
them; even this woman was at one time a beautiful and innocent child”. Flinging an
^  On the Origin o f  Species by Means o f  Natural Selection (1859), The Descent o f  Man and Selection in relation 
to Sex and The Expressions o f  the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) were read by a large section o f the 
public. Many more people would have absorbed Darwin’s key ideas from reports in the press.
. See J. F. Von Arx, Progress and Pessimism: Religion, P o litics and H istory in late 19'^ Century 
Britain. Harvard University Press, 1985.
^  Touching on this subject, George Elliot K.C., in his Forward to Illustrations in Advocacy by Richard Harris 
K.C. Fifth Edition, 1915, a work intended mainly as a guide to effective court advocacy for newly qualified 
barristers, wrote: Further it may also be remembered that the development o f  education amongst all classes o f  
the people has renderedjuries much less susceptible to mere tricks o f  advocacy and less easily divertedfrom the 
real issues before them.
See Andrew Watson, Changing Advocay, Part Two, Justice o f the Peace, Vol. 165, 13* October, 2001, page 
808.
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arm in the defendant's direction in the dock he continued; ” Look at her, gentlemen o f  
the jury. Look at her. God never gave her a chance - won't you ? ” . Just a few decades 
later, because of jurors’ different expectations , this approach would have been received with 
embarrassment rather than anything else: no longer dazzlingly effective oratorical 
pyrotechnics; at best a damp squib Along similar lines, J Alderson Foote recounted how 
Montagu Williams defending a prisoner charged with fraud ini 877 (Chapter Four), said of 
two witnesses against his client:
“Excellent in vice and exquisite in fraud  -  the cunning o f  a cat teeming from  the eyes 
o f  one; the oily soft serpent-like treachery o f  deceit trickling from  the mouth o f  the 
other”. Foote, speculating on how jurors would react in 1910, said:
"Few indeed are the advocates nowadays who could venture upon such flights without 
exciting derision ” In 1921 , Bernard Kelly explained how juries now seemed to have a 
higher appreciation of facts , usually little regard for mere graces of language and almost none
for sentimental appeals : “  cynical yawns , and not higher emotions , more often than
not greet the most pathetic efforts o f  counsel to create a sentimental leaning towards 
their clients at the expense o f  actual fa c t”
Amusingly, drawing on recollections from his career, A W Cockbum Q C described a 
case when “grandiloquence” and “ idle histrionics” did not commend itself to a jury; the 
implicit message being that a more conversational style might have done so:
“I  cannot forget hearing an extraordinary peroration in a very ordinary case some 
years ago which fin ished up with, ‘Members o f  the Jury, the moving finger writes, and
having writ moves on  ’ Then came a slight misquotation, and with a flourish o f  his
coloured handkerchief the exhausted orator sat down. It had all been very moving; 
and after a short breath-taking pause, came the summing up, in which the empyrean 
level was not even aimed at; and in a few  seconds an earth-bound ju ry  were in their
^  Very much to the surprise o f  counsel for the co- defendants in the much publicised Mary -  Ann 
Leneghan case, which took place in 2005 and involved the murder by a gang o f  a teenage girl and an 
attempt to kill her friend, Gilbert Gray QC used the words God never gave  him a chance -  w o n ’t you?  
in his closing speech for a defendant. He was convicted. Interview with Anthony Arlidge QC, who 
represented another defendant, held on 30* October, 2007.
Piepowder, J. Murray, 1911, page 176.
Famous A dvocates A nd Their Speeches, London, Sweet and M axwell, London, Sweet and M axwell, 
1921, page 27. Thirty eight years before, certainly not follow ed then by all barristers in criminal 
trials, more a call for it to be so. Sir James FitzJames Stephen, wrote o f  advocacy: "It is im possible to 
be eloquent in the sense o f  appealing to the feelings without more or less falsehood, and an 
unsuccessful attem pt at passion ate  eloquence is o f  all things the m ost contem ptible and ludicrous, 
besides being usually vulgar. The critical temper o f  the age has exercised an excellent influence on 
speaking in the courts. M ost barristers are ju s tly  afraid  o f  being laughed at and looking s illy  i f  they
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own simple way recording what they thought about coloured handkerchiefs and 
moving fingers ”
By changing their style of advocacy before juries towards the conversational and matter of 
fact, barristers consciously, or sub- consciously, followed Cicero's cautionary advice given 
centuries ago and avoided the "very cardinal sin in oratory; that is to depart from  the 
language o f  everyday life and usage approved o f  by the sense o f  the community”
A possible further explanation for the transformation to a more conversational and matter 
of fact advocacy may have been the reduction of court reporting in newspapers, removing 
much of the gallery from the stage. Attempting to catch the eye of the press for words spoken 
in court, aiding a barrister’s reputation, (sometimes also very useful to fulfill political 
ambitions) was an important contributory factor behind the emotive, theatrical, florid, and 
aggressive advocacy of the early Victorian period and after . As late as the 1930’s 
proceedings in court were still much reported, making barristers household names^*^ For 
instance in a popularity poll organized in 1935 by William Hickey, the Daily Express 
columnist, who invited readers to write to the newspaper naming the public personalities they 
most liked reading about, Norman Birkett got into the first twenty^*^.
After the War there were fewer reports from the courts, partly because of a shortage of 
paper and newsprint which led to cuts in the size of papers generally ( For a time newspapers 
were restricted to only eight pages.). Sir Patrick Hastings, in 1949, compared the situation 
with "not very long ago when every trial o f  the slightest importance was reported in 
the public press ” . He continued: "Morning papers had a page devoted to Law reports ; 
evening papers displayed posters announcing every detail o f  so-called important trials
aim at eloquence, and generally avoid  it by keeping q u ie t”. Sir James FitzJames Stephen, A H istory o f  
the Crim inal Law o f  England, MacMillan and Co, London, 1883, page 454.
Limine, An Address on advocacy to the Christ Church, Oxford, Law Club, May 15*, 1952, 
Published by the Faculty o f  Law, University o f  Southampton.
De Oratore (translated by E W Sutton and H Rockman, Loeb edition, 1942) l.iii.l2 .p a g e  11.
J R Lewis, The Victorian Bar, Robert Hale, London, Chapter 1. A tradition o f  courting the press 
appears to have survived until the late Twentieth Century. A senior judge, interviewed on 11* July, 
2007 (Lord Justice Sedley), spoke o f  how some barristers, at least up until the end o f  the 1970’s, 
would try to cultivate interest amongst journalists in their achievements by drinking and dining with 
them in public houses in Fleet Street, then the centre o f  the newspaper industry, or sending their clerks 
to do so.
In the one man show he performed in the years before his death in 2009, John Mortimer would reminisce 
about how his father, Clifford Mortimer, a blind divorce barrister who freely quoted poetry in court, drawing on 
a vast store, would demand that his wife read out detailed news reports o f current divorce trials when they were 
traveling together in crowded railway carriages, often to the embarrassment of other passengers.
Daily Express, February V\ 1935. Lloyd George headed the list closely followed by Winston 
Churchill and Lord Beaverbrook. The other popular favourites included Grade Fields, Bernard Shaw, 
Franklin Roosevelt, M ussolini, Rudyard Kipling, Greta Garbo and the Aga Khan, with whom Birkett 
tied for the final place amongst the first twenty.
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and possibly even o f  the persons mainly concerned; there were murder cases, libel 
cases, cases about old ladies disputing over garden walls, even breach o f  promise 
cases. Every tribulation known to human life was brought before us and its 
appropriate remedy displayed. When the Courts were closed , the papers were ha lf 
empty, and people knew that the silly season had arrived; something was missing from  
their daily lives ”
The decline in volume of reports from court, and hence attention given to the efforts of 
advocates, appears to have continued throughout the 1950’s. Reduced press interest in the 
courts was noted by Lord Birkett at the start of the 1960’s .
Hastings, Cases in Court, Heinemann page 12. 
Six G reat A dvocates, Penguin, 1961, page 9.
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Chapter Ten :  More changes and influences on 
advocacy before juries in the 20th and beginning of 
the Century.
Advocacy before juries was subject to further influences in the second half of the 20* 
Century.
Closing speeches and perorations.
Traditionally, the structure of a speech to a jury had followed Aristotle's ancient order 
of: Exordium (introduction); Statement (of the issues before the court); Proof (argument 
supporting one's case and the refutation of one's opponent); and the Peroration, an 
emotional appeal, which stood quite apart from the rest of the speech . Richard Du 
Gann QC, writing in 1964, commented on how many modern advocates had appeared to 
abandon that conventional structure and followed no order at all to avoid an obvious
From observation o f surviving counsel’s notes, it seems it was common for Victorian and Edwardian 
advocates to write out perorations in long hand before delivering them. An example o f  a Victorian 
peroration, which were often much longer and richer in relative clauses, is that from a speech by Sir 
Edward Clarke at the Old Bailey in 1872, when he was defending a man o f the same name, quoted in 
Chapter Four. In Forensic Fables, first published between 1926 and 1932, based on observations made 
during his career, Theo Mathew, tells a fable, the moral o f which was that barristers for the defence should 
perorate  ( The Brilliant Orator Who Won Fame As A Defender pp. 321). It may well have been based on 
Marshall -  Hall. He does, however, seem to advise, depending on the audience, that peroration,and the 
traditional division o f  a closing speech, may not always be effective ( See The Blushing Beginner and The 
Bearded Juryman, pp. 57-58 and The Brilliant Person, The Vulgar Individual With A Cockney Accent And  
The Two Malefactors pp. 305- 306 ). Forensic Fables, Reprinted by Wildy and Sons, London, 1999 .
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display o f  these divisions, which might interrupt the sequence o f  thought the advocate was 
trying to induce on his or her listeners He also speculated that a reason for doing this 
was to avoid deciding whether the most important point in the speech should be put first 
or last. On the diminished use of the peroration, Du Cann wrote: “...until quite recently it 
was possible to see counsel winding themselves up into the majestic spontaneity o f  their 
carefully prepared final onslaughts on the emotions o f  the ju ry ”. Perorations in capital 
punishment cases were often long and highly emotional. The abolition of the death 
penalty (effectively in 1965), according to one senior barrister, author and part -tim e 
Crown Court Recorder interviewed®'^, was important in the overall reduction of blatant 
appeals to the emotions and theatricality injury advocacy. Another factor he mentioned 
was the closure of many Victorian built courts in the 1960s and 1970s. Acting in small 
modern rooms, well illuminated by electric strip lighting, rather than poorly lit cavernous 
rooms built in the gothic revival, which were almost stages for melodrama, seemed 
incongruous and dated
A junior barrister interviewed working in criminal work and mainly instructed to 
defend, explained that, in her experience, barristers, both for the prosecution or the 
defence, order their closing speeches similar to the way judges do in their summing up to 
juries. The divisions followed are : informing the jury of the role of the judge and the 
jury; an explanation of the burden and standard of proof; setting out the law and what it is 
necessary for the prosecution to prove; addressing legal points of evidence , if necessary; 
and dealing with the evidence. The barrister explained that, when defending, she would 
conclude by re-iterating the standard and burden of proof. She stated that the approach 
taken throughout was one of the facts, interpreted and commented upon, sometimes 
liberally, by barristers, speaking for themselves, rather than relying on theatrical and 
emotional perorations . In her view, overt appeals to emotion in perorations, and else 
where in closing speeches, rather than engaging their powers of reasoning , would be 
badly received by jurors who increasingly see themselves as possessors of facts through
The Art o f  the Advocate, Pelican, Pelican, First Edition, 1964, page 180.
Geoffrey Robertson QC interviewed 18* April, 2000. Some o f the courts closed in the 1960s and 1970s 
were appreciably older than the 19* Century, for example the Grand Hall at Winchester, built in the 
Thirteen Hundreds.
On the effect o f  courtroom design on proceedings in court see Linda Mulcahy, Architects o f  Justice: the 
Politics o f  Courtroom Design, School o f Law, Birkbeck College. A paper delivered at the W G Hart Legal 
Workshop 2006 at the Institute o f Advanced Legal Studies, University o f London.
Anne -  Marie Critchley. interviewed on 7* September, 2007. She had eight years o f experience in 
criminal work.
The description o f  modem closing speeches given by Anne- Marie Critchley corresponded with 
observation o f cases made at Blackfriars Crown Court, London between 3'^ '' and 5* July, 2007.
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very easy access to computer data bases such as Google, if  not by books The 
possibility of somebody involved in the administration of justice sitting on the jury ,who 
would very rapidly see through what was going on, was also mentioned as a reason not to 
employ what could be seen as theatricality . A leading barrister, specialising in criminal 
defence work and who has practiced since 1962, explained that open appeals to emotion 
and blatant histrionics had disappeared. Advocacy had come to require the much more 
subtle accomplishment of being able to appeal to widely held stereo typical opinions 
which might not correspond with the letter of the law. It was often necessary to do so 
almost subliminally and always essential not to go beyond propriety. Ability to assess 
what the jury would take was vital. A number of examples of broadly held social attitudes 
,to which messages could be directed by stealth, were given. Buttons which could he 
pressed, included women who drink excessively and dress immodestly invite attention 
and persons assaulting others have only themselves to blame when the response they get 
from their victims may be more than the violence they used, provided it not entirely out of 
proportion. Mention was made of a number of prosecutions that had taken place some 
years ago under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 for producing pornographic films. 
Most of these failed before the courts, except where children were involved. As a result, 
proceedings brought by the police are now very rare. Barristers for defendants had 
successfully appealed to the broadly held view amongst jurors that, whilst they would not
In the dissemination o f  knowledge, the arrival o f the internet has been compared with the invention o f  
the printing press. Mathew d’Ancona, Power and the Web, BBC Radio 4, 2"^  December,2007. Use o f  the 
internet by jurors, and its possible dangers injury trials, was illustrated in a manslaughter case at 
Newcastle Crown Court in August, 2008. The trial had to be abandoned when it became known that a juror 
had conducted his own research into the case, partly involving forensic science techniques that he had 
found on the internet, and discussed his findings with other jurors. Some o f  the questions the jury 
subsequently asked the judge revealed he had gained a knowledge o f the case that had not been presented 
to the jury by the prosecution or the defence. See The Times, 20* August, 2008. Also in 2008 a conviction 
for rape was quashed after evidence was presented that a juror consulted the internet on a Blackberry. 
Amongst other directions now given to juries is that they must not look at the internet in connection with 
the trial. Research by Professor Cheryl Thomas, Are Juries Fair?, Ministry o f Justice Research Series 1/10, 
showed that some jurors in her study said they seen information about their case on the internet, whilst a 
smaller number admitted they had looked for it. Professor Thomas called for further research to study what 
type o f  judicial instruction would be most effective in preventing jurors from looking for information about 
their case on the internet. On 14* July, 2010, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, issued new guidance at 
the Court o f Appeal requiring trial judges to give jurors clear formal instructions they should not research 
cases on the internet or discuss them on the on social networking sites. Lord Judge said that internet 
research may consciously or unconsciously affect jury decisions, ye t at the same time neither side at trial 
w ill know what consideration might be entering into their deliberations and w ill therefore not be able to 
address arguments about it. This would represent a departure from  the basic principle which requires that 
the defendant be tried  on the evidence admitted and heard by them in court. On 16* June, 2011 a juror who 
had contacted a defendant on Facebook, causing a trial in Manchester to collapse, was given an eight 
month prison sentence for contempt o f court at the High Court in London.
In April, 2004, lawyers judges and police officers became eligible to serve as jurors as a result o f  
Schedule 33 o f the Criminal Justice Act, 2003 coming into force.
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want to view such films themselves, what adults wanted to watch in private was their 
business .
Democratization of ju ries .
After 1919 both men and women could serve as jurors but it was necessary to meet a 
property qualification Consequently, as one judge. Lord Devlin, recognized, juries were 
predominantly male, middle aged, middle minded and middle-class. Following the 1965 
Morris Report which concluded that a jury should as far as possible be a genuine cross- 
section of the adult community, the Juries Act of 1974 swept away the property condition 
for jury service. The only general qualification for inclusion on the jury panel became 
registration on the parliamentary or local government lists of voters. This led to a huge 
change in the make up of juries. The average age of jurors fell and persons became 
eligible to sit on a jury at 18 years of age. The proportion of women increased, as did that 
of the working classes. It is estimated that the Act increased the number of potential jurors 
from eight million to thirty million . Faced with juries of a wider social composition, 
some of the barristers interviewed said they had intentionally altered their approach in 
addressing jurors and were careful to use plain words wherever possible. In the opinion of 
one barrister, who recalled the reform, this had enhanced the clarity and effectiveness of 
advocacy, rather than reduced it . In an interview , Lord Woolf said that many.
Interview with Anthony Arlidge QC on 30* October, 2007. Mr Arlidge also stated even before judges 
sitting in appellate cases, without a jury, it was sometimes possible to subliminally appeal to concerns 
going beyond the limits o f the immediate case.
Probably expressing the then conventional wisdom o f  counsel and judges on the effect o f  female 
jurors, A J Ashton, then the Recorder o f  Manchester wrote in 1924: Cases seem to take longer when 
women are on the jury. There is a class o f  case, which lasts an hour or two, which men dispose o f  
prom ptly. But women seem to want to talk it over and hear other views, so that they often go out to 
consider their verdict. The men never object to this, as they can smoke in the ju ry  room. But we are 
often w ell into the next case before they come back with an obvious verdict. Women are less w illing  
than men to f in d  a man guilty, and inclined to be hard on a woman, especially  i f  she is good-looking. 
They seem to have a curious difficulty in accepting the evidence o f  a constable. Perhaps it seem s too
good  to be true  I  have noticed that the unm arried woman is often too nervous to do more than
agree with the m ajority; and this is often u se fu l. {A s  I  went on my way, Nisbet and Co, London, 1924, 
pp. 254 -  5 ).
A juror from the City o f  London had to be a householder, or the occupier o f  premises, or the owner 
o f  land or personal estate valued at £60 per year. Jurors in the County o f  London had to reside in 
premises o f  net annual value above £30. Elsewhere they had to live in premises with a £20 net annual 
value.
Lord Morris Committee on Jury Service. (1965) Cmnd. 2627
John Hostettler, The criminal ju ry  old and new: ju ry  pow er from  early times to the presen t day. 
Waterside Press, 2004, page 125.
Richard DuCann, The Art o f  the Advocate, Penguin, Revised Edition, 1993, page 29, assessing the 
consequences o f the abolition o f  the property qualification, wrote that juries became much less susceptible 
to advocates "whose weapons, words, and the use they make o f  them, have not changed at a ll”. A Queen’s
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though not a l l , barristers who changed their style in the 1970’s were anxious to avoid 
appearing patronizing jurors or under-estimating their intelligence.
Following what might be described as the democratization of the jury, more barristers 
began speaking in ways less resembling Received English Pronunciation ("RP"). The aim, 
as one put it, was to appeal more to the common man and woman. The trend continued. 
That RP is used less today, although still perhaps the most frequent pronunciation heard, 
reflects both a widening of the Bar's social base, which began to grow in the 1970’s 
together with the number of barristers, and a general decline in that form. This accelerated 
in the 1990s particularly amongst younger people, many of whom, especially in the South 
East, prefer “estuary English”, the use of which makes it more difficult to identify the 
class and geographical origin of the speaker . The great increase in ethnic diversity in 
Britain, especially in London and the other large cities, has led to more accents being 
heard in court advocacy. A solicitor interviewed reported that certain barristers ,who 
recognize jurors from similar minority backgrounds to their own, occasionally use words 
and phrases , speech patterns and rhythms in their closing speeches to strengthen their 
appeal to them. She also spoke of a decline in use of RP by advocates in the magistrates’ 
court and a rise in accents originating overseas.
Barristers of senior call, said that they deliberately used briefer sentences than earlier in 
their careers when addressing juries and, whenever possible, avoided subordinate clauses and 
parenthesis. They explained this was because short sentences are by far the most used in 
newspapers, magazines, contemporary novels and, above all, in television and films. Perhaps 
exaggerating somewhat, one barrister spoke of the imminent arrival of almost "sound-bite 
advocacy". There was general agreement that the average person's concentration span had
Counsel who was interviewed (Peter Carter QC on 19* May, 2007 ), said that it had certainly consigned to 
history the approach taken by the prosecution during the trial, in 1960, o f the publishers o f D. H. 
Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover, who were charged under the Obscene Publications Act 1959. In a 
closing speech, which was considerably criticized at the time for being out o f  touch, leading prosecution 
counsel, Mervyn Griffith -  Jones, asked the jury if  this was the sort o f  book yow woidd wish your wife or 
servants to read? .
27* June, 2007.
On the fall in RP generally, see Kirsten Sellars, We wanna talk like common people, Daily Telegraph, 
2T* June, 1997 ; Where are the gels who can talk proper?  The Times, July, 23 2007 and also the Leading 
Article o f that date; and Melvyn Bragg, RP RIP, BBC Radio 4, 6* August, 2011,which observed the 
decline o f R P alongside an increasing pride in regional accents. One barrister interviewed said o f  a 
younger recent opponent in a criminal jury trial that her voice s lid  from  Home Counties English down to 
the lower reaches o f  the Thames estuary and back in the course o f  a single sentence.
Moira Lynch, who appears in magistrates’ courts in central London and instructs counsel to appear in 
the Crown Court. Interviewed on 12* March, 2006.
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fallen, mainly because of the effect of television®^  ^Some commented that this was an 
important reason why final speeches had shortened and why more emphasis is now placed on 
cross-examination injury trials. A recently retired Circuit Judge said that juries, like 
judges, prefer it clear and concise . Jurors wanted to go home. He hazarded that, in many 
cases, an advocate who took twenty minutes for a closing speech would succeed over an 
opponent whose lasted an hour .
The movement towards conversational, rather than declamatory, advocacy in closing 
speeches continued. Over the last two decades the practice of reading a prepared speech to a 
jury has been abandoned almost entirely: Spontaneity, or the appearance of it, and chattiness 
, though necessarily one w ay , has become popularly equated with sincerity
In an episode of the BBC series Brief Encounters , the broadcaster and legal 
commentator, Marcel Berlins, emphasized how much the modern jury differed from that 
of earlier times. In his view people were more educated about events because of 
television. They are also less deferential. It is said that society in general is now less 
respectful of status and office than formerly. Some identify this change as originating in 
the 1960s . Ann Rafferty QC, a distinguished criminal barrister who contributed to the
BBC programme, said jurors were drawn from XhQ Iknow  what I  am entitled to culture; 
metaphorically they no longer look up to barristers but peer across at them. This appears 
to be widely appreciated by modern advocates who consciously avoid any appearance of 
looking down at and patronising juries.
Mr. John Cooper, a criminal barrister and a member of the Bar Council, in an interview in the Times, October 
2T*,2009, said: There is no doubt that the ability o f the public to appreciate lengthy speeches and oratory has 
declined over the years. As a society we no longer listen to sermons and speeches at public meetings in the way 
that we would 100 years ago, before the advent o f  multimedia. As a result, advocates had to alter their style and 
the fashion for florid  and colourful advocacy o f  even two decades ago had diminished.
Julian Lipton, interviewed 25* July, 2007
Interview with Anthony Arlidge QC held on 30* October, 2007.
Repeated on Radio 4, shortly after the death o f George Carman QC in 2001.
Anthony Arlidge QC considered that satirical television programmes, which gripped Britain in the 
1960’s, such as the hugely popular That was the week that was, much eroded almost automatic respect and 
deference for politicians. This spread to other figures in the establishment including judges, seen before as 
wise but terrifying figures, and barristers, previously held in awe. Mr Arlidge was o f the view that this had 
been replaced by public fascination in barristers and an expectation they would be good with words. 
Interview on 30* October, 2007. On the decline o f deference and increased questioning o f  authority in 
Britain see Samuel H. Beer, Britain Against Itself: The Political Contradictions o f  Collectivism, Norton, 
New York, 1982, Chapter 3. The phenomenon, though the causes may have differed somewhat, was not 
restricted to Britain.
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References and quotations.
References to, and quotations from, Shakespeare the Greek and Roman myths and 
classics, poetry, Dickens, Sir Walter Scott and other famous authors of English literature 
seem to have been quite prevalent as late as the 1960s, as did mention of historical events 
by advocates. In an interview, one retired barrister said that Shakespearean quotes and 
references would have been comprehended by 40 per cent of those serving on a pre 1974 
jury, whilst the others would pretend that they understood. Greco-Roman classics and 
myths on the other hand would in his estimation have only reached about 10 per cent of 
jurors.
A short article in the Criminal Law Review in 1967 cited press reports in which judges 
and counsel had variously likened defendants and other parties to Macbeth, Lady 
Macbeth, lago, from "Othello ”, and John Ridd, from R D Blackmore’s historical novel 
"Lorna Doone ” . Observations had also been made that certain parties had not been 
brought up in accordance with the principles of Dr Arnold of Rugby School and their 
standards were not those defined by the 19* Century public school headmaster and writer 
Dean Farrar in "Eri”c, or “Little by Little ”. As it appeared that the average juryman 
required a fair measure of literary erudition, the article, perhaps a little humorously, asked 
whether in addition to being predominantly "male, middle-aged, middle-minded and 
middle class jurors" ought also to be well read
If Richard DuCann can be seen as representative, even before the composition of juries 
was reformed, barristers seem to have been aware that references and quotations could be 
overdone, as could other oral seasonings. In the first edition of his book. The Art o f  the
On lawyers’ allusions to Shakespeare, see O.Hood Phillips, Shakespeare and the Lawyers, Methuen and 
Co, 1972, chapter 11.
496 [1967] Crim.L.R. In a concession to contemporary times, it was reported that a reference to James 
Bond had also been made. Judges dealing with pleas in mitigation, especially if  advocates knew they had 
an interest in literature and Shakespeare, occasionally might encounter quotes or allusions to Portia’s 
speech from the Merchant o f Venice ( Act IV Scene 1 ) with its appeal to mercy and praise for who shows 
it. Michael Lerego QC, interviewed on the 4* February, 2010, said that, in his opinion, many pre- 1974 
Juries Act jurors, who were often more socially deferential, and received less formal education than 
barristers, expected to be entertained by a display o f  literary erudition from an educated person, presumed 
to be from a superior social class, and would have been disappointed if  they did not.
A 1940 survey o f reading in non academic high schools, where pupils would have left at 14 showed that 
62% o f boys and 84% o f girls had read some poetry: their favourites included Kipling, Longfellow, 
Masefield, Blake, Browning, Tennyson and Wordsworth. 67% o f girls and 31% o f  boys had read something 
by Shakespeare. ( See Jonathan Rose, The Classics in the Slums, City Journal, August, 2004. )
The survey suggests the suitability o f literary allusions made by barristers to middle aged jurors, as reported in 
the Criminal Law Review article o f 1967. Many jurors, because they were usually middle class and remained at 
school longer, would have had greater knowledge o f English literature than those in the 1940 survey. On the 
importance at elementary school, as part o f English instruction, between 1870 and 1940, o f reciting poetry see 
Catherine Robson, Everyday Life and the Memorized Poem, Princeton University Press, 2011.
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Advocate, published in 1964, Du Cann wrote : the use o f  hyperbole, metaphor, sim ile, 
inversions o f  language , parallels, and allegories should be carefully controlled. 
Arguments should seem to rely more on force o f  logic than extravagancies o f language
Socially inclusive juries, where the educational backgrounds and literary interests of 
many members were not at all similar to those of counsel and the judges, and changes in 
the curriculum of schools, which gained momentum from the 1960’s , even in private
and public schools attended by many advocates, led to a decline in allusions to and 
quotations from literature, references to historical events and other garnishments. The 
retired barrister interviewed said the last thing he wanted to do was to appear elitist or 
remote in front of the jury. Whereas before the reform of the jury their use may have 
helped jurors identify with him, afterwards they became a barrier. To a limited extent, he 
recalled, that they could still be used for some years before juries in more middle class 
suburban areas such as Kingston .
Whilst verbal condiments offered by lawyers to juries became rarer, they continued to 
be served for years to certain stipendiary magistrates, who appreciated them, in London, 
and possibly other large cities. Thirty years ago most stipendiary magistrates were 
barristers, who had often attended public school and many at Oxford and Cambridge 
Universities. Occasionally it was said that some owed their appointments to being well 
connected, rather for outstanding talent at the bar. Some would make quotations in Latin; 
Greek was not unknown but was highly exceptional. References to literature, poetry and 
sport were also made. Why they did this can possibly be explained by their backgrounds.
Richard DuCann, The Art o f  the Advocate, Penguin, 1964 , pp. 179 -  180.
Robert Graves in the Introduction to his The Greek Myths, first published in 1955, wrote ....the Classics have 
lately lost so much ground in schools and universities that an educated person is now no longer expected to 
know (for instance)  who Deucalion, Pelops, Daedulus, Oenone, Laaocoon, or Antigone may have been. ( The 
Greek Myths, Combined Edition, Penguin, 1992, page 11.) The National Curriculum, introduced in England 
and Wales in 1988, made no reference to classics, once at the heart o f British high culture. Jeremy Paxman, 
author and television interviewer, reviewing University Challenge, a quiz programme screened since 1962 
and for which he has been question master for the last 16 years, considered that today’s students know less 
about classics : I t ’s interesting to see how, as years go by, they know less and less about classics and the 
Bible and more and more about science and computing. ( Daily Telegraph, 11* August, 2010, Students 
have lost touch with classics, says Paxman. )
John Downing. Interviewed 2"‘' April, 2007. Five years after the Juries Act 1974, Brian Gibbens QC 
advised young advocates against straining to introduce literary allusions. Brian Gibbens. Elements o f  
Modern Advocacy, New Law Cassettes, Butterworths, London, 1979. Very unusually these days, Anthony 
Arlidge QC, a noted scholar and author on Shakespeare, said that he occasionally used quotes from 
Shakespeare and Oscar Wilde but would go to great lengths to make sure jurors comprehended them and 
why he was doing so. Interview on 30* October, 2007. Gilbert Gray QC (1929-2011), an eminent and 
eloquent advocate before juries, sometimes appeared in the same cases as him. Gilbert Gray never shrank 
from theatrical courtroom gestures and would often quote poetry or Shakespeare.
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boredom after a few years on the bench, and, as was suggested by a Lord Justice of 
Appeal in an attempt to differentiate themselves from defendants in their courts.
The legal historian and writer, James Morton who as a criminal solicitor regularly 
appeared before the Magistrates’ Courts in inner London, described how one stipendiary 
had a great regard for Horace and Virgil. As a result, lawyers might have excerpts from 
their works snapped at them. Extravagant mitigation, for example, could be met with 
"Vitae summa brevis spem nos vetat incohare longam” (life’s short span forbids us 
entering on far-reaching hopes ). Another spoke, in English, of the "sword o f  Damocles”
, when dealing with a suspended prison sentence, of the "labour o f Sisyphus in the 
context of court orders, such as probation and community service, that had failed and of a 
frustration rivaling that o f "Tantalus” One stipendiary had a deep interest in poetry 
and often quoted John Betjeman. Allusions to horse racing, and even hunting, were made 
by an Irish stipendiary, whilst another, fluent in the language, used Italian whenever any 
opportunity arose. In order to be as persuasive as possible, solicitors and barristers would 
try to adopt the language, quotes and allusions made by stipendiary magistrates. James 
Morton described how some would go beyond that by learning replies in Latin or Italian 
that could possibly be made and suitable references to the classics and poetry, ancient and 
modern. Their efforts were very often welcomed and in some instances, he was sure, 
affected decisions made and sentences passed, even to the extent of whether someone 
went to prison. Mr. Morton recounted how a new generation of stipendiaries (now 
referred to as District Judges ) appointed in the 1980’s had no interest in ornate advocacy 
from lawyers , preferring plain words throughout. The last of the old school retired at the 
beginning of the 1990s. With them went what remained of the flamboyant advocacy 
employed by solicitors and barristers in the London Magistrates courts .
Lord Justice Richards, interviewed on 18* July, 2007.
Interviewed on 16* July, 2007.
See Cicero: Tusculan Disputations V, XXI [61].
Robert Graves, The Greek Myths, Combined Edition, Penguin, 1992, pp. 216-220.
Robert Graves, The Greek Myths, Combined Edition, Penguin, 1992, pp. 387-393.
It was reported, by a solicitor interviewed, Moira Lynch on 12* March, 2007, that advocates now, as in 
the past, adopt somewhat different approaches to magistrates who are District Judges ( Stipendiaries ) and 
the great majority who are not. Most often. District Judges do not require opening speeches from the 
prosecution in trials. Closing speeches by advocates for the defence ( prosecutors are not normally allowed 
one in summary trials ) concentrate on the facts in dispute rather than the law, which it is assumed is more 
than understood by the District Judge. In front o f lay magistrates, the pace o f examining witnesses is 
slower and closing speeches concentrate on the law and the evidence. They may also be somewhat more 
susceptible to restrained appeals to emotion. Many advocates structure their closing speeches in the order
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Allusions are still made in court but before juries are mostly likely to be from up-to- 
date culture such as television, films and newspaper stories. This is hardly surprising 
when the power of the mass media in everyday life is considered. As it was put in an 
American article on the subject:
“Mass media has brought its stories into our homes and into our hearts. Contemporary 
mass media provides the central frame o f  our cultural reference fo r  our conversations 
and our fantasies. When we tell our own stories, they often involve encounters with media 
celebrities. When we recount our fantasies, they often involve fictional characters from  
our favorite films or television shows. When we start to speak with our friends catch 
phrases from contemporary sitcoms and commercials roll o ff our tongues, much as 
Shakespeare and the Bible fe ll easily to the lips o f  an earlier generation L e t’s face it— 
media culture is our culture "
In closing speeches a junior barrister interviewed said she draws parallels with 
episodes from television soap operas such as East Enders and sometimes illustrates points 
by referring to reality programmes like Big Brother . The barrister said that when dealing 
with scientific evidence against her clients , she would sometimes try to reduce its 
importance by saying that it is not infallible, unlike the impression that might be formed 
from looking at CSI on the television . Some barristers, though usually sparingly, quote 
lyrics from pop songs to emphasise points they seek to make 
The retired Circuit Judge who was interviewed said, from what he had observed, 
advocates needed to be very careful, when going beyond the common denominator of
that magistrates deliver their judgements: the offence; areas o f  evidence not in dispute; areas in dispute and 
findings upon them.
Unidentified author, published on Massachussets Institution o f  Technology website: httpZ/web.mit.edu
Anne- Marie Critchley. Interviewed 7* September, 2007. Greame Gerrard, Association o f Chief Police 
Officers, interviewed on 11* May, 2010, said that members o f the Crown Prosecution Service had 
informed him they have to take pains to explain to jurors that evidence against defendants is not inadequate 
because it does not include that from science or Closed Circuit Television. Also, Paul Bergman, emeritus 
professor o f law at UCLA, and joint author o f Reel Justice, Andrews and McMeel 1996 and several books 
on advocacy instruction, interviewed on 18* May, 2011, said that jury trial attorneys in the United States 
had to take what has become known as the CSI effect into account.
For example, in the much published Soham murder trial in 2003, Maxine Carr’s defence counsel, 
Michael Hubbard, QC, quoted to the jury Engelbert Humperdinck’s song Please Release Me, Let Me Go, to 
make the point on behalf o f Ian Huntley’s former financée: For I  don 7 love him any more. David Pannick, 
When lawyers try to make the case fo r  the other side disappear. The Times, April 23'^ *', 2009.
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contemporary mass culture, in making allusions to and quoting from literature. This was 
particularly so because of the diverse ethnic mix of many juries in London and other large 
cities. Danger lay in some jurors, because of their different back grounds and education, ( 
they may well have been educated abroad and in languages other than English) being 
completely bewildered, distracted and left feeling apart. Thought had also to be given to 
references to history which might not be understood , or even found offensive.
Peremptory Challenges.
For most of the 20* Century barristers on behalf of defendants could challenge potential 
jurors without giving any reason in an attempt to obtain a sympathetic jury. In 1925, the 
number of such challenges, known as peremptory challenges, was reduced from 25 to 12. The 
number was limited in 1949 to seven (or seven for each defendant where two or more were 
tried together ) and in 1977 , by the Criminal Law Act of that year, fixed at three. The long 
standing right of peremptory challenge was abolished altogether by the Criminal Justice Act, 
1988 on the grounds that it ran against the important principle of random selection of 
juries Senior barristers interviewed explained that being able to assess potential jurors, 
which could have a great bearing on the verdict, was considered an important part of being an 
advocate. Up until 1991, when the provision in the 1988 Act came into effect, if there were 
four defendants, in a ‘multi-hander’ it was possible to change the entire composition of the 
jury. Full exercise of the right by both counsel where two defendants were concerned could 
alter it by half. In many cases the object of using peremptory challenge appears to have been 
to remove people thought of as middle class in the stereotypical belief they might be more 
prosecution minded. The way people dressed was important in making decisions, as were any 
newspapers or books they were carrying. Some barristers looked as closely as they could at a 
potential male juror’s hands . If they were smooth this was an indication that he was not in 
manual employment. One senior barrister interviewed remembered one of the first cases in
One the conclusions reached by Sir David Cannadine, who has led a two year research project at the 
Institute o f Historical Research, London University on the teaching o f history in English state secondary schools 
during the past century, is that since changes in history teaching in the 1960s and 1970s away from teaching the 
subject as a national narrative, and because history is no longer compulsory from the age o f 14, many adults 
today would struggle to recognise characters from British history.(TTie Red Bits Are British, October, 15* 2011, 
BBC Radio 4, Archive on 4.) This may well help to explain why they are no longer usually referred to by 
advocates in speeches to jurors.
Section 118.
The prosecution still has the right to ‘stand b y’ a juror without showing cause and with no upper 
limit, subject to guidelines issued by the Attorney General in 1988.
N igel Ley, on June 2 U ‘, 2006 and John Downing on 2"*' April, 2007.
221
which he defended before a jury in the 1960’s . A co-defendant was represented by another 
somewhat more experienced counsel who, when he saw a smartly dressed man with a copy of 
The Times, said, very firmly, “ at all costs we have got to get rid o f  him. He looks fa r  
too i n t e l l i g e n t Proposals to abolish peremptory challenge were resisted by many 
barristers at the criminal bar and when the right was taken away, in 1991, it was missed.
Removal of jury trial for certain offences.
The Criminal Justice Act 1988 also affected advocacy in the Crown Court by the 
removing from its jurisdiction certain frequently committed offences and specifying that they 
could only be tried by magistrates as summary matters. Defendants could no longer elect to 
be tried before a judge and jury for taking a conveyance without consent, common assault and 
battery and for criminal damage when the amount alleged was below £2,000. Previously , the 
Criminal Law Act 1977 had taken away from defendants the right to choose jury trial in some 
public order offences and where criminal damage below £200 was charged In an 
interview, a senior barrister contrasted the difference in approach and advocacy he was 
obliged to take, shortly after the law was altered, in front of a stipendiary magistrate with that 
which he would have followed before a judge and jury when defending a young man charged 
with criminal damage, no longer able to elect to have his case heard in the Crown Court
Less ferocity.
Senior barristers and a Lord Justice of Appeal interviewed agreed that prosecutors had 
become less ferocious. Even in the 1970’s they recalled that it was not unusual for defendants 
to receive a savage onslaught from counsel. In the opinion of a Lord Justice of Appeal ®®°, 
counsel acting for defendants were now generally less aggressive and more methodical ®®'
Ibid, John Downing.
Sections 37-39.
Sections 15 and 22.
N igel Ley, interviewed June 21®* 2006.
660 J _____, 1 ^  1 1 th
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Interviewed on the 11 July, 2007 (Lord Justice Sedley).
Judge Case, a Circuit Judge and Treasurer of the United Kingdom Women Judges’ Association, who had
begun her career as a barrister in the early 1970’s, interviewed on the 15**’ May, 2009 at the College o f Law 
Bloomsbury, expressed a similar view. When asked if  he had observed a like change in Scottish criminal 
advocacy. Lord Mackay ( Lord Advocate o f Scotland 1979 -  1984 and Lord Chancellor o f England 1987 -  
1997), who began appearing in courts from the mid -  1950’s, said it was his impression that advocacy had 
always been less aggressive, hectoring and blustery than south o f the border and in this respect had not changed
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.However a distinction was drawn with rape cases where some barristers still humiliate 
alleged victims and witnesses. He spoke of having to reprimand a barrister six times during 
one trial for such behaviour. In his opinion, a sub-culture persists in which local solicitors will 
brief known aggressive counsel. This contrasts with the practice of the Crown Prosecution 
Service who frequently instructed sympathetic barristers, principally for the sake of the 
alleged victims.
Defence counsel’s conduct cross-examination attracted much comment after the 
conviction in 2011 of Levi Bellfield, a previously convicted serial killer, for the murder of 
Milly Dowler. In some ways this resembled Nineteenth Century concerns about the 
acceptable limits of advocacy. Bellfield’s counsel, Mr Jeffrey Samuels QC, vigorously and 
relentlessly questioned Milly Dowler’s parents, much to their great anguish, about very 
personal matters. Revulsion was widely expressed in the media®®l Mr Samuels was pilloried 
and his family faced abuse and even death threats. The Chairman of the Bar, Mr Peter Lodder 
QC acknowledged the distress caused to the Dowlers from their cross-examination, but 
maintained the questions asked were relevant and necessary to put Bellfield’s instructions in 
what was a largely circumstantial case against him®®l
Decline in weight given to Poiice Evidence.
There was agreement amongst senior lawyers and judges interviewed that juries, and 
also many magistrates, scrutinise evidence given by police witnesses much more thoroughly 
than they did some decades previously, when there was much confidence in the police. Police 
officers were seen as public servants who gave evidence dispassionately and neutrally in 
court. Decline in weight attached to police evidence was said to be principally caused by 
police mal-practice and fabrication of evidence revealed in successful appeals arising from a 
number of high profile cases. Defendants convicted in the 1970’s, but not acquitted on appeal 
until many years later, included the "Guildford Four” ®®" and the "Birmingham Six” In
greatly. He said advocates and solicitors preferred to show a witness was untruthful by their line o f questioning 
rather than calling him or her a liar ( Interview at House o f Lords, 10* December, 2008 ).
For example see. Justice was also a victim, Mail on Sunday, Comment, June, 26*, 2011, D on’t ever let a 
family suffer again like M illy’s, Sunday Mirror, June, 26*, 2011 and No Justice fo r M illy’s Grieving Family, The 
Sunday Times, Editorial, June 26*, 2011.
Peter Lodder, We may despise Bellfield, but justice was done. The Times, June, 28*, 2011.
^  See Robert Kee, Trial and Error, the Guildford pub bombings and British Justice, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 
1986.
See Louis Blom -  Cooper, The Birmingham Six and other cases, Gerald Duckworth and Co Ltd, 1977. 
Pressure on suspects to confess, and other illegal activities carried out by the West Midland Serious Crime 
Squad, were also much reported in the 1980’s . Geoffrey Robinson QC recalled another source o f skepticism 
about police evidence : The popular television series Rumpole o f the Bailey, written by John Mortimer QC and
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preparing and running cases on behalf of defendants advocates would once try to depart from 
police evidence as little as was absolutely necessary, mindful of the credibility given to it. 
Because jurors and magistrates are now often much more likely to approach testimony of 
police officers with caution, their evidence is challenged more frequently in trials. Contrary to 
the past, advocates for the Crown are now less confident of securing convictions on police 
evidence alone and where there is evidence in addition to that from the police they will seek 
to emphasise it, especially in closing speeches ®®®.
Plea Bargaining.
Senior barristers interviewed recalled that it became necessary for counsel to become 
proficient in plea bargaining, a practise hardly acknowledged to exist in English and Welsh 
courts until an important and controversial study at the Crown Court in Birmingham during 
the 1970s ®®’. In England and Wales, plea bargaining has three meanings: an agreement 
between the judge and the accused that if a defendant pleads guilty to some or all of the 
offences charged against him the sentence will or will not take a certain form; the prosecution 
agreeing with the defence that if the accused pleads guilty to a lesser offence they will accept 
the plea; and the prosecution agreeing not to proceed on one or more counts in the indictment 
against the accused if he or she will plead guilty to the remainder . Plea bargaining in the 
last two meanings has become a frequent occurrence, approved by the courts. The bargain is 
usually struck by prosecution counsel and defence counsel outside court before the start of the
first shown in the 1970’s. Alerted in many episodes to the possibility o f it occurring in interviews that were then 
neither tape recorded or videoed, Old Bailey juries began to throw cases out where they suspected police 
forensic trickery. The buzz in the Old Bailey robbing room was that Rumpole was the reason. Geoffrey 
Robertson, Rumpole o f the Bailey: the very incarnation o f  English liberty. The Times, January 17*, 2009.
®®® Lord MacKay described increased skepticism towards police evidence, a feature he saw as common to both 
Scotland and England, as a very major change during his career and one which has had major effects on the way 
advocates conduct trials. Lord Justice Goldring, interviewed at the Royal Courts o f Justice on the 30* April, 
2009, considered an important reason why juries now often retire for longer periods before announcing their 
verdicts than they did when he began his career as a barrister in the late 1960’s was that jurors became less 
trusting not only of police officers but o f the Crown Prosecution Service, barristers acting for the Crown and 
judges as well. Reflecting society more generally, he saw jurors as less willing to make judgements on the 
conduct o f others. Mr Jonathan Wood, a Senior Crown Prosecutor in Derbyshire, in an interview held on the 4* 
May, 2009, agreed with these views In his opinion skepticism and more moral relativism also helped to account 
for an increase in hung juries which he had observed
John Baldwin and M ichael M cConville, P lea Bargaining and P lea N egotiation in England. Law 
and Society Review , V ol. 13, N o2 Winter 1979, pp.287-307.
John Sprack, A P ractica l Approach to Crim inal Procedure, 11* Edition, Oxford University Press, 
2006, pp. 2 8 4 - 2 8 7 .
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trial. As regards the first meaning, the Court of Appeal has recently given comprehensive 
guidance unjudicial indications of sentence . As a result, it is predicted that this form will 
grow. In practical terms plea bargaining leads to fewer trials for advocates and more 
emphasis on delivering persuasive pleas in mitigation. One senior barrister interviewed 
^^°considered that since the Crown Prosecution Service started to advice the police in the early 
stages of cases, and itself decided what charges to bring , the number of guilty pleas, 
followed by pleas in mitigation, had increased and fewer trials collapsed. He attributed this to 
better standards of preparation.
Social Enquiiy Reports and Pleas in Mitigation.
The introduction of Social Enquiry Reports in the late 1960’s had an effect on pleas in 
mitigation. Produced by the Probation Service (or social services departments if a juvenile 
was involved), they were intended to assist judges and magistrates, who had power to order 
them, in deciding how to deal with an offender. They contained much about a person’s home 
life, work history, previous offending, attitude to present offences and often included a 
recommendation for sentence. Judges usually read the reports before coming into court or, if 
they had not, would do so before counsel started to mitigate.
Reports gave barristers and solicitors additional information. Sometimes this led to clients 
being asked to clarify certain areas and to give their views about recommendations made in 
them. Consideration of reports often suggested lines to follow in making pleas. Information 
presented in a report could result in pleas being shortened. When judges agreed with 
recommendations contained in a report they would indicate to counsel that their pleas could 
be brief. Counsel and solicitors interviewed said that some judges and magistrates would 
become irritable if they felt lawyers were merely reading out what was in the report and 
would say things like, ‘7  have read tha t” o r , even, ‘7  can read too! Too avoid this, it 
came seen as wise to refer judge to the relevant paragraphs rather than quote from them.
R V Goodyear [2005] 3 A ll ER 117.
John Downing, April 2"^ 2007.
These fundamental changes were brought about by the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
Under Section 57 o f  the Criminal Justice Act 1967- see David Haxby, Probation a changing 
service, Constable, London, 1978, Chapter 6. Roughly about this time the entitlement o f  a defendant 
to speak before he or she was sentenced was abolished. Following extensive reforms o f  court 
sentencing brought into being by the Criminal Justice Act 1991, Social Enquiry Reports became 
known as Pre-Sentence Reports. Their content and format became more prescribed, as did the 
circumstances when they were ordered.
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unless there was a very good reason to do so. A senior counsel interviewed spoke of 
problems that arose when a Social Enquiry Report made an unrealistic recommendation, 
usually for a non-custodial sentence. In these circumstances counsel had to use what was 
useful in the report whilst carefully keeping away from that which, if pressed, could well have 
been harmful .
On pleas in mitigation, the junior barrister interviewed , who specialised in defence work
said that the scope for creativity - suggesting certain courses of action and asking for 
credit for aspects of a person’s history - had been reduced when dealing with some offences 
where minimum sentences have been introduced in recent years.
Greater involvement of the prosecution in sentencing.
Traditionally advocates for the prosecution in England and Wales, as ministers o f justice, 
take a neutral position on sentencing defendants convicted after a trial or following a plea of 
guilty, seeing this to be a matter for the court. Unlike many other jurisdictions, it is 
considered not to be the function of a prosecution advocate to argue for a heavy punishment 
or a particular sentence. In summarising facts against a defendant a prosecutor has to ensure 
they are based on admissible evidence and must avoid using emotive language Where a 
defendant pleads guilty but does so on a factual basis different to the prosecution’s version, 
judges and magistrates must resolve the conflict in accordance with rules set out by the Court 
of Appeal in 1983 by either accepting the defence account or hearing evidence to 
determine the matter.
Prosecutors have become more involved in the process of sentencing over the last twenty 
years. The section of the Code for Crown Prosecutors, entitled The Prosecutor’s Role in 
Sentencing^'^^, states that while sentencing is a decision for the court, prosecutors have a duty 
to offer assistance on passing an appropriate sentence by drawing the court’s attention to: any 
aggravating or mitigating factors surrounding the offence disclosed by the prosecution case; 
any Victim Personal Statement; where apposite, evidence of the effect of the offending on a
John Downing interviewed on 10^  ^April, 2007.
As advocacy in the criminal courts adjusted to Social Enquiry Reports, from the 1960’s 
practitioners in the courts dealing with family matters had to have regard to reports written by social 
workers on the welfare and custody o f  children.
Anne Marie Critchley, 7^  ^ September, 2007.
This was re-iterated by the Court o f Appeal in R v Hobstaff (1993) 14 Or App R (S) 605.
R V Newton (1983) 77CrApp R13.
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community; any statutory provisions , sentencing guidelines , or guideline cases which may 
assist and any statutory provisions relating to ancillary orders , for example anti-social 
behaviour orders. The Code continues that, in the light of these factors it lists, prosecutors 
may also offer assistance to the court by making submissions as the sentencing range within 
which the current offence falls^*°.
A Queen’s Counsel, prominent in criminal law^", thought that a growing minority of 
prosecution counsel, particularly those in serious cases, had become more adversarial in 
sentencing. An important reason for this is the Code for Crown Prosecutors, especially that 
part that concerns offering assistance to the court on the sentencing range within which an 
offence falls. According to him some counsel interpret this to mean offering very specific 
recommendations, usually in the form of a very politely expressed skeleton written argument. 
He recounted how the previous week, in a case in which he had acted for a defendant, 
prosecution counsel presented a lengthy submission to the judge on sentence that occupied a 
lever -  arch file. Because many are now heavily dependent on the Crown Prosecution Service 
for w ork, indeed some are directly employed as Crown Prosecutors with Higher Rights, 
counsel, in his view, feel obliged to involve themselves with sentencing to a greater extent. 
Another explanation the QC advanced for a more adversarial stance taken by prosecutors was 
disclosure to them of pre-sentencing reports by the probation service -  a requirement placed 
on it in 2003 More and more prosecutors carefully read these reports, which often contain 
much that will be referred to in a plea of mitigation, and challenge what they consider to be 
inaccurate , misleading or derogatory to third parties. The QC believed that the trend he 
identified over the past decade towards a greater adversarial approach by prosecutors to 
sentencing and pleas in mitigation will continue. As well as being well acquainted with the 
personal mitigating factors of their clients, he argued that advocates acting for defendants 
must know, and be prepared to argue, complex and detailed points about sentencing law and
Published in February 2010, it closely refers to ihQ Attorney General’s Guidelines on the Acceptance o f  
Pleas and the Prosecutor’s Role in the Sentencing Exercise, October, 2005.
During the 1990s the Court o f Appeal, in cases such as R v  Hartrey (1993) 14 Cr AppR(S) 507 and R v Street 
(1997) 161 JP 281, emphasised it was the duty o f counsel both for the defence and prosecution to acquaint 
themselves with the court’s sentencing powers and to alert the judge if  he or she passed an unlawful sentence.
It has become the practice o f the prosecution in the Crown Court to complete a standard form, called 
Mitigation and Sentence, covering those factors set out in The Prosecutors Role in Sentencing and containing a 
submission where in the sentencing range an offence falls. This document is presented to the judge and disclosed 
beforehand to the defence. Interview with Mr Jonathan Wood, Senior Crown Prosecutor, 12**’ July, 2011.
Mr. Rudi Fortson QC interviewed on 8*** July, 2011. Mr Fortson is also a Visiting Professor at Queen Mary 
College Law School.
By Section 159(2) (c) o f the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
997
guidelines and recommended additional time be devoted to this on the Bar Professional 
Training Course.
Accommodating key changes in law and procedure.
When asked about other major influences on advocacy in the closing decades of the last 
century, and at the beginning of this, a number of barristers mentioned the need to 
accommodate three key changes in the law of evidence and procedure.
Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 a criminal court must exclude from 
evidence a confession by an accused if it has been obtained by oppression , or as a result of 
something said or done which is likely to render it unreliable Also under the Act evidence 
generally, including confessions, may be excluded, in the court’s discretion, to ensure a fair 
trial The ability to make submissions on these sections became crucial in advocacy before 
the magistrates and Crown Court.
Secondly, submissions under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (CJPG ) 1994 
also became essential. Before the CP JO 1994, the silence of an accused in an interview could 
not be used as evidence against him at trial. The Act weakened the right to silence by 
providing that adverse inferences may be drawn against the accused in certain circumstances 
from his or her failure to mention certain facts, to account for possession of certain objects, 
substances or marks, or to account for his or her presence at certain places
The third change cited as greatly affecting criminal advocacy was the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003. Prior to this legislation coming into force, a defendant could be cross-examined on 
his or her previous convictions only if he or she attacked the character of the prosecutor or his 
or her witnesses. The circumstances in which an accused’s bad character may be admissible 
were expanded under the Act . Given the generally accepted negative consequences of 
revealing a defendant’s bad character, especially to a jury, submissions on admissibility are of 
great importance in trials. If admitted, advocates for the defendant now have to consider 
calling evidence about previous convictions that would reduce their relevance to offences
Section 76. 
Section 78.
683
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Sections 34, 36 and 37. See Peter Murphy, Murphy on Evidence, Ninth Edition, 2005, Chapter 10. 
Section 101. See Murphy, ibid. Chapter 6.
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presently alleged and also how to minimise their impact by comment in closing speeches 
These, and other changes, led to more preliminary applications on points of law, before a jury 
was empanelled, before judges
Two solicitors , who regularly appeared in the London Magistrates’ Courts and instruct 
counsel in the Crown Court, said that keeping on top of the volume of new law was a 
challenge for advocates. Both thought they spoke for many others in this. One referred to a 
study conducted in 2001 by the Liberal Democratic Party which claimed that, since its 
election victory in 1997, the New Labour government had created over three thousand 
offences, many times the number of its predecessor
Another solicitor interviewed said that more emphasis in recent years in diverting 
offenders away from court had effected advocacy considerably as there was less opportunity 
to practice it in both the Magistrates and Crown Court. He described: an increase in the use of 
cautions ( likely to rise further because the Crown Prosecution Service since April, 2008, 
can impose conditions on cautions, as an alternative to prosecution in the courts); the 
introduction of Penalty Notices for Disorder in 2001 and later widening of the scheme to 
allow the police to issue fines for over thirty offences including theft from shops, and 
warnings for possession of cannabis
Anne- Marie Critchley, 7*** September, 2007.
In the opinion o f  Lord Bingham o f  Cornhill, then Senior Law Lord, the increase in preliminary 
applications on points o f  law, including abuse o f  process, was a notable development in advocacy 
during the closing decades o f  the 20*** Century. Interview on 23’  ^ October, 2007. Lord Justice 
Goldring, interviewed on the 30**’ April, 2009, explained that applications concerning admission into 
evidence o f  bad character have risen while the number o f  application to exclude confessions have 
fallen because o f  audio taping or videoing interviews in police stations.
Moira Lynch, interviewed 10**’ May, 2007 and Deborah Sharpley, interviewed 20th June, 2007
The then Chairman o f the Bar Council 2008/2009, Timothy Dutton QC, interviewed on the 8**’ May, 2008, 
after he delivered an address at the College o f Law, also spoke of more than three thousand additional offences 
since 1997 and o f more criminal justice legislation in the last ten years than in the previous sixty. Lord Justice 
Goldring said that advocacy, by necessity, had become much more detailed as law had become more technical 
and complicated. Interview on the 30**’ April, 2009.
^^* Ed Cape, who is also Professor of Criminal law at the Centre for Legal Research, University o f the West o f  
England and author o f the much used practitioners’ guide Defending Suspects at Police Stations, now in a fifth 
edition ( Legal Action Group, 2007 ). Professor Cape was interviewed in London on 7**’ May, 2008.
These fixed penalty fines are permitted under Sections 1 -11 o f the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.
In 2006 the number o f defendants proceeded against at Magistrates’ Courts was 1.78 million. Of these 78,700 
were committed for trial at the Crown Court. In the same year 350,000 offenders were cautioned, 17percent 
more than in 2005. This included 129,100 juveniles who were given reprimands or final warnings under the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, a rise of eight percent compared with 2005. The cautioning rate for indictable ( 
those capable of being tried in the Crown Court) offences ( i.e. the number o f offenders cautioned as a 
percentage o f those found guilty or cautioned ) rose by three percentage points to 40 percent. As well as 
cautioning offenders the police also issued 201,200 Penalty Notices for Disorder and 80,500 warnings for 
cannabis possession. Source: Criminal Statistics 2006, Ministry o f Justice. Reflecting on research they had 
undertaken, which showed virtually half o f all detected crimes are now dealt with outside courts by punishments 
such as on -the-spot fines or cautions, compared with a third in 1998, the authors o f a report, published by the
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Part 7 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has yet to be implemented in full. A portion which has 
been put into effect provides that a trial without a jury can be applied for if there is evidence 
o f a real and present danger that jury tampering would take place .
To date permission to conduct a trial without a jury has only been granted once 
Controversial provisions for complex fraud cases, subject to a right of appeal, to be tried in 
the absence of a jury remain unimplemented. Those convicted in such trials would be given 
reasons why. If brought into force, they would significantly alter advocacy at fraud trials. 
Much is concerned at present with rendering complicated details and transactions as 
comprehensible as possible to ordinary jurors by calling experts to give evidence on financial 
practices and procedures and in careful explanations in closing speeches. Without a jury, 
trials could be expected to become shorter and conducted in a much more technical style of 
advocacy, with no, or very little, scope for considerations other than the facts and the law.
Expert witnesses.
Parties in criminal trials are relying increasingly on the evidence of expert witnesses. 
Expert evidence, particularly scientific evidence, can have a very persuasive effect on juries. 
This is especially so where no expert in the same field can be called by an opposing party
Centre for Crime and Justice Studies comment that magistrates could be consigned to history due to the 
increasing proportion o f criminals being given out-of-court punishments. Roger Grimshaw and Helen Mills, 
M agistrates’courts and Crown Court expenditure, 1999-2009. Centre For Crime and Justice Studies and the 
Hadley Trust, 2010, especially Chapters 2 and 3. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Crown 
Prosecution Service calculated, in joint report published in 2011, entitled Exercising Discretion: The Gateway to 
Justice, that commonly used out-of-  court disposals, warnings, simple and conditional cautions, and penalty 
notices for disorder, accounted for about one third o f the 1.29 million offences brought to justice. (This did not 
include referrals to restorative justice schemes.) Significant variation in use o f these disposals was found ranging 
from 26 percent o f offences in one criminal justice area to 49 percent in another. The report called for greater 
consistency and transparency in their use.
Section 44 o f the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which came into force in 2007. Jury nobbling, embracery, as it 
was once called, has a history over centuries. A spate o f it in the 1960s, including seven in 1966 alone, helped 
lead to the introduction o f majority jury verdicts in the Criminal Justice Act 1967. Judge alone courts for serious 
cases, Diplock Courts, were introduced in Northern Ireland to defeat jury intimidation by paramilitary groups. A 
detailed judgment, explaining the rationale behind the decision, is issued. In 2006 were about 60 non-jury cases 
in the Province compared with more than 300 two decades earlier. The Government announced in 2009 that they 
were to be phased out but would be retained for at least another year. The acquittal rate in Diplock Courts is 
similar to cases with juries. To the writer’s best knowledge, no studies on the effect o f the absence o f juries on 
advocacy in these courts have been published.
The Court o f Appeal on the 18* June, 2009 decided, in a judgement delivered by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord 
Judge, that four men accused o f an armed robbery at Heathrow Airport could be tried in the Crown Court 
without a jury because ju ry tampering was a very significant danger. The robbery had given rise to three trials at
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and cross examination by a non- specialist advocate provides an ineffectual substitute. 
Miscarriages of justice have taken place in recent years when prosecution expert evidence of 
doubtful reliability was placed before Crown Court juries Unwarranted acquittals may also 
have occurred because of such evidence. Concerned that expert evidence should only be used 
if it provides a sound basis for determining a defendant’s guilt or innocence , the Law 
Commission produced a consultation paper on the admissibility of expert witness evidence 
. Taking the view that reform is needed, the Commission proposed : that there should be a 
new statutory test for determining the admissibility of expert evidence in criminal 
proceedings , which would apply whether the evidence is tendered by the prosecution or the 
accused; that this new test would provide that expert witness evidence is admissible only if 
the court is satisfied that the evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted ; and in 
determining whether or not the test is satisfied the court would in all cases have to refer to a 
statutory list of guidelines for assistance. Although not a formal proposal, the Commission 
also suggested that for Crown Court trials on indictment trial judges should exceptionally be 
able to call on a court appointed assessor to provide them with assistance in applying the 
proposed test.
If the Law Commission’s reforms are adopted, making submissions upon whether the 
statutory test for admitting expert evidence is , or is n o t, met will form an important part of 
the task of criminal advocacy. These submissions may well be of some complexity and often 
require the assistance of experts to formulate
a total cost o f £22 million. The third collapsed after what Lord Judge described as a serious attempt at jury  
tampering.
Very troubling was the case o f Sally Clarke, a solicitor, who was convicted o f murdering her two infant sons 
after a jury heard that the chances o f the babies dying natural deaths was one in seventy three million. That 
statistic was later shown to have grossly misrepresented the chance o f  two sudden deaths within the same family 
fi’om unexplained but natural causes. Sally Clarke had her convictions quashed by the Court o f Appeal in 2003, [ 
2003] EWCA Crim 1020. ( See generally A Wilson, Expert Testimony in the Dock 2005 69 Journal o f Criminal 
Law 330 ) but never recovered fi’om her ordeal and was found dead at her home in 2007. For details o f this and 
other cases where expert evidence o f doubtful reliability was admitted before juries see D. Ormerod and A. 
Roberts, Expert Evidence: Where Now? What Next? (2006) 5 Archbold News 5. and Part 2 The Admissibility o f  
Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales ( A New Approach to the Determination o f  
Evidentiary Reliability) and The Law Commission, Consultation Paper No 190,2009. Some “experts”, who 
have given evidence before courts, have also turned out to be acting fraudulently including Godwin Onubogu ( a 
bogus medical doctor, convicted in 1998), Barian Baluchi ( who pretended to be a psychiatrist, convicted in 
2005 ) and Gene Morrison ( who falsely claimed he was a psychologist and was convicted in 2007).
The Admissibilty o f  Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (  A New Approach to the 
Determination o f  Evidentiary Reliability), The Law Commission, Consultation Paper No 190, 2009.
The proposed admissibility rule itself would effectively restate the common law rule. However the 
Commission ( page 4 o f the Paper. ) expressed belief that a new statutory test would ensure that the question 
would be properly addressed by advocates and the trial judge and that a reasoned decision would be given on 
whether the evidence is admissible or inadmissible.
Lord Justice Goldring, interviewed at the Royal Courts o f Justice on the 30* April, 2009, predicted that if  the 
Law Commission’s recommendations were put into effect the length o f trials would much increase.
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Special Measures for Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses.
Recognising certain witnesses have particular difficulties attending court and giving 
evidence due to their age or personal circumstances or needs or fear of intimidation, the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 ( “ YJCEA 1999” ) introduced a range of 
measures, collectively known as “Special Measures”, which can be employed to help 
vulnerable and intimidated witnesses give their evidence in the best possible way.
Speeial measures that may be available to prosecution and defence witnesses (but not the 
defendant ) with the agreement of the court include :
The witness sitting in a room outside the court and giving evidence via a TV link. He or she 
is able to see the eourtroom and those present there can see the witness on a screen;
Video recorded evidenee. Witnesses videotaped interview evidence is played to the court 
where it stands as examination in chief. ( The court can exclude a recording if there is 
insufficient information about where it was made, or if the recording contains serious 
breaehes of the rules of evidence. )
Making sereens available to shield the witness from the defendant;
Giving evidence in the absence of members of the public;
Removal of wigs and gowns by judges and barristers;
Appointment of an intermediary to assist the witness understand questions asked and to make 
his or her answers understood by the court;
And Permitting use of communication aids, for example an alphabet board.
Use of special measures for vulnerable or intimidated witnesses can only be authorized by 
a court if they are likely to improve the “quality” ( eoherence, completeness and accuracy) of 
a witness’s evidenee. As a single exeeption to the general rule, this requirement does not 
apply to ehildren in need of “special protection”. These are children in sexual cases involving 
violenee, abduction or neglect. In such cases the eourt does not have to consider whether 
speeial measures will improve the quality of their evidenee; it is assumed they will All
child witnesses in need of special protection have the video recording of their evidence
Vulnerable witnesses are defined by Section 16 YJCEA, 1999 . They include children, witnesses who have a 
mental disorder recognised under the Mental Health Act 1983, witnesses whose intelligence and social 
functioning is significantly impaired and physically disabled witnesses.
Intimidated witnesses under Section 17 YJCEA 1999 are whose suffering from fear or distress about 
testifying in a case, complainants in sexual assault cases, victims o f domestic violence, racially motivated crime 
and repeat victimization, the families o f homicide victims, witnesses who neglect or harm themselves, or who 
are elderly and frail.
YJCEA 1999 Sections 23 to 30.
See Sections 21 and 22 YJCEA 1999.
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admitted as evidence in chief, unless it is excluded by the court on the basis that its admission 
would not be in the interests of justice. Child witnesses in cases of violence will normally be 
cross -examined via live TV link. For all other child witnesses, there is a presumption that 
evidence in chief will be given by video recording , if one has been made, and that cross- 
examination will be via live TV link.
Making submissions on special measures, either for the prosecution or the defence, has 
become an integral part of modem criminal advocacy in cases involving vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses
The way vulnerable witnesses are examined came to public attention in 2009 following a 
case in which a man was convicted of raping a girl who was two years old at the time of the 
offence. In accordance with the Act, the jury watched the child on an edited 27 minute video 
answer questions from a police officer. This stood as her examination in chief. The little girl, 
aged four at the trial and the youngest ever witness to appear at the Old Bailey, was placed in 
a side room with a court usher. She briefly met there the defendant’s barrister and the 
prosecuting barrister, both removed their wigs beforehand. Using a TV live link to the 
courtroom, she was then cross-examined for 40 minutes Officials involved in the case 
recorded they were very concerned about what had taken place and some children’s charities 
called for reform One change urged, which would spare young children having to come to 
court, is implementation by the government of Section 28 of the YJCEA 1999. This allows 
video recorded cross -examination if a witness is permitted to give their evidence in chief on 
video. A key intention behind the Section was to introduce early cross-examination, shortly 
after the defence receive the prosecution video, while events were still fresh in the witness’s 
mind. The Section was not implemented because it was said to be impractical for two reasons. 
Firstly, the barrister who will represent the defendant would not yet have been appointed and 
the defence would not want to entrust cross-examination to another advocate. Secondly to 
cross-examine the witness effectively the defence may need all the evidence the prosecution 
has collected, including “unused material” it does not intend to use at trial. The defence may 
not have this by the time they need it. Should these objections be accorded less weight and
Professor Cheryl Thomas, o f University College London and author of Are Juries Fair?, Ministry o f Justice 
Research Series 1/10, said, in an interview conducted on 11* May, 2010, that research on the effect on jurors o f  
hearing evidence through special measures was necessary and that she would recommend this to the Ministry o f  
Justice.
For a transcript o f the cross-examination see Jury transfixed as child rape evidence unfolds on video, The 
Times, May 2”**, 2009.
Including the National Society for the Prevention o f Cruelty to Children in a report by Joyce Plotnikoff and 
Richard Woolfson, Measuring Up? Evaluating implementation o f  Government commitments to young witnesses 
in criminal proceedings. NSPCC, 2009.
233
the Section brought into force, advocates will have to adapt their approaches and skills to a 
new procedure out of the court.
Witness anonymity in serious triais.
In less than two decades, from the early 1990s, prosecution applications to permit witnesses 
fearing intimidation to give evidence anonymously in trials of serious and violent offences 
grew from negligible to common place. The practice by judges of granting witness anonymity 
orders was upon their understanding of common law. It was not based on statute. Faced with 
escalating gun and knife crime, gang culture and low levels of convictions in blighted inner 
city areas, the police found offering complete anonymity to be an effective way of 
encouraging fearful witnesses to come forward. In 2008 one senior barrister said the use of 
anonymity in murder trials had become routine Witnesses who have been offered 
anonymity by the police first give a statement to the police under a pseudonym. If a judge 
makes a witness anonymity order, a witness gives evidence in court from behind screens and 
visible only to the judge and jury. Crucially, the witness cannot be seen, heard or identified by 
the accused, or by the accused’s associates in the public gallery. His or her voice is distorted 
so that it not possible to tell his or her age, gender or race.
The granting of witness anonymity orders greatly effects the defence advocate’s task. 
Although prosecutors are under a duty to disclose any evidence about a witness’s credibility 
this is of limited use because material that would identify the person is not given. Without 
knowing who a prosecution witness is defence lawyers cannot take instructions from their 
clients on matters to put in cross -examination which might undermine his or her credibility 
or question motivation for giving evidence; in some cases anonymity may induce perjury , 
especially in trials for gang-related crime in which witnesses may use it to settle scores. 
Accordingly defence counsel are restricted in what they can say about witness credibility and 
honesty in their closing speeches to the jury. In the course of the trial they are also prohibited 
from asking other witnesses if the anonymous witness was at the scene of the crime because 
to do so would reveal the identity.
That a witness gives evidence anonymously may prejudice a jury against a defendant. As 
a Queen’s Counsel, who defended one of those charged with murdering two teenage girls, 
Letisha Shakespeare and Charlene Ellis, in Birmingham in 2005, put it: Once the jury see a
The Price o f  Justice, The Times, June 25, 2008. The barrister was not named in the article. Another barrister, 
a Queen’s Counsel, also unnamed, estimated that applications for anonymity were made in three quarters o f all 
his cases.
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witness screened o ff and with their voice distorted, you worry that despite warnings from the 
judge and the prosecutor not to do s o , they will simply assume that the defendant is a 
dangerous criminal capable o f  serious violence Trying to counter the effect of screens and
distorted voices on jurors in closing speeches has become a major objective of defence 
counsel.
In a case in June 2008, R v Davis^ ®^  the House of Lords affirmed there was a long 
established principle of common law that an accused can confront his or her accusers and 
held there was only very limited power to grant a witness anonymity from the defendant. The 
House of Lords ruled that legislation was needed for the practice to continue and referred the 
matter to Parliament. The case attracted much publicity. Greatly alarmed at the prospect of 
the collapse of ongoing and pending serious trials, the Secretary of State for Justice 
introduced emergency legislation very rapidly. The Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) 
Act 2008^*° which, in addition to allowing witnesses to give evidence anonymously, ensures 
convictions cannot be quashed solely because anonymous evidence is used.
In particular, the Act:
Sets out an indicative list of the kinds of special measures that the courts may apply to protect 
the identity of an anonymous witness, for example, the use of screens and voice distortion^**; 
Makes provision for any party to criminal proceedings to apply for a witness anonymity order 
so either the prosecution or a defendant may apply^* ;^
Establishes three conditions for making an order -  broadly the measures used must be 
necessary to protect the safety of the witness or another person or in order to prevent real 
harm to the public interest, the defendant must receive a fair trial and the order must be in the 
interests of justice^* ;^
Presents a non -exhaustive list of considerations to which a court must have regard when 
deciding if the conditions for making an order are met covering the defendant’s general right 
to know the identity of a witness, the extent to which credibility is relevant, whether the 
witness’s evidence might be the sole or decisive evidence implicating the defendant, whether 
the witnesses evidence can be properly tested, whether the witness has a tendency or any
Nigel Rumfitt QC, quoted in Can Justice be blind and anonymous? The Times, 23*^  June, 2008. 
R V Davis [2008] UKHL36. 18* July, 2008.
*^° Presented to Parliament on the 3*^  July, 2008 and given Royal Assent on the 2T* July, 2008.
’** Section 2 .
*^^  Section 3.
*^^  Section 4.
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motive to be dishonest and whether alternative means could be used to protect the identity of 
the witness ;
and Requires the judge to give such a warning to the jury in Crown Court trials , as the judge 
considers it appropriate, so that the fact an order was made does not prejudice the defendant
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Given the consequences of granting a witness anonymity order it can be safely anticipated 
that many applications under this legislation will be made and resisted.
Skeleton arguments.
Advocates injury cases where submissions on complex questions of law are to be made, 
usually in the absence of the jury, are now often encouraged by judges to submit skeleton 
arguments beforehand. This movement towards paper advocacy has not been universally 
welcomed by all criminal advocates. A Court of Appeal judge interviewed , who had tried 
cases in the Crown Court, said that requests for skeletons were not always complied with and 
could be very skeletal when they were submitted. The former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, 
considered thought should at least be given to whether skeleton arguments should be 
submitted to juries*'*^ . By convention in heavier cases before the Crown Court, the prosecution 
now make available their opening speech in written form to the judge and defendant’s 
counsel before it is delivered to the jury.
In the Court of Appeal it is necessary for both the Crovm and the appellant to submit a 
skeleton argument. In the spirit of cards on the table, both sides are now required to reveal 
their arguments before the hearing. This has effected advocacy. Before the present approach, 
advocates had the opportunity of observing the response their submissions had on judges and 
their opponents and, if necessary to adjust them or even abandon parts. It may still be
Section 5. 
Section 7.
716 1 n th18 July, 2007, Lord Justice Richards. 
Interviewed on 27*  June, 2007.
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possible to withdraw some submissions at the hearing but this is now more difficult. Judges in 
possession of skeleton arguments, it is said, often reach strong provisional views of the merits 
of a case which may be difficult for counsel to reverse. Questions directed at barristers tend to 
stem from opinions formed before the hearing. Whilst aware of the advantages in saving court 
time brought by skeleton arguments, some barristers regret their reduced opportunity to shape 
the court’s analysis orally of the case before it and loss of flexibility to respond to the way it 
appears to be received
Making statements on behalf of victims’ families.
More lawyers in the Crown Court will act in future as an advocate on behalf of the 
families of victims of murder or manslaughter. Under a pilot scheme introduced at five 
Crown Courts in 2006 they were given the opportunity to make a statement in open court, 
after conviction and before sentence, about the effect of those crimes on them. Whilst oral 
testimony from the maker could be given, a family could choose to be assisted by a lawyer, 
either a CPS prosecutor ( not the prosecutor in the case) or an independent advocate with 
higher court rights, who would deliver a statement to the court The government 
announced, in June 2007, the procedure piloted in the scheme was to operate permanently in 
all crown courts. Although it insisted that allowing victims’ loved ones to express feelings in 
court was not meant to influence sentencing, critics maintain it is unrealistic to expect judges 
will always be immune from highly emotional accounts of their grief
Heavy drinking and boredom.
The impression of a number of interviewees was that heavy drinking by barristers, an 
aspect of the Bar for generations, but seldom discussed, had declined over the last two
View s expressed by Anthony Arlidge QC interviewed on 30* October, 2007. Lord Justice Goldring, 
interviewed on the 30* April, 2009, said he detected resentment amongst some counsel about having 
to make written, rather than oral, submissions.
The Central Criminal Court, Birmingham Crown Court, Cardiff Crown Court, Manchester Crown 
Court and Winchester Crown Court.
A Protocol issued by the President o f  The Queen’s Bench D ivision set out procedure follow ed in 
the V ictim s’ Advocates Pilot Areas.
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decades. Excessive consumption of alcohol had, in their view, impaired the quality of some 
advocacy, especially after lunch, and reduced time for effective preparation of cases, 
particularly those received the night before.
It was said in an interview with a solicitor , who frequently instructs counsel in the Crown 
Court, that sometimes barristers, to relieve boredom felt in some cases, will decide on a 
theme for the day, for example golf, and compete with each other as to who can make the 
most references to it in proceedings. It is impossible to say how widespread this practice is.
More Hastings than Birkett?
Some years ago a former Attorney General, said that much forensic oratory was now 
delivered like a chartered accountant reading a Sunday church lesson. Whilst many would 
regard this as an exaggeration, it is beyond doubt that advocacy to persuade juries, for a 
number of reasons, chief amongst them being the need for advocates to speak in the 
language of time, is shorter, plainer and more direct at the start of this century than it was 
at the beginning of the last. Very broadly speaking, and usually without the bullying 
sometimes associated with him, the style favoured by Sir Patrick Hastings, has eclipsed 
that of Lord Birkett, with its greater concern for the graces and literary heritage of 
English. This does not mean, however, that some histrionic ability amongst advocates is 
considered unnecessary. Speaking about modern jury advocacy. Sir Oliver Popplewell, a 
retired High Court judge said that in his experience jurors expect a bit of style, not 
dreariness, and want to be charmed, without being patronized. In his view, as much care 
as an actor should be taken in pitch, speed of delivery and pauses to accentuate points, 
convey and invite interest. According to him, constant movement of the eyes to scan the 
jury to make each member feel important is vital .
Marcel Berlins, Why victim  im pact statem ents should he axed. The Guardian, December 4* , 2006.
^  Deborah Sharpley, interviewed 20* August, 2007.
Interviewed 24* July, 2004 .
Sir Oliver Popplew ell’s view s echoed those o f  Sir James Stirling, then a judge in the High Court, 
expressed nearly thirty years before:
“To som e extent the sam e technical equipment is necessary to both professions. Voice, diction, 
variation  o f  pace, stress, the effective pause, are necessary weapons in both armouries. The actor 
studies these things deliberately; the advocate is largely let to make use o f  them by instinct and 
acquired experience. A too conscious artifice on the p a r t o f  counsel w ould pro b a b ly  d istract him from  
the main task, which is to m arshall his material: but even good  m aterial can be reduced to 
excruciating dullness by p o o r  delivery or a com plete lack o f  dram atic instinct. Even a wholly ju r is tic  
argument must be given som e “ bite “ i f  it going to be listened to e a s ily ”. Verdict, Oxford University 
Law Society, Hilary, 1966, VOL 2. NO 1. page 8. In this article the judge advanced the thesis that 
changes in advocacy curiously corresponded with those in styles o f  acting. This view  was put to 
Anthony Arlidge QC, interviewed on 30* October, 2007. Mr Arlidge said that parallels could certainly
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Advocacy in defamation cases.
Trials of civil defamation actions before a jury number very few each year but they often 
attract much publicity. It is probably correct to say that more vivid and entertaining advocacy, 
frequently with heaps of sarcasm and ridicule, is employed in these matters than anywhere 
else These trials, in some respects, appear as survivors from an earlier, more unrestrained 
and exuberant period. However, beneath the forensic extravaganza usually lies much greater 
preparation in cross-examination and closing speeches than in earlier times. George Carman 
QC, who died in early 2001, was recognized as the outstanding advocate in defamation trails
When asked, he stressed that real spontaneity in addressing juries was a thing of the past. 
To him, painstaking effort beforehand to coin phrases and choose words carrying emotional 
over-tones and great attention to detail was crucial. In this, his admirers compared him with 
Cicero and Quintillian He also had theatrical ability. Like the playwright Harold Pinter, 
George Carman in court, according to Marcel Berlins ''was a master o f  the pause, allowing 
a witness's dubious answer in cross examination to remain in the air fo r  a while, 
giving the jury  a chance to savour it, before pouncing on it and exposing its 
shortcomings
be drawn with the stage over the last three decades. They had seen the falling away o f  Lawrence 
O livier Shakespearian acting, with its unevenly paced and highly stylised delivery involving hard 
emphasis on selected words, and the rise o f  a more naturalistic and conversational form. On ability 
through voice to convey and invite the interest o f  jurors, it was said o f  the late Richard Ferguson QC 
“that he had the kind o f  voice that could read  the ju ry  the telephone hook and they w ould lis te n ”. 
Obituary, Times, 30* July, 2009.
^  Judges, to the delight the press, are sometimes said to go along with these spectacles by asking 
barristers to explain things, sometimes o f  an embarrassing nature, that they already know. Interview  
with Judge Lipton, 25* July, 2007.
See Dominic Carman, No Ordinary Man: A Life O f George Carman Q. C., Coronet Books, Hodder 
and Stoughton, 2002. Robert Alexander QC (1936-2005), Chairman o f  the Bar Council, 1985-1986, 
him self acclaimed by Lord Denning as the finest barrister o f  his generation, described George Carmen 
and Gilbert Gray as the modern heirs o f  the great legal titans vividly characterised by Anthony 
Trollope ( Gilbert Gray, Obituary, 26* April, 2011, Daily Telegraph).
Marcel Berlins, Writ large, The Guardian, January 8*, 2001. Commenting on the style o f  George 
Carman, Anthony Arlidge QC said it was surprisingly declamatory in an age o f  conversational 
advocacy. Interview on 30* October, 2007. Daniel Taylor, former company solicitor at the Sun and 
News o f  the World newspapers throughout the 1990’s and now Senior Partner at Taylor Hampton 
Solicitors, instructed George Carman in a number o f  defamation cases. In an interview, conducted on 
3* November, 2008, Mr Taylor spoke of: George Carman’s great ability to absorb facts before and 
during trials; his powerful cross-examinations in which witnesses were “hooked” and, unable to 
escape, subject to crushing questions designed to have maximum impact on jurors and his sense o f  
theatricality. When interviewed at his chambers, on 30* July, 2009, Michael B e lo ff QC, spoke o f  
cases in which he had appeared in defamation trials against George Carman. He said it was noticeable 
that when matters o f  law arose George Carmen would hurriedly turn to his juniors for advice. At first 
Michael B elo ff was m ystified by this, knowing that his opponent had obtained a first class degree in
^ 9
law and generally shone brightly at Oxford University, but then concluded he had deliberately pu rged  
him self o f  his knowledge o f  law in order to f in d  the same wavelength as his audience ofjurors.
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Chapter Eleven : Developments from the second 
half of the 20th Century influencing advocacy in the 
civil courts.
Availability of legal Aid.
Before the Legal Aid and Advice A ct 1949, part o f the postwar Labour Governm ent’s 
programme o f radical social reform, htde legal advice or representation in court was available 
to those who could not pay for it . The A c t , described by the then Attorney General, 
Hartley Shawcross, "as the charter of the little man to the British courts of Justice”, introduced means 
tested legal aid, administered by the Law Society, but funded by the government, for a wide 
range o f civil, including family, and criminal cases. This meant professional advocacy before 
the courts was available to greater numbers o f people and, consequendy, for soHcitors and 
barristers work became more abundant. The quahty o f advocacy for clients who before the 
1949 reform would have instructed lawyers on limited funds, but after the Act qualified for 
legal aid, increased as greater resources became available to prepare their cases and to 
represent them in court.
The abohtion, in 1965, o f the Bar’s rule that required a client to pay a special fee if  he or 
she wanted to be represented by a barrister from another circuit made a further , albeit much 
smaller, contribution to access to counsels’ services. This former restrictive practice.
F o r  a n  o u t l i n e  o f  w h a t  e x i s t e d  p r e v i o u s l y ,  a n d  i t s  v e r y  l i m i t e d  n a t u r e ,  s e e  H a r r y  K i r k ,  Portrait of a Profession, 
L o n d o n :  O y e z  P u b l i s h i n g ,  1 9 7 6 ,  C h a p t e r  8  a n d  A .  H .  M a n c h e s t e r ,  A  Modern ~Legal History of England and Wales 
1750-1950, L o n d o n ,  B u t t e r w o r t h s ,  1 9 8 0 ,  p p .  9 9  — 1 0 4 .  S e e  a l s o  S t e v e n  H y n e s  a n d  J o n  R o b i n s ,  The Justice Gap: 
whatever happened to legal aid?, L e g a l  A c t i o n  G r o u p ,  2 0 0 9 :  C h a p t e r  O n e  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  o r i g i n s  o f  l e g a l  a i d ,  
d e v e l o p m e n t s  i n  t h e  s c h e m e  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1 9 4 9  a n d  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  r e f o r m s  m a d e  b y  t h e  N e w  L a b o u r  
g o v e r n m e n t ,  w h i c h  c r i t i c s  m a i n t a i n e d  m u c h  r e d u c e d  i t s  a v a i l a b i l i t y  i n  c i v i l  c o u r t s .  P u b l i c  f u n d i n g  f o r  c a s e s  w i l l  
f u r t h e r  d i m i n i s h  i f  t h e  C o a l i t i o n  g o v e r n m e n t ’s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e t r e n c h m e n t  o f  l e g a l  a i d ,  s e t  o u t  i n  t h e  L e g a l  A i d ,  
S e n t e n c i n g  a n d  P u n i s h m e n t  o f  O f f e n d e r s  B U I  2 0 1 1 ,  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t .
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introduced in late Victorian times, also made it necessary to pay an additional fee for a 
barrister from within the circuit to attend at court
A retired Queen’s Counsel, who had specialized in commercial law reflecting on 
changes in advocacy during his career and why they had occurred , considered the Civil E
Relaxation of the rules against hearsay evidence.
Evidence Act 1968 was of great importance. Together with the later Civil Evidence Acts of 
1972 and 1995, this legislation swept away some two centuries of jurisprudence concerning 
the circumstances in which hearsay evidence could be adduced in civil trials . The hearsay 
nature of evidence became primarily a question of weight rather than admissibility . 
Advocates were no longer required to fill their minds with complex law on hearsay and to 
make often long submissions in trials on why such evidence should be admitted or excluded. 
This contrasts starkly with the United States, where hearsay, and other rigid rules relating to 
admission of evidence, continue to apply in civil trials, even though the majority of cases are 
now decided by judges, not jurors, for whom rules of admissibility were intended
Less anguiar judges.
It was reported by a former solicitor, who had briefed and attended many counsel during 
the 1960’s and 70’s, especially in the Chancery Division of the High Court, that judges could 
be pompous, aggressive and unpleasant to barristers applying for court orders who did not 
know the particular way they managed their court and cases. The slightest mistake was seized 
upon and could result in a case being put at the bottom of the cause list, or even not being 
heard at all that day. It seemed then that knowing the way a judge operated and looking the 
part was sometimes more important than the substance of an advocate’s case. The solicitor, 
who later became a Master in the Chancery Division, the Queen’s Bench Division and the
™  S e e  J .  R .  L e w i s ,  The VictorianBar, R o b e r t  H a l e ,  L o n d o n ,  1 9 8 2 ,  p p .  1 2 7 - 1 2 8 .
Murray Pickering QC interviewed on 20* May, 2007.
See Murphy on Evidence, Ninth Edition, Oxford University Press, Chapter 7.
In Rethinking the rules o f  evidentiary adm issibility in non -  ju ry  trials, 17 Maine Bar Journal 30 
(2002), John Sheldon and Peter Murray question whether strict rules o f  adm issibility, ch ief amongst 
them hearsay, should continue to apply in non-jury trials and consider how se lf  -representing litigants 
(very numerous in American Courts), with little, i f  any, knowledge o f  these rules, may be 
disadvantaged.
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Family Division of the High Court and a circuit judge , explained that the following years
saw a marked improvement. Judges became much more civil and constructive to counsel.
He mainly attributed this to younger judges remembering what they had gone through earlier 
as barristers.
A solicitor who had appeared in the County Courts since the early 1980’s and also sits as 
a deputy district judge, said that certain judges at the beginning of his career were more 
attentive and polite to barristers than solicitors and to solicitors who had briefed them in the 
past when they were barristers. They were least civil to young solicitors, especially females. 
He reported that such behaviour has disappeared
Changes in civil procedure and the transformation of advocacy.
Civil procedure changed enormously in the closing years of the 20^  ^Century and has led 
to a transformation in advocacy.
The picture before reform.
Civil litigation at common law rested on an adversarial system in which the parties 
themselves set the agenda and the pace of proceedings, culminating in a trial where all the 
business was conducted orally, even documents and legal authorities were read out in 
public^^^. Even in the appellate courts, the idea of written advocacy was abhorrent. This was 
illustrated by the case of Rondel v Worsley , concerning the immunity of counsel from 
being sued in negligence. The Court of Appeal was presented with a litigant in person with a 
lengthy and closely argued document. Lord Justice Dankwerts described this "as wholly 
irregular and contrary to the practice o f  the court” and added "in my opinion it should
Judge Julian Lipton interviewed July 25*, 2007. His view o f  judges o f  that period was substantiated 
by Anthony Arlidge QC who recounted that red  ju dges, those in the High Court, could be terrifying  
figures. Interview 30* October, 2007.
Interview, 16* October, 2007, with Mr Michael Gillman who qualified as a solicitor in 1979 and has had 
higher rights o f audience since 1994. He was then president o f the City and Westminster and Holbom Law 
Society. Judge Bailey, o f the Central London County Court, interviewed on T* November, 2007, recounted 
aggression displayed by some judges to advocates in the 1970’s and 1980’s. He was o f the opinion that this was 
now extremely rare in both the High Court and County court and that judges were much alike in the way they 
received advocates. He considered this could in part be due to the difference in people recruited nowadays to 
be judges, who have to be pre-eminently good in producing written work.
For a picture o f  the traditional approach to civil litigation see Mr. Justice Lightman, The case fo r  
ju d ic ia l intervention. N ew  Law Journal, December 3*^** 1999, pp. 1819 -  1836 .
^^[1967] 1 QB 443.
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not he allowed as a precedent fo r  future proceedings ... In appeals to the Court of 
Appeal the judgement below was read out in its entirety, often adding much to the length of 
the hearing .
Little exchange of information by the parties took place before a trial, save for pleadings, 
discovery and following orders for interrogatories (questions asked by one party to the other 
about his or her case). Opening speeches were made and could, in cases of high value and or 
importance, be very lengthy set pieces of advocacy lasting days. If done well they could be 
highly persuasive .Each side called witnesses as to fact who were examined '*'***, cross- 
examined by the opposing advocate and then re-examined. Expert witnesses were called, with 
little or no notice to the other side. A valued tactic was ambushing and surprising opponents. 
This was often done by suddenly producing new witnesses. Provided their evidence did not 
fall outside matters set out in the pleadings this was permitted. To be able to cross-examine 
surprise witnesses was a valued skill demanding considerable mastery of the case. By and 
large at trial Judges asked advocates and their witnesses few questions and only intervened to 
insist that rules of evidence and procedure were obeyed. The outcome of litigation very often 
depended upon whom parties could afford as their advocates and experts’"**. Costs, ordered by 
the court, were unpredictable and often disproportionate to the matter in dispute. They might 
be swelled by the use of pre-trial injunctions, freezing orders and orders to preserve evidence 
which were sometimes used, as were onerous orders for discovery, to harass opponents and 
added unnecessarily to delay. There were hardly any limits on the length of examinations and
Ibid, page 509 .
I f  they wanted to draw attention to its inadequacies, appellants would seek to have the judgement 
read towards the beginning o f  their case. Respondents, i f  satisfied by the judgement usually preferred 
it be read later. Interview with Lord Bingham o f  Cornhill, then Senior Law Lord, held on 23 *  October, 
2007.
In an interview, conducted on 27* July, 2009, Lord Hoffinann, who began his career in the mid -1960s, said 
there was often great advantage to advocates making the first opening speech which give them opportunity to 
shape the case favourably before judges, who had little other information, although this disappeared if  evidence 
was not as said to be or legal argument not as strong or wanting.
’"*** Whether witnesses would come up to proof, ie give as evidence what they said in their statement to 
solicitors, was o f  major concern to advocates who could generally only ask them non-leading 
questions (essentially those that did not suggest their answer ) . Before 1995 barristers were prevented 
by their professional rules from discussing evidence with lay witnesses. Techniques to steer witnesses 
back to what they had said in their proof o f  evidence were essential, as was quick thinking about how  
to manage cases when witnesses failed to come up to proof. Interview with Judge Bailey, E* 
November, 2007.
’"** See Mr Justice Lightman, The case fo r  judicial intervention. New Law Journal, 3rd December, 1999, page 
1820.
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submissions by lawyers, who were allowed to get on at their own speed and on the time 
generally that cases lasted at court. Increasingly from the late 1960s and 1970s onwards, the 
traditional judicial position of "hands o ff , giving almost free reign to barristers in court, and 
the approach of revealing as little of a party's hand before trial as possible, came to be seen as 
contributing much to the slowness and inefficiency of civil justice. The length of many trials 
was prolonged by advocates introducing more exhibits into evidence, much assisted by the 
rise of the photocopier in the 1970’s. (A High Court judge interviewed observed "that some 
solicitors live by their photocopiers” ) . Civil litigation more and more came to be 
regarded as a sport, rather than an effective, swift and just way to solve disputes, and one in 
which those with deeper pockets had a distinct advantage . Radical change was called for 
and began to be met.
Changes begin to occur.
The Report of the Review Body on Civil Justice in 1988 proposed a “cards on the 
table” approach to civil litigation and set in chain a series of reforms. In 1992 compulsory 
exchange of witness statements between parties before trial was introduced. This shortly 
followed on from a requirement that they disclose expert reports to each other. Judges ordered 
more interrogatories to elucidate issues in cases. A High Court Practice Direction in 1995 
carried things further. Under the Direction judges were to exercise greater control over the 
preparation for and conduct of hearings. This was to be achieved by a number of measures: 
limiting discovery; imposing time limits on oral submissions and the examination of 
witnesses; more narrowly defining issues to be addressed; abandoning the practice of counsel 
in court reading aloud documents and authorities; written witness statements were to stand as 
examination in chief unless otherwise ordered so oral evidence would usually begin with
A Court o f  Appeal judge, interviewed on 11* July, 2007 ( Lord Justice Sedley), said it was like a 
slow  bicycle race -  the view  was you  could take as long as you  wanted.
Even before the 1960’s and 7 0 ’s the problems o f  delay and disproportionate expense in High Court 
litigation had been debated. The best way to end them was seen as lying with the judge rather the 
parties. The Evershed Committee ( Final Report o f  the Committee on Supreme Court Practice and 
Procedure (1953) Cmd 8878.) recommended more intervention by the court, and a stronger line on the 
“summons for directions” before trial. Little, however, came o f  this.
Cmnd 394.
Practice Direction [1995] 1 A ll E. R. 385.
Since the introduction o f  witness statements standing as evidence in chief, the function o f  barristers 
in relation to witnesses has become somewhat more complicated. This is because solicitors send draft
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the cross-examination; counsel were to provide the court with skeleton arguments ( These had 
already been introduced for the Court of Appeal in 1989 under Lord Donaldson, the then 
Master of the Rolls); parties supplying the court with bundles and written evidence to read in 
advance of trial; and in heavy cases permitting the court to require written submissions as 
well.
The effect of these reforms was that judges became much more informed about the cases 
they were to try. They were freed from being almost completely in the hands of counsel. No 
longer had they to s it ,” silently like sphinxs, but rarely sm iling” gradually absorbing 
what the application or case was about. Judges could, and did, take greater control of cases 
and began to steer them. The reactive judge of the past was replaced by the proactive judge of 
the present and future. In the words of Mr Justice Lightman , Informed judicial 
intervention was born ” in the courts of first instance . Prior to its arrival there, judicial 
intervention had long come of age in the appellate courts, particularly the House of Lords, 
where judges could read reports and documents from cases decided in courts below. Active 
judicial intervention by Registrars( now District Judges), although seldom informed 
beforehand of the cases they were to deal with, had also existed under the highly informal 
small claims procedure, where parties were only rarely represented by solicitors or counsel, 
which was introduced in 1973.
The Woolf Report, the new civil code and stages in a usuai trial.
One year after the 1995 Practice Direction, Sir Harry Woolf, now Lord Woolf, published 
Access to Justice, the report of a committee of inquiry into civil litigation, which proposed 
more changes to simplify litigation and reduce its cost. The recommendations in the report 
were mostly adopted and embodied in new Civil Procedure Rules. Drafted in 1998, and 
commenced the following April, they replaced ,with a few exceptions, now almost all gone, 
the Rules of the Supreme Court in the High Court and the County Court Rules in the County 
Courts.
witness statements to barristers for their approval or, increasingly, instruct them to draft witness 
statements. Both activities may involve a barrister requesting a solicitor to ask the witness more 
questions for the purpose o f  elabourating upon certain parts he or she has dealt with, and to turn the 
w itness’s attention to other evidence with which it apparently conflicts. Guidance on the role o f  the 
barrister in preparing witness statements, principally to guard against anything approaching witness 
coaching, has been set out by the General Council O f the Bar in P reparing Witness Statem ents fo r  
Use in C ivil P roceedings, Bar Standards Committee. First Issued January, 2001 and Reviewed  
September, 2008.
As it was put by Mr. Justice Lightman, interviewed 8* March, 2007.
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Under what was intended to be a completely new civil code courts are directed to give 
effect to the “overriding objective” of dealing with cases justly ’"*^ This includes ensuring that 
parties are on an equal footing and in ways that are proportionate to the amount of money 
involved, the importance and complexity of the case, and the means of the parties The 
Court must further the overriding objective by actively managing cases which includes fixing 
tight timetables, or otherwise controlling progress of the case, and, where appropriate, 
encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution procedure
"Hands on" judicial participation in trials is a central element in the CPR reform of civil 
procedure. Pre-reading of papers by the judge, particularly of the parties' skeleton arguments, 
and his or her active participation in the hearing are distinguishing characteristics of a modem 
civil trial under the new Civil Procedure Rules. Time limits, placed by Judges on the length of 
speeches and cross-examinations, are also frequently present, especially in cases allocated for 
trial under the "Fast Track" procedure. Subject to some exceptions , notably minor personal 
injury and housing disrepair cases, which can only be heard in this track if they do not exceed 
£1,000 , claims with a value up to £5000 are allocated to the small claims track which 
replaced the small claims procedure, introduced in 1973. Like that which it superseded, strict 
mles of evidence do not apply in small track claims hearings. Unless there are compelling 
reasons not to do so, claims worth between £5,000 and £15,000 were allocated to the fast 
track; and claims exceeding £15,000 were sent to the multi-track. Following acceptance of the 
proposals of a review published in 2007 the £15,000 limit was raised to £25,000 for claims 
commenced on or after 6*^  April 2009 . This will inevitably increase the number of fast-
track cases, which accounted for 32 percent of allocated cases in 2007, and reduce the number 
of multi-track cases.
After a judge has read the bundle of trial papers, skeleton arguments very important 
amongst them , the stages of a typical trial are
Some discussion between the judge and the advocates, but, unlike before, no formal opening 
speeches;
The case fo r  ju d ic ia l intervention. N ew  Law Journal, 3*  December, 1999, pp. 1819 -  1836. 
’"*^CPR,r. 1.1 .
CPR, r. 1.2.
CPR, r. 4.2
See The Department o f  Constitutional Affairs Consultation Paper CP 8/07, published 20*  April, 
2007. The Paper’s recommendations that the limit for small claims should remain at £5,000 and that 
the ceiling for cases o f  personal injury and housing disrepair should also stay at £1,000 were also 
follow ed .
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Witnesses confirm the content of their witness statements; one or two questions may be asked 
of witnesses of fact, at the behest of the judge, but examination-in-chief as previously known, 
is now rare (even before the Civil Procedure Rules judges had been given the power, which 
they often used, to order that witness statements stood as examination-in-chief); 
Cross-examination limited by the trial timetable; discursive cross-examination is stopped by 
the clock and irrelevant cross-examination not allowed to prolong the trial;
Parties' final submissions in which they develop their skeleton arguments, but unlike 
pre-Civil Procedure Rules cases, these usually take the form of a discussion of issues 
with the Judge rather than a formal closing speech (In multi-track cases there may be 
an adjournment for both parties to submit written submissions’^ "*.);
And, following judgment, submissions about costs which may be more lengthy than 
formerly.
Combined impact on advocacy.
The fundamental changes brought about by the Civil Procedure Rules and earlier 
reforms, diminishing the oral element in civil trial procedure, have had a major effect on 
advocacy. Only cross-examination, probably its most important and defining aspect, 
lasts from the traditional form of common law civil trial, which best now survives in the 
United States. Reportedly, insistence on skeleton arguments/case summaries gave rise to 
initial complaints from some counsel who objected that they had come to the Bar to be 
court advocates and not to draft documents. They have, however, become a fact of life. 
Mr. Justice Lightman described properly prepared and used skeletons as "the foremost 
weapon in the advocates armoury”, the impact of which cannot be over-stated. In effect, 
a skeleton is now a party's first "speech" which he or she is allowed to deliver without 
any interruption from the Judge, who may rightly assume it is the advocate's best effort. 
"It may properly enable the judge to form  a provisional view o f  the case on which the 
Judge is asked to make at least a provisional judgment on the case as a whole and the 
merits o f  some or all o f  the issues, and it is perfectly legitimate fo r  the judge to do so 
and so inform the parties, putting them on notice o f  the hurdles to be surmounted: see
See Judge Frenkel, The N ew A dvocacy, The Law Society Gazette 96/24, June 16*, 1999, page 141. 
Mr Justice Warren, o f  the Chancery D ivision o f  the High Court, interviewed on 22"^ October, 
2009, said that written closing submissions were common in High Court cases o f  more than three days 
length, saved considerable court time and were o f  great assistance in writing judgements.
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Costello V Chief Constable o f  Derbyshire [2001] 1 WLR 1437 at page 1440, para 9. In a 
word cases can be won or lost on skeleton arguments” At the appellate level, it has 
been said that some Court of Appeal judges admit that cases are decided before oral 
argument is heard
Because judges are now delivering more and more reserved judgements, both at 
trial and appeal level, skeleton arguments are also , in a sense, advocates' closing 
speeches, available to members of the court long after the oral argument has finished . 
Originally they were conceived as “skeletal” and succinct documents to identify and 
summarise the relevant issues of fact and law, not to argue them fully in writing. The 
essential minimum requirements are a chronological account of relevant facts, a 
statement of the issues of law and fact and an evaluation of the rival answers to those 
issues. Indicative of the growing importance of written advocacy, it is said that courts 
are increasingly unconcerned with their length where material provided is necessary, 
persuasive and assists the court to solve the problem before it. A Court of Appeal judge, 
interviewed in his chambers showed examples of skeleton arguments submitted to 
him. The shortest was 25 pages and the longest 47 pages. Whilst he agreed that skeleton 
arguments concentrate minds on a case , the judge thought that some may be too long 
because they attempted to deal with peripheral matters which might arise. Another Lord 
Justice of Appeal said some were almost like speakers notes. Lord W o o l f s p o k e  of 
needless repetition when advocates merely repeat almost verbatim what has been 
written. They agreed that quality advocates are those who strike a good balance between 
written and oral presentation, appreciating that the purpose of advocates' speeches is to 
elaborate and supplement the skeletons. Books for legal practitioners on written 
advocacy are now beginning to appear. One of these is Andrew Goodman’s, Influencing
Mr Justice Lightman: lecture to the Chancery Bar Association entitled Advocacy -  A Dying Art?, 
January 2004. In a lecture, delivered at the College o f  Law on the 4* February, 2010 and entitled Interim  
Applications at the Junior Bar, Timothy Dutton QC, a former leader o f  the South Eastern Circuit and 
Chairman o f the Bar o f  England and Wales, emphasised the importance o f  short and clear skeleton 
arguments in advocacy concerning interim applications
Andrew Goodman, Influencing The Judicial M ind -  Effective Written Advocacy in Practice, XPL 
Publishing, 2006, pxvii. In support o f  this, Goodman states that in about 40 percent o f  appeals heard 
since 2000, either one side or the other was not called upon to make an oral presentation and that figure 
is now rising.
18* July, 2007 ,Lord Justice Richards.
Interviewed on 11* July, 2007, Lord Justice Sedley. Lord Hoffmann, interviewed on the 27* July, 
2009, spoke o f  a general dislike by appellate judges o f  advocates using speaking notes. This he 
described as a fa ilure o f  advocacy. Reading aloud by advocates had a deadening effect and was very 
time consuming. For these reasons, he was glad they were no longer permitted to read extensively from 
cases but were required to indicate the relevant parts and legal principles derived from them in skeleton 
arguments submitted.
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The Judicial Mind -  Effective Written Advocacy in P r a c t i c e , .In his Forward, the 
author made the interesting observation that despite skeleton submissions being first 
introduced ten years earlier, he had seen no other previous work entirely devoted to 
written argument. Although he reached no conclusion about this, it may reveal an initial 
reluctance on behalf of many members of a legal profession, with such a long history of 
oral advocacy, both to accept the limits imposed on it by written advocacy and its 
persuasive importance.
In modern civil trials witness statements stand as evidence in chief, although judges 
may direct that a witness be examined in chief. A Lord Justice of Appeal when he 
had tried cases at first instance, insisted that counsel should ask a witness a few 
questions in chief on evidence that was not in dispute, so as to help him assess his or her 
general credibility. He understood that this practice, which he considered helpful, was 
now very rare, mainly because of a desire to save court time. Consequently, he believed, 
that in civil cases many young barristers had lost the ability to examine in chief Both 
he and Mr. Justice Lightman were of the opinion that witness statements had greatly 
expanded in length to cover almost any conceivable issue. Time taken in cross- 
examination had much increased on the basis that unless challenged what was in a 
witness statement would be accepted by the court as evidence. Mr. Justice Lightman 
explained that both these developments were to avoid the possibility of being sued in 
negligence by clients and referred to the landmark House of Lords case of Arthur JS 
Hall and Co v Simons decided in 2000 This established that an advocate can be sued 
for negligent conduct in court. Hitherto lawyers could only be sued for negligent 
preparation of a case outside court. In his view, clients in the High Court, were much 
more critical of and aggressive towards their lawyers than earlier. Everyone now has a 
view. This may be connected with the high cost of litigation Because of the growth in
Interviewed 27*’' June, 2007.
^^XPL Publishing, 2006.
Interviewed 18*’' July, 2007, Lord Justice Richards.
This view was shared by Judge Bailey o f  the Central London County Court. The judge usually only 
orders some examination in ch ief o f witnesses, to assist him in assessing their credibility, in cases where 
fraud is alleged. He contrasted advocates’ lack o f accomplishment in conducting examination in chief 
with the past when skill in this area was an essential part o f civil law advocacy. Interview, T* November, 
2007.
Interview, 8*’' March, 2007.
’ '^’ [2000] 3AER 673.
At the level o f  lower cost litigation - the fast track- concern has been expressed that all too frequently, 
especially in road traffic claims, witnesses under cross-examination change crucial parts o f  their 
evidence from that which appears in the witness statement. This inevitably damages their credibility. 
District Judge David Oldham, Getting back on track, Law Society Gazette, 9*’' April, 2009, attributes this
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size of witness statements and correspondingly prolonged cross-examination, the Lord 
Justice of Appeal thought that in some cases the previous system of oral examination in 
chief and cross-examination might be quicker^^^. On the matter of judges imposing time 
limits for cross-examination and closing speeches, Mr. Justice Lightman said most 
advocates observed them. However, when they did not, there was a great variation in 
how judges reacted. Some were very keen to enforce them, whilst others, particularly 
those who had not conducted trials themselves as advocates ( in other words they had 
previously been solicitors rather than barristers ), were very reluctant to intervene. It 
was certainly useful for advocates to have knowledge of their judge and how much 
latitude they would be given.
Encouragement, backed by sanctions in costs, of disputants to jointly appoint a 
single expert witness, whenever possible, is an important component of the civil 
procedure reforms. The single expert's report covering matters in dispute usually carries 
much weight in court. Dealing with these reports in submissions, either to persuade or, 
more difficultly, to dissuade judges to follow their conclusions, has become as 
important aspect of civil advocacy
to some solicitors drafting witness statements which, because o f  sloppy preparation, do not accurately 
reflect their client’s version o f  events A large volume o f  fast track road traffic cases are now handled by 
solicitors situated great distances from their clients. Instructions are seldom taken face to face and 
usually by letter, telephone and sometimes e-mail. Statements are then prepared for witnesses approval 
and signature. Witnesses credibility may also be effected because they have not been properly advised 
about what to expect at court. Often they are represented by counsel and he or she w ill be the first 
lawyer they have met since the litigation began. A feature o f  advocacy in fast track cases is that many 
parties do not come up to proof. This has consequences for advocates in establishing the credibility o f  
their clients and witnesses on their behalf and may involve seeking to persuade judges to permit re­
examination, despite tight time limits for the hearing.
A very similar view was taken by Lord Justice Goldring. In his experience, as a former Judge in the 
High Court (Queens Bench Division) and then as the Judge in charge o f  the Commercial Court, much 
advocacy has become defensive and long winded  as advocates feel they have to make every possible 
point, to avoid allegations o f negligence, in witness statements, cross examination and closing speeches. 
The days when advocates would just select their best arguments had passed. ( Interview conducted on 
30*’' April, 2009. )
It is reported that some parties appoint their own shadow experts to advise them about the single joint 
expert’s report. The concept o f  the single joint expert has led to appellate cases. In Daniels v Walker 
[2000] IWLR 1382 the Court o f  Appeal sent a clear message the fact a party had agreed to jointly  
instruct an expert did not prevent that party from obtaining a report from another expert for reasons that 
are not fanciful. Lord W oolf revisited this issue and developed it further in P v M id Kent H ealthcare 
NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1703. His judgement included a clear point o f  principle: The starting po in t 
is this: unless there is reason fo r  not having a single jo in t expert, there should be only a single expert. I f  
there is no reason that justifies more evidence than that from  a single jo in t expert on any particu lar  
topic, then again in the normal way the report prepared  by a single expert should be the evidence in the 
case on the issues covered by that expert’s report. In the normal way, therefore, there should be no need  
fo r  that report to be am plified or tested  in cross-examination. I f  it needs amplification, or i f  it should be 
subject to cross examination, the court has discretion to allow that to happen ....e itherprior to the 
hearing or at the hearing. But the assumption is that the single expert’s report is the evidence.
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A premium in contemporary advocacy is put on being flexible to deal with issues 
raised, not as the advocate may have calculated, but as they are brought up by the Judge, 
sometimes at the beginning of the case, but more frequently in closing submissions. In 
the opinion of Mr. Justice Lightman the new civil advocacy requires a far greater 
knowledge of the facts and law by advocates than when Judges were ""generally tame 
and on a tight lead” and seldom intervened during proceedings. Now they” may be 
found harking - on occasion perhaps biting at the ankles o f  advocates. He saw 
confidence not to he overawed, resilience to respond, tenacity to challenge, tact to 
mollify and the authority to inform and persuade” as indispensable qualities in 
advocacy when dealing with judicial interventions, which should be made for the 
purpose of directing both parties advocates to essential issues so as to save time and 
costs . As with enforcing time limits in cross-examination and closing speeches, he 
identified differences between judges in the extent they intervene with questions. Again, 
those who had been advocates appeared more likely to intervene than those who had not
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After judgement has been delivered, or following a decision on an interim matter, a 
vital part of advocacy is making persuasive submissions on whether costs incurred, 
which may in some cases exceed the amount of a claim, are proportionate and
The case fo r  ju d ic ia l intervention. New Law Journal, 3'** December, 1999, pp.819-1836. Speaking 
about questions asked by judges in appellate cases. Lord Hoffmann, during an event at the London 
School o f  Economics on the 5*’' May, 2009, entitled. L ord Hoffmann in Conversation with Sir Ross 
Cranston, said that not all questions directed to advocates are for the purpose o f  eliciting answers. 
Sometimes questions are to show other judges which way a judge is thinking.( When this occurs. Lord 
Hoffmann, in interview on the 27* July, 2009, said that advocates should respectfully say they do not 
consider the question relevant, although he conceded this may require tact and courage.) In reply to a 
question from the audience. Lord Hoffmann explained how appellate judges, especially those in the 
House o f  Lords, may try to persuade their colleagues about the direction to follow in cases on matters o f  
law. Techniques include: talking to fellow judges before the hearing; using whatever skills o f  advocacy  
they had acquired as advocates during their careers during adjournments; and rapidly producing draft 
judgements for circulation amongst other judges in the hope they w ill adopt the train o f  thinking 
expressed in them. Lady Hale, a Justice o f the Supreme Court, when asked (after she had been 
interviewed at the London School o f  Economics by Sir Ross Cranston, in an event entitled Lady Hale in 
Conversation with Sir Ross Cranston, on the 26* January, 2010) about what Lord Hoffmann had said, 
said practices such as these were was not as widespread as might be believed from Lord Hoffmann’s 
account, partly because they would be o f  limited value as most appellate judges are very independently 
minded.
Based on his experience at the Central London County Court, Judge Bailey reported advocates were 
not always good at answering questions directed to them by judges in trials. Many expected the 
opportunity to deliver set piece un- interrupted advocacy and some appeared resentful this no longer 
corresponded with reality. Surprisingly few had mastered techniques to buy more time before answering. 
Interview held on L* November, 2007. Lord Hoffmann, interviewed on 27* July, 2009, emphasised how 
much judges, at all levels, appreciated advocates who, when asked about relevant law, could accurately 
condense case authorities and not merely resort to referring to head notes.
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reasonable. According to a senior barrister interviewed this requires advocates to 
have a much greater grasp of the principles upon which costs are calculated, and how 
have been accumulated in the cases in which they are involved, than before the 
introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules.
Speaking shortly after the Civil Procedure Rules came into effect. Lord Justice 
Sedley predicted that ""greater weight placed on co-operation between lawyers in getting 
the real issues before court, more general emphasis under the Civil Procedure Rules on 
compromise and settlement, and the qualities o f  preparation, organization, and 
sensitivity now required o f  advocates would further advance reasoned persuasion in 
advocacy at the expense o f  whatever remains o f  rhetoric and bombast” Interviewed 
eight years later he considered that in civil advocacy this had largely come true. In 
the early 1990’s, Richard DuCann wrote about the practice then emerging in some 
tribunals of requiring summaries of speeches, which were somewhat similar to skeleton 
arguments, in advance of a hearing: ""It may flatten the language which is used , rhetoric 
cannot survive in print, but it does concentrate the mind wonderfully” . Lord Justice 
Sedley said that he strongly agreed with this quotation.
A retired Queen’s Counsel said that in commercial law cases rhetoric and bombast 
had gone long before skeleton arguments and the Woolf reforms.
He explained that practitioners in that area of law were usually highly educated in law 
and of considerable intellectual calibre Commercial cases, especially those on 
appeal, were frequently very complicated and of great financial value. Much preparation 
and research on the law was necessary. In short it was a very serious business and one in 
which there was simply no room for distractions of rhetoric and bombast, which would 
certainly not be appreciated by highly paying clients .A similar opinion was offered 
by Michael Beloff QC.In his view, the decline of rhetoric, the use o ï ""borrowed 
plum age” from literature and history, and of bombast was also much linked to what he
™  Interview, 8* March, 2007.
Nigel Ley, 2"^ ’ June, 2006.
The Lord Morris Memorial Lecture, Cardiff University, September 28*, 1999.
11* July, 2007.
The A rt o f  the Advocate, Penguin Books, 1993, page 189.
Murray Pickering QC, interviewed 20* May, 2007.
His chambers demanded that pupils, who may go on to be tenants, had a first class degree.
Timothy Dutton QC, a commercial silk, former leader o f  the South Eastern Circuit and o f  the Bar 
Counsel o f  England and Wales, interviewed on 4* February, 2010, said that there was much to be said 
for following his no adjective and adverb rule, making the facts speak for themselves -  an approach, in 
his view, much appreciated by judges.
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termed ""fragmentation o ffo ra ” , particularly during the last three or so decades of the 
Twentieth Century. Rather than being, as in past times, generalists in many areas of law 
appearing before a variety of courts, advocates, because of law’s increasing 
technicality, tend to be restricted to practising specialist law in specialist courts and 
tribunals . The language employed there is very much that required by the specific 
setting and simply does not lend itself to what might be described as the more grand and 
universal forms of address heard when advocates appeared before many courts
Lord Justice Sedley considered skeleton arguments and the Civil Procedure Rules 
had speeded trials up and this was beneficial. Whilst recognizing advantages in these 
reforms, Mr. Justice Lightman spoke about how trials were being slowed by advocates, 
orally and in writing, bombarding judges with judgements from superior courts. This, in 
his opinion, was the result of publishers reporting more and more cases without making 
efforts to distinguish between extempore and considered judgements or to avoid 
duplication of reporting : ""The practising lawyer is obliged to expend ever increasing 
resources and time ( paid  fo r  by clients) on obtaining access to and studying these 
reports ” . Barristers interviewed agreed that they often did cite more law than they
did before. One said that this was because internet legal data bases had made cases 
more available, with new ones arriving very quickly .
Internet research has made easier the task of researching foreign law which is 
increasingly cited by advocates as persuasive authority, especially before appellate 
courts. There have been a few occasions when courts, concerned that domestic 
authorities appeared to give an inadequate answer to an acute human problem, have 
invited counsel to explore civil law authority in addition to Commonwealth and United 
States authority already cited to them
Interview conducted on 30* July, 2009.
The 6* Edward Bramley Memorial Lecture, Sheffield University, 2006 and in interview 8* March, 
2007 .
Lord Bingham, then the Senior Law Lord, in The Inaugural Birkenhead Lecture given at Gray’s Inn 
Hall in 2008, The Role o f  an A dvocate in a Common Law System, Graya No. 122, Hilary 2009, pp. 17- 
24, urged advocates in drafting skeleton arguments, or (in the House o f  Lords, now the United Kingdom  
Supreme Court) written cases, and equally in oral argument, to cite authorities” sparingly and without
extensive verbatim quotation. Some authorities were matchwinners they deserved
prom inence  M ore commonly in issue were authorities central to the appeal, but sa id  to be ambiguous,
distinguishable or wrongly decided, which might w ell call fo r  detailed examination and analysis. But no 
purpose was ordinarily served  by listing authorities which, even i f  they illustrated the application o f  a 
principle, decided nothing and added little or nothing to the store o f  existing learning”.
A notable example o f  counsel asked to do this was the House o f  Lords in Fairchild  v Glenhaven 
Funeral Services L td  [2003] 1 AC 32.
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Facility in civil advocacy is no longer measured in the planning and delivery of 
long speeches: Preparation of persuasive skeleton arguments/case summaries and 
chronologies, responding to interventions from judges with a finger tip in depth 
knowledge of the relevant facts and the law and the ability to make pertinent 
submissions on costs are now highly prized In adjusting to the crucial changes in 
advocacy that have occurred, law colleges, teaching vocational courses for barristers 
and solicitors, have increased instruction to students on drafting skeleton 
arguments/case summaries , responding to interventions by judges and submissions on 
costs. More attention will be given to teaching these areas in future.
The tradition of orai advocacy under threat?
An overall reduction in cases and more settlement of those commenced, both 
substantially attributed to the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules which have 
operated since April, 1999, has resulted in a drop in work for advocates This, 
coupled with the new style of civil advocacy stressing persuasiveness on the page and 
time limits on questioning and the length of speeches, led some lawyers, albeit a 
minority, to believe the fundamental tradition of oral advocacy itself in the English 
courts was endangered. In 2000, giving the Margaret Howard Memorial Lecture at 
Oxford University, Michael Beloff, a leading public law Queen's Counsel and President
N eville March Hunnings, for three decades editor o f the Common Market Law Reports, said, in an 
interview conducted on the 7* June, 2010, that successful combination by British and Irish counsel o f  
written and strictly time limited oral advocacy, especially in answering questions from judges, made 
them much sought after by parties before the European Court o f  Justice.
For statistics up to 2005 on the decline in cases issued in the County Court see Michael Zander, Cases 
and M aterials on the English Legal System, 10* Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 132-41. 
Reasons commonly put forward for more cases settling include: pre-action protocols, requiring parties to 
let each other know the basis o f  their proposed claims and defences before the issue o f  proceedings; Part 
36 payments or offers o f payment, especially offers made by claimants ( not possible under the previous 
court rules ); and that under the Civil Procedure Rules the question o f costs is scrutinized to see i f  they 
are proportionate and may be assessed at interim hearings, leading parties to feel the “pain” as soon as 
an abortive or unconsidered application has met its fate. In her analysis o f  the decline in the number o f  
cases coming to both the High Court and county courts since the mid -1990s, Hazel Genn gives weight to 
the reduction in civil legal aid, which fell by a quarter in real terms between 1997 and 2005, and 
increased costs o f  going to court caused by “full fee recovery”, following the Treasury’s decision in 
1992 that the civil justice system was to pay for itself, with the entire cost, including the cost o f  the 
judges, to be met from court fees. Professor Dame Hazel Genn, What is civil ju stice  fo r  (and how much 
is enough)?, Hamlyn Lectures 2008, delivered at University College, London, 27* November,2008. For 
a history o f  warfare between the Treasury and successive Lord Chancellors over who should bear the 
cost o f  the courts see John Thomas, Lord Justice Thomas, then Senior Presiding Judge o f  England and 
Wales, The Maintenance o f  Local Justice, The Sir Elwyn Jones Lecture, Bangor University, 8* October, 
2004.
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of Trinity College, Oxford, expressed the view that, as well as limiting opportunities for 
future specialist advocates to incrementally develop and improve their skills in smaller 
cases, which had become less numerous, the changes could also affect the quality of 
Judges' decisions. In his opinion dialogue between counsel and the bench sometimes 
""forces new thinking not hinted at in the skeleton” argument. Verbosity was to be 
deplored but the pendulum has swung the other way with the danger that ""brevity may 
be seen as an end in itself”.
Some four years later Michael Beloff, in an article entitled England’s dying art 
written for the New Statesman returned to the theme that oral advocacy was under 
threat and with it the quality of justice. He explained that oral address had little role in 
the European Court of Justice, in which British lawyers have now appeared for more 
than three decades, often just occupying fifteen or twenty minutes, and that it was not 
uncommon for more energy to be spent on negotiating the length of the speech before 
the hearing begins than on delivering the speech itself. Interrogation from judges is rare 
and rights of reply better not exercised, he reported. Oral advocacy, he conceded, at the 
European Court of Human Rights, served a greater function, but time for it is measured 
in hours rather than days. Mr Beloff remarked: ""A case that migrates from  the Strand to 
Strasbourg will undergo a process o f  miniaturization
Turning to skeleton arguments, Mr Beloff stated that what were intended to be a 
mere platform for oral presentation had developed obese proportions and, rather than a 
support, they had become a snare: ""With some judges, fidelity to the skeleton prompts 
the retort ‘ I  have already read this ’ with others any departure from  it risks the testy 
question ‘Where is this in your skeleton ? ’ ”. He contrasted 2004 with 1967, when he 
was called to the Bar. In those days ""some judges made it an article o f  faith never to 
read any o f  the papers before they entered the courtroom in case doing so prejudiced 
their minds. They expected -indeed, wanted- counsel to shape the analysis fo r  them ”.
(In an interview Lord Bingham, then Senior Law Lord on the Judicial Committee of 
the House Of Lords, explained that whilst this was accurate, most judges in appeal cases 
would have read the law reports from the courts below and in the House of Lords the
784 jgth pei^i-yary, 2004. Special Supplement: Are they o ff their Trolleys? The Future o f  Legal Services 
pp. xxvi-xxvii.
Beloff, ibid, page xxvi.
Held on 10* October, 2007. Lord Bingham considered skeleton arguments had shortened some appeals by 
days. In a later interview, 23'** October, 2007 he said he had compared the length o f present day appeals with the 
greater periods o f time recorded in the law reports for earlier like cases.
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majority would have considered the Case , the jointly produced document setting out 
agreed facts and issues of law between the parties.)
Mr Beloff identified a further threat to oral advocacy coming from an increasing 
unwillingness on behalf of some judges to hear it, following Lord Templeman who, in a 
series of observations in the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords , strongly 
criticised, ""torrents o f  words”. He said that it ""was not the duty o f  counsel to advance a 
multitude o f  ingenious arguments in the hope that out o f  ten bad points the judge will be 
capable o f  fashioning a winner Where written advocacy is substituted for oral, two 
assumptions are made, which according to Mr Beloff, are not always justifiable. The 
first is that the judge has read the argument and the second is that he or she has 
understood it. On the basis that both are correct, he was troubled that advocates would 
have insufficient opportunity to engage with judges who disagree with their arguments. 
He continued:
“The development o f  the common law -like the English language, one o f  England’s 
major contributions to civilization -  has been the product o f  a constant dialogue 
between Bar and Bench. No experienced advocate doubts that cases can change shape, 
sometimes dramatically, when what seemed an impeccably logical submission is tested 
to destruction, or not, by the judge. As Lord Justice Laws said in a recent decision: 
‘That judges in fac t change their mind under the influence o f  oral argument is not an 
arcane feature o f  the system; it is central to it ’. Or as Mr Justice Megarry pu t it, still 
more succinctly, three decades ago : ‘Argued law is tough law ’ ”
Elsewhere in his article, Mr Beloff asserted, polemically, that relegation o f oral 
advocacy to the margins would be a victory for the solicitors’ profession in the so- 
called “Bar Wars” about solicitors’ rights of audience in the higher courts: ""Having won 
from Lords Mackay and Irvine (previous Lord Chancellors) advocacy rights in the
Michael Beloff, Englands dying art. New Statesman Special Supplement, 16 February,2004, Are  
they o ff their trolleys? The Future o f  Legal Services, page xxvi.
Notably in the case o f  Ashmore v. Corporation o f  Lloyds [1992] 2 All ER 486.
Ashmore v Corporation o f  Lloyds [1992] 2A11 ER 486 at page 493.
Michael Beloff, Englands dying art. New Statesman Special Supplement, Are they o ff their trolleys?  
The Future o f  Legal Services, 16* February, 2004, page xxvii. The quote from Sir Robert Megarry 
comes from a commentary, written in 1968, about the authority o f  his own textbook on Landlord and 
Tenant Law and is cited by Michael Zander, The Law Making Process, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2nd 
Edition,1985, pp.339-340.
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highest courts hut made (with a few  exceptions) little impact there, solicitors are 
thinking, i f  you cannot jo in  them , beat them. And their weapon o f  choice is the written 
page. Is this to be the last hurrah, not only fo r  silks, but fo r  the Bar itself? ”
Some of Michael B eloff s views were put to judges interviewed. One Lord Justice 
of Appeal said skeleton arguments were certainly not a snare or a tyranny. Admitting 
that he could not speak for all judges, he thought considerable tolerance was shown 
when there were departures from what was contained in skeletons. This sometimes 
happens, he explained, when another counsel, who did not draft the skeleton, appears as 
an advocate in court, or a leading counsel decides to run a case differently from that 
indicated by a junior in his skeleton In those circumstances he considered it is not 
perhaps surprising that comments may be heard from judges. He wondered whether the 
remarks by judges reported in Mr B eloff s article had been made in such contexts, but 
emphasised efforts were not made to stifle new submissions. Particularly in appeal 
cases, judges may give a steer to counsel on what they consider to be best points in a 
skeleton and those in which they are least interested in. This, in his opinion, was where 
skeleton arguments were of considerable value. If, however, barristers do not go in the 
directions hinted, they are not stopped from developing their arguments. The Lord 
Justice of Appeal disagreed with Mr Beloff that the greater role of written advocacy had 
inhibited oral presentation and debate . He recognized the latter’s worth in making the 
penny drop and giving fresh insights. In his view many barristers were still addicted to 
oral advocacy and it was something that most judges, at present, put up with. However , 
advocates had to accept greater intervention from judges now much better informed 
about cases before them. That skeleton arguments did not preclude other points being 
raised; that time limits, although generally abided by, were not always rigidly enforced; 
and that there was considerable variation between judges in the extent they intervened 
with questions indicated that civil advocacy was in a time of transition He said that
Michael Beloff, E ngland’s dying art. New Statesman Special Supplement, Are they o ff their trolleys?  
The Future o f  Legal Services, 16* February, 2004, page xxvii.
Interview, 18* July, 2007. ( Lord Justice Richards.)
Lord Hoffmann, interviewed on 27* July, 2009, said that drafting skeleton arguments, wholly or 
partly, by junior counsel in appellate cases was widespread. In his opinion, Jonathan Sumption QC, 
whose method o f  annotating skeletons resembled, throughout, that employed in his historical volumes 
on the Hundred Years War, drafted his own entirely and was unusual in this respect.
The idea o f  advocacy yet to settle was also conveyed by Lord Bingham who considered the happy 
mean between oral and written advocacy in the House o f  Lords had still to be achieved. Indeed it might 
be said sometimes that the worst o f  both worlds existed with appellate judges being inundated with 
papers and yet still having to listen to extensive oral argument. He predicted in future there would be
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there were still many long winded advocates. In the future, as written advocacy becomes 
more accepted as the norm by younger advocates, he thought there would be fewer of 
them. Regarding English appellate cases, on matters of law, he said that he would like to 
see the United States Supreme Court model adopted. Written argument is presented and 
limited time exists, thirty minutes, for oral presentation by advocates of key points only 
and for them to answer questions asked by judges. He recognized that such a shift would 
involve much greater work for judges and advocates outside court’^  ^ Another Lord 
Justice of Appeal described how skeleton arguments, particularly in appellate courts, 
had expanded from two pages to a full argument in writing Whilst useful in focusing 
minds and enabling judges to reach provisional views, he did not want them to replace 
oral argument^^^ . In apparent agreement with Mr Beloff, he said that the dialectic
greater reliance on written advocacy. Interview, 23'^ October, 2007. Reflecting on Lord Bingham’s 
period as Senior Law Lord in the House o f  Lords, Lord Rodger o f  Earlsferry, in an interview held at the 
Institute o f  Advanced Legal Studies on 11* May, 2009, said that Lord Bingham had done much to 
enhance the position o f  written advocacy in the House o f  Lords by insisting that time limits, presented 
by counsel beforehand, for cases were met. He contrasted this with earlier in his career as an advocate 
when counsel faced few, i f  any, restrictions, on the length o f  submissions. Lord Hoffman, interviewed on 
the 27* July, 2009, spoke about how oral advocacy in appellate matters had become a supplement to 
written advocacy -  a huge change. The really persuasive advocate, in his opinion, was able to get a good 
balance between the two.
^^^This view is not apparently widely held amongst appeal judges. Lady Hale, in answer to a question 
asked after she had delivered a lecture at City University on 30* April, 2008 on the imminent 
establishment o f  the Supreme Court, which replaced the Judicial Committee o f  the House o f  Lords in 
October, 2009, said that, to her knowledge, there was little enthusiasm amongst House o f  Lords judges, 
who would initially constitute the judiciary o f  the new court, for adopting a US Supreme Court model o f  
case presentation. Lady Hale did say, however, that she expected considerable discussion in future 
amongst the Supreme Court judiciary on the balance between oral and written advocacy before them. 
Asked about whether creation o f  the Supreme Court o f  the United Kingdom would lead to changes in 
advocacy. Lord Phillips, chosen to be President o f  the new Court, said, in an interview conducted after 
he had delivered a lecture On the Supreme Court, at the London School o f  Economics on the 28* April, 
2009, that” in itse lf  the new court w ill not result in advocacy different from  that in the House o f  L o rd ” s. 
However, he also said that appellate advocacy was in transition  to a much greater use o f  written 
submissions and that further movement in this direction may take place. He considered a possible step 
may be for the Supreme Court, and the Court o f  Appeal, to identify areas, from written submissions by 
parties, upon which counsel would be invited to make further and more in depth written submissions. 
Lord Hoffmann, interviewed on 27* July, 2009, said that he hoped oral advocacy would never become 
just a formality o f  appellate advocacy because it can clarify points and even change decisions. He 
thought it was far better to discuss a case with advocates who had spent considerable time preparing for 
it rather than with colleagues, or law clerks, as in the United States.
Lord Justice Sedley, interview on 11* July, 2007. Lord Hoffman, interviewed on 27* July, 2009 also 
expressed concern that skeleton arguments had grown but said their length could be controlled by judges 
complaining in court when they were too long.
Speaking about written advocacy in appellate cases. Lord Roger, interviewed at the Institute o f  
Advanced Legal Studies on the 11* May, 2009, agreed that skeleton arguments were useful in helping 
judges form a preliminary view. He explained judges varied in the amount o f  weight they attached to 
written submissions. Some were more inclined to read them than others who would prefer not to read 
papers on a Sunday afternoon and for this, and other reasons, put more emphasis on oral argument. Lord 
Hoffmann, interviewed on the 27* September, 2009, said that there is now an expectancy amongst 
appellate judges that skeleton arguments will be elabourate, almost to the extent o f  an American brief,
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between barristers and judges was crucial and could lead to a better decision than would 
have been taken purely on paper. Oral argument, in the higher courts, was a great 
strength of the English legal system and one which, he reported, was much admired 
throughout the world.
Five years after publication of England’s dying art, Michael Beloff was 
interviewed^®^ to see whether he still held the views expressed in that article. He said 
that experience as an advocate, and as Senior Ordinary Appeal Judge in the Channel 
Islands, had led him to modify his position. He now accepted as long as a role for it was 
preserved, allowing an essential dialogue between advocates and judges so that 
arguments could be clarified and tested, oral advocacy could exist harmoniously with 
written advocacy. There was much left to be done to calibrate the balance between the 
two and to organize better written advocacy. Like members of the senior judiciary 
interviewed, he was concerned about the size of many skeleton arguments which , in 
many cases, may resemble the length of briefs submitted to courts in the United States
Mr Bellof suggested two pieces of written advocacy should be submitted to judges. 
The first would be a very skeletal document setting out the matters in dispute and the 
law involved, whilst the second would be fuller giving the background to the case and 
additional details of relevant law. The latter document would be of assistance to judges 
writing their judgements. In drafting paper advocacy, Mr Beloff urged advocates to 
follow the six specific points listed by Lord Bingham in his lecture The Role o f  an 
Advocate in a Common Law System, given in Gray’s Inn Hall in 2008 . They are; set
out the facts in a clear, accurate , fully referenced and neutral way; be clear in your own 
mind exactly what you want to say: make it as simple as possible, but no simpler; cite 
authorities sparingly and without extensive verbatim quotation; be brief; and use clear 
and simple language.
Mr Beloff agreed that modern oral advocacy in the civil courts, where judges, 
largely as a result of written advocacy, have a grasp of the facts and issues and a sense
and oral advocacy economical. He considered that if  it was too economical some judges, particularly if  
the matter was not within areas o f  law known to them, may find it difficult to follow arguments, and 
clarificatory questions asked by them might slow proceedings. Lord Hoffman compared the advocate’s 
task in appellate courts to” mixed ability teaching”.
On 30 July, 2009 at Blackstone Chambers, Temple, London..
It is worthy o f  note that many American courts restrict the length o f  written briefs. Some not only 
limit the maximum number o f  pages but also prescribe the size o f  print and impose fines for excess 
pages.
Summarised in Graya, N o 122, Hilary 2009, pp. 17-24. The lecture was the first in an annual series 
on advocacy, known as The Birkenhead Lecture, inaugurated in 2008 by Mr Beloff, then Treasurer o f  
Gray’s Inn.
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of points they think are crucial, demands that advocates are not thrown when judges ask 
them questions and make comments before they can fully deploy their carefully 
prepared orderly and logical arguments. Closely allied to the key skill of entering 
readily into dialogue with any member of the tribunal is the ability to resume the thread 
of the argument when the judges had finished.
Because of pressures and expense of court time, Mr Beloff recognized that the days 
when ""the judge danced at the speed o f  the tune o f  the litigants had gone Instead it is 
now the judge who is the ""conductor”. In this task paper advocacy has a value.
Accepting his views on written advocacy had altered and were now similar to those 
more widely expressed, Mr Beloff said that his principal opposition to it had been 
because of romantic nostalgia for unhurried oral advocacy in English courts which was 
pleasing to listeners in court, had good, as opposed to negative, rhetorical qualities 
about it and was a form of art.
Perhaps the greatest, though little commented upon, curtailing of the principle of 
oral advocacy has taken place in social security law, mainly for reasons of economy. 
Before Regulations in 1996 were implemented persons dissatisfied with benefit 
decisions could appear in person at a Social Security and Child Benefit Tribunal, or be 
represented there by an advocate (usually from a law or advice centre), although only a 
small minority of claimants were. Claimants, alternatively, if  they wished, could make 
written submissions to the tribunal. This was rare. The government department 
responsible for the decision was always represented by a Representing Officer. After 
expressing concern about wasted expense because nearly one in three appellants failed 
to appear before Social Security and Child Benefit Tribunals, the government, 
introduced the Social Security (Adjudication) and Child Support (No2) Regulations 
1996^°’. These provide that appeals to Social Security and Child Benefits Appeal 
Tribunals should only be dealt with by written submissions, unless one of the parties 
expressly requests an oral hearing, or the tribunal directs oral procedure should be 
followed
Coming into force October, 2T*, 1996.
For an analysis o f  the powers o f  a Social Security and Child Benefit Tribunal to adjourn a paper 
hearing and change to an oral hearing see L. W. Blake, Paper Hearings and Natural Justice, 2005, 12 
Journal o f  Social Security Law, pp.26- 35.
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Decline of allusions to the classics^ poets, history and Latin in 
advocacy.
A former solicitor, interviewed^®^ frequently accompanied counsel instructed by his 
firm to the Chancery and Queen’s Bench Divisions of the High Court of Justice in the 
1960s. He explained that the use of Latin words by barristers and judges was common. 
Greek words were very occasionally heard, although not by him . He made the point 
that this was hardly surprising given the classical education of most judges at the time 
and the central place of Roman Law in law degrees at Oxford, where he had studied, and 
Cambridge Universities. The former solicitor said that allusions to and quotations from 
literature were frequent, especially in the Chancery Division; Shakespeare, Milton, 
Walter Scott and Homer (in English ) were the favourites. References to historical 
events were also made . Lord W oolf reflecting on his early career as a barrister in the 
same period, recounted that quotes and allusions from literature and historical 
references were a feature of the courts but emphasised that many barristers and judges, 
perhaps even the majority, did not use them. To think otherwise would be incorrect . 
A similar view of their frequency was taken by Lord Justice Sedley Both thought, 
because of the particular audience to whom they were addressed, counsels’ purpose in 
using them had been to aid persuasiveness and clarify meaning, but was also intended to 
show their erudition^®^.
®^^ Judge Julian Lipton, 25* July, 2007.
®^^ A barrister, interviewed 24* May, 2007 recounted he had heard o f  an eminent barrister from the West 
Indies who, when appearing in front o f  the Privy Council in a case in the 1970’s, was met by a judge 
(who knew the barrister before him was also a classicist) with a quotation from Homer’s Illiad. The 
barrister was able to quote the succeeding lines, in Greek, back to the judge.
®^^ Interviewed on 27* June, 2007.
®^® Judge Bailey o f  the Central London County Court, who began his career as a barrister in the early 
I970’s, also stressed that although quotations and allusions were made they were not by all barristers. To 
illustrate the point he recounted how his first pupil master would employ them as frequently as possible 
but his second pupil master, who prided him self on being clear and to the point in plain and clipped 
language, did not. Interview held on E* November, 2007. A similar point was made by Lord Hoffman, 
interviewed on 27*’' July, 2009. Recalling the 1960s and 1970s, he remembered few flowery advocates, 
save Leo Price and John Foster, later Sir John Foster o f the High Court, but could call to mind many who 
spoke clearly and simply. He did recall use o f  Latin, but only to clarify, and no one quoted from  Horace. 
*®’ Interviewed on II* July, 2007.
®^* Judge Bailey, spoke o f  other reasons why allusions and quotations were made by advocates. Counsel, 
aware that a particular judge was fond o f the classics or English literature, would make them: Knowing  
the ju dge, then, as now, being a very important part o f  advocacy. I f  it was understood a judge greatly 
valued his knowledge o f  these areas, counsel would sometimes deliberately slightly misquote or make an 
allusion that was not entirely apt. This was done to give the judge the opportunity o f correcting what had
been said. Usually he would begin: “ Surely M r  do you not m ean?” Counsel would then earnestly
agree. The judge, confirmed in his view o f  h im self as the most educated person in court and possibly 
thrilled, might then feel more disposed to counsel and his submissions. Certain judges, however.
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Even when Shakespeare, Milton, Scott, Homer and others were quoted and alluded to 
in abundance during the early 20th century, their persuasive value before Judges had been 
doubted. Sir John Simon , who served as Attorney General and later Lord Chancellor, 
considered such efforts as embellishment; ornamenting an advocate's speech rather than 
achieving practical results . According to Sir Norman Birkett, Sir John Simon’s 
particular strength lay ""in his no-nonsense ability to turn what otherwise may well have 
been a dry recitation offacts supported by authorities into a fascinating and enthralling 
narrative and to tell it with great skill. In the process the facts were marshalled and 
arrayed; the important ones emphasized and the less important lightly touched on. His 
mastery o f  law made complicated matters sound clear and simple and convincing” . In 
contrast to Sir John Simon’s estimation of it. Lord MacMillan, in an address given in 
Birmingham in the early 1930’s valued literary knowledge highly in persuasion: ""I 
believe that no advocate can be a great pleader who has not a sense o f  literary form  and 
whose mind is not stored with the treasures o f  our great literary inheritance upon which 
he may draw at will. The fortune o f  an argument depends much more than is commonly 
realized on the literary dress in which it is presented. A point made in attractive language 
sticks in the judicial memory”.
Sir Norman Birkett in 1954 also spoke approvingly of counsel re-enforcing their 
arguments by appropriate quotations from literature
When interviewed^’^ . Lord Woolf said that the demise of flowery language and 
flamboyance in court was one of the two greatest changes in advocacy that he had 
witnessed ( the other was the rise of paper advocacy ). He had no regrets about it®’"’.
Literary quotations and allusions and references to historical events in Crown 
Courts declined swiftly after the Juries Act 1974 widened very considerably the 
composition of the jury. At the appellate criminal level and in the higher civil courts, in 
part reflecting the similarity in social and educational background of most Judges and 
barristers, they lasted longer. Nonetheless, over the decades, these features in speech
possibly because as barristers they had used the device themselves, were entirely unmoved. Interview,
2"*’ November, 2007.
In an address during a visit to Canada in 1921. Reprinted in Graya No VIII, Easter 1931, pp. 32-35.
Sir Norman Birkett, Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club, Faculty o f  Law, University o f  
Birmingham, 7th May, 1954.
Quoted by Birkett in his Presidential Address, above.
Presidential Address to the Holdsworth Club.
27* June, 2007.
Lord Mackay considered advocates, apart from a very few, in civil (and criminal ) cases in Scotland 
had always been less flamboyant, flow ery and p oetic  in their words than many in England. Interview,
10* December, 2008.
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became increasingly rare as did Latin words and phrases. Lord W oolf described how 
judges had shown less appreciation of their use by barristers. He agreed that 
opportunities for them had further diminished with the arrival of the Civil Procedure 
Rules. Written skeleton arguments, time limits and interventions from judges, replacing 
many aspects of the traditional trial, meant plain, unornamented, direct, and precise 
advocacy was required.
Two Court of Appeal judges interviewed, one of whom studied classics, said that, 
even if they wanted, few judges would feel confident today in quoting from them 
One said that judges had become hesitant about referring to historical events or figures 
in judgements lest they might be considered controversial or a distraction. To explain 
this, he pointed to what Lord Justice Simon Brown had said at the beginning of his 
judgement in Rv Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith and other Applicants 
""Lawrence o f  Arabia would not have been welcome in today’s armed forces: 
homosexual men and women are not allowed to serve”. This led to many articles and 
letters in the newspapers about whether T. E. Lawrence was homosexual. The two Court 
of Appeal judges concurred in thinking that because few judges make allusions to 
literature, quote from it and refer to historical figures and events in their judgements, 
few advocates do so in seeking to persuade them Lord Bingham, then the Senior Law
Most barristers who appeared in High Court judicial reviews o f  public bodies, the number o f  which 
began to increase in the 1960’s and greatly thereafter, adopted a thorough and methodical delivery o f  
their cases. It was said o f  Sir Peter Webster, who was prominent in this field and in 1980 became a High 
Court Judge, that rather than dazzle with flashes o f  rhetorical brilliance, his style was characteristically  
understated and his m easured approach won him many admirers among both clients and colleagues. Sir 
Peter Webster, Obituary, The Times, June 4*, 2009. ))
On Greek derived words, one o f the judges ( Lord Justice Richards) said Lord Diplock’s deployment 
o f  them, some decades ago, was a challenge for him, even as a c la ssic ist. He thought their use today 
would only place unnecessary barriers to understanding. In a judgement, in 2002, in the High Court o f  
Australia, Mr Justice Kirby, dealing with the existence or otherwise o f  a duty o f  care in tort law, said. 
Courts such as this should recall the prayer o f  Ajax. After quoting it in ancient Greek, he translated the 
prayer into English: Save us from  the fo g  and give us a clear sky, so that we can use our eyes. Graham 
Barcay Oysters PTY Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 475 at 616-617. His use o f  Greek and reference to 
antiquity attracted some comment. David Ross in Advocacy, a book designed for those wishing to 
practice as advocates in Australia and Britain, wrote: may be stylish in a judgement, but it w ould be a
meaningless distraction in a subm ission”. David Ross QC, Advocacy, Cambridge University Press, 
2007, page 160.
’^^ QBD 1995 4 All ER 427.
Interestingly, quotations from English literature in advocacy appear to survive better in some 
Commonwealth countries. Fritz Kodagoda, an Advocate o f  Sri Lanka and an English Barrister, 
interviewed 5* July,2007, said that quotes by counsel and judges in the higher courts were not 
uncommon. Mr. Kodagoda said that he had used lines from John Donne. He attributed quotations to 
private school education, in which English Literature was prominent, shared by most advocates and 
judges. Mr. Kodagoda believed the position about quotations and literary references was not dissimilar 
in the higher courts in India.
A brief search o f  the LexisNexis electronic data base o f  appellate court law reports ( which does not 
include those from India and Sri Lanka ), conducted on the 20* June, 2009, showed quotes from
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Lord since 2000, agreed it had become rare for advocates, as well as judges, to quote 
from literature and to allude to history However, he continued to refer to them when 
it aided clarity of understanding A similar approach would appear to be taken by
Lord Justice Wall in the Court of Appeal. Warning of the damage done by warring 
parents in a custody dispute before the Court, he quoted a stanza from Philip Larkin’s 
hard-hitting and very direct “ This be the Verse “ in a postscript to a judgement
Shakespeare made over the last decade by judges in Canada, Fiji, Singapore and the West Indies. 
Shakespeare also appeared in two European Court o f  Human Rights (Grand Chamber) cases.
As yet, no comprehensive survey o f  references to Shakespeare by judges in the higher courts appears to 
have taken place in Britain. In the United States, however, Jules Gleicher studied use o f  Shakespeare 
in the United States Supreme Court. In his analysis o f  cases, the author found surprisingly little o f  
Shakespeare; all but one citation o f  his work took place in the 20*  Century; two thirds since 1970; and 
over half during the 1980’s and 1990’s. Four particular Justices accounted for almost sixty percent o f  
the examples: Stevens(6), Douglas (5), Rehnquist (4), and Blackmun (6). Thirteen occurred in 
majority opinions o f  the Court, three in concurring opinions, and sixteen in dissenting opinions or 
opinions that concur in part with the judgement o f  the Court but dissent on the particular point for 
which Shakespeare is quoted. Gleicher speculates that: Perhaps the rhetorical quality o f  a good  
Shakespearian line is especially  suitable fo r  such separate opinions in which idiosyncrasy has free r  
reign. The B ard at the Bar: Some Citations o f  Shakespeare By the United States Supreme Court, 
Oklahoma City University Law Review, Volume 26, Number 1, 2001. An earlier and wider computer 
search o f  over 60,000 federal and state cases conducted by William Domnarski, Shakespeare in the Law, 
( Connecticut Bar Journal, Vol. 67 1993, pp.317-350 ) showed Shakespeare’s work had been cited or 
quoted in judgements a total o f  798 times . The study also revealed that M ilton’s Paradise Lost was cited 
or quoted in 57 judgements. For other studies on references to literature by judges in common law 
jurisdictions, where discursive styles o f  judgement make this more possible than in the syllogistic forms 
o f  decision associated with civil law, see John M. DeStefano 111, On Literature as Legal Authority, 
Arizona Law Review, Vol.49, 2007, pp. 521-551 and Ellison Kahn, A L iterary Peregrination Through 
the Law Reports, 114 South African Law Journal 229.
Michael B elo ff QC, interviewed on 30th July, 2009, said that he does quote from literature and refers 
to historical events when really appropriate. He strongly disagreed, however, with advocates doing so to 
reflect their learning, or in front oQuries, where these references might be misunderstood and 
distracting. Mr B elo ff said that he sometimes employed humour as a technique o f  persuasion, but, unless 
an advocate knew judges well, this could be a dangerous technique. Speaking on deployment o f  humour 
by advocates, Mr Justice Warren said it had to be done carefully and there was nothing worse than 
laboured humour. However, some people had a light touch and used it w ell. There was no room for irony 
by advocates or judges in court as some listeners might take it literally. Humour in criminal cases had no 
place at all (Interview held on 22"'’ October, 2009 ).
Interview held on 23^  ^October, 2007. One example is Brown v Stott (Procurator Fiscal, Dunfermline) 
[2003] 1 AC 681 at 703, when Lord Bingham drew on Shakespeare’s soliloquy o f  Hamlet:
“The convention is concerned with rights and freedom s which are o f  real importance in a modern 
democracy governed by the rule o f  law. It does not, as is sometimes mistakenly thought, offer relieffrom  
‘ The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks That flesh is heir to’ ”.
In R (Limbuela) v Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department, 2006 lA C  396 at Page 403, he quotes, 
your mountainish inhumanity from Sir Thomas More by Shakespeare, and others. Further examples 
include quotations from Dr Johnson, on whom Lord Bingham was an acknowledged authority and was 
President o f  the Johnson Society in 2000, or from B osw ell’s Life o f  Johnson. See, respectively, Rv H  
2004 UKHL 3 Page 147 and R (  on the application o f  Pretty) v The D irector o f  Public Prosecutions 2002  
1 AC 800 Page 824. On Thomas Bingham’s English literature education in the 1940’s at Sedburgh 
School in the the Yorkshire Dales, and the enthusiasm he showed for Shakespeare and poetry, see Ross 
Cranston, A Biographical Sketch: The Early Years, in Tom Bingham and the Transformation o f  the Law, 
Edited by Mads Andeas and Duncan Fairgrieve, Oxford University Press, 2009.
Indeed, as I  read the papers and the expert report and the oral evidence    I  was pow erfully
rem inded o f  the f ir s t fou r lines o f  Philip Larkin’s This be the Verse.
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The Civil Procedure Rules 1998, which replaced the Rules of the Supreme Court 
and the County Court Rules, removed many Latin words and phrases. They were 
followed by a Statutory Instrument in 2004 ^  which swept away the former Latin names 
of the prerogative remedies. Mandamus, prohibition and certiorari became known 
instead as mandatory, prohibiting and quashing orders respectively^^l The message, 
though never officially delivered, to judges was stop using Latin in court altogether. 
Although not obliged to do so, most have. One of the Court of Appeal judges 
interviewed said that he would still use Latin for technical terms, the meaning of which 
was understood exactly, where there was no simple English translation. He did not think 
he was alone in this
Now, partly as a result of judges using very few Latin words or phrases, if  any, 
advocates generally avoid them. It is reported that some judges will ask them not to use 
Latin, while others, particularly older judges, are more tolerant More generally 
illustrative of the continuing decline of Latin in spoken and written language , a number 
of local authorities in Britain have prohibited employees from using Latin words and 
phrases in documents and ordered employees to stop doing so in correspondence with 
members of the public^^®. This led to opposition from those who said more wordier, less 
precise, alternatives will have to employed instead, but drew praise from campaigners
They fuck you up, your mum and dad.
They may not mean to, but they do.
They f i l l  you with the fau lts they had  
And add some extra, ju s t fo r  you.
The rest o f  the poem  seems to say more about Philip Larkin him self than it does about the human 
condition, but these fou r lines seem to me to give a clear warning to parents who, post-separation, 
continue to figh t battles o f  the p a s t and show each other no resp ec t”. R( A child) Re [2009] EWCA Civ 
358, paras. 124-125.
Civil Procedure ( Modification o f  Supreme Court Act 1981) Order 2004.
Various English expressions were also changed to make them more accessible to those not legally 
trained. For instance “pleadings” became “statements o f  case”, whilst “Mareva orders and “Anton Pillar 
orders” changed respectively to “freezing orders” and “search” orders”.
Interviewed 18* July, 2007 (Lord Justice Richards). His view on the use o f Latin by judges and 
advocates was similar to that o f  Lord Bingham, who retired as Senior Law Lord in 2009, in The 
Inaugural Birkenhead Lecture at Gray’s Inn Hall on 6* October, 2008, The Role o f  an A dvocate in a 
Common Law System, Graya, No 122, Hilary 2009, pp. 17-24. In the lecture Lord Bingham urged 
advocates to employ clear and simple language in both oral and written advocacy. However” this was not 
an argument against the use o f  Latin where appropriate: a host o f  Latinisms had survived over the 
centuries p recise ly  because they had a well understood meaning and there was no convenient synonym- 
such as prim e facie, ab initio, p ro  bono, a fortiori, de facto,, ad  hominem and de minimus and more 
technical expressions such as ratio decidendi, p e r  incuriam, forum conveniens, lex fo r i  ”.
Interview with N igel Ley, barrister, 2E* March, 2007.
Sunday Telegraph, 2"'’ September, 2008. See also BBC News, 3*^  November, 2008, Councils ban use 
o f  latin terms, http.www.bbc.com
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for plain English^^^. Opposing views on the policy of these local authorities resembled, 
in some ways, those heard previously about the removal of Latin in court and the law. 
Despite much removal of Latin and updating of English legal terms, the language of the 
law, a highly specialized form of speech, remains substantially apart from that of every 
day. Expressions, for example, like ""balance ofprobabilities” and ""beyondreasonable 
doubt” hsLYQ distinct technical meanings. Language differences do not end there. They 
extend to language used daily by lawyers in court. ""With great respect” addressed to 
another means strong disagreement. ""May it please your honour ” is frequently used to 
open a party’s case Other court language includes ""Iput it to you that... ” and “ 
suggest”, both often employed by advocates in putting their client’s case in cross- 
examination; ""I hear what you say\ Sir will see ” and ""If I  may trespass upon your 
honour’s patience ”
Changes in advocacy in the County Court.
A  retired County Court judge recalled that when he was appointed to the bench 
in 1979 advocacy was still very formal. A lot was also verbose. Some was flamboyant. 
Many judges were pompous and idiosyncratic in their approach. Knowing how 
particular judges liked to run their courts and about their likes and dislikes was an 
important aspect of advocacy. A number of advocates would try and mirror the 
language, on occasion including Latin, used by them. Literary allusions, metaphors and 
similes, for example to cricket, calculated to please, although not always achieving their 
object, were frequently made. Most judges, in his opinion, realised what they were 
trying to do; some had attempted it themselves as advocates.
Views, including those o f  Mary Beard, a professor o f  Classics at Cambridge University, Peter Jones, 
co-founder o f  the charity Friends o f  Classics and Marie Clair, spokesperson for the Plain English 
Campaign, on the advantages and disadvantages o f using Latin by Councils, and more generally, are set 
out by Chris Hastings, Councils ban ‘e litis t’ and ‘discrim inatory’ Latin phrases. The Telegraph E* 
November, 2008.
District Judge Stephen Gerlis, a champion o f  plain English in the law, has said that this w ould not be 
out o f  p lace in a Shakespearean p lay. Times, July 26* 2007, A bit o f  plain speaking can go a long way.
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This style of advocacy was changed by increasing numbers of cases arriving in the 
County C ourt, as a result of legislation passed in the 1970’s, about housing and 
domestic violence . Particularly in the latter, especially in emergency applications, 
judges needed counsel and solicitors to explain the facts rapidly. They were not 
occasions for long ornamented and formal speeches. In his view this plainer, shortened, 
direct and more business like advocacy spilled over into other areas of the court’s 
jurisdiction. The judge’s view was corroborated by barristers whose County Court 
practices extended back to the early 1980’s The judge said that the second major 
influence on advocacy he had observed came with the introduction of skeleton ^  . 
arguments, written witness statements standing as evidence in chief and fast track trials 
within time limits. In his view much advocacy previously practised was not needed now. 
Skill in cross-examination, though, remained indespensible and always required 
thorough planning. Being on top of the law, especially cases cited in skeleton 
arguments, was vital, as was anticipating and responding to questions from judges on 
facts. A clear mind and concision was necessary. He had no regrets that the type of 
advocacy, though sometimes more colourful, heard when he was first appointed to the 
bench has passed into history. Few other County Court judges, he thought, missed it 
either.
The new realities and clients’ perceptions of advocacy.
It was reported that some clients whose cases were heard soon after the Civil 
Procedure Rules were introduced found the more abbreviated role occupied by oral 
advocacy to be surprisingly different to what they were expecting and were rather 
disappointed^^’. Some even went as far as saying they had felt deprived of "a proper 
day in court". To allay concerns, and forestall complaints, many solicitors, barristers 
and solicitor advocates found it necessary to explain to clients about the new 
procedure, the purpose of skeleton arguments, the role of spoken advocacy to augment
Judge Julian Lipton, interviewed on 25* July, 2007.
Including Mr. N igel Ley and John Downing, interviewed respectively on 29* July, 2007 and E* 
August, 2007.
Mr Justice Lightman said he had heard such from barristers and solicitors at the time. Interview, 15* 
March, 2007. See also Mr Justice Lightman, The case fo r  ju d ic ia l intervention. N ew  Law Journal, 
December 3*'’, 1999, page 1836.
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and support what was written and about time limits^^lThe gap between popular 
expectations of advocacy in civil disputes and reality may have closed. In 2007, Mr. 
Justice Lightman considered they matched, at least in the High Court*^^
Conditional fees and behaviour in court.
Whilst public funding, subject to an applicant qualifying on financial grounds and 
passing a test of legal merits, remains available for social welfare matters, family law, 
judicial review and other proceedings against officialdom and bureaucracy, most civil 
cases have been removed from the scope of legal aid In its place are conditional fee 
agreements, which from 1999 have been allowed in all civil cases, except family. Under 
conditional fees, "no win no fee", lawyers act at no cost to the client. If the client wins 
they may charge a "success fee" of up to 100 per cent more than their usual fee. This is 
normally paid by the losing party Concerns were expressed that giving solicitors and 
barristers, who may be instructed by the former on a no win no fee basis, a direct 
financial interest in the outcome of disputes might lead to more aggressive advocacy, 
less civility towards each other in court and even worse. The Royal Commission on 
Legal Services which reported in 1979, rejected the idea of contingent fees (where 
lawyers take a share of whatever their clients receive). It stated that such a scheme, 
giving lawyers a clear stake in what happened to a case, might lead to undesirable 
practices including ""the construction o f  evidence, the improper coaching o f  witnesses, 
the use o f  professionally partisan expert witnesses, especially medical witnesses, 
improper examination and cross-examination, groundless legal arguments designed to 
lead the courts into error and competitive touting”. Judges and barristers, questioned 
about them, reported little change in behaviour in court as a result of conditional fees, 
but could not exclude the possibility that some advocates might be tempted to act 
unethically. Supporters of conditional fee agreements have commented that the prospect 
of receiving no payment if  cases are lost has led advocates to prepare more thoroughly 
and sometimes this may be reflected in higher standards of advocacy. In the United
Mr Justice Lightman, interview 8 March, 2007 and The case fo r  ju d ic ia l intervention. N ew  Law 
Journal, December 3'  ^ ,1999, page 1836.
Interview, 8* March, 2007.
Access to Justice Act, 1999, Schedule 2.
The Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations, made under Section 27 o f  the Access to Justice Act 
1999 expanded the scope o f  conditional fees to include acting speculatively without a success fee or at a 
discounted rate in a losing case.
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States, where contingency fees often give lawyers a large personal interest in whether 
cases are won or lost, it was reported they have no noticeable effect on manner and 
performance in court After the introduction of conditional fees, the Bar Council 
removed cases under this arrangement from the cab-rank rule
Litigants in person.
Many of the lawyers and judges interviewed for this thesis mentioned that litigants 
in person were an aspect of modern, especially civil, court life. A study published, in 
2005 of four first instance courts^ ^® found that, although there was little evidence of an 
explosion in numbers of litigants in person, unrepresented parties in cases were 
common. They were usually defendants '^*®. Obsessive and difficult litigants formed a
CMND 7648. Volume 1.
Interview with Katherine Pearson, trial lawyer and professor o f law the Dickinson Law School, 
University o f  Pennsylvania, E* August, 2007 . She did, however, say that contingency fees made 
attorneys cautious and more likely to advise settling rather than going to trial. In an interview conducted, 
on the 2E* January, 2009 at the Institute o f  Advanced Legal Studies, London, with Herbert M. Kritzer, 
Professor o f  Political Science at the University o f  Wisconsin-Madison and whose extensive writings on 
contingency fees in the United States includes the book Legal Advocacy, Michigan, 1998, also 
considered that working on contingency fees had no measureable effect on the conduct o f  lawyers in 
court. He said this was mainly because they needed to maintain working relationships with each other. 
Rather colourfully. Professor Kritzer concluded by saying “ i f  an attorney is a pitbull, he w ill be ju s t  
that, no matter the arrangements fo r  payment". In 2008, the Master o f  the Rolls appointed Lord Justice 
Jackson to head a committee to review the costs o f civil litigation in England and Wales. Contingency 
fees are only presently permitted in employment tribunal cases. Whether contingency fees could and 
should be adopted elsewhere by the civil justice system was investigated by the committee. Amongst 
proposals made in its final report, published in January, 2010, which would affect almost every area o f  
civil litigation, from small personal injury matters to high value complex commercial litigation, was that 
lawyers should be able to enter into contingency fee agreements with clients for contentious business. 
However, it was recommended, costs recovery from the other side should be on the conventional basis, 
not by reference to the contingency fee. On 29* March, 2011, the Justice Secretary, Mr Kenneth Clarke, 
announced plans to prohibit lawyers claiming success fees in cases from the loosing side. Later that year 
the government introduced the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment o f Offenders Bill, 2011, currently 
before Parliament. If passed and implemented, this would substantially alter the ‘no win, no fee’ system  
by making a winning claimant’s lawyer’s mark up fees be paid from his or her damages, in effect a form 
o f  contingency fee.
A R J Watson, Advocacy fo r  the Unpopular: The B arristers’ Cab-rank rule in England and Wales, 
Justice o f  the Peace, 20* and 27* June, 1998.
®^® Richard Moorhead and Mark Sefton, Cardiff University, Litigants in person : Unrepresented litigants 
in f ir s t  instance proceedings. Department o f Constitutuional Affairs, DCA Research Series 2/05, March, 
2005.
*^*® The BBC Radio 4 programme. Unreliable Evidence, broadcast on 10* May, 2008, suggested the 
majority o f  parties in family matters represent themselves. Mr.Steven Hynes, the President o f the Legal 
Action Group, interviewed at the College o f Law on 15* May, 2008 predicted that i f  the government 
implements competitive “best value” tendering for legal aid, as recommended by the Carter Review, then 
the subject o f  public consultation, the number o f litigants in person would grow because many solicitors 
firms would cease to perform publicly funded court representation. In 2009, District Judge David 
Oldham, president o f  the Association o f Her Majesty’s District Judges, drawing on his experience o f
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very small minority of litigants in person, but posed considerable problems for judges, 
lawyers and court staff. Although the study did not consider the Court of Appeal, it is 
known to have a large population of unrepresented litigants.
Some litigants in person are assisted in court by McKenzie friends. McKenzie 
friends originate from a divorce case McKenzie v McKenzie in which Mr. McKenzie, 
who was no longer publicly funded and had no representation, was refused a friend to 
come into court and sit with him during proceedings. The case went to the Court of 
Appeal where it was held that Mr. McKenzie’s friend should have been allowed to 
remain and ""sit quietly beside the husband and give him from  time to time some quiet 
advice and prompting” A strong presumption now exists to allow a litigant in person 
a McKenzie friend. Requests are now only refused for compelling reasons, which, if 
found, should be explained carefully and fully to the litigant and the would-be 
McKenzie friend. Some judges allow McKenzie friends to speak on the litigants behalf.
The study, published in 2005, of litigants in person concluded some dealt with 
matters well; others were totally without confidence, whilst some began confidently 
but ended poorly. Litigants seemed to cope particularly poorly with procedural, as 
opposed to substantive, hearings and also where new or unpredicted issues arose^\ 
Judges had a range of ways to deal with hearings with unrepresented parties. They 
included directing opposing lawyers to summarize their case and make very clear 
submissions on it. Some judges, the study revealed, would intervene in hearings 
considerably more than others. A number would intervene quite modestly, telling 
litigants in person that they should get legal advice, rather than saying precisely what 
was wrong with their case, or what needed to be done to put it right. Others much more 
directly engaged with the substantive issues before them, making explicit references to 
legal positions ( sometimes, in effect, advising litigants ) or cross-examining on their
sitting in the county court in Sheffield and accounts from other parts o f  the country, reported that the 
number o f people acting for themselves had soared, especially in family disputes about child residence 
and contact orders. In these areas emotions run high and it is very difficult fo r  peop le  to deal with these 
cases themselves. The Times, 16* April, 2009.
'^*’ [1970] 3W.L.R. 472.
Lord Justice Sachs, at page 477, paragraph H. The judgment also cited a comment made by the Chief 
Justice, Lord Tenterden, in a case in 1831, that any person, whether he be a professional man or not, 
may attend as a frien d  o f  either party, may take notes may quietly make suggestions, and give advice. 
Collier V Hicks [1831] 2 B.& A. p.669.
Richard Moorhead and Mark Sefton, Cardiff University, Litigants in person: Unrepresented litigants 
in f ir s t instance proceedings. Department o f  Constitutional Affairs Research Series 2/05, March,2005., 
page 94.
behalf . These judges were seen to abandon the role of neutral arbiter in favour of the 
neutral advocate , or that of the inquisitorial judge ^  .
Quite clearly a requirement placed on modern advocates is to be able to deal with 
litigants in person, the different ways judges react to them and with McKenzie friends.
844 Richard Moorhead and Mark Sefton, ibid, page 261.
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Chapter Twelve : Advocates, expert witnesses, 
contact with witnesses and alleged victims.
Examination of witnesses is fundamental in the practise of advocacy. Important 
developments in this area are now considered.
Expert Witnesses.
As in the past, expert witnesses may provide advocates with a challenge. Some are 
able to translate complex language and ideas into simple and straight forward words and 
speak them at a pace and volume that those who have to find the facts in court can 
follow. Others struggle, sometimes because few of the cases in which they are instructed 
come to trial and hence they lack court experience. When this happens the onus lies 
particularly heavily on the advocate to act as an interpreter by asking the right questions
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based on a thorough understanding of the subject. Whilst fact finders are said to be often 
fascinated by expert evidence, and to concentrate on it greatly, they may not do so if  it 
is not lucidly presented, despite the best efforts of barristers and solicitors.
Over recent years there has been some departure from the traditional approach of 
taking expert witnesses, who may be without gloss or even lacking an undercoat, as you 
find them. Companies offering witness ""familiarization ”, within the rules of Law 
Society and General Council of the Bar, have emerged to assist experts to write clearly 
and on skills in the court room Courses run by the firm Bond Solon include: the 
function of the expert as an independent educator of the court; how the adversarial 
system works; the roles of the various people in court; preparing for court and effective 
personal presentation; taking the oath or affirmation with confidence; techniques 
lawyers use in cross-examination and how to handle them; who to speak to and what to 
call them; expressing an opinion based on a foundation of fact; preparing an opposing 
brief ; and giving clear testimony under difficult cross-examination. In addition to 
offering courses which last one day. Bond Solon , in collaboration with Cardiff 
University, introduced a five day programme, which, upon passing independently and 
anonymously marked tests, leads to the award of the Expert Witness Certificate. Over 
800 experts have completed, this certificate or are in the process of doing so
Contact with witnesses, rehearsal of evidence and court familiarization.
Other than with experts, clients and character witnesses, barristers were not 
permitted contact with witnesses, except when they gave evidence. After the 
introduction in civil cases of carefully drafted witness statements to stand as 
examination in chief, the position of barristers and witness preparation became more 
complicated. This is because solicitors send draft witness statements to barristers, 
instructed in cases, for their approval or, increasingly, they instruct them to draft 
witness statements. Both activities may involve the barrister requesting the solicitor to 
ask a witness to elaborate on certain areas not mentioned, and to attend to other 
evidence which apparently conflicts with his or hers.
Training for experts in civil cases on effective presentation o f evidence, both in written reports and 
orally, was recommended in the Final Report o f  Access to Justice 1996, pp. 150-151.
Bond Solon Training, 13 Britton Street, London, ECIM 5 SX.
O f 203 experts who replied to a survey, conducted by Bond Solon, 58 p e r  cent said that training in 
witness skills should be made compulsory. Law Society Gazette, 22"'* November, 2007.
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Guidance on the role of the barrister is set out by the General Council of the Bar 
In 1995, rules governing a barrister’s contact with witnesses were changed considerably. 
Under amendments to the Bar’s Code of Conduct the rule that prevented his or her 
contact with witnesses was abolished. Under the amended provisions barristers were 
reminded that it is their responsibility to put nervous or vulnerable witnesses as ease by 
explaining unfamiliar court procedures. A distinction was drawn between contact with 
witnesses to put them at ease and for interviewing them and discussing the substance of 
their evidence. Contact for the latter purpose is now allowed but it is left to the 
barrister’s discretion whether it should take place, bearing in mind that it is the 
solicitor’s function, not that of the barrister, to investigate evidence and that discussion 
of evidence may lead to suspicions of coaching, tending to diminish the value of that 
witness’s testimony. The amended Bar Code of Conduct recognized that cases in the 
Crown Court may expose barristers to special pressures. Accordingly in such cases, save 
for lay clients, character witnesses and experts, the Code states it is wholly 
inappropriate for a barrister to interview any potential witnesses. Interviewing, under 
the Code, includes discussing with any witness the substance of his or her evidence or 
the evidence of other witnesses.
Under the Bar Code of Conduct a barrister ''must not rehearse, practise or coach 
witnesses in relation to their evidence or the way they should give it ” . Identical
wording appears in the Law Society’s Code for Solicitor Advocates Guidance to the 
Bar Code says counsel is not prevented from imparting general advice to a witness 
about giving evidence such as: "speak up; speak slowly; answer the question; keep 
answers as short as possible; ask i f  a question is not understood; say ifyou  cannot 
remember; and do not guess or speculate”. Nor is there any objection to robustly testing 
a witness’s recollection to ascertain the quality of his evidence or to discuss issues that 
may arise in cross-examination. By contrast, mock cross-examinations or rehearsals of 
particular lines of questioning that counsel proposes to follow are impermissible.
Counsel is told to bear in mind, when interviewing a witness, the distinction "between 
questioning him closely in order to test the reliability o f  his evidence ( which is
Judge Bailey described witness statements as highly crafted documents designed by their drafters to 
offer as much protection as possible against attack in cross -  examination. Interview, T* November, 
2007. Interviewed on 22"  ^October, 2009, Mr Justice Warren said at best witness statements are ta ilored  
to the witness ; at w orst they manipulate the witness.
Paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 were amended.
Rule 607.
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permissible) and questioning him with a view to encouraging the witness to alter, 
massage or obscure his real recollection (which is not) To emphasise the difference, 
which it acknowledges calls for careful judgment, the Guidance cites a IS^  ^Century 
New York case. Re Elridge in which Judge Francis Finch said: "While a discreet and 
prudent attorney may very properly ascertain from  witnesses in advance o f  the trial 
what they in fa c t know and the extent and limitations o f  their memory, as a guide to his 
own examinations, he has no right legal or moral, to go further. His duty is to extract 
the facts from  the witness, not to pour them into him; to learn what the witness does 
know, not to teach him what he ought to know ”
The Guidance shows an awareness of the suggestibility of witnesses. It draws 
attention to the fact that, even in the absence of any intention to do so, authority figures 
do subconsciously influence lay witnesses and further discussion on the substance of a 
case may unwittingly contaminate the witness’s evidence. Particular danger is seen to 
arise where such discussions take place in the presence of more than one witness of fact, 
or involve the disclosure to one witness of fact of the factual evidence of another 
witness. Barristers are reminded that both these practices have been strongly criticized 
by the courts as inevitably tending to encourage the rehearsal or coaching of witnesses 
and to increase the risk of fabrication or contamination of evidence
Solicitors and witnesses: What is permissible now.
From limited research undertaken in 2000, it seemed that a small number of 
solicitors, mainly involved in immigration and asylum law and crime, in the absence of 
specific prohibition by a rule of professional conduct, rehearsed evidence and conducted 
role play to introduce clients and non-client witnesses to questions they were likely to 
meet in cross-examination. When asked about this, a representative from the Law 
Society explained that great caution had to be taken to avoid encouraging witnesses to 
alter, massage or obscure their evidence Because of fears about falling into this, 
combined with a suspicion that role-playing is ethically dubious, the great majority of
Paragraph 6.5 page 391, The Guide to the Professional Conduct o f  Solicitors, 1999, The Law Society. 
^^^New York Court o f  Appeals 37 NY161, 171.
R V A rif  (1993) Times, May 26‘^  and Smith New Court Securities L td  v Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset 
M anagement)Ltd  [1994] 1 WLR 1271.
The Law Society Code o f  Practice at paragraph 21.10 provides that solicitors must not tamper with 
the evidence o f  a witness or attempt to encourage the witness into changing their evidence nor interfere 
with the evidence o f  a witness.
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solicitors did not practice witnesses^^^ Following a decision of the Court of Appeal in 
2005, R V Momodou solicitors in criminal cases may no longer coach or train 
witnesses in the giving of their evidence. - it can only be speculated whether some still 
do , covertly and unlawfully.
The case arose out of a highly publicised disturbance at the Yarl’s Wood 
Immigration and Detention Centre in 2002 . The centre was greatly damaged by 
detainees, some of whom escaped and had to be captured by the police. Anticipating 
future criminal and civil court cases. Group 4, the private company that operated the 
centre, placed a number of its employees with the specialist trainers Bond Solon for 
witness training. While the witness training programme was abandoned before the 
criminal trial, the involvement of at least some witnesses with it formed part of the 
appeals ( unsuccessful as they turned out) against the convictions of two detainees. The 
Court of Appeal largely supported the clear direction given to the jury by the trial judge 
who said "there is no place fo r  witness training in our country . We don’t do i t . It is 
unlawful”. The Lord Justices of Appeal clearly stated witness training for criminal trials 
was prohibited and that in their view the risk that training or coaching could adversely 
affect the accuracy of individual witnesses must be a constant risk, either deliberately or 
inadvertently, especially where witnesses may be trained in joint sessions. Such training 
could result in witnesses being influenced by what others had said.
The Court of Appeal distinguished witness training from “witness familiarisation” 
programmes which it said should be actively encouraged. Whilst witness coaching or 
training was not allowed, because witnesses should be uninfluenced by any third party, 
the Court of Appeal considered they should not be prejudiced by an unfamiliarity with 
the court process, or the psychological effects of undergoing a cross-examination. It was 
therefore perfectly acceptable, in its view, to assist witnesses to comply with their duty 
to the court and to provide their best and honest evidence. In the case of criminal trials 
the Court of Appeal (Lord Justice Judge) set out guidelines that should be followed 
regarding any familiarisation programme^” :
Professional legal advisers should be consulted on the intended programme and asked 
to provide written advice;
A Watson, Witness Preparation in the United States and England and Wales, Justice o f  the Peace, Vol 
164, October, 2000.
[2005] EWCA Grim 177 581.
R V Momodou.[2005] 2A11ER 581 at 588, paras, 62-65.
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Proposals for any intended familiarisation programmes should be reduced to writing;
the trial judge should be informed of any familiarisation process;
The process should be supervised or conducted by a solicitor or barrister with 
experience in the criminal justice process and preferably by an organization accredited 
for the purpose by the Bar Council or Law Society;
None of those involved should have any personal knowledge of the matters in issue;
Records should be maintained of all those present and the identity of those responsible 
for the familiarisation training session. These records should be retained together with 
all written materials used during the familiarization training sessions;
None of the materials should bear any similarity whatsoever to the issues in the 
criminal proceedings and should not play on or trigger the witness’s actual recollection 
of the events;
There must be no discussion between the witnesses, trainers or others present as to the 
facts in the actual case in dispute. If any such discussions do ensue they should be 
stopped immediately and the witnesses warned of the danger of evidence contamination;
And Documents used in the process should be retained and if  necessary produced to 
the court.
Organisations offering expert assistance in witness familiarisation programmes, and 
leading firms of solicitors that took steps to ensure that their witnesses were properly 
prepared for the courtroom, acted swiftly to make sure their activities complied with the 
Momodou Guidelines^^l Litigators and advocates involved in cases now have to 
consider whether they have been abided by. Although the Guidelines were drafted for 
criminal cases, those conducting civil litigation also take close note of them
Prosecutors and witnesses: An Important Change.
Traditionally in England and Wales, prosecutors were expected to put their 
witnesses in the witness box without speaking to them in advance about their evidence 
or any of the issues in the case. The rule arose in the 18 '^ Century when prosecutions 
were largely brought by private persons. Judges at the time did not trust private people 
to deal honestly with their witnesses because a widespread trade existed in bribing them
858 Julian Clark, When witness training becomes tampering with evidence, Lloyds List, 9*^  March, 2005.
The Bar Standards Board Guidelines on Witness Preparation ( First issued in October 2005 and last 
reviewed in September 2008. ) state that until an authority emerges, it would be prudent to p ro ceed  on 
the basis that the general principles in Momodou also apply to civil proceedings.
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. To reduce this, the judges developed a rule that people who prosecuted privately 
must not speak to witnesses they were to call.
In a speech delivered at Kings College, London to the Centre for Crime and 
Justice Studies in 2006 the Director of Public Prosecutions, and head of the Crown 
Prosecution Service, Mr. Kenneth MacDonald QC made the point that public 
prosecutors today are not private citizens; they are members of professional legal 
bodies, and of a public prosecuting authority subject to all the codes of conduct and 
rules that status implies. When speaking about the rule to colleagues abroad, the DPP 
said they were astonished to hear that a criminal justice system operated in which 
prosecutors are forbidden from speaking to witnesses before a trial begins. Indeed he 
recounted how a Supreme Court Judge in Canada had told him she would report a 
prosecutor to his professional body for incompetence if  he or she was to call a witness 
in a serious criminal case without testing that evidence before proceedings started 
To the DPP, the rule, preventing prosecutors speaking to alleged victims, was at its 
most unsupportable where the Crown Prosecution Service had to decide whether to 
bring cases when it was one person’s word against another, as in rape where the 
defence of consent is run. In what can only be described as a fundamental change in 
the legal system and the practice of advocacy, Mr. MacDonald announced: So we are 
now in the business o f  interviewing witnesses and I  suspect that in areas like serious 
sex crime there will be a very significant improvement in prosecutions and prosecution 
decision making.
A pre-trial witness interview pilot scheme was introduced in Greater Manchester, 
Merseyside, Lancashire and Cumbria in 2006. Before it was introduced consultation 
took place with the judiciary, the Bar Council and the Law Society to allay concerns 
that witnesses would be coached or evidence contaminated. The Bar agreed to change its 
professional code of conduct to facilitate the scheme and a Code of Practice was drawn
See J. H. Langbein, The Origins o f  Adversary Criminal Trial, Oxford, 2003, pp. 148 -  150. One 
aspect o f  this trade was that ‘men o f  straw’, identified by pieces o f  straw tucked into their shoes, hung 
about outside courtrooms, available to act as witnesses -  for a fee.
23''' May, 2006.
The rule preventing prosecution advocates interviewing their own witnesses was much questioned in 
Britain following the acquittal o f  four youths charged with manslaughter o f  the south London school boy 
Damilola Taylor in 2002. The judge ruled that the evidence o f  the main prosecution witness, a 12 year- 
old girl, could not be relied on. The then Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith QC, in 2003, began a 
process o f  consultation on whether CPS lawyers should interview witnesses before trial. In 2004,the 
Attorney General concluded that prosecutors should be able to interview key witnesses about their 
evidence.
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up for Crown Prosecution Service lawyers^^\ It was decided that interviews would be 
recorded on audio or, in some circumstances, video taped and made available to the 
defence . Interviews were designed to: assess the reliability of the witnesses evidence; 
assist the prosecutors in understanding complex evidence and explain court processes 
and procedures to witnesses. Researchers from the University of Nottingham, engaged 
by the CPS to study the pilot, concluded that prosecution decision making was 
improved, both by strengthening cases that proceed to trial and by timely rejecting 
potentially weak cases. They further found witness interviews were particularly useful 
in word against word cases including those involving rape
In November , 2007 the Attorney General, Baroness Scotland, announced that the 
scheme piloted in the four areas was to operate across England and Wales from April, 
2008 Very shortly before its national implementation, an experienced prosecution 
barrister put forward that pre-trial interviews could considerably affect the task of 
advocacy in some cases. In his view, as it is not unusual for the defence to suggest that a 
witness’s account has been influenced by questions asked by a police officer taking his 
or her statement, potential will ex is t, where a pre-trial witness interview has taken 
place, to suggest that questions asked by the prosecution lawyer were improper and have 
influenced the witness.
"That puts the prosecution lawyer in a very difficult position since, whereas the police 
officer who took a witness statement can go into the witness box and answer any such 
accusations , it is not convenient fo r  the lawyer who is conducting the prosecution to be
Polly Botsford, Early warnings. Law Society Gazette, 105/12 , 2 March,  2008, pp.12-13.
In an interview with the Director o f  Public Prosecutions, held on 23'^ May, 2006, Mr. McDonald 
expressed confidence that sufficient safeguards would exist against coaching witnesses and “improving” 
evidence.
The study conducted by Professor Paul Roberts and Candida Saunders, University o f Nottingham  
School o f  Law, also reported several concerns about Pre-trial Witness Interviews (PTWI). Amongst the 
most significant were: risks o f  witness coaching; witness non-cooperation; hostility or avoidable trauma; 
and the possibility that PTWI would produce impeachment material damaging to the witness’s 
credibility, potentially undermining future prosecutions involving the same complainant, as well as the 
present case. I f  it was to be extended nationally, the authors o f  the study concluded continuous 
monitoring o f  the schem e’s implementation, to ensure practice by prosecutors remained faithful to its 
original aims, would be prudent.
Attorney General’s Office, News Release, 27*'* November, 2007. The scheme was fully implemented 
on T* April, 2008 ( CPS Press Release o f  that date).
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presenting the case one minute and then stepping into the witness box to defend him or 
herself the next”
David Allan, 23 Essex Street Chambers. Interviewed by Polly Botsford for article. Early Warnings, 
Law Society Gazette, 105/12, 28''' March, 2008. pp. 12-13.
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Chapter 13: The teaching of Advocacy- an 
important infiuence.
In Sir Patrick’s day.
Patrick Hastings, whose style in his great forensic successes did much to influence that 
of other barristers, wrote in 1954 "There is no school o f  advocacy, in all probability no
such school would be any value even i f  it could exist......
Sir Patrick was of course absolutely right in as much as no school of advocacy existed 
then. The bar examinations, introduced in 1852 and made compulsory in 1872, covered only 
the law Since medieval times, when apprentices would sit in ‘the crib’ at the royal courts 
at Westminster, the principal way for young lawyers to learn about advocacy was to go and 
watch it in the courts, especially the efforts of acknowledged masters. Early in a barrister’s 
career briefs often came only very slowly allowing ample time to do so. Discussion about
Cases in Court, Pan Books Ltd, 1954, page 252. Similarly Sir Malcolm Hilbery, also very likely  
reflecting a w idely held view  at the time, in his address on advocacy in Gray’s Inn in 1938, was 
doubtful whether advocacy could be system atically taught except, perhaps, by observing successful 
practitioners in court. Graya XX, pp. 11.
This was eloquently criticised by Leo Page, First Steps in Advocacy, Faber and Faber, 1943, pp. 10-11: "'If 
fo r  example, the student intends to be called to the Bar, amongst other esoteric knowledge he must master the 
matrimonial system o f  the Roman Empire and the Institutes ofJustinian, to which in all probability he will never 
again have occasion to refer and which the day following his examination he will make every effort to forget. 
Until recently, i f  he desired to be admitted a solicitor he was required to ground himself in ecclesiastical and 
Admiralty jurisprudence which almost certainly fo r the remainder o f  his professional career would be 
completely useless to h im . Towards whichever branch o f  the profession he may incline the law student will, 
therefore, be necessarily equipped with a vast amount o f  learning o f  which much is o f  dubious value, if, indeed, 
it is o f  any value at all. Yet it is a singular reflection that in the training o f  an advocate neither the Benchers o f  
his Inn nor the Council o f  his Law Society include Advocacy as an essential study”.
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what was observed between contemporaries and with more senior barristers in chambers also 
took place.
An understanding of advocacy could be supplemented by reading a small number of 
practical books on the subject, for example, corresponding with Sir Patrick’s early career, 
Robert Harris’s Hints on Advocacy and works by Frederic Wrottesley ( later Lord Justice 
Wrottesley) might also be studied^^". During this period, and certainly in earlier times , those 
who had studied the classics, might recall, and see some value in, the methods of 
Demosthenes ( whose oration On the crown was still seen as instructive to prosecutors as 
late as 1943 by George Keaton in the Eighteenth Edition of Harris’s Hints), Lysias , Cicero 
and Quintilian Young barristers may additionally have gained advice on techniques of 
advocacy by reading biographies and autobiographies of judges and lawyers Some might
have acquired skills in public speaking and debating through membership of debating 
societies, especially at Oxford and Cambridge Universities^^^ and, earlier at school.
Half a century, or so , later, the quote from Sir Patrick no longer holds good: Law schools 
now teach advocacy and this is widely perceived as very worthwhile.
In 1943 available practical books were joined by Leo Page’s First Steps in Advocacy, with a foreward written 
by Viscount Simon, the Lord Chancellor. Leo Page was a stipendiary magistrate and former highly 
accomplished barrister. His Honour Judge John Bull, a retired Circuit Judge, interviewed on 12*'' July, 2010, 
described this short book as a vastly important work which had influenced heavily the post war generation o f  
barristers, including Richard Du Cann, with whom he was a contemporary in chambers. In his turn Richard Du 
Cann, through his successes and widely read book. The Art o f  the Advocate, first published, by Penguin, in 1964, 
affected advocates later in the 20*'' Century.
The value o f  studying classical masters as a preparation for the bar was increasingly questioned by 
the I9 2 0 ’s and before, as is indicated in Theo Mathew’s Forensic Fables, see the Blushing Beginner 
And The B earded Juryman pp. 57-58. and The B rilliant Person, The Vulgar Individual With A Cockney 
A ccent A nd The Two M alefactors .pp305- 306,( Forensic Fables, Reprinted in 199 by W ildy and Sons, 
London.) . Hastings, himself, was certainly no enthusiast for classical influences on modern forensic 
advocacy, see Cases in Court, London, Heinemann, pp. xi - x i i  .
From the 19*'' Century the number o f these works significantly expanded. See Philip Girard, Judging Lives: 
Judicial Biography from Hale to Holmes, Australian Journal o f Legal History (2003) Vol. 7. Two barristers, 
Barrie Nathan and Gerald Rabie, respectively interviewed on 22"'' July, 2009 and 30*'' July, 2009, who had been 
called to the Bar in the late 1960s, before bar students received formal training in advocacy, said that they, and 
most o f their contemporaries, had read Norman Birkett’s Six Great Advocates, Patrick Hastings’s Cases in Court 
and biographies written on Marshall Hall, F. E. Smith and others. The methods and techniques they found in 
them were discussed amongst students and pupil barristers.
In First Steps in Advocacy, however, Leo Page, page 21, saw many university debating society addresses, 
"concerned to display the speaker’s own brilliance, prepared in advance, sparkling with epigrams, but with the 
merest semblance o f  advancing a case or o f  dealing with an argument, as models o f what should be avoided by 
young men who wish to avoid their living in the courts”.
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Formal advocacy instruction for bar students and young barristers.
Limited formal instruction in advocacy for bar students began in the 1970’s when the 
Council of Legal Education (“CLE” ) required whose who had declared an intention to 
practise at the bar to undertake practical exercises. The element of advocacy training in the 
programme was not extensive and largely consisted of small groups of students, during the 
early evening, visiting barristers in chambers for instruction on how to conduct straight 
forward submissions. One or two students might attempt exercises that they had prepared 
beforehand and then receive comments upon them from the barrister. Court visits, when 
students had the opportunity of talking to judges^’^'* and magistrates, were also arranged. For 
advice on conducting trials, students were strongly urged by tutors, and by practicing 
barristers they met in chambers to read The Art o f  the Advocate by Richard Du Cann, who 
was invited to the CLE each year to give a lecture of about one hour’s length. Students could 
also see themselves, albeit very briefly, on film performing a short plea in mitigation.
Following extensive research, at the behest of the Bar Council, mostly amongst the junior 
bar, about what a full time course to bridge the academic stage of training and pupillage 
should comprise, the Council of Legal Education introduced the Bar Vocational Course 
(“BYC”) in 1989. It replaced the previous rather academic Bar Finals course which had been 
slightly shorter. Delivered exclusively at the Inns of Court School of Law (“ICSL”) in Grays 
Inn, the new course taught knowledge of criminal and civil procedure, evidence and 
sentencing. The greatest concentration, however, was on the teaching of skills in opinion 
writing and drafting, conducting conferences with clients and, above all, advocacy^^  ^ .The 
educational philosophy which informed instruction was that the successful performance of 
any skill could be broken down into a number of elements . From these elements, it is 
possible to identify performance criteria. These criteria can be used for assessing how good a 
particular performance is, and as the basis for providing constructive ‘feedback’, to improve it 
if n ecessary .S o m e years after the inception of the BVC at the ICSL , the Bar Council gave
Judges and senior barristers would often advice intending barristers to go on a public speaking course. Judge 
Gibbens QC, speaking in 1979, strongly recommended this. Elements o f  Modern Advocacy, New Law Cassettes, 
Butterworths, London, 1975.
In an interview conducted on 27* July, 2009, Lord Hoffmann, who in 1989 was Chairman o f the Council o f 
Legal Education,the body which then governed the Inns O f Court School o f Law, said that he favoured the 
introduction o f structured advocacy teaching as sensible consumer protection at a time when a number of 
solicitors did not exercise sufficient quality control o f barristers they instructed in the lower courts. This had led 
to complaints o f some pretty shocking performances.
Peter Hungerford-Welch, Advocacy, New  Law Journal. 150 NLJ 1532, 20*  October, 2000.
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permission for the course to be taught at a number of other institutions in the country. The 
ICSL, however, remains the biggest provider of places
Advocacy skills, defined as "skills necessary to prepare , manage and present a 
case or legal argument, both orally and in writing, [ reflecting the rise of paper 
advocacy] before a court or other tribunal, whether form al or informa ”l are key on 
the BVC. Instruction in advocacy is to the level that will sufficiently prepare students for 
later advocacy training during pupillage . The Bar Standards Board specifies that each student 
is to undertake at least 12 advocacy exercises in class under the supervision of a tutor and that 
advocacy will be assessed six times on the course, three times on a formal basis. Advocacy 
assessment must contain: submission of a written argument ; interventions from the bench; 
knowledge and application of legal principle; and witness handling, including examination in 
chief and cross-examination. Witness handling comes in the later stages of the course and 
legal submissions may dealt with in mooting. The amount of teaching needed to complete the 
advocacy element of the BVC varies between approved establishments. At the College of 
Law, for instance, instruction in civil advocacy, requires students to act as barristers in: 
opposed applications to set aside default judgements; injunctions, unopposed and opposed; 
summary judgements, for which they have to draft skeleton arguments; submissions on costs; 
and personal injury submissions. There are also two trials, one fast track and the other multi­
track, where, in addition to being counsel, students play witnesses. Judges and senior 
practitioners , some of whom have retired, act as judges in the multi-track trial where three 
parties are represented
Criminal advocacy training at the College of Law, which is embedded in the teaching of 
criminal procedure and evidence, includes: making applications for adjournments, and bail ; 
summary trials; submissions of no case to answer based, amongst other things, on 
identification evidence; pleas in mitigation and drafting indictments and defence statements 
of case for Crown Court trial. There are also sessions devoted to practising opening and 
closing speeches, examination in chief and cross-examination and applications to exclude 
evidence
In August, 20007 the ICSL ceased to exist as an independent entity and was incorporated into City 
University Law School.
Bar Council: BVC Specification Requirements and Guidance. Revised 2006 .
Information kindly supplied by Mr. John Van Issum, Senior Lecturer and head o f  the civil stream 
on the BVC, College o f  Law, London. Interview, 4* July, 2007.
Interview with Mr. N icholas Ross, Senior Lecturer on the BVC, College o f  Law, London on 16* 
August, 2007.
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Students’ advocacy is often video recorded so that, together with tutors comments made , 
it can be reflected upon later. In addition to instruction during the day, there are a number of 
practitioners evenings when students are obliged to perform exercises before practising 
barristers who appraise them. Most students involve themselves in mooting competitions, 
judged by members of staff and external barristers.
In 2001 the Bar Council declared that all teachers of advocacy on the BVC should be 
qualified as instructors by the Inns of Court Training Committee (lATC) and use its methods. 
Loosely based on techniques pioneered by the American National Institute of Trial Advocacy, 
the lATC approach, developed to train pupil barristers, is a strict one. The instructor identifies 
one aspect of the student’s performance, explaining to him or her what they did , why it is 
inappropriate and how to avoid the problem. The instructor then seeks to demonstrate to the 
student how to improve before asking him or her to replay that aspect of his or her 
performance. From observations made, performances and the feedback from instructors are 
short. It was reported that a number of BVC lecturers at the ICSL considered the lATC 
method was too narrow and unsuitable for students, yet to acquire the resilience of pupil 
barristers, who may require constructive feedback and sensitive encouragement on more than 
one selected point. Strong feelings were aroused ; some lecturers approved of it 
wholeheartedly, considering it introduced students to harsh realities of life at the bar; others 
resolved to use it sparingly or not at all.
As in the past, there is an expectation that pupils will spend the first six months of their 
pupillage, during which they have no rights of audience, accompanying their pupil master or 
mistress in court and the watching advocacy there. ( known in earlier times as standing by 
Nellie ). In 1992 the Bar Council, in order to higher standards, made it a requirement that 
before their second six months of advocacy expired all pupil barristers must attend an of 
advocacy programme at their Inn of Court, lasting the equivalent of three days. These have 
evolved and developed since then. At Gray’s Inn, for instance, pupils must now take a two 
part short course on practice management which includes guiding them through the transition 
from academic student to independent advocate and a discussion on ethical issues of practice. 
They are also obliged to attend two workshops about witness handling which together deal 
with case analysis and then gives students the opportunity to practice examination in chief 
and cross-examination. Pupils are further required to participate in a course on interlocutory 
applications. After a short discussion with trainers in their chambers, in which they have the 
chance to discuss their skeleton arguments, pupils perform before a real judge sitting in the 
Royal Courts of Justice, who afterwards offers some advice. A fuller appraisal is later given
by the trainers. Finally pupils must take part in a trial exercise held at the Royal Courts of 
Justice. Each party to a case is represented, before a real judge, by a pair of pupils. Witnesses 
are played by members of the Inn. Trainers critique pupils’ performances at various stages.
Pupils may also attend two voluntary courses. The first of these is on legal argument 
and involves pupils in an opposed injunction application. Their performances are reviewed by 
trainers. The second non -  compulsory course covers handling costs applications. Courses are 
run by volunteers, either barristers or judges belonging to the Inn, and the lATC method is 
used extensively. Usually six pupils are instructed by two trainers
The Bar Council in 1998 introduced a rule that all barristers in their first three years of 
practice must complete a minimum of 45 hours of continuing professional development 
including at least nine hours of advocacy. Gray’s Inn runs a weekend programme to satisfy 
the advocacy requirement, an important feature of which is handling expert witnesses in 
court. Bar Circuits have also introduced formal advocacy training courses for barristers 
during their early years. One such is the intensive week long Advanced Advocacy Course 
held annually at Keble College, Oxford. The faculty, which constructively critiques 
participants, consists of senior juniors, silks, and judges, all of whom have undergone teacher 
training for the course. Participants work on either a criminal of civil case. After interlocutory 
matters have been dealt with and participants have devoted one and a half days of working 
with experts in a trial setting, the course culminates, on the last day, with a full trial. In the 
civil case this is before a High Court Judge or Deputy, whilst the criminal case is heard by a 
judge and jury. The jury’s deliberations are filmed : each participant receives the film. Jurors 
also complete a confidential questionnaire on each advocate’s performance
In an interview, the Vice Chairman of the Grays Inn Advocacy Committee expressed 
the view that the greater attention to teaching advocacy that arrived with the Bar Vocational 
Course and the efforts made in advocacy training for pupils and for barristers in their first 
three years practice had led to greater proficiency in court by newly admitted barristers. He 
said this opinion was shared by most senior barristers and judges The days of the fledgling 
barrister asking the court usher to put his or her case at the bottom of the court list, so he or 
she could listen to similar cases to fathom out what to do, had largely gone. The Vice
Information kindly supplied by Sue Harrop, Assistant Advocacy Officer, Gray’s Inn, London. 
Course kindly explained by Mr. Michael Lerego QC, one o f  the devisers and organizers, in an interview held 
on the 4* February, 2010.
Peter Carter QC interviewed on 18* May, 2007.
Mr. Justice Warren, o f the Chancery Division o f  the High Court and President o f the Finance and Tax 
Chamber, interviewed on the 22"  ^October, 2009, described the training in advocacy that barristers now receive 
as a great plus.
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Chairman agreed that the introduction of formal advocacy training marked a great shift away 
from the long held belief that competence in advocacy was innate- you either have it or you 
do not- towards recognizing that it can be taught and later improved upon by work and 
experience. BVC lecturers also interviewed strongly sympathized with the latter position 
The Vice Chairman doubted whether increased formal training had resulted in more 
uniformity of barristers style, as had been predicted by the less enthusiastic about it. He said 
that the nature of much work in early years of practice did not permit too much of a distinctly 
individual approach which, in his view, develops later and with more heavy work. A Lord 
Justice of Appeal agreed that BVC and Inns of Court training in advocacy, which 
concentrated on the basics, did not prevent acquiring more personal forms of advocacy 
afterwards. He added that his son had recently qualified as a barrister and had reached a 
standard much higher than when he had done some thirty years before**”^. The instruction in 
advocacy then did not sufficiently equip barristers to practice advocacy: "It was o f  little 
help”.
In September 2010 the Bar Vocational Course was replaced by the Bar 
Professional Training Course (“BPTC”). Essentially the core of the BVC course, 
including training in advocacy, was retained, but the BPTC curriculum is broader ***. 
In particular it includes a “resolution of disputes out of court” module, comprising 
negotiation, mediation, arbitration, early neutral determination, expert determination 
and other processes of alternative dispute resolution. Students are instructed in the 
specialist skills of advocacy necessary and are required to perform a mock mediation. 
Entrance requirements to the BPTC will be more rigorous. An internal report 
conducted by the Bar Standards Board, in 2008, found poor standards in English 
amongst some BVC students; both native and non-native speakers of the language. 
Inability was identified both to speak fluently, with close attention to grammar, 
vocabulary and syntax, and to write clear, correct and well structured prose. Concern
Michael Beloff QC, a most accomplished, much sought after advocate ( reputedly the highest paid silk at the 
English and Welsh Bar) and Treasurer o f  Grays Inn in 2008, did not embrace this as strongly. He considered that 
first class advocates excel because they come to the Bar with gifts and acquired experiences o f  public speaking, 
rather because o f what is learned on courses and workshops. Whilst he thought these did not create great 
advocacy, they had a clear value in reducing errors and mistakes that can be made in early days. He said it was 
very noticeable how much people attending advocacy workshops at Grays Inn rapidly improved. Interview on 
30* July, 2009.
Interviewed, 18* July, 2007 (Lord Justice Richards).
Mr Timothy Dutton QC, Chairman o f the Bar Council 2008/2009, interviewed on the 8* May, 2008, after he 
had delivered an address at the College o f Law, Store Street, London, considered that training in advocacy for 
barristers in England and Wales was amongst the best in the worldhvX added this does not mean there is no 
room fo r  future improvement.
2 8 8
was expressed about how standards o f advocacy could be damaged. Aimed to avoid 
this, a new aptitude test for admission, which concentrates on critical reasoning and 
clarity in expression, will be introduced for BPTC applicants. It is voluntary in 2010, 
but will become compulsory in 2 0 1 .
Advocacy training for solicitors
Advocacy for solicitors, as James Morton, the distinguished criminal solicitor, historian 
and former editor of the New Law Journal, put it, was "very hit and miss: no courses, no
lectures, get on and do it. So o f  course, some advocates were better than others ”
It was not covered by the professional examinations or courses until the Legal 
Professional Course (“LPC”) was introduced in 1993.
Mr Morton, whose career began in London in the early 1960’s, described how new 
solicitors instructed to appear in the magistrates court sought advice from those more 
experienced in their firm and, crucially, from others present at court, who were generally very 
helpful. They would ask the clerk to the justices about the procedure to be followed, which 
sometimes varied considerably from court to court. Requesting cases be called on later, so 
that applications and submissions could be observed, was common. Books on advocacy were 
occasionally consulted, but sometimes disappointment was felt by readers as few had direct 
relevance to the business of the magistrates. There is little to believe that preparation for 
appearances in other courts, such as the County Court was very much different.
Nowadays there is formal training in aspects of advocacy. The Law Society LPC written 
standards state: "Students should be able to formulate a coherent submission based 
upon facts, general principles and legal authority in a structured, concise and 
persuasive manner. The student should understand the crucial importance o f  
preparation and the best way to undertake it. The student should be able to 
demonstrate an understanding o f  the basic skills in the presentation o f  cases before 
various courts and tribunals ”
They do not prescribe the amount of teaching time to be devoted to advocacy, although 
institutions that provide the course typically spend between 7 and 12 hours teaching i t . This
See Marcus Soanes, Enhancing Legal Education, Counsel, January, 2010, pp .14-16.
M ichal Peel and Jane Croft, Bar to hold  p ilo t  tests fo r  fluency in English, Financial Times, 
February 1®*, 2010.
Morton’s Musings: Kings o f  the Court, Law Society Gazette, James Morton, 22"'' February, 2007. 
Interview held on 16* July,2007.
LPC written standards lOvs - September 2004.
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is usually divided between large and small group sessions . Some providers, such as the 
largest, the College of Law, also use e-leaming such as web casts, permitting students to 
study at their own pace. Teaching can be in the context of either criminal or civil litigation. At 
the College it is mainly in civil. The prime focus of LPC advocacy rests on presentations and 
applications. There may or may not be some discussion of the principles of witness handling 
(examination in chief and cross -examination) but not practice. This contrasts with the BVC 
where witness handling is seen as a key skill. Also unlike the BVC , advocacy is assessed 
only once and on a simple competent/non-competent basis. In recent years, examination at the 
College of Law involved submissions in summary judgement or setting aside a decision made 
in default
There is no requirement for trainee solicitors to undertake any advocacy, although some 
do at tribunal or civil interlocutory levels, where rights of audience are not necessary. Before 
the end of their two year training contract all trainees must undertake the Professional Skills 
Course (“PSC”) of which three days is devoted to advocacy training. The advocacy element 
of this course, provided by a number of institutions, varies considerably in content. Some 
include witness handling at an introductory level.
All solicitors spoken to considered formal advocacy training, introduced by the LPC 
and PSC, was very positive for the profession. It had contributed to greater confidence and 
competence amongst newly qualified solicitors. Some, however, wanted more, especially in 
conducting trials. This was thought urgent because of the arrival of higher rights of audience.
Fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives.
In 2006 the Institute of Legal Executives was approved by the Lord Chancellor to grant 
greater rights of audience to its Fellows. ILEX issues certificates in civil proceedings , family 
proceedings and criminal proceedings Fellows certified as eligible, on the basis of their 
knowledge and experience, attend a six day course, which they must pass. Interactive 
tuition in small groups takes place using case studies and practical exercises. The final day 
consists of assessing performances in advocacy and knowledge of procedure and evidence.
Information about the College o f Law kindly supplied by Mr. Fred Price o f the Store Street Branch, London. 
See Chapter Fifteen: Rights o f  Audience.
Baljeet Basra, Professional Development and Regulation Department, Institute o f  Legal Executives, 
interviewed on 17* July, 2007.
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When assessing influences on advocacy, the introduction of systematic and rigorous 
training in the late Century, must be considered a most important factor.
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Chapter Fourteen : US Jury Advocacy and the 
decline of trials in America.
Consideration of changes in forensic advocacy in England and Wales, and o f 
reasons why, since the mid 20^  ^Century, may benefit by comparison with advocac 
in the United States and developments there during the same period.
Style and development
Trial by jury, guaranteed in criminal matters by the Constitution and in civil cases by the 
Bill of Rights, is more prevalent in the United States than England and Wales. Practising 
American lawyers, judges and legal academics, who kindly agreed to be informally 
questioned ^^ ^were of the view that significant alterations in style had occurred during the 
latter 20^  ^Century. They agreed that compared with lawyers earlier in the 20th century, of 
whom the internationally famous Clarence Darrow (1857-1938) was given as an example.
At the Winter Harvard Law School Trial Advocacy Workshop in 2000 and 2003. Two o f those questioned 
were later formally interviewed in London: His Honour John Cratesly, Massachusetts Superior Court, 20* 
November, 2007, and Amy Millard, 30* Attorney, daym an and Rosenberg, New York, 30* January, 2008.
See Kevin Tierney, D arrow : A biography, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979 and, for his later career, 
Donald McRae, The O ld  D ev il C larence D arrow: The W orld’s G reatest Trial Lawyer, Simon & 
Schuster Ltd, 2009. One semi-retired lawyer, in his seventies, said that he had quoted Clarence 
Darrow (1857 -  1938) to juries in the 1960’s and 1970’s, especially the closing lines o f  his 
summation, closing speech, in the B illy  Hayward trial o f  1908. Clarence Darrow’s advocacy combined
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most modem attorneys avoid grand rhetoric, preferring to influence the jury's emotions 
through plain, but pointed, speech*^*. It was explained that plain speech was needed more
unswerving dedication to clients, eloquence, powers o f  description -  words mattered considerably in 
the pre-television world -  that would stand comparison with any novelist, the ability to personalize 
those who he represented making jurors identify with them, a sense o f  dramatic delivery, wearing 
clothes and mannerisms to suggest sincerity and being down to earth, strong appeals to emotion 
capable o f  producing tears in jurors and even judges, use, on occasions, o f  biting sarcasm and pointed 
wit, well planned and, where necessary, robust cross -exam ination, rapid response to points made by 
opponents and judges and often long summations rich in personal stories, references to universal 
truths, irresistible forces acting on humanity, historical events, many quotations from poetry including 
Robert Burns and Walt Whitman and passages from Shakespeare. He was probably the best known 
trial advocate in America. The Tennessee “Scopes Monkey Trial” in 1925, in which Darrow played a 
prominent role in defending a young biology teacher, charged under state law( The Butler Act ) with 
teaching that "man descended from  a lower order o f  an im al” rather than a biblical account o f  creation, 
was reported by journalists from over two hundred newspapers and broadcast live, with the help o f  
commentators, on the radio, the first case ever to have been done so. Clarence Darrow’s style o f  
advocacy was undoubtedly a powerful influence on many attorneys in the United States for decades 
and shaped jurors’ expectations o f  how cases would be presented at trial. Another influence on both 
advocates and what jurors associated expected o f  them was Samuel Leibowitz (1893 -  1978). By the 
end o f  the 1920’s he was considered the new Clarence Darrow, the most successful, even the greatest, 
defence lawyer o f  his generation, defending over one hundred people accused o f  murder; only one 
went to the electric chair. Leibovitz ceased to be an attorney when he was appointed a judge in New  
York in 1941. He was best remembered in the public mind as counsel for the Scottsboro Boys, nine 
Black youths who had been falsely accused o f  rape and sentenced to death in Alabama in 1931. 
Leibowitz worked without pay for the next seven years in their much publicised cases ( elements o f  
them are found in Harper L ee’s "To K ill a M ockingbird’, a classic o f  modern American literature. ), 
one o f  which reached the United States Supreme Court, whose decision effectively put an end to the 
practice in Southern States o f  excluding blacks as jurors ( See Quentin Reynolds, Court Room, Victor 
Gollancz, London, 1950, Chapters X and XI ). Cases conducted by Leibovitz were m eticulously  
researched; he was w illing to study many scientific disciplines, notably including psychiatry, 
medicine, anatomy and ballistics, to bolster evidence for his client or damage the prosecution’s; 
thoroughly prepared, so that he was seldom surprised at whatever the prosecution did; and were 
presented, sometimes using the latest visual aids,when thought to assist persuasion, in a well 
modulated voice. Courtesy was displayed to all. He excelled at cross-examination. Again and again in 
his career he tore prosecution evidence, especially circumstantial, to shreds. He sometimes em ployed a 
tactic o f  needling a prosecutor into a line o f  cross-examination which he knew would backfire on him. 
Less inclined to quote poetry and make other references to literature than Clarence Darrow, his 
summations were, nonetheless, delivered with drama, wit, timing and spoken in forcible and emotional 
language. Defendants deeds were sometimes ascribed to Acts o f  the Almighty. Widespread b e lie f that 
the police often extorted confessions was explicitly or im plicitly played upon and much was said 
about the standard and burden o f  proof. In 1950 a very readable biography about Leibovitz( 
Courtroom, Victor Gollancz, London), was published. The author, the writer and journalist Quentin 
Reynolds, closely analysed his famous cases and m ethods.( Also see Fred D. Pasley, N ot G uilty! The 
Story o f  Samuel Leibowitz, G. P. Putnam, New York, 1933, Chapter XVI: Technique. ) The book was 
widely read by the general public and by lawyers and law students. Indeed John M. Me Court, in a 
book review published in the 1950 University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review ( [V ol.99], pp. 435- 437 ), 
begins by commending it as " of great prac tica l value to lawyers, particu larly  young aspiring tr ia l 
lawyers, and it is at the sam e time o f  tremendous interest to the general book-loving p u b lic ”.
In the closing chapter o f  Reynolds biography on him, Leibowitz regretted the rapid disappearance o f  
eminent defence lawyers like the Darrows, Steuers and L ittletons  and believed this was because much 
more money could be made almost everywhere else away from criminal law, which was "the m ost 
backbreaking branch o f  the p ro fessio n ” and demanded” tr ia l court talent o f  the f ir s t  o rd e r”, and that 
young lawyers had often been discouraged at law school from undertaking criminal trial advocacy.
Declamatory styles of court room advocacy had given way to a much more informal and conversational 
approach to juries. It was put this was much because o f changes in public speaking more generally, especially 
the “fireside” manner o f  President Roosevelt’s frequent radio broadcasts from the 1930’s to audiences calculated 
to have exceeded sixty million .( Interestingly, in Britain during that decade Stanley Baldwin, when Prime 
Minister and when serving under Ramsey MacDonald, also made radio broadcasts in conversational form.)
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than ever because of comparatively recent changes in the grounds for selection to serve as a 
juror. Instead of being chosen from lists of registered voters, jurors, in many states, are now 
selected from records of car licence owners. Although widening the pool of jurors, it is said to 
have lowered overall educational standards amongst them and led to more people serving 
whose first language was not English . Some said that advocacy was more homogeneous 
than a few decades earlier, largely because of the disappearance of individuals and characters 
who had done much to develop their own individual styles. Bombast is still used powerfully 
as are rhetorical questions. Quotations from literature are less. Those that are used tend to be 
taken from modem popular works, and references are sometimes made to television and 
films. Lyrics from pop songs are sometimes quoted when it is thought they may be 
persuasive. In the United States it has been said that film can exert an important infiuence 
on the way cases are presented to juries in that some lawyers purposefully fashion their 
examination and cross-examination of witnesses and closing addresses to portray parties 
as similar to characters in well-known movies . Charts, graphs, photographs, and more 
and more computer generated displays, are employed to gain jurors attention and to 
emphasize points. Warnings from jury consultants about jurors diminishing attention spans 
have led to a further reduction in time spent on closing arguments and greater emphasis on 
developing memorable direct examination (examination in chief) and cross-examinations^®'.
Reversing a long trend, President Obama, inaugurated at the beginning o f 2009, uses a much more formal 
oratory than did his presidential predecessors. This has been analysed as a carefully crafted mix o f classical 
rhetoric, strophic structure and parallisms; that originally derived from the psalms in the King James Bible, then 
deeply embedded in the black Baptist churches o f the American south which later shaped much o f language o f  
the civil rights movement, and the speeches o f Abraham Lincoln. ( Sam Leith, Obama’s oratory. Financial 
Times, January 17*, 2009.) It may not be entirely fanciful to suggest that President Obama’s more formal style 
of oratory, especially if  he is popular in office, could influence American public speaking and that elements o f  
it might be heard before juries,.
Interview with Professor Katherine Pearson o f  the Dickenson School o f  Law, Pennsylvania State 
University on 28* July, 2007. For a description o f  how the jury evolved from the blue ribbon,and  in 
the South entirely white, body o f  1900 to its modern inclusive composition see Lawrence M. 
Vv\Qàman,American Law in the 20*  Century, Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 263-266.
Phil Meyer, Why a Jury Trial is More Like a Movie than A Novel, Journal o f  Law and Society, Volume 
28, No 1, March, 2001, pp. 133-146. In this country, none o f  the barristers interviewed were aware o f  a like 
practice in England and W ales.. Paul Bergman, emeritus professor o f  law at UCLA and joint author o f  
Reel Justice, Andrews and McMeel, 1996, and several books on training for advocates, interviewed 18* 
May, 2011, doubted it was wide spread in the US.
This view was endorsed by Paul Bergman in interview o f  18* May ,2011, above. A former trial attorney and 
retired judge, who was interviewed informally at the Harvard Trial Winter Advocacy Workshops attended by 
the author (see Methodology section, page 21 ) considered a further very important reason why summations had 
shortened was that power in American courtrooms had shifted away from attorneys and juries to judges and that 
few o f  them, not least because o f limits on their court time, would now permit the sort o f lengthy address given 
by Clarence Darrow and those with a similar approach, depicting their criminal clients as effected by 
mechanistic workings o f  the universe, telling personal stories and quoting freely from poetiy and literature.
294
Apart from wigs and gowns, which have not been worn as a uniform by American 
attorneys for over two hundred years few would disagree that modern jury 
advocacy in the United States is more histrionic than in England and Wales®®  ^unlike 
when the reverse was true for a considerable part o f the 19th century. In some 
jurisdictions attorneys are permitted to walk about the courtroom whilst examining 
witnesses and addressing juries. Demonstrative movements of arms and hands are not 
uncommon®®"*. Generally speaking, more overt appeals to jurors' emotions are heard 
than in England and the language used in closing arguments (speeches) tends to be 
more florid. (Unlike in England and Wales, judges generally do not sum up the 
evidence for the jury and may have less influence on jurors’ decisions.) Cross- 
examination may be more aggressive and, unlike England and Scotland there is no 
obligation on counsel to put his or her case to a witness for the other side.
Much thought and effort in both civil and criminal trials is devoted by attorneys to 
opening statements, and to the image of themselves that they wish to project during it, 
given it is often said that jurors first impressions can decide cases ®®\ Advocates in the 
USA have more scope to develop themselves as characters before juries than do their 
English and Welsh contemporaries ®®®. A visible dissimilarity in criminal trials is that
®®^ After some debate, the Supreme Court decided in 1790 that judges would not wear w igs, but would 
appear in robes. ( Bernard Schwartz, A H istory o f  the Supreme Court, Oxford University Press, N ew  
York, 1993, pp. 15 -  16 ) Advocates would wear neither. This set the pattern for federal courts. By the 
beginning o f  the 19* Century wig and robe wearing by advocates had disappeared throughout all state 
courts.
®®^ In seeking, as he puts it, ” to get one’s point across to an underpaid extremely bored ju ry  pan el”, few, if  any, 
modem lawyers follow the showmanship o f the controversial attorney Mr Steven Leventhal. During his opening 
and closing submissions Mr Leventhal often folds a dollar bill while explaining to the jury that his opponent s 
case does not add up: then, as he unfolds the note, the jury sees that it has changed to a hundred dollar note. In a 
personal injuriy case in the Philadelphia County Court o f  Common Pleas, in 2009, opposing counsel filed a 
motion preventing Mr Leventhal fi'om using this and other devises on the grounds it would be "highly 
prejudicial, confusing, misleading fo r  the jury and have nothing to do with the substantive issues in this 
m atter”. Because the case settled the judge did not have to rule whether Mr Leventhal’s approach was outside 
the rules o f professional conduct. See David Pannick, lawyers try to make the case fo r  the other side 
disappear. The Times, 23* April, 2009.
®®"* D elivering a keynote address, entitled Silent Speech, at the University C ollege London, Law and  
L iterature  conference ( 4*  -5* July, 2011) Professor Peter Goodrich, o f  Cardozo Law School, N ew  
York, spoke o f  the historic and present persuasive importance o f  gestures in legal advocacy. He 
considered this aspect o f  external rhetoric  had received little attention and called for a systematic 
study o f  it
®®^ In contrast, because o f  a fuller and more precise written indictment against an accused, opening 
speeches do not exist in criminal trials in Scotland. Clear exposition o f  a case in both examination in 
ch ief and cross-exam ination is, therefore, vital and a much prized skill in Scottish courtroom  
advocacy. ( Interview with Lord MacKay, 10* December, 2008. )
®®® Andrew Watson, Changing Advocacy'. Part three. Justice o f  the Peace, (2001) Vol. 165 JPN 862, 
3rd Novem ber, 2001. A lso see Andrew Watson, Trial Advocacy Instruction from  H arvard, Justice o f  
the Peace, (1999) Vol. 163 JPN 290, 10* April, 1999, at page 292.
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defendants, because of the presumption of innocence, sit next to their lawyers, rather 
than appear in a dock, although fears of escape or violence may lead to them being 
shackled to the desk
Instead of saying to the judge that "I hesitate to raise and interrupt my learned 
fr ie n d ”, as advocates do in England and Wales when they wish to challenge questions 
put to witnesses by opponents , trial lawyers in the United States call out objection. If 
the judge agrees he or she says sustained and if  he or she replies with over-ruled. It is 
sometimes said that visitors to English courts are struck by the infrequency that 
objections to questions are made®®*. A useful weapon for plaintiffs' counsel and 
prosecutors, not available to advocates in England and Wales, is the rebuttal argument 
that in the order of the trial comes after the defendants' closing argument, which itself 
follows that of the plaintiff or prosecution.
Witness preparation -  a  great contrast with Engiand and Wales.
In the United States preparation and rehearsal of witnesses, both for direct and cross- 
examination, is usual and has a long history. Most frequently known as “propping” it is also 
known as “wood-shedding” or “horse-shedding”. The latter name is said to have been coined 
by James Fennimore-Cooper (1789-1851), the first major US novelist, who heard attorneys 
rehearsing witnesses in horse carriage sheds near the old court-house in White Plains, New 
York ®®®. Most witnesses in the USA, come to court, or, if called upon to do so, make a 
deposition (testimony taken orally usually at the office of the opposing attorney and either
®®’ The contrast with English courts was observed by Charles Dickens as early as the m id-19*
Century. Dickens described the American defendant as "lounging among the m ost d istinguished  
ornaments o f  the lega l profession, whispering suggestions in his cou n sel’s ear, or making a toothpick  
out o f  an o ld  quill with his pen-knife”. Charles Dickens, Am erican N otes For G eneral C irculation, 
Chapman and Hall, London, 1842, Volume 1, page 627.
Some modern day advocates consider because defendants in England and W ales appear in court docks 
with security officers this diminishes the presumption o f  innocence as jurors may believe they would  
not be there without good reasons. In their view  the task o f  the advocate is to surmount the confines o f  
the dock by stressing the standard and burden o f  proof.
®®^ Brian Gibben, Elements o f  Modern Advocacy, N ew  Law Cassettes, Butterworths, London, 1979. 
The main reason for this is prior agreement between advocates, based on their understanding o f  the 
rules o f  evidence and procedure, on what will and w ill not be admitted. The process by which  
statements are gone through by advocates usually takes place at court and is often referred to by 
counsel as doing an editing jo b .  The greater number o f  objections raised in courts in the United States 
suggests less editing, or at least agreement on what should be edited, before trial.
909 J. W. McElhaney, 1987, Trial Notebook, ABA, 2nd Edition, Chapter 4, The H orse Shed.
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taped or recorded by a reporter from court) having been prepared, although some more than 
others. The trial lawyer David Berg put it this way:
“There are lawyers who refuse to woodshed (prepare) witnesses at all, who ju s t  
throw them up there and let them tell their story. Their clients are most often referred  
to as “appellants It is axiomatic. Everyone who testifies has to be wood-shedded. It 
is probably unethical to fa il to prepare a witness and it is undoubtedly cruel to subject 
anyone to cross-examination without preparation. The unrehearsed witness can deal a 
lethal blow to an otherwise winnable case ” .
Whilst refreshing a witness’s recollection of events and then suggesting and rehearsing 
better ways of answering questions is permissible, coaching, in the sense of telling him or her 
what to say, is professionally unethical and unlawful, amounting to subornation of perjury ®".
That rehearsal of witnesses is accepted as normal, almost without question, was confirmed 
in interviews with lawyers and law teachers in the USA and in conversations with judges, 
lawyers and trial consultants at the American Bar Association Meeting in London, held in 
2000. One lawyer there, in private practice, said that the nearly universal view amongst 
lawyers is " if  the other fe l la ’s using it, so have you- pure and simple ” . The only time he 
did not prepare a witness this way was when a client is unable to afford it. He always 
explained to clients that prospects of a favourable outcome at trial may well be increased by 
rehearsal of their evidence and that of their witnesses. Whilst some lawyers, judges and law 
teachers interviewed held reservations about comparatively new techniques of preparation 
developed by witness consultants ( below ), most saw rehearsal of testimony as acceptable in 
that it helped clients and witnesses to testify effectively. Several said it was particularly 
important nowadays that they did so as many jurors, influenced by television and cinema 
court dramas, have expectations that witnesses will be fluent and assured in manner. Failure
P reparing w itnesses. Litigation, Vol. 13, Number 2, 13, 1987. Preparing and rehearsing w itnesses 
can be traced at least to Roman times. There appears to be evidence that Cicero routinely undertook 
this task. See Robert Harris, Lustrum, Hutchinson, London, 2009, Chapter XVII.
How much unethical client and non-client witness preparation occurs in the United States cannot, 
for obvious reasons, be measured. Complaints are seldom heard before the courts and bar disciplinary  
tribunals, but lawyers and law teachers interviewed said it is a feature o f  the legal landscape and had 
been for some time. In 1913 a state judge wrote on the subject: "The preva len ce o f  perju ry  is a serious  
m enace to the adm inistration o f  justice, to preven t which no means have as y e t  been sa tisfactorily  
d ev ised ” . For some discussion on crossing the line between proper and improper w itness preparation 
see Andrew Watson, “W itness Preparation in the United states and England and W ales”, Justice o f  the 
Peace, Vol 164, pp.816-822, 14* October, 2000.
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to conform with what was expected may be unfairly disadvantageous. Both federal and state 
prosecutors routinely rehearse witnesses for trial, although they are required to be particularly 
alert to the danger of exerting improper influence on prosecution witnesses.
Where resources are adequate there may be numerous rehearsals of witness evidence 
spread over time before trial by lawyers in the offices of private firms, prosecutors and public 
defenders. For important high profile cases it is even said that some lawyers recommend up to 
50 rehearsals . During rehearsals the witness is vigorously cross-examined. An attorney 
draws to the attention of the witness where he or she has been “tripped” and how the 
testimony can be restructured to prevent it happening. Frequently nowadays, even in small 
firms of lawyers, witnesses performances are video taped, played back and studied for 
improvement. All the time watched by the witness, the lawyer may take the place of the 
witness and be cross-examined by a colleague. The lawyer’s “shortcomings” in simulated 
testimony are discussed; following which the lawyer may then conduct a mock cross- 
examination of his or her colleague. The witness who has observed these lawyers’ 
performances may be examined and cross-examined again by the lawyers in the expectancy 
that he or she will have benefited from them. It is far from unknown during the course of 
rehearsals, which may be over the course of many weeks, for clients and other witnesses to 
remember previously un-recollected facts and to develop fresh ideas to prevent being 
“tripped” in cross-examination. Sometimes this may occur shortly before trial.
Witness preparation may continue after a trial has begun. One trial lawyer advises , 
"Parties and those witnesses who are allowed to sit in the court-room should profit 
from  what they hear. During recesses and at night go over the main areas o f  concern 
in the light o f  the testimony elicited” . “Going over” may include fiirther rehearsals of
evidence. Some courts, however, prohibit lawyers from speaking to non-client witnesses 
during a recess in testimony, but it is established that a lawyer cannot be prevented from 
consulting with a defendant client in a criminal case during a recess about his or her evidence.
M. Freedman, Counselling the Client: Refreshing Recollection or Prom pting Perjury?, Litigation, 
Spring, 1976.
913 David Berg 1987 P reparing Witnesses. Litigation. Vol. 13, Number 2, 13.
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New methods of witness preparation and trial consultancy.
In recent years, new methods of witness preparation have emerged. They result mainly 
from a greater interest, which started in the 1970’s, by social scientists in studying the 
American legal system. The legal profession became increasingly willing to make use of their 
empirical studies, employing methods developed in anthropology, psychology, linguistics and 
social linguistics, about how witnesses present themselves in court influenced decisions made 
there. These studies, revealed a number of consistent linguistic patterns amongst witnesses, 
and that some of these were definitely more compelling than others. They strongly suggested 
that training in the style that evidence is given may improve a witness’s credibility in the eyes 
of jurors ®*. Because of expense, the newer forms of witness preparation are generally 
restricted to where a party, or parties, to a case has ample funds. They are often undertaken, 
or supervised by trial preparation consultants who have backgrounds in the social sciences 
and social psychology.
Amongst techniques employed is the witness test, used both for lay and expert 
witnesses. A group o f six to eight people who are eligible for jury service locally are 
assembled together in either a mock courtroom or a conference room. They are given a 
summary of the case. After this the witness is directly cross-examined by two 
attorneys familiar with its facts. The “jurors” then measure the witness under separate 
headings o f competency, trustworthiness and likeability, and also numerically rate the 
clarity, believability and persuasiveness with which he or she has presented 
“evidence”. These results are later analysed by computer and a profile o f the w itness’s 
strengths and weaknesses is produced. Additionally, “jurors” are sometimes asked for 
written observations on a witness. After listening to the witness and completing the 
rating forms, the mock jurors are given 45 minutes to discuss the case, evaluate the 
testimony and talk about any aspect of the witness’s presentation they consider worthy 
of comment. Their discussions are video-taped and watched on a monitor, or through a 
two way mirror, in an adjoining room. When the 45 minutes have passed, one o f the 
“trial team” joins the panel and concentrates members discussion on the w itness’s
An important early study conducted by John Conley, W illiam O’Barr and Allan Lind, The P ow er o f  
Language:Presentational S tyle in the Courtroom, Duke Law Journal, 1978, pp. 1375-1399, focused on 
four linguistic patterns: the use o f  “powerful” and “powerless” speech by witnesses; the 
“narrative”style, in which attorneys ask few questions in direct examination and where evidence is 
principally given in the w itness’s own words as opposed to the “fragmented” style, when attorneys 
frequently ask witnesses questions; the use o f  “hypercorrect” speech by witnesses; and the speech  
behaviour o f  lawyers and witnesses in instances o f  simultaneous speech and interruptions in 
testimony. See also Conley, J and O’Barr, W Just Words: Law, Language and Power. 1998, Chicago, 
University o f  Chicago Press.
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style o f presentation and,or, elements of his or her evidence. Information gained from 
the witness test is acted upon. Perceptions of “competency” and “likeability”, for 
instance, can usually be improved by further rehearsals. Appearance and demeanour 
can be adjusted to match panel members’ expectations. Poor scores on 
“trustworthiness” invariably means considering: whether such a witness should give 
evidence at trial? ; could it be given more effectively by another witness in the case? ; 
and, if  not, whether a further witness altogether should be sought ? .
As well as revealing witnesses’ strengths and weaknesses, the witness test is also 
regarded as advantageous in helping to control difficult witnesses who do not listen to 
what lawyers tell them about cross-examination. A witness like this might be played 
the video-taped comments o f mock jurors. Their description of a person as arrogant or 
argumentative, and for these reasons ineffective, may lead to a radical alteration in 
behaviour, at least at the witness stand. Hesitant witnesses, on the other hand, seeing 
themselves on video and hearing the opinions of mock jurors might try, and indeed 
will be encouraged by the trial team, to project a more certain and confident image, 
improve posture and body language and to avoid inadvertently adopting opposing 
counsel’s language during cross-examination. By exposure to themselves on video , all 
types of witness may better appreciate the need for precise language as a guard against 
probing and attack in cross-examination.
Many o f the expert firms that provide specialist methods of witness preparation 
also offer jury and trial consultancy which, in high value or profile cases, now exerts a 
strong influence on advocacy. These activities entail advising about the use of 
peremptory challenge and on questions to ask potential jurors to establish whether 
challenge for cause on account of bias (a much wider concept in the USA than in 
England and Wales) should be made. They also involve organizing mock juries to hear 
the case, monitoring and videoing jurors’ discussions and deliberations and , in the 
light of them, advising on how lawyers should develop themes at trial, narrate their 
opening and closing speeches. Further, on the basis of their observations and 
expertise, these experts may submit opinions on general prospects of success, 
including whether a settlement in a civil case, or a plea o f guilty in a criminal matter, 
might be the best course of action. Trial consultants are also becoming more active in 
advising parties on making presentations when matters are taken to Alternative 
Dispute Resolution.
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Reduction in trials.
Despite the prominence of the trial in television and newspaper reporting and in 
popular culture through, film, drama and novels, it is perhaps not quite so well known that 
trials, federal and state, civil and criminal, jury and bench (non-jury) are rapidly declining. 
This is occurring a time when virtually everything else in the legal world seems to be 
expanding. There is more law and the amount of regulation continues to grow .
Stories and anecdotes about decreasing numbers of trials are now backed by empirical 
evidence. The data is perhaps clearest in the federal courts. In 1962, there were 5,802 civil 
trials, comprising 11.5 percent of all terminations. By 2004, when there were five times as 
many cases filed, only 3,951 trials took place, making up 1.7 percent of terminations Over 
this period the total number of civil cases terminated rose 400 percent while the number of 
trials fell by 32 percent. The average sitting federal district judge conducted about 11 trials in 
2004, down from 35 in 1985 and 39 in 1962. On the criminal side, in 1962 5,097 defendants 
were tried, 15.4 percent of defendants whose cases were terminated. The number of criminal 
defendants from 1962 to 2003 rose by 152 percent, while the number of trials decreased by 32 
percent. At the top of the federal system, the Supreme Court of the United States decides 
fewer cases - less than half as many as twenty years ago and less than a quarter as in the 
earlier part of the 20^' Century’’’.
Trials in the federal courts are only a small percentage of the number of trials in the 
USA; the great majority occur in state courts, perhaps 98 percent of the total. Data compiled 
by the National Center for State Courts , albeit not as extensive as that gathered for the 
federal courts, shows similar trends to those in the federal courts. In the courts of general 
jurisdiction of 22 states (and the District of Columbia) that contain 58 percent of the US 
population, the proportion of civil cases reaching jury trial declined from 1.8 percent of 
dispositions in 1976 to 0.6 percent in 2002 ; bench trials fell by 34.3 to 15.2 percent. The 
absolute number of jury trials diminished by one third, and bench trials fell by 6.6 percent. 
Regarding criminal matters in the courts of general jurisdiction of the 22 states , the overall 
rate of trials dropped from 8.5 of dispositions to 3.3 percent. The decrease injury trials was 
from 3.4 to 1.3 percent and from 5.0 to 2.0 percent for bench trials. While dispositions
Clyde W. Crews, Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot o f  the F ederal R egulatory  
State, Cato Institute, 2005.
1962-2004 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.COURTS ANN. REP., Table. C-4.
Edward Hartnett, Questioning C ertiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-F ive Years A fter the J u d g es’ 
Bill, 100 Columbia Law Review, 2000, 1643. See pages 1646-50.
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increased by 127 percent in these courts , the absolute number of jury trials fell by 15 percent 
and that for bench trials shrunk by 10 percent.
Analysing both federal and state statistics, Marc Galanter points to a decline in the 
percentage of jury and bench trials and a fall in absolute numbers for both. In federal courts , 
bench trials have fallen even more dramatically than jury trials; and in the state courts , jury 
trials have shrunk more” ’. In explaining the steep decline in civil trials since the 1980’s, 
Galanter identified a great increase injudicial case management at the early stages of 
litigation and their active promotion of settlements. This is caused by judges more and more 
seeing the principal role of courts to be resolving disputes and less to pronounce and enforce 
public norms.
Another factor in the decline of trials has been alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), 
embraced by the courts, politicians, and business elites, which has proliferated. Courts have 
incorporated alternative processes like mediation, early neutral evaluation, arbitration and 
summary jury trial. They have engaged in what Galanter describes as “outsourcing” to ADR 
institutions. To avoid costly trials, and the fear of hostile juries making large awards, many 
business organizations insist that parties in contractual dispute with them use alternative 
procedures either exclusively or at least at first. Professor Peter Murray reflecting on why 
the proportion of civil cases filed that actually go to juries is now less than one or two percent 
in almost all American jurisdictions, is of the view that much is because of the tremendous 
costs imposed on private clients . Not only must they pay for the best available lawyers, 
litigant and other witness preparation, the need to present jurors with a superior presentation 
causes litigants to expend huge sums in discovery and trial preparation. ''There is almost no 
end to what can be justified  in terms o f  time and money in hopes o f  getting a good
Brian J. Ostrom, Shauna M. Strickland and Paula L Hannaford-Agor, Examining Trial Trends in the 
State Courts, Journal o f  Empirical Legal Studies, 2004, pp. 755-782.
W orld without Trials?, delivered at the University o f  Missouri-Columbia School o f  Law, 
September 12*’', 2005 and in The P rivatisation  o f  Justice and the Vanishing Trial, a paper for the W G 
Hart Legal Workshop 2006, Institute o f  Advanced Legal Studies, given on the 27*’' June, 2006. Marc 
Galanter Professor Emeritus o f  Law at University o f  W isconsin-M adison and Centennial Professor, 
London School o f  Econom ics and Political Science.
Illustrating a long term trend in civ il jury trials, statistics derived by Professor Peter Murray, from 
an analysis o f  annual reports and other records o f  the Commonwealth o f  M assachusetts, show some 
2,700 trials took place each year during the 1920’s. By the end o f  the 20*’' Century the annual number 
o f  civ il jury trials in the state had dwindled to less than 500, despite great increases in the numbers o f  
cases filed, judges and practicing lawyers. See John Sheldon and Peter Murray, Rethinking the rules o f  
evidentiary adm issib ility  in non - j u r y  trials. Judicature, Volume 86, Number 5, March-April 2003.
” ’ Professor Peter L. Murray, Robert Braucher Professor o f  Law from Practice at Harvard Law School, 
where he teaches Trial Advocacy, Evidence, Comparative Civil Procedure and The American Legal 
System. Amongst many other works, he is author o f  B asic Trial A dvocacy  (Maine Law Book Co,
2003), an advocacy training treatise. He is Director o f  the Winter Trial Advocacy Workshop.
Professor Murray kindly agreed to be interviewed on 29*’' March, 2007.
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outcome before the jury. It is easy fo r  litigation costs to become a large percentage o f  
the amount or interest in dispute , despite every effort by parties to hold them in 
check ” .
Unpredictability of outcome and difficulty in appealing against the decision of a jury, 
even when it seems extreme and unsupported by evidence, are also reasons identified by Peter 
Murray for the decline in civil jury trial. In the unlikely event of restrictions being imposed on 
the availability of civil jury trial in the United States, it is reasonable to expect that the 
number of cases tried by judges would increase, not merely to compensate for those which 
could no longer be heard by a jury but principally because it would be cheaper to bring them 
to court and appeals would be easier. Professor Murray foretells the civil jury trial will largely 
disappear as a means of resolving ordinary civil disputes In his view civil jury trials will be 
confined to high stakes cases which effect the conduct of major elements of the national 
economy. Examples given by him were what cigarette companies may do to promote their 
products; how careful a drug company should be before putting its products on the market 
and what training a company must give to its employees to reduee the chances of sexual 
harassment at work.
Reduction in the number of criminal trials in the United States, although apparently yet to 
be more fully researched, is explained mainly by the growth and consolidation of plea 
bargaining. After great increases in the 1920’s, especially in the federal courts faced with 
large numbers of prohibition cases, and in the 1960’s, perhaps related to the expansion of 
street crime, plea bargaining again grew sharply from the 1970’s. Nowadays about 95 percent 
of criminal cases in the United States are settled by some form of plea bargaining. It is said 
that without it criminal courts would come to a grinding halt.
Expansion in the number of negotiated pleas since the 1970’s came against a background 
of more severe sentences together with tighter sentencing guidelines that provide a high 
degree of certainty about the sentence that a judge will impose for an offence, following an 
agreement between the defence and the prosecution. Prosecutors can therefore generally 
assure a defendant of a lower sentence than there would be after a trial. Since the Supreme 
Court case of Boykin v Alabama (1969) it must be determined to the satisfaction of the judge 
that a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty and understands what that plea means. Some critics 
of plea bargaining believe its growth is to some extent caused by over charging defendants 
with serious offences, for which there is insufficient evidence, so that they will plead guilty to
Arthur T. von Mehren and Peter L. Murray, Law in the U nited States, Second Edition, 2007, 
Cambridge University Press, Chapter 8 pp. 227-230.
303
lesser offences. Professor Murray of Harvard Law School strongly criticised this practice 
as unethical. He called for more money to be made available for public defenders, funding for 
whom in many states has been reduced, and for court assigned counsel, in those areas where a 
public defender system does not exist, to resist over charging; if necessary by going to jury 
trial.
Consequences for advocates.
The decline in the number of trials has consequences for advocacy; less attorneys are 
required as advocates. Fewer young lawyers acquire trial experience and those that do have 
little chance to hone them further. Cutting ones teeth on minor road accident cases, “fender 
benders”, is now extremely rare. Newly qualified lawyers who have the greatest opportunity 
to develop trial skills nowadays are prosecutors. Nearly all big law firms, according to 
Professor Murray, have ceased to be interested in criminal trials and spoke of a divorce 
between criminal lawyers and others. Professor Galanter, in the course of an interview ,
described how the average age of court advocates in many law firms had risen considerably 
and that many were now under much pressure of work. On the other hand. Professor Murray 
recounted how advocates who do not now frequently conduct tria l, because of their rarity, 
feel much less confidence when they do. Lack of assuredness also extended to judges who try 
far fewer cases. A feature of the US legal landscape is the high level of support given by the 
legal profession to pro -  bono work, which frequently involves advocacy before lower courts 
and tribunals. Professor Galanter was of the view that firms assisted out of a sense of 
responsibility and also because pro bono programmes gave newly qualified lawyers advocacy 
skills unlikely to be obtained elsewhere. In his opinion, an evaporating pool of seasoned 
advocates will further discourage resort to court trial.
Professor Murray explained that most students who take the Harvard Trial 
Advocacy Workshop are aware their prospects of undertaking trials are slim, but many 
consider that the skills they learn will be useful if  called upon to conduct smaller 
pieces o f advocacy such as pre-trial applications, summary judgements, cases before 
tribunals and pleas in mitigation.
Whilst attorneys may have less opportunity for trial advocacy, the scope to acquire 
experience of alternative procedures to trial has increased. Lawyers may be instructed to
Interviewed in London on 29*’' March, 2007.
Held on the 28”* June, 2006 at the Institute o f  Advanced Legal Studies, London.
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accompany clients or represent them. As mentioned above, various forms of ADR have been 
integrated into the court and pre-trial processes of many states. Lawyers are expected to be 
able to represent clients whose cases have been referred to ADR hearings. It is increasingly 
recognized that the qualities and skills needed for ADR representation may differ in 
important ways from those necessary in court, where there is greater formality, stricter 
procedure and rules of evidence, dominance of ease and statute law, and more 
demonstrative and aggressive advocacy, especially before juries. Acknowledging these 
differences, numerous American law schools now teach "mediation advocacy" as a sub­
category of advocaey, or even as a subject in its own right. Each year the American Bar 
Association section of Dispute Resolution holds mediation advocacy competitions in 
which teams of law students from many universities take part
Interview, 29”* March, 2007.
For information on this I am indebted to Professor Andrea Schneider, Marquette University Law
School, M ilwaukee, W isconsin.
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Chapter Fifteen : Changes Ahead.
Diverse matters likely to effect advocacy in future years are discussed in this ehapter. The 
first is the expected increase in mediation, as an alternative to using the courts.
Next is extension of rights of audience in the higher eourts to solicitors, representing an 
important break with the past when they were confined to barristers. This change, driven by 
ideas of market competition, accepted by the governments, raises questions about what 
criteria should be met, and training undertaken, by solicitors seeking higher court rights. As 
restrictions will be eased eonsiderably in the near future a key question is how many solicitors 
will want to acquire them? The effect of solicitor advocates on the quality of advocacy overall 
is also highly important. Issues arise from large firms of solicitors conducting in-house 
advocacy, often by solicitors granted higher rights, including, rather fundamentally, whether 
it is always in the interests of clients that they do so. The Crown Prosecution Service’s use of 
its own advocates with higher rights of audience, in place of members of the independent bar, 
to carry out more prosecutions in the Crown Court has proved controversial, as has increased 
rights of audience granted to its employees not admitted as lawyers in the magistrates eourt. 
The number of advocates will be expanded by Fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives, who 
are now permitted to obtain extended rights of audience in the lower courts.. With more able 
to act as advocates, maintaining standards of advocacy can be expected to assume greater 
significance. The creation of new formal quality control mechanisms are already planned. 
These developments are described in this section.
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Attention then turns to broadcasting court proceedings, at present not permitted in 
England and Wales. Whether it should be allowed, and if so under what conditions, has been 
debated. The effects on advocacy and advocates, was it be introduced, are considered, with 
reference to overseas research.
This is followed by dress in court. It has been said by some that the traditional attire of 
judges and barristers ,often seen as emblematic of British courts, has contributed to 
pomposity of speech and needlessly theatrical behaviour, - an opinion vehemently denied by 
others. Views on the long running question of dress are presented. New rules, which have 
probably settled the matter, at least for some time, are explained. Still within the topic of 
court dress, the effects on advocacy of wearing the Moslem niqab and burqa by advocates, 
judges and witnesses in court are pondered .
Finally, new technology in the courtroom, and the very significant ways advocacy may 
be infiueneed by it, is examined.
Mediation and Collaborative Law.
The W oolf reforms in the late 1990’s introduced a range of measures to further a 
more co-operative approach to civil justice. One o f these was positive encouragement to 
use mediation so that disputes, wherever possible, should be resolved without eourt 
hearings. Pre-action protocols and cost sanctions, as well as the over-riding objective of 
the Civil Procedure Rules, promote recourse to mediation by parties to litigation. Cases 
in the courts have supported mediation. Senior members of the judiciary have clearly 
stated that an unreasonable refusal to mediate may result in cost penalties following trial
927
Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR"), of which mediation is one technique, is 
less commonly used in the United kingdom than in many other common law countries, 
notably the United States, Canada and Australia, but has increased and is widely 
predicted to rise in the near future. The government pledged in 2001 that it would 
actively consider use o f ADR in suitable cases in which it was involved. In 2005/6 ADR 
was employed in 336 cases where the government was a party with 241 settling, saving
For example in Dunnett v Railtrack  [2002 2 ALL ER 850], H alsey v M ilton Keynes G eneral H ospital 
NHS Trust [2004] 1WLR 3002 and Burchell v B ullard and others [2005] EWCA Civ 358.
307
costs estimated at £120.7million A number of lawyers have qualified as mediators. 
Particularly in cases of high monetary value or other importance, persons going to 
mediation are accompanied by lawyers to advice them and speak on their behalf. As 
mentioned in the previous section about the United States , the skills of advocacy 
necessary for mediation representation differ from those required in the more formal 
setting of court. Mr. Justice Lightman considered that ADR had now taken off in this 
country. He described it as "a positive development to avoid financially crippling and 
socially disruptive litigation ”, and believed that it was vital that student barristers and 
solicitors be exposed to the special advocacy necessary to make it a success. The ability 
to project the strength of a party’s case at the outset of a mediation was seen as 
particularly important and key to reaching a settlement. At least for bar students, the 
training Mr. Justice Lightman sought became a reality in 2010 when Mediation 
Advocacy became a compulsory part of the Bar Professional Training Course , which 
replaced the Bar Vocational Course
As an alternative to traditional divorce practice, collaborative law has recently 
arrived in this country from North America. About 250 firms of solicitors, comprising 
over 1250 lawyers, are equipped to handle cases under the procedure In essence this 
involves parties and their lawyers entering into a binding commitment to resolve all 
matters without involving the Courts.
They then take part in a series of meetings at which everyone - the individuals and 
their lawyers - are present. During the course of these Four Way meetings lawyers help 
to ensure all relevant information is on the table, advise when neeessary and aim to
Department for Constitutional Affairs, Annual Report 225/6, M onitoring the Effectiveness o f  the 
Governm ent’s Commitment to using Alternative D ispute Resolution.
Interview, 15”* February, 2007.
An explanation o f  the mediation process; composing a mediation statement o f  case, in some ways, 
though in others not, resembling a skeleton argument; making an opening statement; advising clients on 
the suitability offers made with reference to the law and drafting settlements at the conclusion form 
essential elements o f  the new course. Interview, held on 5”* July, 2010, with Mr. N igel Waddington, 
Senior Lecturer on the Bar Professional Training Course, who designed the Mediation Advocacy course 
at the College o f  Law. In so doing Mr. Waddington said he had consulted a body o f  literature from other 
countries, conspicuously the United States, dealing with advocacy for mediation and other forms o f  
ADR.
See Sarah Lloyd, The Continuing Growth o f  the C ollaborative Process, Family Law, Fam Law 37 
(270), T* March, 2007. Also see Jon Robins, Keeping it in the Family, Law Society Gazette, 18* 
October, 2007 and Catherine Baski, Collaborative law p lea . Law Society Gazette, 26*  February, 2009; 
the latter describes attempts by the family lawyers group Resolution to persuade the Legal Services 
Commission to extend legal aid to collaborative law. A  number o f  solicitors firms are running training 
courses for solicitors wishing to practise in this area. Amongst them is Cambridge Law Practice. They 
also provided training for students interested at the College o f  Law, Bloomsbury. This was held over a 
number o f  evenings, between March and May, 2011, and covered each stage o f  the process.
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move their clients towards workable and fair agreements. Creative acceptable solutions 
tailored to particular domestic circumstances are sought. Once every one is in agreement 
the lawyers draft a formal document which is submitted to the court for approval and 
made into a binding Order. Two solicitors interviewed described the advocacy they 
perform in Four Way meetings as a hybrid of advocacy and negotiation.
Comparisons were drawn between the informal speech they employ with the stylized 
and rigidly structured advocacy in the divorce courts, still with some room for rhetorical 
flourishes, especially by counsel. Both emphasised the need to choose carefully words 
that would be readily understood by parties and to carefully explain technical and legal 
terms.
It is anticipated that collaborative law will soon be extended into the commercial
arena
Rights of Audience .
The present position concerning barristers and solicitors.
Currently, barristers enjoy rights of audience in all courts after completing the first six 
months of their pupillage. Solicitors, apart from those granted higher rights, are limited to the 
lower courts. They have full rights to be heard in the Magistrates Court, Small Claims Court, 
County Court and the Coroners’ Court. Solicitors have rights of audience at the Crown Court 
in sentencing hearings, appeals from the Magistrates Court in specified circumstances and 
certain preliminary hearings. In the High Court they have rights in chambers and may 
represent a client in open court in an emergency with the leave of the judge. No automatic 
rights exist in the Court of Appeal. Save before the Appeal Committee, there are none in the 
Supreme Court. In Europe, English and Welsh solicitors have the same full rights as barristers 
to be heard in the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of First Instance and 
the European Court of Justice. It is sometimes not always appreciated that the greatest amount
Helen Greenfield and Bradley Williams o f  Family Law in Partnership, Covent Garden, London. 
Interviewed together on 24* April, 2008.
Lord Kerr, a Justice o f  the Supreme Court, was o f  the view  this was likely to happen. See report o f  
speech in Collaborative Law flourishes. Law Society Gazette, 15* October, 2009.
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of advocacy in this country is performed in the Magistrates Court and the County Court, 
predominantly by solicitors. Indeed, beginning in the 1980’s, more solicitors began to 
specialise in advocacy before the lower courts, either as members of firms or as free lance 
advocates, sometimes operating from the equivalent of barristers’ chambers, instructed by 
firms or by the Crown Prosecution Service.
Calls for an expanded advocacy role for solicitors and the granting of Higher 
Rights of Audience to them.
Historically, the courts determined which advocates had rights of audience before them. 
Concerning litigation in the higher courts, it was considered that the interests of justice were 
best served by the solicitor meeting the needs of clients, developing a rapport with them , 
taking full and proper instructions, advising on likely outcomes and thoroughly preparing 
cases for barristers at trial.
This traditional view came to be questioned by those who maintained that clients would 
gain if solicitors conducted every stage. It was argued that clients would benefit from a 
representative with a deeper understanding and familiarity with their case than a barrister who 
may have been instructed at short notice, especially if the barrister originally instructed could 
not appear at court because he or she was “part-heard” (occupied in another case which had 
“over -run”), or just for an isolated hearing. Savings in costs might also be made with a 
solicitor being paid on an hourly rate, as opposed to paying a barrister a brief fee; this being 
particularly relevant if a case settled before trial
The Conservative government was receptive to these points and, principally in the name 
of increasing choice and competition between lawyers in the interests of consumers of legal 
services” ^ made provision for solicitors to achieve higher rights of audience in the Courts 
and Legal Services Act 1990” ’. The means by which this was to be implemented was 
through Regulations. In discussions about the introduction of the Higher Courts Qualification 
Regulations 1992 the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Legal Education 
(“ACLEC” ) put forward that the training of trainee solicitors in advocacy, higher court
For a summary o f  these arguments see Kate Henley, Higher Rights: Access all areas. Law Society Gazette, 
25* January, 2007.
Speaking about widening o f rights o f audience. Lord MacKay, Lord Chancellor at the time, said that to him it 
did not matter if  advocates were called barristers or solicitors. What was important, however, was that they were 
proficient for the task. Interview on 10* December, 2008.
Section 17.
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procedures and evidence did not equate with that received by trainee barristers. This analysis
y f
was shared by the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary. The consequence of these discussions
-  - /  ■
was the introduction of rigorous training and assessment requirements for solicitors who 
wanted to acquire higher rights of audience in the criminal courts, civil courts or both 
Partly because of the toughness of examinations, which many candidates failed, the number 
of solicitors who sought and who acquired higher rights was low The operation of the 
scheme to acquire higher rights was the subject of à review in 1995 from which came the 
Higher Courts Qualification Regulations 1998 intended to provide greater opportunity for 
solicitors to obtain them.
The Access to Justice Act 1999 introduced the radical principle that, on full admission to 
the profession, all solicitors would have full rights of audience in all courts but required them 
to comply with the training requirements and rules laid down by the Law Society. The 
government, now Labour, again justified this change in who could perform higher court 
advocacy on the basis that more competition between lawyers would advantage consumers of 
their services. Following the Access to Justice Act, the Higher Courts Qualification 
Regulations 2000 amended the existing route leading to the Higher Courts Qualification and 
added two others. The three are now: the development route , for more junior solicitors who 
complete thorough training and assessments in advocacy, evidence , procedure and ethics, 
and present a portfolio of their experience; the exemption route, for solicitors or barristers 
with at least three years’ post-qualification experience who can demonstrate a track record of 
advocacy in the higher courts; and the accreditation route, again for solicitors with at least 
three years post-qualification experience who can show litigation experience (not necessarily 
advocacy) in the higher courts and who complete advocacy training and assessment.
At the time of passage of the Access to Justice Act 1999 worried voices were heard, 
mainly belonging to barristers but also some from the judiciary, that standards of 
advocacy could fall if  considerable numbers of solicitors chose to exercise their new
See Higher Rights o f  Audience Discussion Paper, Solicitors Regulation Authority, 2007, page 3. 
Representatives o f the judiciary and the bar on ACLEC were critised in some quarters, for example in the 
Lawyer, Comment, 10 August, 1996, Give solicitors equal rights o f  audience, for discriminating against 
solicitors and for trying to protect the bar’s dominance o f higher court advocacy at all costs.
Figures contained in the Lord Chancellor’s Consultation Paper Rights o f  Audience and rights to conduct 
litigation in England and Wales: ‘The Way Ahead’, Lord Chancellor’s Department, June 1998, para 1.11, 
showed that in May 1998 only 624 solicitors , out o f more than 70,000, had obtained the Law Society higher 
courts qualification. O f these many were former barristers. See also Solicitor advocates : reluctant Rumpoles -  
only a tiny number o f  solicitors has qualified to work as advocates in the higher courts. Law Society Gazette, 
93/24 5* June, 1996.
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rights. In the 1999 Cardiff University Lord Morris Memorial Lecture Lord Justice 
Sedley explained that advocacy can be accomplished by many people,” but at its higher 
and highest levels it involves unique skills o f  preparation, learning and sensitivity which 
requires as many years o f  single-minded practice as make, fo r  example, a firs t class 
conveyancing solicitor or corporate contract negotiator. I f  solicitors continue to 
function as solicitors, rather than devoting themselves entirely to advocacy, the nature 
o f  their work will prevent them from  expanding their competence in advocacy to that o f  
the best barristers”. A further related concern expressed by Lord Justice Sedley about 
greater involvement by solicitors in advocacy is how it might limit the early acquisition 
by barristers of essential skills. He argued that if solicitors absorb all but the heaviest 
cases the incremental experience, which makes a reliable barrister, will evaporate 
causing the Bar to eventually whither, impoverishing clients of a specialized resource 
and removing from the courts a source of assistance on which they rely. Skills in 
forensic advocacy, for which this country has been renown for generations could, he 
feared, be lost forever .
Others, who welcomed greater participation by solicitors in advocacy, made known their 
belief that these apprehensions were either unfounded or greatly exaggerated, perhaps in an 
attempt to keep as much of a restrictive practice as possible, and took little account both of 
the capacity of solicitors to rapidly adapt to the higher courts and of the additional training 
they would receive before appearing in them. They pointed overseas to the majority of 
countries that do not have the division between barrister and solicitor. Asserting standards of 
advocacy do not suffer there on that account, they maintained that trial lawyers in these 
jurisdictions accumulate more than adequate competence through experience. (With reference
See Julian Gibbons , Those same o ld  arguments. Comment, New Law Journal, October, 23*” 1998, 
and Robert Verkiak, Nick Murray and Stephen Ward, Focus rights o f  audience: Changing Advocacy,
Law Society Gazette, 95/36 23 September 1998, pp. 20-23.
940 28*September; entitled The Future o f  Advocacy.
Eight years later, the same Court o f  Appeal judge, asked about solicitor advocates, still maintained 
that in order to be proficient in the higher courts frequent practice is necessary. Difference in the amount 
o f  experience generally explained why standards o f  advocacy were usually higher amongst barristers 
than the solicitor advocates who appeared before him. He drew a comparison with an orthopaedic 
surgeon performing a neurological operation. Expressing a candid view, he said that whilst sometimes 
encountering poor advocacy from barristers, he seldom saw a good solicitor advocate. Interview, 11* 
July, 2007. Lord Bingham considered, with notable exceptions, few were very good. Before his 
appointment as Senior Law Lord, in 2000, he had been addressed by some in the Court o f  Appeal. 
Appearances by solicitor advocates were very rare in the House o f  Lords. Like Lord Justice Sedley, he 
considered that advocacy at the highest levels required repeated experience. Some solicitors, though, 
may acquire this. Interview, 23*” October, 2007.
For example Thomas Lawson- Cruttenden, holder o f  a higher courts qualification in the civil courts. 
Advocacy -The pow er o f  speech-solicitor advocates should not be intimidated by their Bar brethren as 
preparation, not oratory, is the key to winning. Law Society Gazette, 92/16 29 November 1995.
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to the United States, where opportunity for trial advocacy by attorneys is decreasing, this 
argument may now be less than compelling.)
There was speculation about whether significant numbers o f solicitors would act as 
advocates in the higher courts” ^ Whilst it was predicted that solicitors in the Crown 
Prosecution Service and other government bodies and those with a real taste for 
advocacy would do so, a major factor was said to be economic circumstances. If the 
economy continued to be buoyant then, in most cases, it was thought that it would 
usually be more profitable for solicitors to remain working in their offices and instruct 
barristers to appear, rather than themselves attending court, which might consume an 
uncertain and considerable portion of the day.
From the rule amendments in 2000 to 1st January, 2007 the number of solicitor 
advocates rose to 3663, an increase of 212 percent. Of these 889 solicitors held Higher 
Courts Qualification in all proceedings; 111 solicitors obtained the qualification in civil 
proceedings; and 1,997 had acquired it in criminal proceedings In the context of 
approximately 5,000 barristers engaged in criminal work, it is in this last category that 
solicitor advocates have made the most impact. The Criminal Bar Association in a discussion 
paper expressed concern that increased use of solicitor higher court advocates (“HCAs”) 
by the Crown Prosecution Service and defence solicitors, coupled with the government’s 
intended reforms of legal aid fi"om 2008, thought likely to encourage law firms to handle 
more advocacy would reduce the amount of work available to criminal barristers and 
lower standards of representation. Whilst welcoming competition from highly qualified
See Nick Murray, Focus rights o f  audience: Advocating Change, Law Society Gazette, 95/36 23 
September 1998, pp.21-22.
Source: The Solicitors Regulation Authority (“SRA”) The total number rose to 4,995 by 2008 (SRA) 
and further increased to5,200 in 2012 ( Law Society Gazette 2"” February,2012.).
Published on 12* February, 2007.
The Chairman o f  the Bar Council 2008 / 2009, Timothy Dutton QC, interviewed on the 8* May, 2008, 
after he had delivered an address at the College o f  Law, Store Street, London, was o f  the view  that 
solicitors firms will keep more advocacy in publicly funded criminal and civil work in house when 
reforms recommended by Lord Carter’s Review o f  Legal Aid Procurement are implemented. The Carter 
Review envisages firms doing publicly funded work will amalgamate into larger ones and then 
competitively tender for funds from the Legal Services Commission for blocks o f  cases in their area.
Bids would be on the basis o f  a set amount for a case . In all but exceptional circumstances, the lowest 
tender could be expected to obtain a contract to supply legal services. The Chairman o f  the Bar 
expressed his fear that concern by firms to put in low bids could badly effect the quality o f  work 
performed, not least in advocacy in court with less preparation and fewer instructions sent to more 
experienced advocates be they barristers or solicitors.
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solicitor higher court advocates, it was claimed there was a danger that the market would be 
abused by under-qualified and inexperienced HCAs”’.
A sore point with a number of solicitor HCAs was that they were instantly 
reeognizable as such because, unlike barristers, they did not wear a wig in court. Some 
said that this could have placed them at a disadvantage, especially before juries who 
might have considered them inferior. One solicitor -  advocate interviewed said the 
solicitors’ gown he had to wear, different in design to those worn by barristers , made
” ’ The Criminal Bar Association returned to the theme o f reduced quality o f advocacy in a speech made by its 
chairman at the Bar Conference in 2008. Peter Lodder, QC, accused solicitor advocates o f keeping the conduct 
of serious trials for themselves instead of instructing more experienced barristers and o f being unfit for the task. 
He said : There is a huge increase in the use o f  higher court advocates. The Bar does not say such an advocate 
is bad by definition. Some are good, but there are many who are truly appalling -  defence solicitors who have 
never before conducted a crown court trial and have very little experience in the magistrates ’ trials now appear 
as junior advocates to defend in murder trials. (Reported in The Times, 3* November, 2008.) More criticism 
was directed towards solicitor advocates in the Crown Court in April, 2009 when Judge Gledhill QC openly in 
court criticized the performance of three of the four solicitor higher court advocates in the case he had tried. 
Concerned about the competence o f one o f them, he said he came close to discharging the jury. Further, Judge 
Gledhill alleged the advocates’ firms had chosen to keep the trial within the company for financial reasons.
Judge slams solicitor -advocates. Law Society Gazette, 23* April, 2009. A spokesman for the Law Society 
expressed dismay that the judge made his comments without giving the advocates concerned an opportunity to 
comment or respond, causing them substantial harm. The Law Society sought an assurance that what it termed 
judicial misconduct would not be repeated. Following criticism o f their conduct in an appeal arising from a 
murder trial by solicitor advocates, the Society o f Solicitor Advocates in Scotland held an extraordinary meeting 
at which it was agreed objective advice should be given at all times to enable clients to make an informed choice 
of representative. Society ‘ dismayed’ by Gledhill, Law Society Gazette, 30* April, 2009. Because of what it 
described as unfair competition from solicitor higher court advocates, who have direct access to clients and can 
pay referral fees for work, the Bar Council established a working group in May, 2009. The group was to 
consider mounting a campaign in police stations, magistrates’ courts and prison newspapers to explain 
entitlement to a barrister and also to press solicitors to inform clients, in their initial correspondence with them, 
of their right to a barrister. Also in May, 2009 the president o f the Council o f the Inns o f Court, Lady Justice 
Smith, wrote to presiding judges, resident judges and circuit leaders asking if work done by solicitor higher court 
advocates is being done satisfactorily and to seek their views on whether defendants were being offered a proper 
choice of representative. The letter was rapidly withdrawn after the Law Society expressed concern that it 
appeared biased against solicitor advocates and employed lawyers and seemed to support a campaign against 
them by the self-employed criminal bar. In the wake o f the criticisms made against solicitor higher court 
advocates, June Venters, the first female solicitor QC and an experienced solicitor advocate, alleged that 
prejudice from some members o f the bar and some judges was “a fact o f  life”. ( Law Society Gazette, 2"” July, 
2009. ) In December, 2010 a report written by Mr Nick Smedley, commissioned by the Law Society, said that 
unless the training o f higher court advocates (“HCAs”) improved they will continue to be viewed as second 
class citizens. The report considered current training arrangements were” not f it  fo r purpose and that the quality 
and quantity o f  training is inadequate to set and maintain standards ”. In particular advocacy training on the 
Legal Practice Course and during training contracts fell short of what was required; post -qualification 
continuing professional development must be improved ; a compelling case existed for improving the training in 
the lower courts; and a new Advocacy Accreditation Scheme for HCAs and an academy for solicitor-advocates 
should be established. Post -qualification, the report recommended, HCAs should be mentored during their first 
three years in practice, with mandatory continuing professional development advocacy skills training and an 
annual minimum of hours requirement imposed to prevent practice by what were described as occasional HCAs. 
Amongst 45 persons interviewed in the report were the Lord Chief Justice, the Chief Executive o f the Legal 
Services Board, the Chairman o f the Bar Council and the President o f the Council o f the Inns o f Court.
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him look like a court usher. Differences in dress were removed as from 1st January,
2008 when a Practice Direction issued by the Lord Chief Justice came into effect” ^ .
More calls for reform.
The professional rules governing rights of audience for solicitors and barristers 
remained controversial even after the Regulations of 2000, which eased the burden for 
solicitors to obtain higher rights of audience. Some solicitors continued to regard it as 
wrong that those with vast experience were still required to prove themselves in the 
courtroom whilst newly qualified barristers had automatic access to the higher courts. It 
was seen as anomalous that advocacy was the only area of solicitors’ practice that 
required a separate qualification. Further, a number o f questions were asked including: 
why is a high value county court settlement considered suitable for solicitors and not a 
case of shoplifting before the Crown Court or merely taking a judgement in the High 
Court? and why in a protracted fraud case, in which the advocate becomes unavailable, 
cannot a solicitor, who is greatly acquainted with the case, address the court?
The Solicitors Regulation Authority’s Consultation Paper.
The sense of inequality prompted the Solicitors Regulation Authority (“SRA”)” ’ to 
re-examine the rules governing solicitors’ higher rights of audience and at the beginning 
of 2007 to start a three month consultation process to review whether current 
restrictions on solicitors were justifiable.
As part of its consultation the SRA put forward three alternative arrangements to 
amend solicitors’ access to higher rights. The first was to retain the current restrictions , 
but instead of acquiring the one off qualification solicitors would be required to undergo 
compulsory accreditation which would be subject to periodic re-accreditation, perhaps 
every five years. A second option was to remove current restrictions and replace them 
by a non-mandatory system and periodic re-assessment. Such a scheme would be
Practice Direction(Court Dress) No.4. Made by the Lord C hief Justice in accordance with procedure 
laid down in Part 1 o f  Schedule 2 o f  the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The first w ig to be worn by a 
solicitor advocate was in Doncaster Crown Court. Law Society Gazette, 10* January, 2008.
See Kate Henley, Higher Rights: Access all areas. Law Society Gazette, 25* January, 2007.
” ’ The Solicitors Regulation Authority was established in January 2006 (then known as the Law 
Society’s Regulation Board) as an independent body specifically for regulating solicitors.
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supported by the professional duty on solicitors to act within their competence. A clear 
message would be given that solicitors who routinely, as opposed to infrequently, 
exercised higher rights would be expected to be accredited .The third possibility 
suggested in the SRA consultation paper was remove the current restrictions altogether 
and have no system of accreditation. Instead reliance would be placed on the 
professional duty of solicitors to act only when competent to do so , referring matters 
outside of their competence either to in-house specialist advocates , or to independent 
barristers or solicitor advocates.
The first alternative was criticised by a number of respondents to the consultation 
process for doing little to resolve anomalies felt to exist in the system’” . The majority of 
submissions favoured some other form of ensuring standards in advocacy in place of 
what existed. A submission made by the Bar Standards Board, however, whilst 
supportive of new ways of training advocacy and increasing the choice available to the 
public, believed it right to maintain a mandatory training requirement and some sort of 
pass/fail accreditation to avoid reducing the quality of advocacy in the higher courts by 
solicitor advocates’” .
In the consultation paper itself, it was recognised that the third option carried the 
danger that some solicitors who were not competent to do so would none the less be 
tempted to appear in the higher courts, to the detriment of clients who would be poorly 
represented. That it would remain open for unaccredited practitioners to represent 
clients in court was seen, in some submissions, as a disadvantage of the second 
possibility in the consultation paper ’” .
Solicitors Regulatory Authority Consultation Paper, Higher Rights o f  Audience, 20* January, 
2007.WWW. http: sra.org.uk
A number o f  variants to this approach were suggested: a scheme designed only for advocacy in the 
higher courts; a two tier scheme with a basic level for advocacy in the lower courts, and a more 
advanced level for the higher courts; no specific scheme for advocacy but advocacy elements embedded 
into schemes devised for areas o f  practice, such as crime, family etc; and no specific scheme for 
advocacy but offering advocacy elements as a “bolt-on” to schemes devised for areas o f  practice.
Rule 1 Solicitors’ Practice Rules 1990.
’”  One hundred people or organizations responded to the consultation. Ninety completed an on-line 
survey and the remainder responded by e-mail or by post. See Solicitors Regulation Authority (“SRA”), 
H igher rights o f  audience consultation. Analysis o f  resp o n ses.'EàMcation and Training-policy, May 
2007, page 7. A majority o f  respondents (56 percent ) felt that the existing restrictions should not be 
maintained, mainly because they saw no reason for them ,or that they were too onerous or unfair. The 
Bar Council and Bar Standards Board were not o f  this view  ( page 5).
’”  Solicitors Regulation Authority, Higher rights o f  audience consultation. Analysis o f  responses. 
Education and training -p o licy . May 2007, page 12.
SRA Analysis o f  responses, ibid, page 4.
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The SRA’s decision and its possible results.
After the consultation was completed the Solicitors Regulation Authority, in June 
2007, decided to remove restrictions on solicitors wanting to appear in the higher courts 
and to replace compulsory accreditation with voluntary assessment schemes covering 
criminal, civil and family advocacy. It rejected calls by some members for complete 
deregulation and for leaving it to solicitors to decide whether they were competent to 
exercise higher rights. The Law Society’s Education and Training Committee had 
supported a compulsory accreditation scheme but indicated that it was content for the 
scheme to be voluntary because market pressures and other factors -  such as demands 
for quality from the Legal Services Commission, which allocates public funding for 
lawyers -  would dictate that most solicitors would undergo assessment.
Whether the changes brought about by the SRA will result in more solicitors ( the 
number of those with a practicing certificate now exceeds 100,000 ) appearing in the 
higher courts and whether the quality of advocacy will be affected cannot be clearly 
predicted. As regards solicitors in government service, including the Crown Prosecution 
Service, it can confidently be predicted that they will be required to be assessed before 
acting in the higher courts. Firms with advocacy departments can be expected, for 
reasons of competition, also to ensure that their members undertake the voluntary 
assessment. Some solicitors in smaller firms, not doing publicly funded work, may be 
attracted into doing occasional higher court work, particularly that which is not 
complex, without voluntary assessment. It could reasonably be expected that the 
decisive factor will be whether it will be financially worth their while to represent 
clients there, rather than instructing barristers or solicitor advocates. The down turn in 
the economy, which became very evident in 2009, and the reduction in other forms of 
solicitors’ work, could well drive more into practicing advocacy, keeping cases wholly 
within firms, rather than instructing barristers or solicitor agents.
A senior solicitor interviewed, who has had higher rights of audience since 1994, 
said the SRA’s decision was very controversial. He feared it could threaten the integrity 
o f advocacy and strongly favoured retaining compulsory qualification as a necessary 
control of quality. In his opinion it was unlikely that many solicitors in private practice
317
will exercise rights of higher audience because most solicitors did not want to be 
advocates and because the economics were against it
Higher rights and firms.
As a part of a more general move to provide a total service for clients, a “one stop 
shop”, larger firms of solicitors have over the last number of years made great efforts to 
supply full “in - house” litigation services for their clients. This involved training 
partners and solicitors to carry out roles generally undertaken by barristers including 
drafting pleadings, settling evidence, preparing skeleton arguments and acting as 
advocates. Advocacy is performed by solicitor advocates with higher rights of audience, 
some of whom are former barristers who have converted to become solicitors, and who 
because of the Access to Justice Act 1999 have been able to retain their rights of 
audience, and by employed barristers. Since the 1999 Act barristers employed by firms 
are permitted to keep their rights to be heard in all the courts. They were not, however, 
eligible to become partners with solicitors. However, this changed when the Legal 
Services Act finally became law in October, 2011, and introduced legal disciplinary 
partnerships. The trend for barristers to work in solicitors firms may well now gather 
pace
Providing advocacy by solicitors has been taken furthest by the city firm Herbert 
Smith, with a large litigation practice” ’. It established an advocacy unit, or “in house 
chambers,” in 2005 to undertake advocacy in general commercial matters brought to it 
by other departments in the firm. The unit has three partners of whom two are Queens 
Counsel. One of their roles is to monitor the quality of advocacy services provided in 
house. In addition three associates are permanently attached to the unit, while another 
three or four are seconded from other practice areas. Skills that they gain are carried 
back to their own practices. The advocacy unit is adamant that clients are offered
” ’ Interview with Mr Michael Gillman held on 16* October, 2007. Mr Gillman is a partner with Bishop and 
Sewell and has had rights o f higher audience since 1994.He was then President o f the City and Westminster and 
Holbom Law Society.
Law Society statistics showed that in 2012 62 mixed solicitor / barrister practices existed providing 
advocacy services in courts and tribunals where a member or employee o f a practice has rights o f  audience. Law 
Society Gazette, 2“” February, 2012.
” ’ See Advocacy Unit. Herbert Smith, http://www.herbertsmith.com and Herbert Smith brochure 
International Advocacy, 2012.
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freedom of choice. If an advocate is required, a client can select in house counsel, one 
of the firms 57 solicitor-advocates, or an independent barrister from external chambers. 
While it does not provide a full service and still goes to the bar for specialist areas such 
as intellectual property, it is reported that the unit has more work than it can sometimes 
deal with.
The big firm Eversheds has also established a dedicated advocacy unit and it is 
said that Clifford Chance is considering whether to do so as well The extent to which 
the “Herbert Smith model” o f an advocacy unit can be emulated is thought to be limited 
to all but the biggest firms with their large sized litigation practices from where cases 
can be referred.
Advantages of in-house advocacy for clients are said to include greater familiarity 
with cases, speed of service, a significant savings in cost because fees are calculated on 
an hourly rate instead of a fixed barrister’s brief fee, paid even if  a case settles, and 
greater transparency in accounting for work done. Not all welcome unreservedly the rise 
of inhouse representation. In a lecture delivered at Sheffield University in 2003, and 
re-iterated in an interview Mr Justice Lightman said:”^ / /  too often I  have occasion to 
doubt whether the clients o f  a firm  can have been fu lly  advised o f  the relative merits and 
costs o f  the decision to instruct the solicitors to fu lfill the role usually fu lfilled  by the 
B ar” . He believed there was substantial ground to question if  clients were receiving 
full and detached advice from solicitors about whether their interests would be better 
served by instructing counsel rather than be represented by in house lawyers, who may 
be less experienced and more expensive. In short he doubted if  clients always had 
freedom of choice. Where senior counsel was instructed, Mr Justice Lightman spoke of, 
"Firms increasingly foisting partners and s ta ff as junior counsel on leaders they retain 
to obtain fo r  their members ’ exposure and educational experience. I f  that were all and  
there was no need fo r  a junior counsel who justified his presence on merit and value , 
and i f  no charge were made fo r  the public relations or educational role o f  the solicitor, 
the situation would be defensible. But this is not in practice ju s t to obtain exposure and 
experience: it is also to obtain fees. I f  the firm  decides to provide exposure or education
’’’ Nina Goswami, The Lawyer, 21®* May, 2007.
’”  The C ivil Justice System and the Legal Profession — The Challenges Ahead, The 6*** Edward Bramley 
Memorial Lecture.
Held on March 8*\ 2007.
A similar view was expressed by Mr Justice Warren in an interview held on 22"” September, 2009.
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fo r  its own members, it must be at its own expense: the client should not be expected to 
pay fo r  it. Too often the client is paying and indeed at rates significantly exceeding the 
fees to be charged by counsel ”.
To prevent exploitation of the special relationship with clients, and inflating the 
heavy cost of litigation even further, Mr Justice Lightman said it was vital that solicitors 
should fully comply with their fiduciary duty to provide services to clients only where it 
is in their interests.
A summary of Mr Justice Lightman’s concerns were put to Lord W oolf in an 
interview Whilst not opposed to a greater role for solicitor -  advocates and in house 
advocacy, he said that its development should be monitored to ensure that professional 
duties were complied with.
It has been suggested that rule changes agreed by the Bar Standards Board in late 
2009 may limit the growth of in house advocacy. The rules will allow a solicitor’s 
firm to treat a barrister’s fee as a cost they can mark up when billing a client to generate 
a profit. Previously when a solicitor instructed a barrister his or her fee was treated as a 
disbursement on which no profit could be made. Following the rule alterations barristers 
can be contracted to a firm of solicitors for a case or a period of time , while also being 
practicing from chambers in the traditional way. Solicitors will now have the 
opportunity to earn additional income without the cost of recruiting and retaining in- 
house advocates.
Higher rights and the Crown Prosecution Service.
The Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) describes itself as the “largest law firm” in 
the UK . Out of a total of about 8,750 people, some 2,700 of its employees are lawyers. 
The CPS is responsible for advising the police on cases for possible prosecution, 
reviewing cases submitted by the police, preparing cases for court and presenting cases 
in court. Every year it deals with more than 1.3 million cases in the magistrates’ court 
and about 115,000 in the Crown Court.
Following its birth in 1986, lawyers employed by the CPS were introduced in the 
Magistrates’ Court to conduct prosecutions, replacing police officers who had done so 
previously. At first complaints were made by magistrates, police and members of the
Conducted on 27* June, 2007 .
’’’Reported in the Law Society Gazette, Solicitor ‘ to profit f r o m  the bar. 17* December, 2009, page 2.
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public that the standard of advocacy shown by some advocates was not high. Also for a 
number of years, because of insufficient staff, contributed to by levels of pay not 
enough to attract lawyers of adequate standard, the CPS found it necessary, particularly 
in London and some other areas, to brief solicitor agents and barristers in independent 
practice to appear before magistrates on its behalf” . These difficult times are now 
behind it.
Prosecutions in the Crown Court were undertaken by barristers instructed by the 
CPS. Early suggestions that they too should be undertaken by CPS salaried lawyers 
were strongly opposed by the Bar. The Bar asserted that barristers in independent 
practice provided a vital safeguard against unjust or unfounded prosecutions. It was 
argued they brought with them a further review of the evidence, based on experience 
and a disinterested analysis, and, as ministers of justice, would not strive for convictions 
at all costs in court” ’. Questions were asked how independent barristers were in the 
face of CPS instructions and suggestions were made that the Bar’s eloquent objections 
had much to do with preserving a great proportion o f the work of the criminal bar.
Crown Court prosecution advocacy remained a sensitive issue. In 1999, representing 
a radical break with the past, the CPS started to undertake advocacy in the Crown Court. 
The principal reason for this was to reduce costs. Originally CPS Crown Court advocacy 
was confined to interlocutory matters, bail applications and putting the prosecution case 
before pleas in mitigation were delivered. The amount of advocacy has increased but is 
still comparatively small. It does, however, now include trials. In 2006 the CPS secured 
a guilty verdict after its first ever murder trial in which it was represented in court by its 
own lawyers According to its annual report 2005-2006 external counsel cost the CPS 
£137 million pounds. In house advocacy saved £4.7 million that would have gone to 
counsel, an increase of £1.2 million from the previous year” ’.
” ’ See Gary Slapper and David Kelly, The English Legal System, Twelfth Edition, Routledge, 2011- 
2012, pp. 345-346. Also see H appy Birthday CPS, New Law Journal, 3*  May, 1996, page 617.
” ’ Speaking at the Annual General Meeting o f  the Bar in 1998, Heather Hallet QC, chair o f  the Bar 
Council said “I do oppose any extension o f  rights o f  audience to Crown Prosecution lawyers, which  
substantially undermines the role o f  the independent advocate in the prosecution process. As a m atter o f  
principle, to ta l sta te control o f  the prosecution is not in the interests o f  justice. As a m atter o f  
practica lity  why increase the tasks o f  the CPS when they fa ce  extensive reorganization? Counsel, 
August, 1998, page 17.
Law Society Gazette News: CPS in -house murder win, 17* August, 2006.
” ’ Figures produced for the following year 2006-2007 show a saving o f  £9,617,670 gained by using 
CPS prosecutors with Higher Rights o f  Advocacy in the Crown Court: Crown Prosecution Annual 
R eport and Resource Accounts, April,2006 -  March 2007, page 13.
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CPS Crown Court advocacy is performed by approximately 1033 higher court 
advocates of whom nearly 70 percent are solicitors, the remainder being employed 
barristers who brought their rights of audience with them when they joined the service. 
Solicitors have to obtain the higher rights qualification via the exemption or 
accreditation route. They are also required to pass an internal higher court advocacy 
course, at the end of which they are assessed externally by advocacy trainers from 
Nottingham Law School. All CPS higher court advocates have very extensive 
experience of advocacy in the Magistrates court
The then Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Kenneth MacDonald QC, made 
it clear that the CPS would do much more higher court advocacy than it has traditionally 
done, partly to attract the strongest candidates, who want a career in all aspects of 
criminal law, to work for it and also to enable the DPP to hold his prosecutors more 
accountable for their decisions .
Because of the nature of the work it undertakes, the junior criminal bar has been 
most affected by the CPS doing more Crown Court advocacy. Complaints arose in some 
parts of the country, that to achieve area targets for the overall amount of advocacy 
undertaken, most, or all, interlocutory matters (Pleas and Case Management Hearings) 
were being conducted by CPS lawyers’” . This was said to frequently lead to difficulties 
being experienced by independent barristers briefed later for trials because they lacked 
control of cases when vital earlier decisions were made. At a basic level dissatisfaction 
was expressed that barristers were receiving their briefs from CPS higher court
As o f  March 2010: CPS Annual Report 2009- 2010, Director’s letter to Attorney General. The 
number stood at 838 in March 2007 : CPS Annual Report 2006 -  2007, page 7.
Much helpful information on CPS advocacy was kindly supplied by Mr. Jonathan Wood, a Senior 
Crown Prosecutor with higher court rights, in Derbyshire CPS.
Mr. Kenneth MacDonald QC, Director o f  Public Prosecutions, during a lecture entitled Building a 
M odern Prosecuting Authority, delivered to the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies, Kings College 
London on 23rd May, 2006. In 2008 Mr. MacDonald announced that for the period 2008-9, CPS areas 
would have a target o f  between 20-25 percent o f  all Crown Court cases, excluding the most complex 
trials. Sir Ken M acD onald : W e  are determ ined to do more ’ .The Times, April 8*, 2008.
Although the numbers sought are small, the CPS has now started to recruit senior barristers as in house 
advocates to conduct organized crime and terrorism cases. In a brief interview, after a lecture, entitled 
‘‘Independent Prosecutors and Dem ocratic Accountability ”, delivered at the London School o f  
Economics on the 4 *  March, 2010, Sir Kenneth McDonald, now former DPP, stated that greatly 
expanding the amount o f  advocacy undertaken at all levels had been key to making the CPS attractive to 
high quality applicants seeking a career in it. In his view the CPS was now principally an advocacy 
organization, rather than one in which court advocacy by staff had been secondary and often performed 
by the independent bar and solicitor agents.
’”  See Mr Geoffrey Vos QC, Chairm an’s Column, Counsel, July, 2007, page, 3.
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advocates too shortly before trial Against this background, the Bar Council and the 
CPS agreed guidelines in late 2006 designed to safeguard the junior bar ’’’.Under them , 
external barristers are to be instructed at an earlier stage and follow the case through to 
trial, rather than most interlocutory matters being given to CPS advocates. Barristers 
will return plea and case management briefs only in exceptional circumstances. Further, 
under the guidelines, CPS in-house advocates should not act as juniors to self-employed 
Queens’ Counsels , unless they are sufficiently skilled and experienced to undertake the 
case themselves, and to handle it if  the silk becomes unavailable for some unforeseen 
reason. The Criminal Bar Association urged the CPS, Bar Circuit Leaders, Heads of 
Chambers and individual members of the bar to ensure that these guidelines were 
followed ’” . Some eight months after they had been entered into, the then Chairman of 
the Bar Council, Mr Geoffrey Voss QC, expressed the view that the guidelines were not 
being abided by and that this must stop’” . He reported that in many parts o f the country 
the CPS higher court advocates were still doing whole lists of plea and case 
management hearings with no intention of doing any of the trials. According to the 
chairman there was also some evidence of higher rights advocates taking junior briefs in 
serious cases when they were not capable of taking over the conduct of the trial if  the 
silk was away” \
Despite the CPS’s intention to conduct more of its higher court advocacy, for the 
foreseeable future, most prosecutions, especially trials, will still be undertaken by 
members of the independent bar’” .
See Memorandum subm itted by the Criminal Bar Association to the House o f  Com m on’s Justice  
Com m ittee's Inquiry into the Crown Prosecution Service, dated October, 2008, 
http://www.Dublications.parliament.uk, paras 14-24.
’”  C PS/ Bar Framework o f  Principles fo r  Prosecuting Advocates in the Crown Court. A  copy appears 
as Appendix One o f  Memorandum, supra. Document also obtainable on Bar Council website, 
http://www.barcouncil.org.uk
’”  Discussion paper on current issues facin g  the Criminal Bar, published on 12* February, 2007.
’”  Chairm an’s Column, Counsel, July 2007, page 3.
The Criminal Bar Association in its Memorandum to the House o f  Common’s Justice Committee’s 
Inquiry into the Crown Prosecution Service,dated October, 2008, stated the CPS had continuously failed  
to comply with the Framework and presented examples o f  non adherence.( para 19}. The Association  
considered it notable that the Framework was not on the CPS website nor was it referred to in the CPS’s 
stategy and Business Plan for 2008-11 (para 20).
” ’ In a highly controversial speech, delivered at the annual Bar Conference held in 2008, the chairman o f  
the Criminal Bar Association, Peter Lodder QC, was disparaging o f  much CPS advocacy in serious 
trials. He said some CPS advocates had left the Bar because they had never risen above a modest 
practice. “Now they have become the leading advocate in murder prosecutions, cases in which they 
w ould never have been instructed by the CPS while they rem ained in p riva te  p ra c tic e ”. He later added, 
in a newspaper interview ( The Times 3rd November, 2008.) : “A ll this is done in the interests o f  
econ om y. Watching the destruction o f  the system  by the use o f  apparently cheap and inadequate labour
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In mid 2009, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer QC stated "that high 
quality advocacy is a mark o f  a modern prosecution service ” and announced the 
introduction of the Advocacy Quality Management Strategy to monitor performance of 
in house advocates and to concentrate on their training’ ’^ .
Leaving aside the very controversial issue of quality, it has been said that the 
presence of CPS higher rights advocates in growing numbers attached for periods of 
time to a particular Crown Court, enabling them to have a greater knowledge of the 
ways o f judges there than advocates in independent practice, who appear in more 
courts, is affecting the style of advocacy. The principal changes reported are in brevity 
and informality of language used, compared to independent advocates
is deeply upsetting and dem oralizing to the professional B a r”.. In reply the Law Society President, Paul 
Marsh, said these comments were “exactly what you would expect from  a profession that is fa ilin g  to 
deal with com petition” and there was no evidence o f  poor levels o f  advocacy by solicitors. Further, Mr 
Marsh said “advocates have to p a ss  a demanding test in order to exercise higher rights o f  audience, 
whereas there is no quality assurance at the bar at a l l”. He added that the bar’s decision to make such 
allegations in the press rather than by complaint to the regulator suggested they could not be 
substantiated. ( Law Society Gazette, 6* November, 2008. ) . A review carried out by Her Majesty’s 
Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, published on the 16* July, 2009 found tensions were easing 
between the CPS and the independent bar and some members o f  the judiciary over the greater use o f  in- 
house advocates and a “more collaborative and less combative ” approach was beginning to emerge ( Her 
Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, Report o f  the thematic review  o f  the quality o f  
prosecution advocacy and case presentation, 2009, page 12 ).
Crown Prosecution Service Press Release, 25* June, 2009. The HMCPS Inspectorate Report, above, 
involving observation o f  68 jury trials and 45 in Magistrates’ and Youth Courts, found there was a clear 
need to develop CPS advocates’ competences (pp. 12 -  14). Too many cross-examinations were 
“unstructured, lacking a theory o f  the case and frequently amounted to little  more than “pu ttin g ” the 
c a se ” (page 5). Àt the Crown Court, “the quality o f  cross-examination could be im proved significantly i f  
more consideration was given to exploring any inconsistencies given in evidence or interview and  
understanding how to make key poin ts with the most dram atic effect that the ju ry  w ill understand”. 
Greater planning o f  opening speeches to identify relevant issues and reasonably foreseeable defences 
was also necessary, as was more structuring o f  closing speeches. Weaknesses observed in case 
preparation and in presenting legal arguments were called to be remedied. Additionally, significant work 
was recommended to correct the style  o f  some advocates who failed “to presen t with an air o f  
authority”, used inappropriate tone and pace and were insufficiently engaging. Other factors identified, 
although less significant, as negatively effecting the quality o f  advocacy included: inadequate clarity and 
voice projection; failing to make sufficient eye contact; “fa ilin g  to minimise distractions such as paper  
shuffling and specific mannerisms; and fa ilin g  to use, where appropriate, sim ple and concise language”
. To a far lesser extent, the Inspectorate observed examples o f  advocates dressing unsuitably for court, 
being discourteous to others there, and lacking awareness o f  the relevant practice and procedure, at its 
most basic resulting in not using correct forms o f  address forjudges or magistrates.
In HMCPS Inspectorate Follow up report ot the thematic review  o f  prosecution advocacy and case 
presentation, March, 2012, C hief Inspector o f  HMCPSl, Michael Fuller, warned that local management 
imposed cuts were damaging the effectiveness o f  in-house prosecutors in the Crown Court and the 
quality o f  their advocacy ( Executive Summary ,page 3). He emphasized that good advocacy should be 
paramount and that CPS prosecutors are not used just to save money.
Interview, held on 4*  February, 2010, with Terri Starr, barrister in independent practice, who both 
defends and prosecutes.
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“Lower Rights of Audience” for lay prosecutors in the Magistrates Court.
In 2004 the Crown Prosecution Service permitted specially designated non -legally 
qualified support staff to appear on its behalf in all non-contentious matters in the 
Magistrates Courts, including early administrative hearings and cases following a guilty 
plea where the court ordered a pre-sentence report. Designated caseworkers (“DCWs”) 
had been allowed, since 1998, to assist qualified CPS lawyers and handle 
straightforward guilty pleas, usually concerning minor motoring offences, before 
magistrates. The Crown Prosecution Service predicted that the extended use o f DCWs 
would relieve more qualified lawyers from routine work in the Magistrates’ courts, and 
enable them to spend more time working as duty prosecutors in police stations, advising 
the police in the early stages of cases and also upon the most appropriate charges to be 
brought. The then Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Mr. Kenneth Me Donald QC 
emphasised that staff would be carefully chosen and would have to undergo a training 
programme beforehand. They would not conduct trials and committals or be involved in 
sending defendants to the Crown Court for sentence In 2005 the CPS expanded their 
role further to include uncontested bail applications and routine case management 
hearings at the Magistrates’ court The move was opposed by many legally qualified 
prosecutors. The First Division Association, the trade union which represents CPS 
lawyers, argued that the extension was solely driven by cost cutting and contrasted the 
minimal training received by DCWs with that of lawyers
At present there are about 400 DCWs. The CPS maintains that their selection and 
training is adequate. Candidates are required to have three years’ relevant experience as 
a caseworker, or to have a suitable legal qualification such as a law degree or diploma. 
Those whose written applications are accepted are invited to appear before local 
interview panels. Successful applicants then receive training involving assimilating a 
resource pack through distance learning, attending a foundation course on legal 
principles and a separate advocacy course, lasting three days and independently assessed 
, which must be passed before a recommendation for designation can be made. After this
Lay CPS s ta ff take on court role, Law Society Gazette, 7‘ May, 2004.
The current powers and rights o f  audience o f  DSW s is set out in their General Instructions, available 
in Annex D, Crown Prosecution Service Annual Report and Resources Account, 2006-2007.
Fury over CPS caseworker p lans. Law Society Gazette, 6'** October, 2005.
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DCWs have to complete on-line e-learning modules on case management hearings, 
custody time limits, domestic violence, conditional cautioning, and the Fraud Act 2000. 
Attendance on a one day course on bail applications is also required. Additionally, 
DCWs must complete 16 hours of continuing professional development each year 
Further, according to the CPS, the supervision of DCWs by qualified lawyers is 
sufficient for the level of cases they undertake.
The CPS in 2007 sought an amendment of the law which was achieved the 
following year, to allow DCWs to prosecute in all summary trials, including those 
involving either way offences that could be tried by a judge and jury, if  the defendant 
elects Crown Court trial. A range of assaults, drugs, public order, th e f t, fraud and 
driving offences fall into this category. This could lead to thousands of trials being 
undertaken by non-lawyers each year. Also, under the change in the law, DCWs would 
be able to handle contested bail applications and applications for many court orders 
including anti -social behaviour orders , restraining orders, parenting orders and 
drinking and football banning orders.
The plan to widen the use of DCW’s was very contentious. Worries were raised 
about the quality of advocacy they might deliver given their comparative lack of legal 
knowledge and experience of contested matters. The chairman of the Magistrates 
Association said '^Magistrates deal with an enormous number o f  cases. We are most 
concerned that justice should always be fa ir  and efficient. Our priority is that every 
matter should be presented to us by those with sufficient training and expertise” . In a 
briefing paper produced for Members of Parliament, before the second reading of the 
Bill containing the clause to enlarge the rights of audience of DCWs, the Law Society 
said it "did not oppose deploying paralegals in appropriate cases as this will result in 
the time o f  legally qualified prosecutors being more productively used. But added. 
Allowing designated case workers to undertake summary trials or contested bail 
applications in relation to serious offences is inappropriate ”. The paper had concerns 
about the level of supervision DCWs received from Crown Prosecutors and their limited 
training, which it believed was confined to a two week residential course and continuing 
training. It considered this was wholly insufficient for the tasks of opposing bail and
Criteria for designation as a DCW, and an outline o f  training received, is set out in The Crown 
Prosecution Service Annual Report 2006-2007, Annex E.
986 Through Clause 58 o f  the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill. The amendment was passed as
Section 55 o f  the Criminal justice and Immigration Act, 2008. 
Cindy Barnett, The Times, July, 16***, 2007.
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representing the Crown in a trial, which could lead to imprisonment for up to 12 
months^^^ The very real possibility of a victim of crime seeing an accused prosecuted by 
a lay person but defended by a lawyer was broached. It was also pointed out that 
caseworkers, unlike lawyers, are not officers of the court or subject to any professional 
code of conduct.
The short conclusions of the Law Society paper were that the government was 
trying to prosecute on the cheap. Witnesses and victims might be imperiled at trial. 
Victims might be deterred from allowing cases to go ahead if  they fear they will not be 
handled properly.
The then Vice Chairman of the Bar, Mr Timothy Dutton, QC, said the plan was 
against the public interest: "Legally -  qualified advocates are required because o f  the 
burden o f  responsibility, the advocacy skills needed fo r  the cases, and the need to
ensure independence ofprosecutions in our criminal justice system   Qualified
lawyers are under a strict duty to be independent. Unqualified workers are no t” .
Mr James Morton, a former criminal solicitor in the London courts, writer and legal 
historian , in an interview explained that when police officers acted as prosecutors in 
co u rt, before the Crown Prosecution Service was introduced in 1986, many did not have 
a full understanding o f the law of evidence in trials. They were not always corrected by 
court clerks . Miscarriages of justice did occur. In his opinion history could be repeated 
if  DCWs were allowed to prosecute in summary trials.
The Director o f Public Prosecutions robustly defended the move to devolve 
advocacy work He argued that the use of DCWs had been a success, freeing qualified 
lawyers to deal with serious and difficult cases and cutting trial delays. DCWs were 
adequately supervised and were o f high quality, often entering the CPS on law 
scholarships and then moving on to take law degrees and become prosecutors. All had
In similar vein, when the B ill was later before the House o f  Lords in March, 2008, the First D ivision  
Association, representing CPS prosecutors, expressed the view  that the proposals to extend the powers o f  
caseworkers were unworkable and would place an “impossible burden” on prosecutors to supervise 
caseworkers, who would need to be satisfied with the standard o f  presentation and prepared lines o f  
cross-examination for each trial. The union predicted adjournments and delays would increase because 
caseworkers in court would frequently need to consult qualified prosecutors. Law Society Gazette, 13*** 
March, 2008.
Wider role fo r  CPS caseworkers ‘not in public  in terest’ Law  Society Gazette, 19*** July, 2007 . In 
response to concerns expressed by the Law Society, the Bar, the First D ivision Association o f  Civil 
Servants and by some DCWs, the Director o f  Public Prosecutions announced that he was negotiating 
with the Institute o f  Legal Executives to ensure caseworkers are adequately trained. The Times, 8***
April, 2008.
Conducted on 9*** July, 2007.
^^ * Council hits out at CPS over casework extension, Law Society Gazette, 26*** July, 2007.
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substantial experience and knowledge of the law and court procedure before being 
designated. He emphasised that they would be given full training and supervision for 
their additional duties.
The DPP insisted that he could not envisage any situation in which DCWs would 
be entrusted to handle cases where a defendant might go to gaol. Sir Kenneth 
MacDonald asserted that case workers performing advocacy in court was part of a wider 
trend across the professions in which more straightforward work is transferred to trained 
workers so as to allow professionals to focus their skills most productively 
Comparisons were drawn by him to nurse practitioners at doctors’ surgeries, who, 
amongst other functions, can prescribe some medication, teaching assistants, based in 
classrooms to help teachers in their everyday work, and police community support 
officers , who usually patrol a beat and assist qualified police officers at crime scenes 
and major events. Whether these were apt comparisons for transferring courtroom 
advocacy to non legally qualified personnel was questioned. What can , however, be 
said with certainty is that the use of lay persons as advocates before Magistrates runs 
against the move, over two decades ago , which was successful in 1986 with the creation 
of the CPS, to replace non legally qualified prosecutors with lawyers.
The CPS strategy, largely driven by economy, of increasing the amount of higher 
court advocacy conducted by in-house barristers and solicitors and expanding case 
presentation by non barrister or solicitor DCWs, renamed Associate Prosecutors in 
2009, in the magistrates courts is controversial. Critics maintain a strong link exists 
between the quality of prosecution advocacy and how much the state is prepared to pay 
for it.
Extended rights of audience for Fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives.
Rights of audience spread some years ago beyond barristers and solicitors to 
Fellows of the Institute o f Legal Executives who were allowed, in very limited
^  The Times, July 16***, 2007. The National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee 
commented upon the use o f  DCWs, renamed Crown Prosecution Service associate prosecutors  during 
2008. Both recommended a greater use o f  them to increase the efficient running o f  the magistrates, 
court. A ll associate prosecutors are in the process o f  becoming members o f  the Institute o f  Legal 
Executives. As members they must comply with the Institute’s code o f  conduct and guides to good 
practice. See Barry Hughes, C hief Crown Prosecutor, London, For the defence. Law Society Gazette, 9*** 
April, 2009.
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circumstances, to represent clients in family and civil matters in the lower courts In 
2006, the Lord Chancellor granted legal executives greatly extended rights in these 
areas and for the first time permitted them to appear in criminal courts. The Institute is 
now able to issue certificates, following satisfactory completion of an advocacy training 
course lasting six days, in civil proceedings; family proceedings; and criminal 
proceedings. Holders of the Civil Proceedings Certificate are permitted to: appear in 
open court in the county court in all actions, except family proceedings; appear before 
Justices or a District Judge (Magistrates Court) in the Magistrates Courts in relation to 
all matters originating by complaint or application, including applications under the 
licensing , betting and gaming legislation; appear before any tribunal under the 
supervision of the Council on Tribunals where the tribunal rules provide for a non- 
discretionary right of audience being available to barristers and solicitors; appear before 
Coroners Courts in respect of all matters determined by those courts and to exercise 
rights of audience to those exercised by solicitors and barristers.
Legal Executives who obtain a Family Proceedings Certificate, are allowed: to 
appear in court (including open court) in all County Court family proceedings; to appear 
before Justices or a District Judge (Magistrates Court) in the Family Proceedings 
Courts; and to appear before Coroners’ Courts in respect of all matters determined by 
those courts, and to exercise rights of audience similar to those exercised by solicitors 
and barristers.
Fellows to whom the Institute of Legal Executives awards a Criminal Proceedings 
Certificate are permitted: to appear before Justices or a District Judge (Magistrates’ 
Court) in all adult magistrates courts in relation to all matters within that Court’s 
criminal jurisdiction; to appear before Justices or a District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) 
in all Youth Courts in relation to all matters within that court’s criminal jurisdiction; to 
appear in the Crown Court or High Court before a judge in chambers to conduct bail 
applications; to appear in the Crown Court on appeal from the Magistrates’ Court, the 
Youth Court or on committal of an adult for sentence, or to be dealt with, if  he or she , 
or any solicitor by whom he or she is employed or any other solicitor or legal executive 
in the same employment as him or her, appeared on behalf of the defendant in the 
Magistrates’ Court or Youth Court; and to appear before Coroners’ Courts in respect of
See Institute o f  Legal Executive Order 1998 which set out rights o f  audience available to legal 
executives.
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all matters determined by those courts and to exercise rights of audience similar to those 
exercised by solicitors and barristers.
It remains to be seen how many of the 7,000 fellows of the Institute of Legal 
Executives will seek these rights of audience and become what are now known as Legal 
Executive Advocates. A  spokesperson from the Institute considered that interest 
amongst the half of the total number of fellows who are not involved in litigation will be 
limited. As with the take up of higher rights in the higher courts by solicitors, economic 
factors will be to the fore. Firms performing publicly funded legal work, who are at 
present under considerable costs pressures, may find some savings in employing legal 
executives, who are usually paid less than solicitors, to do courtroom advocacy. The 
spokesperson, redolent of a point put in favour of granting solicitors higher rights of 
audience, said that clients, especially those facing criminal charges, would welcome 
having their cases dealt with by the same lawyer throughout.
In 2007, Fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives became eligible for judicial 
appointment, further advancing their position in court
Quality control of advocacy.
The Bar in England and Wales responded to anecdotal accounts from magistrates 
and judges (which are often, it claims, unsubstantiated) of poor quality court room 
advocacy, by setting up a Bar Quality Advisory Panel ^  .
The Panel, which began to operate on the 15*^  October, 2007 receives reports 
o f cases from judges solicitors and other barristers where barristers provide below 
standard services. A barrister is able to refer him or herself to it as well. It does not 
have a disciplinary role and referral to it does not prevent any complaint being made to 
the Bar Standards Board, the Bar’s regulatory body, established in 2006, as a result of 
the Bar Council (which now represents 14,000 barristers in England and Wales) 
separating its representative and regulatory functions. After seeking an explanation from
^  Baljeet Basra, Professional Development and Regulation Department, interviewed on July, 16*\ 2007. 
Under Part 2 o f  The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
The Panel was first proposed in a consultation paper, Bar Council Consultation Paper on Quality, in 
April 2007. Bar News, June, 2007, page 1.
Counsel, November, 2007, page, 4.
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the referred barrister, the Board, if  it considers it necessary, offers him or her advice. 
This might include advising him or her: to undergo a period of advocacy training or 
continuing education to deal with any shortcoming identified; to discuss the matter with 
his or her head of chambers, circuit leader, a benpher of his Inn of Court, or some other 
suitable person acting a mentor; to take specific action concerning his or her personal 
administration; and to take remedial action to improve his or her conduct or service in 
the future.
Following a request from the Bar Council, the Bar Standards Board has amended 
profession’s training regulations so that barristers of four to six year’s call are now 
required to undertake three hours of advocacy training each year. Previously this was 
only compulsory for those of three year’s call and under.
With an eye fixed on competition, which is expected to intensify from solicitor 
advocates, the then Bar Council Chairman, Geoffrey Vos QC, said of these two 
measures:
“The Bar Council wishes to ensure that barristers aspire to and achieve excellence, so
that the future o f  the profession is assured................ Quality control is not a threat to
our independence. And it must not become burdensome or disruptive. It i s , however, a 
necessary part o f  growing up. We are a big profession now, attracting entrants from  all 
backgrounds. We must be able to produce evidence fo r  our oft repeated assertion that 
we provide the highest quality advocacy and advice available anywhere ” .
The Bar Council supported a recommendation made in the Final Report o f Lord 
Carter’s Review of Legal Aid Procurement ^  that a Quality Assurance for Advocates 
scheme (“QAA”), based on principles of peer review and a rounded appraisal system, be 
established for all advocates working in the criminal, civil and family courts According 
to the Review, the new quality monitoring system envisaged should be developed 
initially for publicly funded criminal advocates, then for publicly funded family and 
civil advocates and ultimately for all advocates, who should be graded according to 
skills and experience*”®®.
Officials from the Ministry of Justice and the Legal Services Commission , which 
runs legal aid, together with representatives from the judiciary , the Bar Council and Bar
Quoted in The Times by Frances Gibb, April, 10 , 2007.
Lord C arter’s Review o f  Legal A id  Procurement: A market -b a se d  approach to reform. House o f  
Lords, published on 13*** July, 2006.
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Standards Board, the Law Society, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, the Institute of 
Bar Clerks, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Attorney General’s Office formed a 
Working Group to develop a QAA. Because it was of the view that good quality of 
advocacy is particularly important in criminal defence , where an individual’s liberty 
may be at stake, the Group decided to first develop a pilot scheme for assuring the 
quality of defence advocates in the Crown Court and above. Not just advocacy and legal 
knowledge, but the whole range of skills now required of advocates was to be assessed 
including case management, client service and effective interaction with the wider 
justice system *°®*. The pilot began in Autumn 2007. It was intended that lessons drawn 
from it would help shape quality assurance in other areas of publicly funded advocacy.
After considerable delay, agreement on a joint scheme to assure the quality o f 
criminal advocacy was finally concluded by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, Bar 
Standards Board and the Institute of Legal Executives.
All advocates, irrespective of their prior education and training and professional 
qualification, will be assessed against a common set o f standards. Judges will 
evaluate the performance o f advocates who perform Crown Court trials.
The scheme will commence in summer 2012, with advocates notifying their 
regulators that they will be seeking accreditation through the scheme
It seems likely that QAA will be applied to all areas of publicly paid advocacy in the 
future and might possibly, as recommended by the Carter Review, be extended later to 
privately funded advocacy.
1000 Recommendation 5.3, page 14.
*®°* The detailed competences against which the Working Group proposed advocates should be 
measured are found in Annex 1, Annex 2 and Annex 3 o f  Creating a Quality Assurance Scheme fo r  
Publicly Funded Criminal Defence Advocates. Ministry o f  Justice and Legal Services Commission . 
Consultation Paper 13/07 . Published on 22”** June, 2007. To avoid disadvantaging overseas entrants, 
those who came late to practice, part-time practitioners or lawyers who have taken breaks in their career, 
evidence o f  an advocate’s behaviours and skills was emphasized, rather than length o f  experience or 
qualification held. (The Period o f  Consultation ended on 12*** September, 2007)
*®®^ Catherine Baski, A dvocacy  com prom ise dea l includes ju d ic ia l assessm ent, Law Society Gazette, 
23*** March, 2012. Some judges welcom ed the prospect o f  formally assessing the performance o f  
advocates. Others expressed reservations. They include Lord Justice M osses, interviewed by Joshua 
Rozenberg, Law in A ction , 19*** June, 2012. He considered evaluation o f  advocates by judges w ill 
damage the “ su btle  rela tionsh ip"  between them and ‘‘p e rv e r t the pu rpose  o f  the tr ia l process."  In 
particular, advocates seeking promotion to a higher grade ( under the Quality Assurance Scheme 
there w ill be four grades.) might refrain from pressing points not finding favour before judges, 
even though they may be correct. In this way an undesirable factor, risking injustice, may be 
introduced into advocacy.
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Necessity to satisfy formal controls of quality, additional and external to those 
imposed by lawyers’ own professional bodies, seems to be a growing feature of 
advocacy which can now be undertaken by many more than previously.
Broadcasting of Court Proceedings.
The current law.
The Criminal Justice Act 1925 prevents photography, or sketches being made, in or 
around the courts in England and Wales and publishing any that are produced. This has 
been interpreted by case law to cover filming for cinematic and television purposes *®®\ 
Recording of sound is prohibited by the Contempt of Court Act 1981, except with the leave 
of the court *®®\ Further, the Act declares that it is a contempt of court to broadcast 
recordings of court proceedings to the public
Before the 1925 Act was passed, photographs of participants in court proceedings were a 
popular subject for newspapers and were often taken by portable and discreet cameras by a 
growing band of news photographers. During the debate in the House of Lords on the
Criminal Justice Bill specific reference was made to "a photograph  taken at the Old
Bailey o f  a judge passing sentence o f  death... A most shocking thing to have taken, or to 
have published, dreadful fo r  the judge, dreadful fo r  every body concerned in the case ” .
In the House of Commons some arguments were heard against trying to censor the press, 
but the majority view was that "Everybody has sufferedfor a long time by prisoners in the 
dock and witnesses being pilloried by having their photographs taken, and this is to prevent 
that happening”
Section 41.
Re Barber v Lloyds Underwriters [1987] IQB 103, 105; i? v Loveridge, Lee and Loveridge [2001]2 Cr. 
App. Rep.29, C A .
*®®" Section 9 ( 1 ) .
Section 9 (2) .
House o f  Lords Debates, Vol. 56, column 313.
House o f  Commons Debates, Vol. 183, column 1599.
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Parliament has been televised since 1989. This included the Judicial Committee of the 
House of Lords, then the highest domestic court Although broadcasting of court 
proceedings is not permitted, in most cases it is legal to broadcast inquiries *®*°, however 
only with leave of the chairman. In 1999, for example, the Chairman of the Southall Rail 
Accident Inquiry, Professor John Uff QC , granted permission to televise all its 
proceedings. The highest profile inquiry in recent years has been the Inquiry Into The 
Circumstances Surrounding The Death of Mr. David Kelly C.M. G. (“The Hutton Inquiry”) 
in 2004. Lord Hutton, the chairman of the inquiry, allowed broadcasting of the opening and 
closing statements, and the publishing of a rolling transcript of the inquiry on the internet 
and on 24-hour news channels, but refused permission to allow television pictures of 
witnesses giving evidence to be filmed.
Should proceedings be broadcast?
Broadcasting of court proceedings varies internationally. At one end of the scale lies 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland , where all access to electronic media is prohibited 
under any circumstances. At the other are most Australian states where television cameras 
are allowed into courts and their activity is controlled solely by the discretion of judges or 
officials *®*‘. Similarly, in California filming is permitted in trial and appellate courts at 
judicial discretion In between are jurisdictions such as the Federal Courts of the United
States and New York State which only allow cameras in appellate courts.
Since the banning of photography in English and Welsh courts in 1925, and particularly 
the in the past thirty years, the question of broadcasting court proceedings has been raised 
several times. An argument put strongly in this country, and abroad, in favour of 
broadcasting centre is that justice should be “seen to be done” and those who make it 
sometimes quote Jeremy Bentham, "Publicity is the very soul o f  justice. It is the keenest 
spur to exertion and the surest o f  all guards against improbity” . In addition, it is argued 
by some, showing court proceedings would bolster public confidence in the criminal justice
To allow proceedings in its successor, from October, 2009, the United Kingdom Supreme Court, to be 
televised, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 amended Section 41 o f the Criminal Justice Act 1925 to 
exclude it. Cases may be watched live on the court’s website: http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk 
*®*° Save for those held under the Tribunals and Inquiry (Evidence)Act 1921 which are covered by Section 9 
o f  the Contempt o f  Court Act 1981, restricting sound recording.
*®** Daniel Stepniak, Paper produced for Department for Constitutional Affairs Broadcasting Courts Seminar 
held on 10*** January, 2005.
*®*^  Broadcasting Courts, Consultation Paper, CP28/04, Department for Constitutional Affairs, November, 
2004, Annex E.
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system and, as far as civil justice is concerned, it would make courts less daunting for lay 
people to use.
In 1989 , a working party of the Bar Council chaired by Jonathan Caplan QC published 
a report, “Televising the Courts ”, into the feasibility and desirability of televising court 
proceedings in England and Wales. The report advocated amending the law to permit 
televising of courts on an experimental basis. Its recommendations were put in to a Private 
Members Bill, the Courts (Research) Bill 1991, but this fell on its Second Reading in the 
House of Commons.
The then Lord President, Lord Hope, in neighbouring Scotland, allowed a strictly 
controlled experiment, in 1992, which allowed cameras entry to courts. A number of BBC 
documentaries involving courtroom film were produced. These included The Trial, a series 
of five programmes showing scenes from first instance Scottish criminal trials. Broadcasts 
in the 1990’s on British television of the trials of William Kennedy Smith (1991), O. J. 
Simpson(1995), and Louise Woodward (1997) from the USA were much deplored as prurient 
soap opera and media circuses*®***. They were cited by opponents of court filming in this 
country, although the BBC ten part documentary series "Boston Law ”, shown in January 
2001, depicting many court scenes, was greatly praised for explaining the Massachusetts 
system of criminal justice*®*^ .
In 2002 the BBC was granted permission to televise Abdel Baset Ali Mohmed Al-Megrahi’s 
appeal, under Scots Law in the Netherlands, against his conviction for the Lockerbie 
bombing. The coverage was under strict guidance laid down by the Scottish Courts, 
including a prohibition broadcasting any witness giving evidence *®*®.
Whether court proceedings should be broadcast, and if  so how it should be regulated, did 
not disappear. In 2004 Lord Falconer, the then Lord Chancellor, issued a Consultation Paper 
in 2004 entitled Broadcasting Courts. The following year a pilot filming exercise of appeal 
cases in the Royal Courts of Justice took place. Footage was never broadcast but was studied 
for possible use as material for news reports, documentaries and educational programmes.
Importance for advocacy and advocates.
*®*^  The Works o f  Jeremy Bentham: Volume 9, page 49, Russell and Russell, New York, 1962 .
*®*** Jonathan Caplan QC, From Pen to Lens, Counsel, April, 2001, page 10. For a mixed opinion, which 
acknowledged filming may have helped educate viewers about courts and criminal procedure, see Notes o f the 
Week, The Trial o f  Louise Woodward, Justice o f the Peace, Vol. 161, November, 15*, 1997, page 1051.
*®*^  For example by John Cooper, Boston Law, The Times, February 13*, 2001.
*®*® Abdelbast Ali Mohmed A l Megrahi v Her M ajesty’s Advocate SCCR [2002] 509. See Broadcasting Courts, 
Consultation Paper, CP 28/04, Department for Constitutional Affairs, November, 2004, page 19.
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The possibility of broadcasting court proceedings raised a number of important matters 
for advocacy and advocates. The then Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg, expressed the 
opinion in 2001 There is a great risk that the behaviour and judgements o f  law yers, 
witnesses and the ju ry  might be affected by the knowledge that they were participating 
in a live media event . Suggestions were made that lawyers would be tempted into 
histrionics, playing to television audiences to further their reputations , as some had done to 
newspaper reporters in earlier times, when there was intense press interest in court cases.
Fears were expressed that the serious business of justice would be turned into entertainment, 
much as it was in the 19^  ^Century cause celebre.
International evidence on the effects of broadcasting on advocates is not extensive. It 
appears to vary in the USA. A three year experiment, commencing in 1991, in the United 
States Federal Courts allowed televising civil and appellate court proceedings. The 
experiment was evaluated by the Federal Judicial Centre using questionnaires, interviews and 
analysis of broadcasts. It found that judges felt there had been no adverse effect on counsel 
due to cameras and some even reported an improvement in their perfbrmance*®*  ^ Following 
the O.J. Simpson trial in 1995, a judicial task force was set up in California to survey the 
views of trial and appellate judges and attorneys about televising cases. The task force found 
little evidence of lawyers playing to the camera *®*®. These findings contrast with what was 
said in conversations with American legal academics and lawyers and judges *®^® .They were 
all of the opinion that televising court proceedings did encourage attorneys to act theatrically 
and diminished the standing of the courts.
Reviewing televising cases in Commonwealth countries, Geoffrey Robertson QC 
found there was little to show lawyers "hammed up" their advocacy. On the contrary, he 
reported, television has "produced greater prepared lawyers, better behaved judges and 
a more informed public ” *®^*. It has been said that The T ria l, a series of programmes made 
under the controlled experiment in Scotland, earlier, represented an accurate picture of the 
courts and that cameras had not led participants, including lawyers, playing up to the
Quoted by Bob Marshall- Andrews QC, Court on camera. Legal services. N ew  Statesman, 16* 
February, 2004, page xv. He suggested that Lord Irvine should have added “judges” as “it is difficult 
to see why they would be immune from the process”.
*®** Research summarized in Broadcasting Courts, Consultation Paper, CP 28/04, Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, November, 2004 on pages 49 and 101.
*®*® Report summary o f  the Californian Judicial Task Force on Photographing, Recording and 
Broadcasting in the Courtroom.
*®^® At Harvard Law School Trial Advocacy Course Winters 2000 and 2001; admittedly not a 
statistically significant sample o f  academics, lawyers and judges in the United States but not a small 
number.
*®^* Court on C andid Camera, The London Evening Standard, September 29***, 2000.
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cameras . In his Report, in 1999, Professor John Uff QC, the Chairman of the Southall 
Rail Accident Inquiry, wrote*®^ :^ "The experience o f  televising the inquiry gave no 
support whatever to fears expressed by many parties that witnesses would be 
prejudiced or that advocates would play to the cameras. The extent o f  serious 
television coverage was, however, disappointing”.
In an interview *®^** Lord Woolf, the former Master of the Rolls and Lord Chief Justice, 
said although, subject to safeguards, he agreed with experimental broadcasting of court 
proceedings, the possibility that some lawyers would behave theatrically could not be ruled 
out. Such an approach, however, in trials before judges and on appeals, which almost 
completely turn on law, would be wholly counterproductive for their clients *®^  ^Lord 
Bingham, who opposed televising court proceedings principally because of the additional 
stress it might impose on parties involved, also considered there was a danger some lawyers 
would act to the audience behind the camera *®^®.
A barrister interviewed thought if  television was allowed in courts a fresh impetus 
might be given to advocacy, but doubted it would be healthy *®^^ . He feared for the cab rank 
rule. Some advocates might find reasons to decline cases because they would not want to be 
seen across the breadth of the country with particularly unpopular defendants or parties; 
whereas publicity of them at present is limited and not a major consideration . Certain 
clients, consequently, might be deprived of the best and most skilled representation. The 
same barrister was apprehensive publicity seeking barristers would be more concerned with 
their images than with effectively representing clients, resulting in failure to put unpleasant, 
but highly probative, questions to particular witnesses. Further he considered there was a risk 
that prosecutors might behave in a more aggressive way so as not to attract public criticism 
for being soft. Bob Marshall Andrews QC, MP , writing in 2004 *®^ %claimed that the vast 
majority of practicing barristers opposed cameras in court.
In the civil courts a considerable number, often for financial reasons, bringing or 
defending cases represent themselves or are represented other than by a professional lawyer.
*®^  ^B roadcasting Courts, Consultation P aper, CP 28/04, Department for Constitutional Affairs, 
November ,2004, page 15.
*®^  ^ Quoted by Jonathan Caplan QC, From pens to lens. Counsel, April 2001, page 10.
1024 June, 2007 at the House o f  Lords.
*®^  ^Both Lords Justice Sedley and Lord Justice Richards, interviewed respectively on 11* July and 
18* July, 2007, considered that some barristers would play to the gallery i f  cameras were present.
*®^® Interview held on 23*  ^ October, 2007. 
*®^’ Alexander Hewitt, 14* September, 2007.
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The quality of their “self advocacy” could be affected if they felt intimidated by cameras*®^ ®. 
There must also be risk that some would behave in a dramatic way. Lawyers , facing litigants 
in person, and judges would be forced to take these considerations into account.
Research from abroad indicates that the presence of cameras may deter people acting as 
witnesses *®^®. It is widely accepted that testifying as a witness, especially as an alleged victim 
in a criminal matter, can be a most nerve - racking experience . For many people cameras in 
court may well add to this. In research conducted by the Californian Judicial Task Force, 87 
per cent of trial and appellate judges surveyed reported that witnesses were more nervous or 
self conscious when giving evidence before cameras. It could reasonably be expected that 
defendants and parties to civil cases who gave evidence would also find the experience more 
stressful if cameras were present. In the event of filming, advocates would have to take into 
account that witnesses may be more reluctant, nervous and self- conscious.
There is a danger that if witnesses watch coverage of other witnesses giving evidence 
earlier they might, either deliberately or subconsciously, alter their testimony. Also some 
might be tempted to tailor their evidence to make it more acceptable to the viewing public. 
Again advocates would have to deal with both these possibilities.
It has been argued that broadcasting court proceedings might encourage judges to play 
to the camera when making decisions or passing certain sentences. Rather alarmingly, in 
1997, the New York State Committee, set up to study a ten year experiment of televising 
courts in that state, recorded that 37 per cent of judges surveyed said that television coverage 
causes judges to make rulings they otherwise might not have. This may be most acute in 
jurisdictions where judges are elected or confirmed by vote after appointment.
*®^  ^Court on camera, New Statesman, Special Supplement: The future o f  legal services, 16* February,2004.
*®^® See Broadcasting Courts, Consultation Paper CP 28/04, Department for Constitutional Affairs, November, 
2004, page 50. The number o f litigants in person appears to be increasing. Figures produced by the Personal 
Support Unit, a charity, showed a big increase in the number o f unrepresented litigants it assisted in London and 
Manchester during 2010-2011 : Litigants in person soar. Law Society Gazette, 13th October,2011.
*®^® A committee set up in 1995 to evaluate a ten year film ing experiment o f  civil and criminal trials 
and appellate courts in N ew  York found, in a poll o f  voters, that 54 per cent o f  those surveyed said 
they would be less w illing to testify i f  cameras were present (Cameras in N ew  York Court Rooms . 
Marist Institute for Public Opinion Poll, December 1996) . In a similar poll held in New  Zealand, 58 
per cent said cameras would affect their w illingness to appear as a witness in a criminal trial. ( UMR  
Insight Ltd, Media Coverage o f  Court Proceedings: A Summary Report, February 1998) . This 
evidence contrasts with that from the 2001 Committee o f  the N ew  York Bar Association and the 
Federal Judicial Centre, which analysed the US Federal Court film ing experiment. The former showed 
that, in the many cases they investigated, only two witnesses had been lost because o f  cameras in court 
(Report o f  the Special Committee o f  the N ew  York State Bar Association on Cameras in the 
Courtroom), w hile the latter discovered only one o f  the 110 counsel who responded to its survey 
reported losing a witness because o f  filming. (M olly Treadway Johnson, Electronic Media Coverage 
o f  Courtroom Proceedings, November 4*, 1993).
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Cameras in court, the Committee said, could have an effect on decisions reached by 
juries. If there was a very strong tide of public opinion in a case as a result of television or 
radio coverage, it might be very hard for a jury to remain unbiased. This may make the task 
of advocates acting for the defence more difficult.
In former times, as was put by Lord Justice Laws, before the current debilitating 
form s o f  mass entertainment were available the leading barristers were pop stars F
E Smith, Edward Carson, Rufus Isaacs, Marshall Hall, Norman Birkett and Patrick Hastings 
were household names due to intense reporting of court cases in newspapers. Save the late 
George Carman, with his defamation practice, no advocate has since remotely had a public 
profile approaching theirs. If trials were to be televised it is possible barristers could again 
become very well known. However, how long the popular appetite for real, as opposed to 
fictional, court cases would last is uncertain. The barrister Bob Marshall-Hall Q C, M P. 
described most crimes in court as generally sad, tragic or dull. This perhaps suggests, apart 
for when the famous and celebrities are involved, public interest might rapidly wane and with 
it the number of cases broadcast.
Government plans to allow limited broadcasting from courts.
If broadcasting of courts is allowed in this country it will have a number of 
consequences for advocacy. The previous Labour government did not reach a decision 
whether to permit i t , however the former Justice Secretary, Lord Falconer QC, set out his 
thinking in a speech to the Press Gazette and Newspaper Society Media Law Conference in 
2007*®"":
“The test must be, in allowing television access to courts, will this add unnecessarily 
to the distress o f  victims and witnesses and separately, will knowledge that the TV  
cameras are there- make people less willing to give evidence? Open justice may lead 
to the removal o f  justice . Something no one wants to see.
There is no easy answer. As I  have sa id , I  am in favour o f  moving forw ard in ways I  
have already set o u t . No to film ing witnesses and v ictim s, yes to judges when fo r  
example they are making their sentencing remarks. But the way forw ard must be one 
 which does not deliver openness at the price o f  individual protection.
*®"* John Laws, Epilogue: C icero and the M odern A dvocate, in Jonathan Pow ell and Jeremy Paterson 
Ed, Cicero the advocate, Oxford University Press, 2004, Chapter 15, page 413.
*®"^ Court on camera. Ibid.
*®"" Held on the 17* May, 2007 at Reuters Building, Canary Wharf, London.
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Broadcasting in courts does not have to be a binary decision cameras or no cameras. 
In the US, fo r  instance, there is a variegated pattern o f  when and where cameras are 
allowed in . A simple yes or no, would not serve anyone’s best interests”.
In September, 2011, Mr Kenneth Clarke QC, the Justice Secretary, announced his 
intention to amend existing legislation to allow broadcasting from the Court of Appeal 
and also of sentencing remarks by judges at the Crown Court, though not o f trials, 
jurors, witnesses, defendants or victims. Consultation with the judiciary is planned to 
ensure the move will not hinder the administration o f justice and that protection is 
given to victims, witnesses, offenders and jurors. Giving evidence to the House of 
Commons Justice Select Committee, the Attorney General, Dominic Grieve QC, said 
there were no plans to extend broadcasting beyond what was announced. Any further 
expansion could, in his view, lead to “theatricals” from lawyers and defendants and 
cause “ethical and practical difficulties”
Dress in court.
Wigs and gowns.
Judges and barristers appear dressed both in gowns and wigs in the criminal courts , and 
in gowns in civil courts and also some family hearings. They are not worn in the Supreme 
Court (nor were they in its predecessor, the House of Lords), the Commercial Court, the 
Magistrates’ Court and most family hearings. It is probably true to say that many throughout 
the world strongly associate British courts with wigs and gowns. The wearing of wigs, 
although somewhat different to present ones, by judges and barristers dates from the late 17^  ^
Century. Barristers’ black robes, which replaced those in other colours and designs, also 
originate from that time. Judicial robes, worn today, can be traced to the 14^  ^Century, but 
have much evolved in style since then
Whether wigs and gowns should be worn is an issue that has reared its horsehair head 
over many decades and has usually been accompanied by a flurry of correspondence in The 
Times and elsewhere. Opponents believe they "epitomize all the defects o f  English law, 
its remoteness, its uncritical reverence fo r  tradition, its absence o f  rationality, and its 
inability to see obstacles in the way o f  the understanding o f  the legal system by
*®"** Daily Telegraph, 8*  August, 2011.
J.H. Baker, A history  o f  English ju d g e s ’ robes, SN 1978.
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laymen ” The opinion that it may intimidate victims and witnesses, especially the young 
and the vulnerable, has also been voiced. Further, some assert that that the wearing of wigs 
and gowns encourages self importance and pomposity of speech. It has been claimed they can 
result in unnecessary flamboyance amongst barristers. A critic of wigs and gowns said: 
"Dress affects manner . People tend to act the part they look.. Theatrical costume is 
fine fo r  drama productions , but do we really need dramatic behaviour in our 
courtrooms? It may be good fo r  the tourist trade, but does it f i t  the seriousness o f  the 
work in hand? ”
Arguments for retaining traditional court dress include*®"® : that it: symbolizes the 
authority of office holders; helps instil a respect for the law; reminds judges and barristers 
that theirs is a solemn role; emphasizes the impersonal approach and disinterested approach 
of the judge; assists people in court identify who is who; and provides some security to 
wearers through anonymity, especially in criminal cases. Another point made is that it helps 
create a level playing field by preventing barristers from competing with each other in dress, 
with the object of winning favour with jurors, which it is said has happened in the United 
States, and other countries, between attorneys. Wigs and gowns, it is also claimed, help to 
reduce discrimination on grounds of age, race and gender Whether wigs and gowns should 
be retained was publicly consulted upon by the Lord Chancellor’s Department in 1992 *®"®. A 
clear majority of respondents backed continued wearing of them and it was announced by the 
Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice that no changes would be made. In 2002 
practising members of the Scottish Faculty of Advocates voted decisively to retain wigs and 
gowns *®**®.
The matter was revisited in England and Wales by the Lord Chancellor’s Department the 
following year when it produced another consultation paper *®^‘ which contained the result of 
a preliminary survey of 1500 members of the public and 500 court users , defined as victims
*®"® Ursula Riniker, Wigs, robes and other paraphernalia . Justice o f  the Peace, 9* September, 2000.
An early critic was Thomas Jefferson who wrote, during a debate in 1790 about whether w igs should  
be worn in the new American federal Supreme Court: “For heavens sake d iscard  the monstrous w ig  
which makes English ju d g es look like ra ts peep in g  through benches o f  oakum ”. Quoted by Charles 
Warren, The Supreme Court in U nited States H istory, 3 Volum es, Boston: Little Brown, 1924, Volum e  
1, Page 48.
*®"^  Adrian Turner, Time For A N ew Look, Justice o f  the Peace, 30* September, 2006.
*®"® Court catwalk. Counsel, June 2003, page 5.
*®"® Court D ress, a consultation paper, was issued in 1992. 520 responses were received from 
organizations and individuals - 67 percent favoured retention o f  court working dress; 15 percent were 
for abolition in all respects; and the remainder supported some sim plification, including 14 percent 
who advocated abolishing the wig.
*®**® The Wigs H ave It, Law Society Gazette, 2002.
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of crime, witnesses, jurors and defendants in the criminal courts, as well as claimants and 
defendants in the civil courts. More than 60 percent of respondents thought court dress should 
be modified in some way
Very probably mindful of this research, the Lord Chief Justice announced reforms of 
court working dress, ending centuries of tradition. From L* January, 2008, judges no longer 
wore wigs, wing collars and bands when sitting in open court in civil and family proceedings. 
Circuit Bench judges continue to wear the same gown as before, but all other judges now 
appear in a new simply designed gown*®****. Other than having a single set of robes throughout 
the year, there is no alteration in court dress worn by judges in criminal proceedings. 
Advocates follow a similar dress code to that of the judge. Accordingly what is worn by the 
Bar in criminal proceedings has not changed , but in civil proceedings wigs, wing collars and 
bands are no longer worn; robes, however, still are *®**". Solicitor advocates, who had long 
fought for parity with barristers, are now permitted to wear wigs, wing collars and bands in 
circumstances where these are worn by the Bar.
The niqab and burqa and advocacy.
At least for the foreseeable future, the question of traditional court dress appears to have 
been settled . The same cannot be said of some items of clothing that reflect Britain has 
become much more ethnically and religiously diverse. Little, if any, controversy arose about 
the wearing of Silk turbans and the Moslem head-scarf- hijab, instead of wigs, in court by 
advocates and judges.
The full -face veil with a slit for the eyes, the niqab, is worn by a small minority of 
Moslem women in the United Kingdom. It entirely hides the woman’s face, head and hair 
from view. The burqa is the most radical veiling. This is a loose garment that completely
*®*** Court Working D ress in England and Wales, May, 2003.
*®**" 53 percent o f  respondents believed dress should be changed for criminal judges, 64 percent for 
civil judges and 61 percent for barristers. A survey conducted by the journal Counsel amongst 
barristers attracted 3,751 responses. It showed that the bar was w illing to embrace change in certain 
areas but there were others, most conspicuously criminal work in the Crown Court, where it was not. 
For a detailed breakdown o f  the results see Counsel, July, 2003, page 22.
*®**" On the 12* July, 2007.
*®**** The simple continental-style black gown, with slicks o f  red extending to the chest from the collar, was first 
revealed on 13*** May, 2008 and modelled by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Philips. It was designed by Betty 
Jackson, a former designer o f the year, who made no charge for her work. The Guardian, 13*** May, 2008. The 
gown is made o f a dark navy gabardine and wool mix, trimmed with velvet on the cuffs and facings. The version 
for women has a pleated white removable ruff.
*®**" For the bar’s divided reaction to the Lord C hief Justice’s announcement concerning court dress see 
Elizabeth Davidson, Time to D ress Down? Counsel, October, 2007, pp. 18-19.
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conceals the wearer apart from her hands with a gauze panel or slit for the eyes. It is worn by 
many fewer women than the niqab. However the wearing of both garments appears to be 
increasing. In November 2006 an advocate in a full-face veil was asked to stand down at an 
immigration tribunal hearing. The judge said that he could not hear what she was saying. This 
case sparked a debate on wearing the niqab and burqa in court The Judicial Studies Board 
(“JSB”) has issued guidelines that veils should be accommodated in court unless judges, on a 
case by case basis, think otherwise .
Wearing clothes that obscure the face raises a number of issues for advocacy in courts 
where hearings remain predominantly oral and open. Dealing first with advocates, any 
difficulties of audibility could be relatively easily overcome by microphones. The face, 
however, in seeking to persuade judges, magistrates and especially jurors is a fundamental. It 
is of great importance in cross-examination and for encouraging witnesses in examination in 
chief. An advocate who chooses to cover her face, it could be argued, is disabling herself and 
not acting in the best interests of her client. In matters which are concerned with questions of 
law and do not involve witnesses this view may be of less weight.
Veiled judges, magistrates and tribunal members would be challenging for advocates 
accustomed to receiving facial clues, which can, of course, on occasion be misleading, as to 
how their submissions are being received. However it must be said that some judges and 
magistrates give little or nothing away by non-verbal communication.
The facial gestures of witnesses being cross-examined are often of use to fact finders in 
assessing their credibility. Behind the veil the impact of questions is hidden. When dealing 
with witnesses it may be possible to reach a compromise: Evidence might be given unveiled, 
but in a court emptied of spectators and possibly behind a screen making her visible only to 
the judge, a jury if there is one, and the advocates. The use of a videolink may also be of 
assistance.( Finding acceptable solutions in each case is emphasized much by The Judicial 
Studies Board.) Also, when considering witnesses, it may be that some would find it 
daunting, or even intimidating, to be cross-examined by a veiled advocate.
It is predicted that challenges for cause will be made at the Crown Court by counsel on 
the inclusion of a woman wearing the full veil as a member of the jury. The JSB reminds
See Barbara Hewson, L et us see you r fa ce . Counsel, June 2007 pp. 10-12. and Fatim Kurji, Justice  
fo r  all, same issue o f  Counsel pp. 14-16. On the veil generally, see Jennifer Heath, The Veil: Women 
Writers on its H istory, Lore and Politics, University o f  California Press, 2008.
Equal Treatment Bench Book, Chapter 3.3. In Pakistan a different approach has been taken. The 
C hief Justice o f  the Peshawar High Court issued a directive in November, 2006 that veils were not to 
be worn, reported in the Pakistan D aily Times, 4 *  November, 2006.
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judges that, as in all such challenges, there must be a genuine and legitimate basis for it, 
based on the particular circumstances of the case.
These, and other concerns about the niqab and burqa in court will affect advocates and 
judges in the future. It may be that some will have to be resolved by court decisions which 
balance the right to manifest one’s religion or belief, under Article 9 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.
New Technology.
In future technology will exert a greater influence on advocacy.
Many judges can now be seen taking a note of proceedings on a lap-top computer. The old 
adage that an advocate should "watch the judge's pen" to gauge the speed of his or her 
delivery has been adapted to "watch the Judge's fingers on the keyboard"
Advocates are having to adapt to video conferencing (“VC” ) and video links. The Access 
to Justice Act 1999 allows video-conferencing to be used in civil proceedings, including case 
management conferences, ancillary relief hearings , applications for permission to proceed 
with judicial review, where there are overseas or remote witnesses or in any civil cases in 
which the court directs the use of video and the parties involved consent to it.
Following the success of a pilot scheme, involving the Royal Courts of Justice, Cardiff 
Civil Justice Centre and Leeds Combined Court in 2000, the use of video conferencing 
substantially increased . Over sixty courts now have VC and it is possible for each to connect 
with each other and for multiple courts to be connected at once. For example, Bournemouth, 
Leeds and Manchester can be used to take evidence for a matter being heard at the Royal
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Courts of Justice The lack of availability of expert witnesses constitutes a major source of 
delay in child care and supervision cases. To reduce this, all 53 Care Centres across England 
and Wales have been provided with VC equipment to provide them with greater flexibility as 
to when and how expert witnesses will be heard by the court. Video conferencing is now 
available in nearly 160 Magistrates’ Courts which are linked to prisons. In those courts 
prisoners are not usually required to be physically present for remands, bail applications and 
other matters .Video links have been installed in 85 Youth Courts so that child victims and 
witnesses no longer have to appear in person in the courtroom. It was announced in autunrn 
2007 that the government is to pilot extending the use of video links into Crown Courts for 
witnesses in certain sex offences. The pilot scheme was planned to last one year’®"*.
It is commonly agreed that successful advocacy requires keen sensitivity to the words 
and body language of witnesses and judges. Some barristers were interviewed after a case 
conducted by video link up as part of the pilot scheme conducted at the Royal Courts of 
Justice in 2000. Whilst they broadly approved of the use to which technology was being put, 
they said they were unable to pick up some of the judge’s subtle nuances and body language 
on the monitors. One said ,” Advocates can usually tell when a judge is getting  
impatient, but something was lost in translation ” It may be that as technology 
improves, and also as they gain more experience in video link cases, advocates will be able to 
detect subtle signs from judges and witnesses more acutely. There is certainly a strong case 
for advocacy training at colleges and elsewhere to include exercises involving V C.
*®**® Although not necessary for judicial appointment, most judges are computer literate -  interview  
with Lord Justice Richards, 18 July, 2007 who is a member o f  the Judicial Studies Board.
***® Information kindly supplied by Mr. Roger Little Hazel, Royal Courts o f  Justice, The Strand.
*®"® At present it is necessary for defendants to attend in person at their first appearance before Magistrates. 
However the Justice Secretary, Mr. Jack Straw, announced in May, 2009 that pilot tests to allow defendants to 
make their first court appearance would take place from a police station in central London and one in north 
Kent. The pilot requires solicitors to sit alongside their clients in a modified police interview room rather than 
separated by a dock. Some solicitors expressed fears for their safety from clients reacting violently to bad news. 
Law Society Gazette, 2T* May, 2009.
*®"* Law Society Gazette, 104/38,4* October, 2007, page 4. Five Crown Courts participated. The pilot scheme 
was intended to test the level o f  additional demand for live links, assess the extent to which this provision 
improves efficiency and to help inform decisions on the need for further investment in this technology.
Firm in court video link. Law Society Gazette, October 26*, 2000, page 3.
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Reception of technology in the United States.
In the United States, both at Federal and state court level, there has been considerable 
investment in technology Most courts can now display evidence by a document camera, 
a vertically mounted television camera that transmits an image of whatever item is placed on 
its base. Many courts have monitors, or a large screen and projector, allowing counsel, jurors, 
witnesses and judges to see evidence that has been put in digital form. In some high tech 
courts monitors are touch screen enabling witnesses to annotate displayed images, using 
related software. Key text or other parts may be emphasized or enlarged. Presentational 
software , such as Microsoft’s Powerpoint, is increasingly employed by lawyers , especially 
in opening and closing speeches.
New technology has expanded the ways in which evidence and arguments may 
be put to courts. It may transform what might otherwise be dry technical and 
difficult to understand reports into much more comprehensible forms. Particularly in 
high value civil cases involving accidents, very expensive computer recreations are used more 
and more by lawyers in court Because they are such a powerftil form of presentation, and 
may assume what is in dispute, their admissibility is sometimes challenged.
Advocates have to decide what will be the most persuasive means of 
presenting a case. This demands a knowledge o f technology and how to operate it. 
Electronic methods o f presenting documents and exhibits are marketed by 
companies to lawyers as a means o f obtaining an advantage over opponents who 
might use no longer leading techniques such as models, charts graphs and 
photographs. Advocates generally make electronic presentations from a litigation  
podium. As the technology is comparatively new, technical problems still 
occasionally occur in court. The wise counsel will have a reserve traditional low -  
tech strategy in the event o f technical difficulty to maintain the credibility o f his or 
her case .
Most who work with evidence presentation technology in America agree that it 
saves at least a quarter to a third o f the time a traditional civil trial would take.
For the extent o f  technology in Federal Courts see C. W iggins, M. Dunn, and G Oort, F ederal 
Judicial Center Survey On Courtroom Technology . Federal Judicial Center 2003. Further growth has 
occurred since this survey was published.
In describing an aircraft crash sim ulation, made in Am erica, that he had seen, Richard 
Susskind, former IT A dviser to the Lord C h ief Justice and Gresham Professor o f  Law, observed, 
in an interview  conducted on 21®* February, 2001 , that "no amount o f  eloquen t an d  descrip tive  
advocacy  cou ld  have r iv a lle d  it".
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although the amount o f pretrial preparation required from advocates is often much 
more. Because o f the increased speed o f trials some attorneys report that they have 
little time to reflect on their case during trial and that this can contribute to stress
1056
A feature o f new court technology court is real -  time transcription by which 
a court reporter, or stenographer, using a voice recognition computer system 
trained to his or her voice, can supply a rough transcript o f the court’s proceedings 
to counsel’s computer notebook, where, if  necessary, it can be later annotated. 
Real-time transcription, though expensive, has become more readily available. It 
can be transm itted through the Internet to the law yer’s office or elsewhere.
A lawyer can obtain almost instant assistance back, via his or her lap top computer, 
from an expert, who may be far away, on questions to ask in cross-examination. 
Perhaps less helpfully, instructions from absent, but interventionist, clients located 
anywhere in the world could also be received on what to put to witnesses and 
points to make, lessening counsel’s control o f the case.
The expense o f real time transcription precludes its use in most cases. Automatic 
voice recognition programmes, which do not need a stenographer are under 
development. In years hence it is likely that software systems sophisticated enough 
to recognize different voices in a courtroom will be available. Some thing that 
functions very like real time transcription, but much cheaper, may then be widely 
used in American courts and beyond. Reports o f most cases could then be 
published virtually simultaneously on the Internet. Judges and advocates in their 
submissions would need an even more immediate knowledge o f relevant cases.
As courtroom technology is rapidly becoming an ordinary and necessary 
aspect o f trial presentation in the United States, the ability o f lawyers to use it 
effectively becomes ever more important. An increasing number o f trial lawyers are 
attending courses on what technology offers and how to work it. More law schools 
are following William and M ary Law School - the home o f the Courtroom 21 
Project, an influential pioneer in the area o f courtroom technology - which
F. Lederer, High tech tr ia l law yers and  the court: R esp o n sib ilities , prob lem s, and  
opportu n ities, an in troduction . 2003 W illiam  and Mary School o f  Law.
*®"®F. Lederer, C ourtroom  Technology: A S tatus R eport. ( 2006  ) W illiam  and Mary School o f  
Law.
In 1993 the Project opened the Me Gothlin Courtroom, still considered to be the most 
technologically advanced court in the world. With this courtroom, W illiam and Mary Law School is
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requires every second year law student to be instructed in basic use o f courtroom 
technology and offers those interested in trial work a technology augmented trial 
advocacy course
As yet, more limited use in England and Wales but great future impact.
Video conferencing apart, the use o f technology in courts in England and 
Wales is much more limited than in America. A small number o f Crown Courts do 
have monitors that display evidence. They are used in major trials involving fraud 
and terrorism*®"®. As a means o f presentation, Powerpoint is not employed. In an 
interview *®®® the former Master of the Rolls and Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, 
considered that it might be useful in closing speeches to juries in the Crown Court 
*®"* . A Lord Justice o f Appeal *®“ saw little utility for it before the Court o f Appeal. 
He did, however, strongly favour placing documents on DVD coupled with the 
technology that would allow them to be raised on monitors and which permitted 
participants in trials to make their own separate electronic notes on what they saw 
*®®" . Computer sim ulation was used in the Bloody -  Sunday Inquiry in Northern 
Ireland*®®**, conducted between 1998 and 2004 and published in 2010. W itnesses 
could “walk” around a virtual Londonderry in 1972 to help them recall events and 
where they were at the time *®®".
exploring the place o f  information technology in litigation in the USA and the social consequences it 
may bring.
*®"®F. L eéerev.H igh tech tr ia l law yers and the C ourt, W illiam  and Mary School o f  Law, 2003 . 
*®"®In an interview , held on the 30 *  April, 2009 , Lord Justice Goldring em phasised that in serious 
fraud cases nowadays alm ost all paper evidence is scanned and presented to jurors on computer 
screens.
*®®® Held on 2 7 *  June, 2007.
*®®* It was reported by an Australian lawyer, Mr. Paul M ead, Senior Lecturer, C ollege o f  Law,
N ew  South W ales, Australia, interview ed on 15* July, 2005 , that in som e states Powerpoint is 
em ployed by a number o f  ju d ges to assist their summing up to juries.
*®®" Lord Justice Sedley, interview ed on 11* July, 2007.
i®63 Lord Justice said it had been explained to him that at least one fifth  o f  the protracted 
M axw ell fraud trial in 1996 was taken up by the physical effort to display evidence in ring binders 
to parties, jurors, counsel and the judge. Lord Bingham  o f  Cornhill, interview ed on 23*^ ** October, 
2007 , was o f  the v iew  that many judges w ould prefer to exam ine original and w hole docum ents, 
rather than what m ight be incom plete and selective  presentations.
*®®** B loody Sunday was the name given to January 3 0 *  1972 when 13 people were k illed  by 
sold iers on a banned c iv il rights march in Londonderry.
*®®" Explained by D ouglas M cQuaid in the course o f  a lecture entitled When tw o w o rlds co llide: IT  
and A dvocacy . G ray's \rm, February, 2001. The Judicial Inquiry concluded in 2010 . Lord Saville, 
who presided over it, was interview ed by Richard Susskind, President o f  the S ociety  for 
Computers and Law, for a programme in the U S te lev ision  series. The D ig ita l A ge, broadcast in 
early 2011 . He explained how digital technology had played a crucial role in its conduct, along  
with traditional forensic sk ills.
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A government paper published in 2000 which foresaw a much more rapid 
adoption o f computer technology in the English and Welsh courts than has actually 
happened, predicted that advocates’ verbal submissions would reduce in length:” In 
the courtroom o f  the fu ture  it w ill not he necessary fo r  a lawyer to state the agreed  
facts, history , relevant case law and statutes, when all o f  these materials are 
available in electronic form  and are therefore more easily accessible in the 
courtroom
In a panel discussion on legal biography, held at the London School o f 
Economics *®®’, Lord Roger said that he was aware that Internet Google and other 
searches were carried out by some barristers on Law Lords before whom they were 
to appear because they believed that knowledge o f judges’ backgrounds would 
assist them in their submissions. This was new technology being employed to do 
what many barristers had previously done by other means to know their tribunal.
Although at present behind the United States in its reception, courtroom 
technology, which continues to develop briskly, will have a very im portant future 
bearing on advocacy in this country. Few advocates will escape its influence.
Those who teach advocacy at professional law schools, and elsewhere, will have to 
become very fam iliar with IT and provide opportunities for students to use it. 
Young people, especially, acquire much knowledge and information by looking at 
the internet and from other material on computers. Visual learning, rather than 
aural, is likely to increase as technology consolidates its position and advances. 
Proper functioning o f a trial depends on jurors listening, often for prolonged 
periods. It is said some may lack sufficient ability to assimimilate oral evidence o f 
defendants and witnesses, especially if  lengthy, submissions by advocates and what 
is said by judges *®®. Some have spoken o f the oral tradition o f advocacy in ju ry
1066 Ju stice  2000, A Vision o f  the C iv il Ju stice  System  in the Inform ation Age, Departm ent o f  
C onstitutional A ffairs, Section  3, paragraph 3 .46 .
1067 lyth October, 2007. In a lecture, Qn the Supreme Court, delivered on the 28th April, 2009 at the London 
School o f Economics, Lord Phillips, who has become the President o f  the new Supreme Court, admitted that 
some cases in the House o f Lords might have been be decided differently depending on how the panel o f  judges 
was composed.
*®®® See Lord Judge, The Lord C h ief Justice o f  England and W ales, The C rim inal J u stice  System  in 
E ngland and Wales Time F or Change, Speech To The U niversity  o f  H ertfordshire, 5th N ovem ber, 
2008 , page 11. A lso see report o f  a speech by Lord Judge in the Times, October, 2009 . 
Interestingly, research by Professor Cheryl Thomas, A re Ju ries F a ir l, M inistry o f  Justice 1 /10, 
did not show that younger jurors were less able to com prehend oral legal instructions than older 
jurors. In fact the contrary was found: understanding o f  d irections fe ll as the age o f  the juror
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trials under imminent threat. Others think this is an exaggeration. Inevitably 
more demands will be made for inform ation to be presented on screens in most 
cases, not just those that are protracted and complex How courts and advocates 
should respond to broad changes brought by I T requires detailed thought now, 
rather than later, when it may pose problems. A sensible response may be to 
commission research on how, if  at all, jurors ability to follow live evidence and 
addresses by advocates and judges has been affected by new technology. Unless 
the law is changed, jurors in real cases could not be interviewed. Mock juries 
would have to be empanelled to hear similated cases.
To reduce the amount o f live oral evidence necessary for jurors to assimilate, 
it has been proposed that criminal trials could follow civil trials by making witness 
statements, stand as examination in chief . At first sight this may seem 
attractive. However, strong reservations exist. The way a person questions a 
witness when a statement is made may, unconsciously or consciously, distort 
recollections o f events ( this may be particularly relevant regarding suggestible 
persons) and fail to accurately convey his or her character in print. I f  a statement 
does not accurately capture the w itness’s version o f events a clear risk arises that 
he or she will depart from it under cross- examination, thereby damaging 
credibility before a jury. It has also been said that an important function of 
examination in chief is to settle witnesses, many o f whom have not given evidence 
in court before and may be nervous about doing so , and give them confidence 
before being cross-examined. Depriving them o f this would be unfair and could 
reduce the quality o f their evidence in cross-examination^®’* . Further if  jurors were
increased. In an interview , held on 11*  ^ May, 2010 , Professor Thomas said further research, which  
differentiated in ages, was necessary, on jurors’ capacity to fo llow  com plex evidence.
*°®®The Lord C hief Justice has also suggested that in future, juries m ight be handed evidence on 
computers to take away and evaluate, L C J ca lls  f o r  cou rt trad ition  reth ink. Law Society  Gazette 
22"** October, 2009 , page 4. Such a course would have many ram ifications.
*°’° To a limited extent, this is already possib le  under the “Section 9 procedure” ( Criminal Law Act 
1967 ) which allow s a statem ent to be read by a prosecutor when it has been agreed with the 
defence that the maker is not required at court to be cross-exam ined. ( Hearsay and other 
inadm issible evidence is edited out beforehand.) Section 10 Criminal Law A ct, 1967 allow s facts, 
w hich would otherw ise be in issue, to be agreed betw een the prosecution and the defence. A lso , 
under Section 27 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence A ct 1999 a v ideo -  recorded interview  
w ith a vulnerable w itness before trial may be admitted by the court as the w itn ess’s evidence in 
ch ief.
*07* Yhis v iew  was put by Lord Justice Goldring, interview ed on the 30*** April, 2009 . A sim ilar
opinion was expressed by Deborah Sharpley, a so lic itor advocate who has represented clients in 
jury trials at the Crown Court and has also prosecuted there, when em ployed by the Crown 
Prosecution Service. In her v iew  it was essentia l that jurors hear the w itn ess’s fu ll story, not just
cross-exam ination, in order to properly assess his or her credibility. She ju stified  a distinction
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given witnesses written statements, which stood as examination in chief, they 
would take them into the jury  room when considering their verdict. The possibility 
would then exist that jurors would give greater importance to them than to their 
memories and notes o f cross-examination *®” .
Rather than according witness statements the status o f examination in chief, 
other measures may be adopted, to cope with ju ro rs’ perceived less ability to 
follow oral evidence. These include replacing ju ry  trial in cases o f serious fraud, 
which frequently demand listening to much evidence, with that by a judge and lay 
assessors, before whom advocacy would be markedly different, and by further 
removing the right to jury  trial for lesser offences .
In De Oratore, Cicero advised advocates to speak the language o f everyday 
life and to follow usages approved by the sense o f the community. To this 
perhaps might now be added, "and employ the technology o f  the time".
betw een practice in the crim inal and c iv il courts on the grounds that in the former the liberty o f  
the subject is at stake, whereas in the later, although very serious matters are decided, it is not. ( 
Interview 30“* April, 2009 .)
1072 This could perhaps be countered by a direction from the judge not to do so and by supplying  
them with by a written record o f  cross-exam inations.
1073 approach was thought more likely  by Lord Justice G oldring, interview ed on the 30*** 
April, 2009 .
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Conclusion.
For the greater part of the period covered by this thesis much advocacy in England and 
Wales, especially for jurors, was directed to the passions, the emotions. It was often loud, 
long and declamatory, frequently diffuse and meandering, full of pathetic description, florid, 
extravagant in words and gestures to the point of theatricality. Advocacy was sometimes 
marked by intemperate exchanges amongst counsel and between counsel and judges, brow 
beating and bullying of witnesses. An important part of advocacy was to obscure and 
confuse, to cloak weaknesses in cases.
No longer prolix, but highly focused and limited by considerations of time, advocacy 
is now vastly more subdued, undertaken in plain language without the borrowed plumage of 
poetry and the classics, restrained by tight rules of procedure and evidence and, in a spirit of 
forensic enquiry, aimed at satisfying what is required by substantive law . Any appeal to the 
emotions of jurors is carefully disguised as reason or made subliminally. Advocacy now
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extends beyond the oral to that on paper and outside the court to various forms of arbitration 
and mediation.
Explaining the journey taken by advocacy, at an uneven speed and fastest in the late 
20^  ^Century, is a complicated task. It has been propelled by a complex mixture of many 
influences, but most notably individual advocates, alterations in the law and broader social 
factors. Principal drivers include:
The approaches, methods and styles of successful members of the bar. In a small profession, 
which, until very recently, lacked formal training in advocacy, junior advocates watched 
closely how big men performed in court and sought to emulate their triumphs. Those 
particularly observed, and who often took advocacy further along its path, include: Coke, 
Bacon, Cowper, Yorke, Murray, Burke, Sheridan, Garrow, Brougham, Scarlett, Erskine, 
Romilly, Copley, Curran, O’Connell, Phillips, Kenealy, Parry, Ballantine, James, D igby- 
Seymour, Hawkins, Clarke, Holker, Hardinge-Giffard, Russell, Isaacs, Muir, Wrottesley, 
Carson, Smith, Marshall- Hall, Hastings, Curtis-Benett, Birkett, DuCann, Carman, Gray, 
Arlidge and Beloff.
Judicial tastes. When sitting without jurors this is strongly for practical and unadorned 
advocacy. Much appreciated is an orderly presentation o f the facts, to which the 
law must be applied, after which they greatly prefer to be left alone, unexposed to 
rhetorical embellishment.
Greater following by courts of case precedent, the consolidation o f stare decisis, 
in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries and its effect on argum entation by 
lawyers.
Changes in court procedure brought about by judges, for example in the 18^  ^
Century allowing counsel to represent prisoners charged with felony ( and in the 
civil context, over two centuries later, the High Court Practice Directions o f the 
1980s and 1990s), and under statute,notably the Prisoners’ Counsel Act 1836, 
allowing defendants full representation by counsel.
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Levels o f respect and civility between advocates and between the bar and the 
Bench and the latter’s ability to control proceedings in court and impose limits on 
what counsel’s forensic license.
The amount of reporting by the press o f court cases: A link existed, probably at its 
strongest in the 19^  ^ Century, between the publicity advocates received and their 
conduct. The m atter is topical once again with proposals to televise certain court 
proceedings.
Public and press opinion about the acceptable limits o f advocates' tactics and 
oratory.
Rules o f etiquette and conduct established by barristers and solicitors and the 
enforcement o f them by the Bar Council, Bar Messes and the Law Society.
Greater valuation by judges o f court time and more willingness to impose time 
limits on advocates in their conduct o f cases.
Reforms in the law o f evidence concerning who, and what, may be put before 
courts and informing the content o f submissions made. Conspicuous examples 
include the rise o f hearsay evidence and its demise in civil trials, the ability of 
defendants to give evidence on their own behalf and the expert evidence.
More and complex substantive law after the opening o f the Victorian period 
resulting from greater regulation, in the wake o f industrialization, growth of 
commerce and banking and expansion o f international trade. The need to satisfy 
requirements o f statutes, ie to make submissions on law, displaces room for 
rhetoric and also promotes precise, rather than indiscriminate, examination of 
witnesses and strictly relevant closing speeches.
M ajor alterations to criminal and civil procedure in both the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries. Prominent examples o f the former include the Criminal
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Procedure Act 1851 and the Indictments Act 1915 and o f the latter, the Judicature 
Acts 1873-1881 and Civil Procedure Rules, 1999.
From the m id-Nineteenth Century, a reduction in the use o f juries in both civil and 
criminal trials.This lessened opportunities for passionate appeals to emotion, floral 
passages and histrionic gestures.
The social origin o f jurors and levels o f their education. Greater education amongst 
common jurors in the later Victorian era made them less susceptible to advocates’ 
melodramatic appeals than before. Jurors with broader perspectives, including 
scientific knowledge and Charles Darwin’s theories, expected more o f an appeal to 
reason in a conversational and m atter o f fact manner, rather one pitched at their 
emotions and religious faith. Successful barristers recognised this and altered their 
advocacy accordingly.
Dem ocratization o f juries. The Juries Act 1974, which swept away the property 
qualification for jury  service, led to a massive increase in numbers o f potential 
jurors, more women jurors and a reduction in the minimum age to 18. Advocates 
became more aware than ever that in addressing juries they had to take into 
account the range o f educational attainment and contemporary use o f language 
and, when making allusions, draw on popular culture, shaped by newspapers, 
novels, radio, films and television ( and now increasingly the computer internet).
General styles o f public speaking and discourse in society, for example the decline 
o f declamation and grand oratory and the emergence o f a more intim ate fireside  
approach.
The educational curriculum usually received by judges and lawyers, which has 
substantially evolved since the 1960s, and its effect on allusions made in court. The 
much reduced place o f the Classics, Latin and Greek, once so prominent, is a 
striking feature.
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Formal teaching o f advocacy to barristers and solicitors, only comparatively 
recently introduced and generally held to be beneficial.
A relationship, although not a simplistic one, between the quality o f advocacy and 
the amount parties and the state are prepared to pay for it. This is perhaps 
particularly germane at present with cuts both to public funding o f cases (legal aid) 
and to the Crown Prosecution Service.
New technology which has already started to exert an influence on advocacy and 
can be expected to do so powerfully in the future.
Through a methodology combining a literature survey and a series o f semi­
structured interviews with advocates, judges, trainers and academics to ascertain their 
views on the past and changes in advocacy over recent decades and their predictions 
for the future, this thesis emphasises how advocacy has developed piecemeal, rather 
than resulting from overall planning and logic.
It has endeavoured to synthesise material over the centuries, from many sources, to 
enable a chronological and overall presentation of developments in advocacy, to 
investigate as many factors as possible that led to them and to draw comparisons with 
the United States.
Limited narrative and analysis exists elsewhere on the late Eighteenth Century 
and there is very little in the late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Particular 
attention was paid to the exuberant, emotive and combative form of advocacy which 
culminated in the mid Nineteenth Century and thereafter, for reasons described, 
became increasingly restrained. An opposite trend in the United States in the 
Nineteenth Century is identified and explanations advanced for it. The great changes 
in English advocacy, and why they came about, especially in civil advocacy in the 
second half of the 20th Century are also scrutinised. Further, factors affecting 
advocacy in America during that period are examined.
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Advocacy is conceived as very fluid - certainly not static as might be thought 
by those who regard courts and the law as very conservative- subject to a complex 
interplay of factors, the principal ones, which have varied in weight over time, are 
identifled.
Hopefully, by use of diverse sources, this thesis may, in a small way, 
contribute to the growing body of external legal history, which examines law and legal 
phenomenon within wider historical, so c ia l, economic and political contexts and may 
also be o f interest other than to lawyers. The author would be delighted if  it helped to 
provide some background and context for those teaching and learning professional 
advocacy skills ( A teacher o f practical skills in advocacy has contacted him with a 
view to adding a historical dimension to his course.)
Although cross cultural relationships are not simple, it may also assist 
comprehension o f future developments in other countries, where court oral advocacy 
has recently been given greater importance, by providing some explanation o f how 
and why advocacy has changed in Britain and the United States over the years.
At a time when there is particular interest in the effect of one influence - the 
computer and the internet on advocacy before jurors - this thesis be a reminder that 
advocacy is shaped by many factors.
Finally, very tentatively, and not suggested hitherto in this thesis, material 
collected on changes in the style and content o f advocacy could, perhaps, assist in a 
Weberian sociological analysis of the subject employing concepts o f charismatic 
authority and rational legal domination and the transition between the two.
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Excursus: Classical Rhetoric.
Early origins.
Odysseus’s ability to use words (although not always truthfully) in the Iliad 
and in the Odyssey ( originating in the 12*** Century BC and probably written down 
between 725-675 BC), to extricate him self from trouble and generally to influence 
others was much admired for centuries and had been the subject o f emulation 
However, systematic thought about rhetoric, the art o f persuading a specific audience 
through use o f language to particular act or belief, appears not to have occurred until 
the 5*** Century BC.
The first written manual about rhetoric has been attributed to Corax and 
his pupil Tisias in the Greek colony o f Sicily. Their work, as well as that o f many o f 
the early rhetoricians, grew out o f the courts of law. In the 5*** Century Sicily faced a 
surge in litigation about land following a series of confiscations. Because o f the 
absence of professional legal advocates, parties had to conduct their own causes 
before the court. There was hence a demand for rhetoricians to help them present 
their cases. Tisias, amongst others, is believed to have written speeches for litigants 
to deliver before juries.
The focus o f rhetoric then shifted to Athens. In order to advance themselves 
in the democracy of Cleisthenes and before the courts, reformed by Ephiales in
In an interview, held on the 29*** January, 2009, after he had delivered a public lecture, entitled  
The R eception  o f  H om er in Byzantium , at University C ollege London, Doctor Antony Makrinos, o f  
the Department o f  Greek and Latin UCL, said that Homer is often described as the fa th er  o f  
rhetoric.
*®’  ^See Thomas C ole, Who w as Corax?  In Edwin Carawan, O xford readings in the A ttic  ora tors, 
Oxford U niversity Press, 2007 , Chapter 2.
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462BC, citizens required skills in persuasive public speaking. In this, they received 
education and more immediate practical help from itinerant teachers, known as 
sophists, the best known of whom were Protagoras (481-420BC), Gorgias (483- 
376BC) and Isocrates (436-338BC) . As in Sicily, the law o f Athens required the
litigant to speak for him self in an adversarial system without professional advocates, 
but not altogether without advocacy.
Athenian forensic speeches divided into three categories: those delivered in 
person in a case in which the orator was one o f the parties; synegoriai speeches made 
in support of one or more or other at party in a trial ( synegoroi were often people 
with a demonstrable personal connection with the litigant -  usually friends or 
relatives and who were barred from receiving payment which would have been seen 
as a form of bribery ) and “ghost written” speeches by paid logographos ( literally 
“speech -  writer”) for clients who then delivered them in person*®” . The 
development of logography was a response to the fact that hearings took place before 
an enormous body o f judges, so that the average litigant acting in person risked 
ridicule if  he did not perform well. Also at the end of the proceedings there was no 
jurisprudential summing up nor any discussion by judges: they just voted as each felt 
moved to do. Under such conditions presentation could make all the difference *®” . 
Speeches had to be written as though they came from speaker; any attempt at 
rhetorical trickery would excite ju ro rs’ suspicions and might lead to an adverse 
verdict. Disclaimers of rhetorical skill became commonplace and a recognized topic 
within rhetoric itself -  which became , to some extent at le a s t , the art o f concealing 
art *®” . O f these times in Athens, Plutarch (46- 127), centuries later, told the amusing 
story o f Lysias writing a defence for a man who was to be tried before one o f the 
Athenian Tribunals. Long before the Defendant had learned the speech by heart, he 
became so dissatisfied with it that he went in great distress to the author:
*®’  ^Jacqueline de Rom illy, The G reat Sophists in P ericlean  Athens. Clarendon Press/Oxford  
University Press, 1992.
*®”  About 100 forensic speeches survive from the Athenian law courts which sat in the period 430 -  
323 BC, although evidence given by w itnesses in cases does not. The gamut o f  cases in which they  
were delivered include treason, violent crimes, inheritance and property disputes. Records were 
preserved not so much as legal documents, but as tools for teaching rhetoric and were much used in 
the H ellanistic and Roman periods. Adriaan Lanni, Law  and Justice in the C ourts o f  C lassica l 
Athens, Cambridge University Press, 2006, page 5.
*®”  J. A. Crook, L egal advocacy in the Roman w orld , London: Duckworth, 1995, pp. 30-31.
*®”  J. Pow ell and J. Paterson, C icero the advocate, Oxford U niversity Press, 2004 pp. 1-11.
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I  was delighted with your speech the f ir s t time I  read it; but I  liked it less the second 
time, and still less the third time; and now it seems to me to be no defence at a ”1.
My good friend,sm d  Lysias,”yow quite fo rget that the judges are to hear it only once 
1080
In Athenian courts there was effectively no rule of relevance limiting litigants to 
information and arguments related to the legal charge or issue. Forensic oratory 
could thus range widely. Both legal and extra-legal arguments were considered 
relevant by Athenian judges to reach an individualized correct verdict in what was a 
flexible but unpredictable system of justice. Extra -  legal argumentation found in 
preserved speeches o f the Classical period covers: discussion of the broader 
background and content o f the dispute, including past relationships and interactions 
between the parties and their approach to litigation and settlement; defence appeals 
to judges for pity based upon the harmful effects o f an adverse verdict (unlike 
today’s common law courts matters concerning guilt and sentence were not separated 
) and the character of the parties *®" .
“A vice which should not take root”: the difference between Plato and 
Aristotle.
The sophists came to Plato’s attention. In his dialogue the Gorgias, Plato (427- 
347BC) saw the paid teaching o f rhetoric, with its potential to manipulate and to 
deceive, as a vice which should not take root in society. Plato considered rhetoric to 
be a subdivision o f flattery as opposed to dialectic and philosophy. Such a hostile 
view o f rhetoric was not shared by Plato’s pupil, Aristotle (384- 322BC), who 
attempted to describe rhetoric as a human art or skill which would authenticate truth 
rather than deceive. In an extended treatise, the “Art o f Rhetoric”(written in about 
330BC), Aristotle identified that rhetoric had three essential elements: ethos, how 
the character, or at least public persona, and credibility o f the speaker influence an
M entioned by AW  Cockburn, In Limine. An address on A dvocacy to  the C hrist Church, Oxford, 
Law Club, May 15***, 1952. Published by the Law Faculty, U niversity o f  Southampton. For more on 
Lysias, see Stephen Usher, Lysias and his C lients, in Edwin Carawan, O xford readings in the A ttic  
orators, Oxford University Press, 2007, Chapter 2. A lso  see the Victorian work o f  John Claverhouse 
Jebb, A ttic  O rators From Antiphon To Isaeos, Cambridge Library Collection C lassics, 2010,
Volum e One, Chapters 7 to 11.
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audience; logos, the deployment o f facts, numbers, and figures to compose an 
argument; and pathos, the use o f emotional appeals through metaphor, storytelling or 
presenting the topic in a way that evokes strong emotions in the listeners. He also set 
out a five-fold division o f rhetoric:
invention - accumulation of relevant material through research or reflection;
arrangement o f this material - a piece o f persuasive prose was arranged in five parts; 
introduction; narration, or statement o f facts; proofs; refutation and conclusion;
style, or the choice of diction. Great attention was paid to prose rhythm, the use of 
periodic (sentence) structure, repetition and triplicates. Euphony, pleasing sound, 
was achieved through assonance and illiteration. Themes were elabourated upon 
through metaphor, simile and metonymy, the use o f a suggestive word for what is 
actually meant. Three major styles emerged: Attic, or plain style, which was 
employed particularly in philosophical discourse; middle, or neutral, aimed at 
achieving a balance between form and substance, and Asiatic, criticized by its 
detractors for an over -  abundance o f pathos and matter, risking overwhelming the 
listener.
memory; and
delivery.
In Rome.
The Romans, for whom oration was also an important part o f public life, 
and who, developed, over time, a profession o f paid advocates, saw much value 
in A ristotle’s rhetoric . Cicero (106-43BC) and Quintillian (35-lOOAD) were 
the principal Roman rhetoricians and their work was an extension o f his.
Adriaan Lanni, Law and Justice, Cambridge U niversity Press, 2006, Chapter 3.
J. A. Crook, L egal advocacy o f  the Roman w orld , London: Duckworth, 1995. Chapter 2.
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Cicero.
Cicero was the first Roman orator to assimilate and ponder the theory of 
rhetoric in the fullest sense and it is plausible to argue that his mastery of 
rhetoric, in practice as an advocate, gave him a clear advantage over many of 
his contemporaries and opponents
After deciding to become an advocate, Cicero was apprenticed to notable 
jurists (jurists, legal experts, then formed a separate body from advocates) and 
attended the courts to listen to the speeches. He made his debut in court at the 
age of 25 acting as a substitute for a more experienced advocate who had 
initially undertaken the case. At that time the dominant rhetorical style was the 
Asiatic which was high flown, elabourate, flowery and rhythmic, better heard 
than read, and accompanied by much animation from the speaker. In Rome its 
leading exponent was the aristocrat Quintus Hortensius Hortalus. Nicknamed 
the “dancing bear”, his action was highly artificial and the manner of folding 
his toga was noted by tragic actors o f the day. Before Cicero’s later successes, 
Hortensius was the leading Roman advocate. Unfortunately, none o f his 
speeches survive. Cicero consciously followed this style as he set out to be an 
advocate. Nervous and physical exhaustion, however, led to the temporary 
abandonment of his career and a journey to Athens, where he deepened his 
knowledge of philosophy, especially some aspects Aristotelian and Stoic logic ( 
which he later applied in argumentation of Roman Law), and then from there to 
the island of Rhodes, where he received rhetorical training from Apollonius 
Molon.
Molon was a lawyer who had pleaded in the Roman courts brilliantly. In 
recognition o f this he had been invited to address the senate in Greek, which 
was without precedent. On retirement to Rhodes he opened a school of rhetoric. 
His style o f rhetoric was very different to Asiatic; plain, to the point, certainly 
no more than necessary, and requiring the speaker to be far more static with his 
head generally held straight. This style was o f great moderating influence on 
Cicero after his return to Rome and the resumption o f his practice.
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Cicero’s style developed over time. For him style was never an end in 
itself but always an instrument o f persuasion Although his sentence 
structure was often elabourate, essentially he spoke ordinary Latin, holding to 
the view that a Republican law court was not the place for poetically inflated 
diction or boldly original metaphors . Indeed, he wrote it was a great fault in 
an orator to depart from ordinary habits of speech In grander moments, 
Cicero’s forensic speeches do show a fondness for rhetorical figures, including 
parallelism, antithesis, chiasmus, tricolon, anaphora and collocations o f 
synonyms. However, they were used not for ornamentation but for effectively 
putting forward an argument or reinforcing a point.
A distinctive feature of Cicero’s advocacy was a constant use of 
argumentative structures derived from logic and dialectic particularly the 
dilemma, which in the technical, rather than the colloquial sense, is an argument 
with three premises and a conclusion Ridicule of some sort was rarely 
absent from Cicero’s speeches, although always in the service o f some purpose. 
His use o f literary allusions and quotations is fairly rare in court. In some 
speeches rhythmical habits are to found quite strongly, possibly reflecting 
Greek rhetoric o f the time and the influence o f the great Athenian orators, 
especially Demosthenes and Isocrates , whom he had studied.
Cicero recognized the importance, as do lawyers today, o f different styles 
for different tribunals. There was more scope for grand oratory in addressing a 
large jury  than in conducting a case before a single judge .The extent to 
which ancient audiences, particularly juries, in Cicero’s time would have been 
trained in rhetoric and therefore able to recognize rhetorical techniques or tricks
.J Pow ell and J. Paterson, C icero the advocate, Oxford University Press 2004 , page 43.
J.Powell and J. Paterson, ibid, page 9.
Pow ell and Paterson, C icero the A dvocate , Oxford U niversity Press 2004, page 50.
Cicero, Brutus ( For Brutus, a short history o f  Roman Oratory dedicated to Marcus Junius 
Brutus. ) 321. Brutus with an English translation  by G. L. H enrickson, London: W. Heinem an, Ltd, 
1939.
Pow ell and Paterson, C icero the advocate, Oxford University Press 2004, pp. 48-49.
On the advocacy o f  D em osthenes, see, Hans Julius W olff, D em osthenes as A dvocate: The 
Functions and M ethods o f  L egal Consultants in C lassica l Athens, in Edwin Carawan, O xford  
readings in the A ttic  orators, Oxford U niversity Press, 2007, Chapter 5.
For exam ple C icero’s style in Pro Quinctio, before a single judge, is very different from that o f  
the speech for R oscius o f  Ameria, although separated by about one year. See Pow ell and Paterson, 
ibid, page 9 and more generally Crook, L egal A dvocacy in the Roman World, Duckworth, London, 
page 136.
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advocates might employ is debated. Because of his great success before the 
courts, Cicero’s style became much imitated in his period and after.
On memory, Aristotle’s fourth division of the orator’s art, the ability to 
conduct a case without excessive notes, still important in modern courts, was 
vital. Advocates were expected to be in full command o f the facts and the law, 
to speak fluently and to be able to adapt to changes in circumstances as a trial 
progressed. No orator worthy of the name would dream o f reading out a text or 
consulting a sheaf of notes. The standard method of memorizing the content of 
arguments was for the speaker to imagine him self in his house visiting each 
room in turn and finding the appropriate argument there. Both Cicero and his 
great rival Hortensius were said to have wonderfully tenacious memories*®®*. 
Obviously because we were not present, Cicero’s delivery, Aristotle’s fifth 
division, can only be imagined but it is known that M olon’s school o f rhetoric 
paid great attention to voice production, essential when conducting cases in the 
open air Forum before great numbers.
As to ethos, identified by Aristotle as an essential element of rhetoric, and 
to him meaning primarily the speaker’s presentation o f his own character, this 
took on an extended role in Cicero’s world. In addition to the advocate’s own 
character and that o f his client to consider, there were other persons, not 
necessarily in court to take into account, whose characters bore on the case in 
some way and could be presented either favourably or unfavourably. There was 
also the opportunity to destroy the credibility of a prosecutor or of a hostile 
witness. A defendant would as a matter o f course have his life completely 
exposed in tabloid detail; there were no rules against attacks on past character. 
Rules restricting the admissibility of particular kinds o f or arguments were few 
in a “free for all treatment of evidence in the Roman Courts” *®®’.
*®®® J. Pow ell and J. Paterson, C icero the advocate, Oxford University Press, page 44.
*®®* When apprenticed to jurists Cicero learnt by heart the entire written version o f  Roman Law 
that had been tabulated in about 450 BC. Phrases in litigation had to be exact. An action to 
recover a goat against som eone who had taken it, for example, would fail unless the animal 
was referred to as a “browser upon leeks”.
*®®^ J. A. Crook, L egal A dvocacy in the Roman World, Duckworth,London, page 6. Lord Brougham  
remarked that only one-sixth o f  Cicero’s speech defending Archias kept to the point, from which  
Cicero, brilliantly haranguing a susceptible and em otionally charged gathering, was evidently w ell 
able to distract attention. M ichael Grant, C icero S e lec ted  Works, Penguin, 1960, page 22.
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Concerning pathos, Cicero was supreme in appealing to the emotions 
especially in the final appeal to mercy, regularly found in his perorations. *®®\ 
Even in his own time some opponents accused him of shedding croeodile tears 
and histrionics*®®"*. However his gifts as an advoeate and the then sentimental 
fashions of society defeated sueh critieism *®®^. There were no limits to 
theatrieal urgings o f sympathy: a defendant, his family and relatives would 
appear in mourning, unkempt and dirty. For pathetic effect, Cicero ended one 
speech with a baby cradled in his arms. The final speech for a defendant would 
always conclude by Cicero placing his arm on his client’s shoulder.
As outlined earlier, rhetorieal theory, at least sinee Aristotle, recommended 
a standard order and ingredients for presenting speeches. This structure took the 
form of: exordium  (opening section); narration ( narrative); division (setting out 
headings for argumentation); argumentation (the argument itself); refutation  
(refutation o f opposing points); digression { digression, not mandatory, but if  
used located here) and peroration  (conclusion).This order was designed to assist 
the listener in following arguments -  a convenient formula, not a prescriptive 
rule, more a convention. Although keeping to it closely throughout his earlier 
career, Cicero later quite frequently departed from the standard components, or 
from their expected sequence, where he considered it would aid the 
comprehension o f listeners and bolster the overall persuasive effect o f his 
advocacy *®®®. The order reeommended by Aristotle was much followed by 
English barristers, espeeially in the 19*** and 20*** Centuries in elosing speeches 
before juries -  a clear influence from classical times *®®’.
In a pieee such as this, about how advocacy in England and Wales has 
altered and the reasons for this, with some regard also to the United States, it is 
perhaps o f value to note that styles o f advocaey in Rome were not immutable
*®®^ For exam ples see J. Pow ell and J. Paterson, C icero the advocate, Oxford U niversity Press, 
2004, Chapter 8.
*®®"* At the conclusion o f  what is often regarded as his finest speech, P ro  M ilone, C icero, in sobs, 
told the judges : But I  m ust stop  now. I  can no longer speak  fo r  tears -  and my clien t has fo rb id d en  
me from  using tears in his defence. Pro M ilone, 105, O rationes, Volum e 2.
*®®^ J. Pow ell and J. Patterson, C icero the advocate, Oxford University Press, 2004, page 30, were 
reminded o f  Edward Marshall Hall w hose im passioned appeals to juries were legendary but “/« the 
hands o f  a lesser p ra c titio n er  w ou ld  seem lu d icro u s”.
*®®® J Pow ell and J. Paterson, C icero the advocate, Oxford U niversity Press, 2004, pp. 46-47.
*®®’ Richard Du Cann, The A rt o f  the A dvocate, Penguin Books, London, 1993, pp.217 -  218 and 
page 153, earlier.
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either. There were rival and changing tastes in advocacy during Cicero’s time. 
His youthful liking of a grand style, much in the manner o f Hortensius, a master 
o f the “Asiatic style”, and the alteration which came after his time with Molon 
o f Rhodes has already been mentioned. Later in his lifetime, when a severer 
manner was coming into vogue, some Roman orators criticized Cicero’s style 
for being too influenced by the elabourate styles o f the Eastern Greek schools. 
They championed an austere “Attic style” modelled on that of Lysias . 
Cicero, himself, claimed that the orator should be a master of all styles so as to 
be able to choose the most appropriate for the tribunal, for the point reached in 
an argument and to advance the ultimate aim of persuasion *®®®.
As well as publishing the lawcourt speeches, nearly all delivered before 
the indicia publica  or quaestions, both o f which sat in the open air of the 
Forum, Cicero wrote major works on rhetoric. De Oratore^ addressed to his 
brother, is a kind o f handbook for the young orator; Brutus is an account of 
Roman oratory and Orator is a discussion o f the ideal orator as omnicompetent 
-  lawyer, philosopher, psychologist, politician and supreme manipulator of 
language. These were augmented by additional minor works De Optimo Genere 
Oratorum ,De Partitione Oratia and Topica.
Cicero’s letters and many o f his speeches were discovered by Petrarch in 
Liege in 1333 and were to become hugely important in the Renaissance revival 
of interest in rhetoric. His orations became the standard o f Latin prose. In 
addition to his speeches against Cataline, on the occasion o f the conspiracy to 
seize power of the Roman Republic, and the Philippics, against Mark Anthony 
(which led to Cicero’s death), other much read speeches included those for the 
defence in the court cases o f On Behalf o f Archius, On Behalf of Balbus, and 
On Behalf of Roscius and his prosecution o f the massively corrupt governor of 
Sicily, Against Verres, which established him as the leading advocate, above 
Hortensius, in Rome.
On the Attic -  Asian controversy, see Narducci, E, Brutus: The H istory o f  Roman Eloquence, 
James May, (ed). Brills Companion to Cicero, Brill, 2002. For a consideration o f  later changes in 
Roman A dvocacy and their causes, in particular the bureaucratization o f  the judges “with no time 
for or taste for long -w in d ed  floridities”, see Crook, ibid, especially  Chapters 1 and 5.
*®®® J. Pow ell and J. Paterson, C icero the advocate, Oxford U niversity Press, 2004, page 9.
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In the 18*** and 19*** centuries Cicero’s works were much studied at public 
and grammar schools and many judges, barristers, and educated jurors, 
especially special jurors, would have knowledge o f him.
Quintillian.
The classically educated o f those centuries usually would also have been 
acquainted with the works o f Quintillian (Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, AD 35 -  
95). Building on Aristotle and Cicero, his work can be seen as the culmination 
o f Greek and Roman rhetorical theory. Beginning as an advocate in the courts 
o f law, Quintillian’s reputation grew so enormously that the Emperor Vespasian 
created a chair o f rhetoric for him in Rome. The climax o f his work, towards the 
end o f his life during the harsh reign o f Emperor Domitian, was the publication 
o f the Institutio Oratoria (Institutes o f Oratory), an extensive twelve volume 
treatise dealing not only with the theory and practice o f rhetoric, but also with 
the foundational education and development of the orator him self **®®. This work 
was only available in fragments in medieval times, but discovery of a complete 
copy, in central Europe in 1416, led to it becoming one of the most influential 
works on rhetoric during the Renaissance **®*.
As a young man Quintillian left Spain and studied rhetoric in Rome in the 
time o f Emperor Nero. He adopted Domitius Afer as his model and listened to 
him speak and conduct cases in the law courts **®’. Afer was a more austere, 
classical and Ciceronian speaker than those common at the time and he may 
have inspired Quintillian’s high regard of Cicero.
From the middle o f the first century BC there had been a flowering o f Roman 
rhetoric. However by Quintillian’s time popular taste in advocacy, reflecting a 
time o f flowery and flamboyant language more broadly, principally favoured
**®® The Institu tio  O ratoria  o f  Q uintillian w ith  an English translation  by H. E. Butler, London: W. 
Heinemann, 1922.
**®* Enthusiasm for Quintillian spread with humanism itself, reaching northern Europe in the 
15*** and 16*** Centuries. Perhaps indicative o f  his influence in 18*** Century Britain is that he is 
mentioned by Alexander Pope in “An Essay on Criticism ”:
In g rave  Q u in tillia n ’s influence we f in d  
The ju s te s t  ru les and clearest m ethod jo in e d  
(Lines 669 -  70)
**®’ George Kennedy, Q uintillian. N ew  York: Routledge, 1996. page 16.
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“silver Latin”, a style that placed ornate embellishment over clarity and 
precision. In Institutio Oratoria, Quintillian urged a return to simpler and 
clearer language. The model he commended was Cicero’s far more concise style 
during the previous century, which he saw as achieving a perfect balance 
between form and substance. His taste for simplicity and clarity may have been 
influenced by the late Emperor Vespasian, Quintillian’s former patron, who 
disliked excess and extravagance. Vespasian was a man o fplebian stock  .... A 
down to earth realist with the common touch . Interestingly Marcus Aper, a 
leading first century advocate (died 85 AD) did not see Cicero’s forensic 
speeches as exemplars. Criticizing the length o f some o f Cicero’s speeches, he 
considered that a jury o f his time would not be prepared to sit through them 
Tacitus (AD 56-117) , who also favoured a much crisper style, him self wrote: 
“The public in those olden days, being untrained and unsophisticated, was quite 
well pleased with long winded and involved orations, and would even bless the 
man who would f i l l  up the day fo r  them with his harangues”
Institutio Oratoria is a comprehensive textbook on the technical aspects of 
rhetoric. Its thoroughness and accessibility reflect Quintillian’s long experience 
as an orator and teacher. In AD 70 he opened a public school o f rhetoric. 
Amongst his pupils were Pliny the Younger and, perhaps, Tacitus.
Quintillian, following Aristotle and Cicero, organized the practice of 
oratory into five canons: inventio (Discovery of arguments), dispositio 
(arrangement o f arguments), elecutio ( expression or style), memoria 
(memorization) and Pronuntiato (delivery). For each of these, especially the 
first three, he set out a thorough exposition o f all elements to be mastered and 
considered in developing and presenting arguments. From the eleventh chapter
O. Murray, The O xford H istory o f  the Roman World. N ew  York : Oxford University Press, 1991. 
page 431. Earlier, Emperor Claudius, AD 41-54, set out to discourage rhetorical eloquence, used, in 
causes before him, by Telegonius and his follow ers, and to promote advocates with com m on sense, 
clear voices and a talent for reducing cases to their sim plest elements; amongst these Agatho was 
particularly favoured. See Robert Graves, Claudius the God, Arthur Baker, 1934, Chapter 27. Under 
the Principate, the prin cep s  ( Emperor by another name ) could judge any case ( See N igel Rodgers, 
The R ise and F all o f  A ncient Rome, Hermes House, 2004, pp. 98- 110), although some performed 
this task much more than others. The Emperor’s taste was therefore an important influence on 
advocacy.
**®"* Tacitus, D ialogus  20. Cited in Pow ell and Paterson, C icero the advocate, Oxford University  
Press, 2004, page 3.
Tacitus, D ialogue o f  O rators, W illiam Peterson translation, 1893, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
page 64.
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o f Book II to the end o f Book X I , Quintillian covers such topics as natural 
order, invention, proof, emotion and language. Books V lll and IX were 
particularly influential on advocacy and examine tropes and figures 
Like Cicero, Quintillian certainly approved o f forensic melodrama:
“Actions as well as words may be employed to move the court to tears. Hence 
the custom o f  bringing accused persons into court wearing squalid and unkempt 
attire, and o f  introducing their children and parents, and it is with this in view 
that we see blood-stained swords, fragm ents o f  bone taken from  the wound ,and
garments spotted with blood  and scourged bodies bared to view. The
impression produced by such exhibitions is generally enormous, since they seem 
to bring the spectators face to face  with the cruel fa c ts ” **®’ . On a cautionary 
note he gives a number o f instances where dramatic gestures backfired. One 
spectacular failure recounted was when an advocate turned to a boy who was 
crying. It was the child’s opportunity to say that he was weeping for his 
murdered father or his ruined mother:
“Why weepest thou? ” he enquired in tragic tones.
“My tutors pinching m e”, came the lad’s answer.
Quintillian was also concerned with the effect o f the advocate’s personal 
appearance on tribunals. He had definite views on clothes, writing the following 
on how the toga should be worn:
“The left arm should only be raised so fa r  as to form  a right angle at the elbow, 
while the edge o f  the toga should fa ll  in equal lengths on either side....
trope involves the substitu tion  o f  one w o rd  fo r  another, a fig u re  does not n ecessarily  en ta il 
any change either to the order or m eaning o f  w ords . ( V incent B. Leich, The N orton A nthology o f  
Theory and C riticism . W. W. Norton and Co, N ew  York, 2001, page 156). An exam ple o f  a trope 
would be a metaphor, the altering o f  a word’s meaning . A figure, on the other hand, g ives the 
words a new aspect or greater em otional value. Figures are divided into figures o f  thought, w hich  
may make proof seem more forceful, intensify em otions, or add elegance or ornamentation; and 
figures o f  diction, further subdivided into the gram m atical, in which fo rm  o f  the w ord  crea tes the 
figure, and the rhetorical, in which the p o sitio n  o f  the w ord  is the prim a ry  fa c to r . ( Aubrey S. J. 
Gwyn, Roman E ducation from  C icero to Q uintillian. N ew  York: Teachers C ollege Teachers C ollege  
Press, 1926.)
**®’ Quintillian, Institu tio  O ratoria  VI. 1.30
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The ancients used to let the toga fa ll to the heels, as the Greeks are in the habit
o f  doing with the cloak  Cicero was in the habit o f  wearing his toga in such a
fashion to conceal his varicose veins, despite the fa c t that this fashion is to be
seen in the statues o f  persons who lived after C icero’s day ......
When a speech draws to its close, more especially i f  fortune shows herself kind, 
practically everything is becoming ; we may stream with sweat, show signs o f  
fatigue, and let our dress fa ll  in careless disorder and the toga slip loose from  
us on every side ...........
On the other hand, i f  the toga fa lls  down at the beginning o f  our speech, or 
when we have only proceeded by a little way, the fa ilure to replace it is a sign 
o f  indifference, or sloth, or sheer ignorance o f  the way in which clothes should  
be worn ”
Delivery, the Elocution Movement and forensic oratory.
Because they are common to both speaking and writing, the first three of 
A ristotle’s divisions, invention, arrangement o f material, and style were 
subsequently always discussed more than the last two and indeed were the main 
concerns of Campbell, Blair and Smith in the 18*** Century The last division, 
oratorical delivery, received rather little attention from rhetoricians after the 
collapse o f the ancient schools o f declamation. Interest in delivery began to 
revive in the 17th century, especially in France, but was to reach its greatest 
height in Britain and Ireland in the 18th century with the Elocutionary 
Movement, the leading light of which was the Irishman Thomas Sheridan, father 
o f Richard Brinsley Sheridan. Like John Walker, another key figure in the 
movement, Thomas Sheridan had been an actor on the London stage. To them, 
echoing Demosthenes, the only part of ancient rhetoric that really mattered was
Quintillian, ibid, XI. III. 139.
**®® See Chapter One, C lassics and rhetoric.
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delivery ***°. Sheridan lectured widely, organized demonstrations o f elocution, 
published several Works, including his best known Course o f  lectures o f  
Elocution in 1762 and tried to establish a school to cultivate a standard form of 
correct English. His later Lectures on Reading (1775) provided directions for 
marking and reading aloud passages from literature. John Walker published his 
two volume Elements o f  Elocution in 1781 which provided detailed instruction 
on voice control, gestures, pronunciation and emphasis****.
The Elocution Movement attracted much attention not only within the 
British Isles but beyond in the colonies and in America***’ (In the 19*** Century, 
on both sides o f the Atlantic, elocution was to become a staple part o f the 
school curriculum for the growing middle classes). The Movement, with its 
stressing the importance o f effective delivery, undoubtedly affected forensic 
oratory.
***® George Kennedy, C lassica l rh etoric  and its C hristian and secu lar trad ition  from  ancient to  
modern tim es. Groom -  Helm, 1980, pp.231-232.
**** John Walker, Elem ents o f  Elocution, 1799 Edition, Cooper and W ilson.
***’See Christopher Grasso, A Speaking A ristocracy, U niversity o f  North Carolina Press 1999 
Chapter 8.
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Appendix II
Example of a List o f Questions required by some interviewees 
before interview.
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I l" 'July, 2007.
Dear Lord Justice Richards,
Many thanks for agreeing to see me next week on the 18^  ^July at 4.30pm.
The particular matters I would like to discuss are:
The changes you have witnessed in advocacy over your distinguished career and why have 
occurred;
The decline in court of allusions to the classics and quotations from other literature 
and whether you have any regrets about this;
Your views on written advocacy, especially skeleton arguments;
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The impact of the “Woolf’ changes in civil procedure on advocacy;
Opinions on the use of technology in court and advocacy;
Views on solicitor -advocates;
Should more be done to ensure the quality of advocacy given that more people will be able to 
appear in the higher courts in future?
Your views on broadcasting court proceedings;
And how would you like advocacy to develop in future?
Thank you.
Yours sincerely,
376
Andrew Watson.
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